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Abstract for Thesis Examining 'The Post-Colonial 'Nation-Building' Novel'.
This is a 'novelistic' study, that, among and through its other objectives, will attempt
to demonstrate how such a characterisation in no way excludes an engaged
examination of history, politics, society, culture, ideologies etc.— i.e. the multiple
'worldedness' of human existence. We argue, on the contrary, that the inclusion of
such dimensions is absolutely fundamental to the writing and interpreting of novels.
By 'novelistic' we understand, and will establish in our first chapter, a mode of
interrogation of human being-in-the-world that is ontologically oriented and
epistemologically equipped, in a manner unique among discursive practices, towards
evoking (repeatedly and diversely) the sheer fullness of existence itself.
Thereafter our major objective will be to demonstrate these propositions in practice;
in showing how post-colonial novels in India and Africa have collectively subjected
the processes of post-independence national becoming in their societies to uniquely
exhaustive examinations, precisely by utilising both the novel's singularly
comprehensive discursive capacities as well as its radically flexible formal potential
for alternative re-inscriptions. We establish how various novels have dissolved
together in simultaneous, dynamic performance the spectrum of disparate locations,
processes, selves, conflicts, and structures that national becoming involves. But a
later chapter will also examine how some post-colonial novels articulate
heterogeneously-premised and directed trajectories of self-conception and
community, thereby envisioning paradigms and histories that inevitably engage with
but do not require the horizons of nationalist discourses for their validation. This last
possibility also applies to the narratives about and by the women in these societies:
another chapter focuses on fictions examining various aspects of their particular
relationships to their national histories, as well as the distinct dimensions of their
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lives that are influenced but refuse to be subsumed by the nation's structures and
categories.
My study throughout will engage with the writings of historians and theorists of
various nationalisms, as well as literary/cultural critics and theorists of the novel, but
my thesis will always attempt to prove its premise— that one of the qualities most
valuable about fiction is that it can interrogate such themes not only in abstraction or
in specialised separation, but rather by evoking their interactive, simultaneous
fullness; thereby realising the possibility of discursive engagements that illustrate
and examine, but also extend, enrich and challenge such theoretical or specialised
formulations through their comprehensive performances. All of this will be re-
focussed in the conclusion to establish the depth, breadth and detail of 'worlded'
involvement evident in the African and Indian novel's examinations of their post-
independence histories, and examine some of their verdicts with reference to
questions of post-colonial nationhood, history and the processes of fictionalising
itself in such contexts.
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Section (1): Words and Worlds: The Discursive Uniqueness of the
Novell
What follows is a literary study that, among and through its other objectives, will
attempt to demonstrate how such a characterisation in no way excludes an examination
of history, politics, society, culture, ideas, economics etc.— in a word, the world. On the
contrary, it argues that the inclusion of such dimensions is absolutely fundamental to
the writing of novels, and thereby to our analysis of them, and that this inclusive
capacity is intrinsically part of what makes them existentially relevant. We will show
how stories are always, already necessarily 'worlded' from within, and that therefore it
is possible to remain 'inside' a literary discussion and never abandon discussing other
aspects of human existence at the same time. One of the stated aims of this study is to
demonstrate that post-colonial novels in Africa and India have subjected the processes
of post-independence national becoming in these societies to uniquely exhaustive
existential examinations, precisely because novels have singularly comprehensive,
dynamic, and multivalent containing capacities when it comes to narrating trajectories of
human beings-in-their-worlds. Yet another primary underlying objective, performed
through the overt themes and pre-occupations of this thesis, is to re-argue the relevance
of reading and making fictions, by attempting to rejoin a theoretical rift that has opened
up within much criticism in the last few decades: between discussions of literature and
its thoroughly implicated, interactive relationship with the rest of life, between talking
about literary words and the worlds they arise from and describe, as if we (can) only do
one or the other at a given time, as if we have to choose.
This is a study conceived of as 'novelistic' and is primarily about novels, and their
possibilities and limits as discursive forms. By 'novelistic' we understand, and will
'
Please note that footnotes are sequenced by sections rather than by chapters. Thus each new section
inaugurates another sequence.
2
establish through our initial arguments, a mode of interrogation of human being-in-the-
world that is ontologically oriented, in a manner unique among discursive practices, to
nothing as much as the sheer fullness of existence itself. Our major effort in this study
will be to examine the 'post-colonial' novel and its attempts to narrate the 'post-
colonial' nation in what we believe are singularly engaged and exhaustive ways. Yet, to
establish that, such a thesis will first have to demonstrate more generally these distinct
containing capacities we claim for fiction, of its being able to dissolve and co-perform
in narrative diverse stories, themes, and worlds simultaneously.
This first section therefore is divided into two chapters that are to be treated together as
introductory. They are kept separate so that the progress of the argument may be
followed clearly. This first chapter, primarily through the examples from Calvino,
Joyce, and Kafka, begins to enunciate our sense of fiction's particular capacities: its
singular ontology and epistemology when it comes to narrating uniquely inclusive and
dynamic portrayals of the fullness of human existence. Using the work of thinkers (and
practitioners) such as Milan Kundera, Saul Bellow, Edward Said and Mikhail Bakhtin,
it will lead us to some general conclusions regarding the ways in which novels perform
their narratives, as well as how this might alter our reception of them as critical readers.
In both cases, we will end by arguing, there is an especially comprehensive and implicit,
but also open and revisable, relationship in novels between their words and the worlds
being read or written about. The second chapter, which inaugurates our particular focus
on post-colonial issues, will begin by considering some recent critiques of the history
of the European novel as well as of the very activity of fictionalising itself. It will relate
questions of composing novels with allegations of participating in a manner of
'narrative imperialism', and debate the power relations— and the exclusions and
misrepresentations— that make each of these practices possible. Building on a
response to such critiques through the earlier foundational work, the conclusion of this
introductory section will focus on our primary endeavour, that of enunciating how
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novels may narrate the fullness of a nation's life in uniquely revelatory ways, and
thereby asking what the post-colonial 'nation-building' utility of fiction's particular
capacities may be.
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Chapter (1) Words and their Worlds: The Performance and Reading of
Fictions.
How a Story Works: An Instance.
In Calvino's novel-fable Invisible Cities, Marco Polo and the Great Khan reach a point
in their conversation where the latter cannot concentrate any more on the chess match
they are playing:
It was the game's reason that eluded him [...]. What were the real stakes? At
checkmate, beneath the foot of the king, knocked aside by the winner's hand,
nothingness remains: a black square, or a white one. By disembodying his
conquests to reduce them to the essential, Kublai had arrived at the extreme
operation: the definitive conquest, of which [his| empire's multiform treasures
were only illusory envelopes; it was reduced to a square of planed wood (1997,
131).
But he is not in this mood for long when Marco Polo, who has been telling him stories
all night of the cities he has visited in the Khan's realm-— cities the Khan himself
knows nothing about even though they are supposedly his possessions— begins to
speak again:
Your chessboard, Sire, is inlaid with two woods: ebony and maple. The square
on which your enlightened gaze is fixed was cut from the ring of a trunk that
grew in a year of drought: you see how its fibres are arranged. Here a barely
hinted knot can be made out: a bud tried to burgeon on a premature spring day,
but the night's frost forced it to desist (131).
Extrapolating from that same square, Marco Polo goes on to speak of caterpillar's
nests that caused the tree to be chopped down, of wood carvers, "ebony forests, about
rafts laden with logs that come down the rivers, of docks, of women at the windows,
[...] gradually overwhelming the Khan with "the quantity of things that could be read
in a little piece of smooth and empty wood" (132).
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The Novel as Unique: a) Its Ontological Orientation Towards Fullness.
To begin then, as the parable above performs, any detail (such as a chessboard square)
within a fiction can allow a narrator to leap off into further storytelling that is at least
potentially endless. Marco Polo's tale moves seamlessly from a whorl in the
chessboard's wood to talking of seasons, plant and insect life, and then onto the lives of
woodcarving men and women by a riverside, thus narrating an existential continuum in
which they are all dynamically embodied. The great Khan's weary contemplation of a
philosophical nothingness is revealed to be as superficial as his illusion of possession-
by-conquest, when the lives he supposedly rules over are transformed by Polo's
fictions into a vertiginous demonstration of infinite, irrepressible fullness. Yet Calvino's
fable is also a performance of the ontological possibilities of fictionalising itself. Here
the simplest kind of storytelling displays a special suppleness in how it can carry
together textures of the endlessly inter-connected becomings of beings (and things) in
the world. This to us constitutes a unique capacity for formal flexibility, where any kind
of content narrated in any order and from any perspective can fill out with its own
shape, flux and language the novel form. Perhaps its very name indicates this openness
to novelty, to the seamless, simultaneous, metamorphic multi-valence of anything that
exists in its 'meanings' and connections. Bakhtin theorises that "a new zone [is
thereby] opened by the novel for structuring literary images, namely, the zone of
maximal contact with the present [...] in all its openendedness" (1996, 11). This thesis
will argue that fiction is the only discursive form ontologically able to achieve such a
dynamic evocation of existential fullness, which makes it fundamentally distinct from
intellectual disciplines whose hermeneutics are based on principles of abstraction
and/or specialisation. And it is this capacity that (we shall demonstrate) allows each
novel to contain some of the diverse locations, dimensions, structures, conflicts, agents,
and processes that collectively constitute the becomings of nations.
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If such a category could even apply here, 'truth' for fiction is simply and entirely all
that has to do with being human, just by virtue of its existence— including all that could
be, all that is conceivable, imaginable, expressible. The limits of an individual narrator's
language, interest, and imagination are the only limits of any particular fiction. Milan
Kundera writes that the novel "examines not reality but existence":
And existence is not what has occurred, existence is the realm of human
possibilities, everything that man can become, everything he's capable of.
Novelists draw up the map of existence by discovering this or that human
possibility. (1990, 42).
Uncovering new dimensions to existence is what he deems the novel's "only
morality". Thus for instance, madness, dreams, lies, hallucinations, delusions all qualify
under the universal eligibility to be fictionalised, just because they are all elements of
human existence. Within the pages of a novel, anybody can be a narrator, and anything
his or her subject. The first thing Oskar Matzerath, the narrator of Gunter Grass's The
Tin Drum, confesses is that he is writing from inside a mental asylum. This revelation
immediately situates and relativises his particular narrative, but in no way discredits its
validity, its right to be a narrative. If something is, it is of interest to fiction, because
anything that exists (or might exist, or exists merely in conception) comes suffused
with the 'truth' that it is, and thereby with the truth of its being a partial but inter-
animating dimension of everything else human. Novels propose that everything
humanly conceivable might be relevant to understanding human performance; that
everything human serves as existential illustration and needs to be taken into narrative
account. A founding premise of this study is that only fiction seems flexible enough to
deal discursively with the implications of this simple yet anarchic proposition, because
of its formal capacities to contain disparate versions of the ceaselessly dynamic and
inter-related continuums that together constitute the performance of existence.2 Citing
2
Perhaps poetry has the same flexibility to a more limited degree, limited first because of size: most
novels are simply larger and can encompass more strands, dimensions, processes and events from out
of the fullness of human becoming. Another related point is that poems are often less 'internally
dialogised' or 'polyphonic' in Bakhtinian terms: i.e. a single poem rarely contains as many
autonomous voices, trajectories and conflicts as a novel can, and can therefore rarely evoke social
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novels such as Hermann Broch's The Sleepwalkers and his own The Book of Laughter
and Forgetting as examples, Kundera characterises the novel form as "polyphonic"
for its "extraordinary powers of incorporation". "Whereas neither poetry nor
philosophy can incorporate the novel, the novel can incorporate both poetry and
philosophy without losing thereby anything of its identity" (1996, 64). For Kundera,
such plasticity of form and openness to diverse content allows fiction to be
"polyhistorical", which means "marshalling all intellectual means and all poetic forms
to illuminate 'what the novel alone can discover': man's being" (64):
A novel is a long piece of synthetic prose based on play with invented
characters. By the term synthetic I have in mind the novelist's desire to grasp
his subject from all sides and in the fullest possible completeness. Ironic essay,
novelistic narrative, autobiographical fragment, historic fact, flight of fantasy: the
synthetic power of a novel is capable of combining everything into a unified
whole like the voices of polyphonic music (New York Times, 30-11-80).
For the novel, such flexibility does not arise out of any recent philosophical or
theoretical re-orientations. It has always been implicitly necessary in order for such a
discursive form to have any chance of performing some of the infinite 'polyphony' of
existence itself. "The novelist doesn't set up as a scholar, a doctor, a sociologist, a
historian, he analyses human situations that are not part of some scientific field but are
simply part of life" (Kundera, 1996, 165). Thus, in fiction, "everything becomes theme
(existential questioning)" (165). Such an ontological pursuit of fullness is what
Kundera considers the essence of fictional 'prose', which he defines as "not only a
form of discourse distinct from verse", but as "an aspect of reality" itself, "its daily,
concrete, momentary aspect, and the opposite of myth":
portraits as multi-layered and dynamic. (Even in exceptions such as The Waste Land, the various
voices, fragments and narratives are subsumed finally under one narratorial 'over-voice')- Yet a fuller
discussion of the differing premises and practices of these genres is beyond the scope of our present
argument. Mikhail Bakhtin, for one, takes such a line of discussion much further. See The Dialogic
Imagination (1996, 285-286 & 296-298).
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This goes to the deepest conviction of every novelist: there is nothing so
thoroughly disguised as the prose of life. [...] If the novel is an art and not
merely a 'literary genre', the reason is that the discovery of prose is its
onto logical mission, which no art but the novel can take on entirely. (1996, 132-
33).
For fiction, existence is the great given, the only absolute, the grand narrative that is the
Heideggerian ground for everything else: (an inaccurate formulation: existence is
'everything else'). Its limits and extents are unspeakable, as is its opposite (we cannot
call 'non-existence' into conception: 'nothing' once spoken is not 'nothing' any
more). Existence is the only 'text' there is no getting outside of, the founding non-
fiction, that there is everything rather than nothing. Nothing we say can ever encompass
existence, separate us from it or transcend it. Existence is everything that is, immersed
inextricably together, every element, process and dimension dissolved in dynamic
disguise with numerous others.3 We will take up by the end of the next chapter
Perhaps this is the point at which to clarify our position vis-a-vis certain philosophical projects
whose concerns bear some relationship with our own: as for instance with the work of Heidegger and
Deleuze. While I acknowledge that Heidegger has been an awakening influence in ways not always
possible to mark by citations, this study situates itself in an ontologically different space from his
work— i.e. within the novel as opposed to philosophy. Thus, despite the apparent resemblances of
our objectives— both of which seek to establish an epistemological practice that is founded upon the
entire fullness of being-in-the-world— we will proceed on different discursive terrain defined by
distinct hermeneutic horizons. For similar reasons we acknowledge but do not pursue further any
analogies with Deleuzian "transcendental empiricism", which is again premised and developed
philosophically upon the fact of human immersion within unrelentingly multiple and interactive
planes of becoming. Yet, beyond indicating a certain comparability of aims, we must clarify that we
do not actually 'borrow' either our ontology or our methods from any such body of philosophical
thought, and hence will not be able to treat them with the argumentative thoroughness that they
merit. On the contrary, the work of this first chapter will make clear that that we derive our
interpretative premises and critical strategies solely from the nature of novelistic discourse itself, and
also why this is integral to our critical project.
In this thesis, it is fundamentally a 'novelistic criticism' that we are seeking to articulate and practice.
Therefore, while we will continue to indicate and examine throughout any relevant points of contact
with ideas and approaches from diverse intellectual disciplines (indeed, it will become clearer
presently how establishing such relationships is vital to our project), a more extended exploration of
individual comparisons between these different modes of working is neither directly relevant nor
always possible within the bounds of our present purposes.
But for those interested in pursuing such issues further, Heidegger's Being and Time and What is
Philosophy and A Thousand Plateaus... by Deleuze and Guattari would form obvious starting points.
Deleuze and Guattari devote a chapter of What is Philosophy to articulating their vision of 'planes of
immanence' (1994, 35-60) upon which they premise their interpretative approach of 'transcendental
empiricism', while A Thousand Plateaus... (1988) in its entirety might be regarded as the actual
practice of such a 'method'.
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questions regarding the post-colonial nation-building utility of a discursive form which
can perform such a conception of the fullness of existence for its own sake, but for now
we continue investigating how the novel realises this ontological potential through its
distinct epistemologies, and what gives fiction this particular plasticity that we claim for
it before the fullness of human Being.
The Novel as Unique: b) Selves as Epistemologies.
Selves are the novel's distinct currency, its uniquely formulated units of discussion and
discovery. If exploring existential fullness is implicitly part of the novel's ontology,
narrating through selves is its particular mode of epistemology. The stories of selves
immersed in specific situations (in times, places, bodies, cultures, politics, languages)
are the very basis of the novel's methods. Kundera reminds us: "but again, to exist
means: 'being-in-the-world'. Thus both the character and his world must be
understood as possibilities" (1990, 42). What are selves, the novel asks, and how are
we to interpret these beings in bodies in worlds? Kundera defines his Heideggerian
sense of our 'always, already' thrown-ness into our worlds:
Man does not relate to the world as subject to object, as eye to painting; not
even as actor to stage set. Man and the world are bound together like the snail to
its shell: the world is part of man, it is his dimension, and as the world changes,
existence (being-in-the-world) changes as well (1990, 35).
And if man is always, already 'worlded', so is any story relating to him. There can be
no discussion epistemologically based on selves that is not simultaneously examining
those particular worlds they come inextricably embodied in. It is in such attempts to
narrate the fullness of individual beings-in-their-world that the novelistic text comes
necessarily to be 'worlded' from within (which was the assertion we began with, and
whose full consequences we will examine later). Thus, through this singular
conjunction of ontological orientation and means of narrating, the novel can explore in
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singularly exhaustive ways the relentlessly dynamic interaction of human beings with
the various determinants of their worlds— systems, structures, histories, ideologies,
other selves— always asking how we are to interpret selfhood as memory and matter,
bodies and discourses at the same time? Fiction is uniquely poised discursively to
contain comprehensive performances of how human becomings unfold in disparate
spaces and times, with the seamless impinging of diverse pasts (inter-personal, physical,
historical, cultural) that are present all together, variously interpretable in their inter¬
related implications. And most of all it pushes the limits of the question: how and how
much of all this can be rendered communicable in language?
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'Always, Already Worlded': A Performance of Selves, Worlds, and Their
Thorough Interactivity in Ulysses.
To consider just one instance, Joyce's novel Ulysses finds Bloom's 'self' to be a
performance site that contains disparate combinations of existential elements and
dimensions just in its daily living. He describes Bloom's being-in-the-world as a
ceaselessly interactive continuum so that his narrative collapses various binaries in its
complete solubility: between 'inner' and 'outer' lives, body and consciousness,
individual, familial, racial and national histories, between 'being' and 'becoming',
reality and myth, hallucination and appearance, memory and the present, action and
thought. Form and content are inseparably interwoven, as when the novel
simultaneously uncovers how many modes of being dissolve together in the
performance of one human moment, and what varieties of language may be employed
to evoke them? Such is the trajectory that Joyce's novel travels, and in performing its
route extends its exploration with 'organic' narrative logic to any level of human
inquiry that he can force language to express.
Yet the book evokes not only the relentless interactivity between Bloom-in-his-world
and his endlessly streaming 'inner life', but also the interrelated dynamic extent of that
world around him. Joyce includes events and exchanges between other Dubliners on
the streets on the same afternoon, in the pub and in the library where Bloom is not even
present, and 'inside' the consciousnesses of Molly and Stephen, thus filling out a
history of a Dublin day with human becomings at various levels and locations, a spatial
evocation of the inter-connected inhabiting of a certain time in a town narrated all
together. We will develop later the idea that this is an example of exactly the sort of
comprehensive 'nation-building' (as well as its simultaneous deconstruction) only
novelistic examination can achieve, because of its unique capacity to narrate the
dynamics of human existence at various levels and locations simultaneously. Ulysses
asks what selfhood is when held up to history, when it is seen as being relentlessly in
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history: selfhood as the convergence and performance site of diverse histories. It re¬
formulates thereby in a singularly exhaustive way Tolstoy's question from War and
Peace about what history itself might be (which we shall consider in the next section)—
as to whether everything human on every level is to be interpreted as entering into and
shaping history? Should history be considered a synonym for the dynamic all-soluble
fullness of human existence, and how might that be novelised? The novel (and the post-
colonial novel of national interrogation is only a specifically focussed instance of this)
is a discursive form uniquely able to investigate the implications of such a conception,
because of how it looks for interactive selves immersed in their worlds and investigates
most fully the extents of that involvement.
The Novel as Unique: c) Narrative Limits and Existential Inexhaustibility.
Yet a caveat important to establish at the very outset is that however ontologically
orientated towards fullness we might argue the novel to be, this is emphatically never to
be equated with any claim for either omniscience or finality. The limits of Marco
Polo's narrative above are his memory, his breath, his prejudices and preferences, and
his eye on Khan's interest. Yet the dimensions that he does narrate evoke so many
others that he leaves untold; and each could be as seamlessly included in someone
else's re-telling, and seen to be as inter-animating, illustrative, and relevant as the few
things that Polo selects to speak of. But fiction allows Marco Polo to juxtapose events
and details in any sequence he chooses and just commence his narrating without
requiring plinth, preamble or proof: his conception of the continuum is the only validity
his narrative requires. Anybody who disagrees with his order or his omissions can tell
another story, no less limited, no less valid. This capacity for experimental re-
inscription we posit as another of fiction's unique distinctions: the implicit
acknowledgement of its own limits and specificities that (even when revealed and
explored as an epistemological crisis) can then logically demand alternative retellings.
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Even a novel as exhaustive and ambitious as Ulysses about a day as circumscribed as
Bloom's— with its efforts to create language for the minute metamorphoses of his
every moment— can only select certain episodes, particular trains of thought and not
others, and be suffused with the irony of evoking all that it cannot include through the
very richness of all that it does. Each fiction, even the most apparently capacious,
demonstrates through the very arrangements of exclusion and selection that lead to one
story being told out of numerous others, as well as the endless re-interpretability of
even that single story, that it is impossible to contain or express the fullness of what a
self does with its time, and all that time does with it, even on a single day.4 Saleem Sinai
in Midnight's Children wonders if to swallow just one life whole, one has to swallow
the world entire. (And who but God (and possibly Hegel) has unerring access to the
becomings of every being throughout all of time, to be able to arrange the infinitely
interpretable implications of their activities and interactions, and thereby tell us with
certainty what it is all finally leading towards)? But existential inexhaustibility such as
the novel uncovers has no transcendental or religious conceptions at its basis, nor does
it claim to omnisciently reveal the ultimate aims of History. Lukacs in his Theory of the
Novel notes this ontological capacity for 'irony'— which is how fiction foregrounds,
internalises, and survives the inevitable boundaries defining all expression:
The novel is the epic of a world that has been abandoned by God (1999, 88).
[...] Irony, the self-surmounting of a subjectivity that has gone as far as it was
possible to go, is the highest freedom that can be achieved in a world without
God (93). |... | This is why irony is the objectivity of the novel (90).
By being a set of stories about specific selves in specific times and places, a novel
always foregrounds and insists on human immersion: that selves only exist involved in
the rest of existence, never above, never beyond it. They can only speak bounded and
constructed by the contexts of their various immersions (though, as we shall see, this
fact is not at all to be understood deterministically). Yet it implies that any utterance is
4
Henry James describes the problem as well as the illusion of resolving it: "really, universally,
relations stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally but to draw, by a geometry
of his own, the circle within which they shall happily appear to do so [...] (1984, 1041).
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necessarily partial, relative, derivative, one of many possible versions— a fiction
endlessly alterable. These limits come embodied in any particular narrative, but these
same pervasive limits become the source of a resulting liberation (in a way analogous to
the release of re-readings by deconstruction because of the potentially endless surplus
of meanings generated by language). And these inevitable limits are what allow (and
demand) the emergence of new stories, alternative re-interpretations and re-inscriptions,
because no one reader or narrator can ever claim fullness or finality. If we can all tell
only partial stories, we can all disagree and revise other stories. Moreover it gives
everyone a potentially equal right to tell stories. In The Tin Drum Oskar Matzerath
does not need to conceal that he might not be mentally stable. That immediately
becomes part of his particular 'worldedness'; his circumstances are intrinsic to his
story. This makes the novel an exceptionally democratic area of discourse: any number
of rewritten Bloomsdays, for example, are novelistically conceivable, in various voices
and modes of narrative, ranging from the Hemingwayesque to the Joycean.
Fiction is as limited and partial therefore as anything else human; yet in its insistent
attention to specificity, it could be said to acknowledge openly and confront the
implications of such a provenance, unlike so much of the history of theory and
philosophy, which pretended exactly the opposite in claiming to be objective, timeless
and universally relevant. For ever so long, post-Platonic philosophy contrived to sustain
in its self-image and its categories the illusions of being bodiless, placeless, selfless,
changeless and transcendentally limitless, somehow free of every human limit and
attribute.
My thesis will thus proceed on these premises, which it will try to prove all the time in
its critical practice. To summarise where we have arrived, the novel's particular terms of
conducting human discovery, of uncovering beings-in-worlds, allow it dimensions of
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discussion fuller than other disciplines, more grounded, better suited to narrate our
existence as it is actually inhabited— inextricably and variously immersed, always
embodied and situated, and yet dynamic and endlessly interpretable.5 The novel's
narrative epistemology is necessarily more honest because it takes as the basis of any
performance the implicit acknowledgement of its subjective limits (i.e. it is no more
than a single story of limited people inhabiting certain locations and processes of the
world). And yet a novelistic narrative is necessarily fuller because it is precisely this
orientation of subject that opens for the form an opportunity to realise its distinct
ontology, by allowing it to evolve organically the potentially limitless breadths and
depths of its enquiry. Following a self through a story, as we see with Joyce tracking
Bloom, could imply dissolving in performance any number of existential dimensions,
no matter how incompatible and in the most incongruous order, just because the self in
question does. Because whatever occurs on any level of human existence, is narratively
relevant to the novel. And finally, if the novel is concerned ontologically with the
fullness of existence which yet remains forever beyond encompassing, since any single
narrative perspective is revealed to be inevitably particular and limited, then anyone's
story is allowable, and any subject or voice that he or she chooses. In Ulysses, detailing
the fullness of just one self on a single day is revealed to be finally impossible, even
after the contents of his bookcase, his fantasies, and his bills have been exhaustively
represented. Thus, even in the largest and most ambitious of novels, humility (for both
reader and writer) becomes not the opposite of narrative ambition but its implicitly
realised destination. The capacity to contain, survive, and thrive off this unique and
paradoxical conjunction is what Lukacs admires when he calls the novel the "art-form
of mature virility" (1999, 71), since it confronts the inexpressible fullness of being as
its very basis:
5
Again, the analogy to Deleuze and Guattari's conception of existence (and any possibility of
expression) always occurring within various interactive 'planes of immanence' is apparent, but we
hope by now it is clear that we have arrived at such a formulation differently— not 'philosophically'
in the same sense as them or Heidegger (i.e. by arguing against the assumptions and methods of
earlier philosophy), but from the nature of novelistic discourse itself.
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Time is the fullness of living, although the fullness of time is the self-abolition
of life, and with it, of time itself (123). [...] That is why only the novel, the
literary form of the transcendent homelessness of the idea, includes real time—
Bergson's duree, among its constitutive principles (121).
These singularities of ontology and epistemology are what allow the novel narrative
capacity that we have found lacking in more specialised, generalised or abstract-
theoretical discussions of history and nationhood, such as are available in cultural
theory, philosophy, politics, and sociology. This is not at all intended as a summary
denial of the validity of the methods or conclusions of such disciplines. On the
contrary, throughout its course this study will utilise formulations, historiographies and
theories of post-colonial nationhood as reference points to set among its readings of
fictions. Yet we will argue, and will begin by demonstrating immediately below, that the
novel can put all such separately detected versions and dimensions— political, socio¬
economic, historical, anthropological— to a fuller kind of narrative and interpretative
experiment, by dissolving them in simultaneous interactive performance with each other
to explore the metamorphic proportions of their presence in the fullness of social life.
Exploring the implications of this unique discursive potential for the narratives of post-
colonial nation-building will constitute the body of my study, but first we wish to
develop these general propositions further, of the novel's particular capacity to narrate
'worldedness' and what reading possibilities they can release for us as 'literary'
critics.
d) How Existence is Irreducible to Ideas: An Instance from The Trial.
At the heart of Joseph K.'s all-pervasive struggle with the Court (and its procedures
and functionaries) lies his meeting with the priest in the cathedral. What K has assumed
to be a chance encounter turns out to have been a planned summoning, and the priest
informs him that he is also the prison chaplain, another of the Court's employees. Part
of their conversation consists of the parable Before the Law, which is followed by a
series of exegeses by the priest, of which each contradicts every other without ever
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departing from the 'facts' of the text, and yet they are all supported by a long and
learned tradition of commentary. Each reading is nuanced, self-contained and
convincing in itself, though the priest reminds K that they are all inevitably limited and
partial, for, after all, as the commentators themselves note, "the right perception of any
matter and a misunderstanding of the same matter do not wholly exclude each other"
(Kafka, 1992, 238). And not only is each reading itself in error, each reading taken by
itself also induces only error. It does not matter if K objects to a particular point or if he
agrees; the priest reminds him he is either forgetting to include crucial textual details or
adding his own words when there is no support for them. He advises K not to
overestimate the extent of his own or anybody's interpretation: "I'm only showing you
the various opinions concerning the point. You must not pay too much attention to
them. The scriptures are unalterable and the comments often enough merely express the
commentators' despair" (239).
Ultimately the parable is both inexhaustible and impenetrable, a Derridean
demonstration of the 'deconstructive abyss' long avant la lettre. But I wish to use the
parable and its readings as an illustration of the activity of interpreting fiction itself, and
to advance two related arguments. The first is simply to point out that lives are being
consumed (and endlessly 'deferred') in and during the events described. Both within
the parable and the wider framework of the novel that contains it, we see how such
radical deconstructibility employed in these particular contexts ultimately destroys the
lives of the man from the country and K respectively (rather than liberate them,
ironically, as deconstruction is widely supposed to do). Within the parable, the
doorkeeper and the man from the country live out vast parts of their lives doing nothing
but facing each other off in their equally enigmatic yet opposed states of ignorance.
And K's interest in a solution emerging to the riddle is hardly 'theoretical' either: in
the next chapter he will be dragged off for execution by a Law he never understood, for
a crime never specified to him. Yet in the chapters before he has found the Court to be
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the basis of everything else he encounters, the pervasiveness of power performed on a
scale such as Foucault would later describe in his theories and histories. Hitherto
unconnected dimensions of K's life and the city have been revealed to him as actually
conducted under the auspices of the Court. Every exchange now comes embedded
within that basis; every new encounter, with painter, priest or chambermaid, turns out to
be an encounter with another aspect of the Court.
'Novelistic Deconstruction': The Re-lnterpretability of Fictional Narrative.
Perhaps such pervasive presence does prefigure a Foucauldian/Althusserian conception
of impenetrable, impersonal and institutionalised power regulating every
"microphysical" aspect of social and individual life, just as the priest laying
interpretation upon partial interpretation as derived from an inexhaustibly generative
text (thus turning "lying into a universal principle" (1992, 242) according to K.)
evokes (later) Derridean deconstruction. But we wish to argue that Kafka's mode and
methods of narration are fundamentally different from either of these thinkers. In his
work such readings come dynamically embodied within a novel, rather than argued
philosophically as separate theories or as 'concepts' arising out of general
historiography, and this distinction is crucial. Literary commentators and theorists of
other persuasions have offered various readings of K.'s predicament besides the ones
above: some in doing so have conferred upon him crimes even the Court never clarified.
There are Marxists who have indicted K. for being "both a product and an agent in a
very particular matrix of bourgeois mercantilism" (Kafka, 1992, xi). Those of
psychoanalytic leanings have found evidence in the text to accuse him of the crime of
long neglecting his mother: others have deemed him guilty because of his alleged
inability to conceive of relationships with women except on the grossest sexual terms.6
6
Kundera lists a range of the interpretative verdicts on Joseph K. over the years: Marxist, Freudian,
biographical, psychoanalytic. For a fuller discussion, see Testaments Betrayed (1996, 206-207).
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All such critical versions (like those of the commentators of the parable) have more or
less evidence from hints and details present in the text, but what is greater than each of
these separate inferences is the sum of their parts; i.e. the novel that evokes them all
through its narrative performance. In The Trial, through the details of mere (or sheer)
storytelling, all such readings, without ever being separately named or delineated as
such, are evoked inextricably together as dimensions of K's being-in-the world, and
therefore raised as interpretative possibilities. The narrative, just like the parable within
it, is endlessly deconstructible, without ever being encompassed by any one of its
interpretations. In being thus narrated— as a novel which itself specifies no charges
against its protagonist— no one reading of K's tale outlaws all others by fitting
perfectly the fullness of his fate, just as no commentator can claim to have explained the
priest's parable once and forever. By evoking so many interpretative possibilities
simultaneously through a single story, fiction suggests that each separately discernible
dimension of existence (socio-economic, psychoanalytic, or theological) might be read
as interacting in actual performance with many others— entering, making, and shaping
the irreducible totality of (even) one human becoming. The more of existence that is
evoked, the less its re-readability is exhausted. Bakhtin formulates the interpretative
dilemma— to him "the novel gets on poorly with other genres" (1996, 7),
interpretative as well as discursive. He continues:
The novel sparks the renovation of all other genres, it infects them with its spirit
of process and inconclusiveness [...]. The utter inadequacy of literary theory is
exposed when it is forced to deal with the novel. In the case of other genres
literary theory works confidently and precisely, since there is a finished and
already formed object, definite and clear [...]. Everything works as long as there
is no mention of the novel. Faced with the problem of the novel, genre theory
must submit to a radical re-structuring (7-8).
The previous section argued that from a fiction-maker's perspective, the act of telling
new stories is potentially endless, because of the limits of each particular narration, and
because the fullness of existence upon which their work is premised is inevitably
beyond encompassing. This instance of interpreting The Trial illustrates some further
implications of that argument, for us as critics and readers. It is not a choice of
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interpretative paradigms on offer any more: (even though, as we see above, critics of
various persuasions each conduct their exclusive trial on K, and pronounce absolute
verdicts). But the text never confirms if it is finally an allegory pre-emptively illustrating
a Foucauldian/Althusserian theory of social existence as being solely the affects and
implications of impersonal power, or a Derridean demonstration of textuality as pure
and endless play, or a Marxist critique of bourgeois mercantilism or anything else,
where each position may be knocked down by a better argument restating another. In
fact, K.'s story performs the full implications of inhabiting the 'play' of pervasive
power: power toys with him and he lives and dies dizzied by the play of its endless
variations and radical inscrutability. Each exclusive critical version is filled out, inter¬
related and therefore challenged and extended in being performed interactively and
simultaneously within the world of the novel.
Novelising the Fullness of History.
But Kafka goes further; not only does he thoroughly 'world' the selves in his story, he
also demonstrates how 'worlds' are the sum performance of the selves that constitute
them, by narrating the humanity behind every law, process, abstraction, and institution
that plagues K. Just as Joyce fills out Bloom's Dublin, Kafka demonstrates what
Kundera reminds us of: that a "historical situation is not a background, a stage set
before which human situations unfold; it is itself a human situation, a growing
existential situation" (1990, 38). For the novel, if there is no uncovering a being
without simultaneously uncovering the multiple worlds that interactively constitute and
surround him, those worlds in their turn are also novelistically revealed to be the
multivalent and dynamic aggregate of the becomings of other human beings. To
Kundera, "every situation is of man's making and can only contain what man
contains" (115). So the novel must examine History not only in how it creates
"revelatory existential situations" (36) for its characters, but also by demonstrating
how "History itself must be understood and analysed as an existential situation" (38).
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Kafka performs the pervasiveness of the Law through narrating the fullness of its
prose, uncovering the "daily, concrete, momentary aspects" to being-in-the-world that
Kundera considers the novel's "ontological mission" (1996, 132-33): thus he fills in
all the human detail constituting the Law, the Court, the Cathedral, the Magistrate and
the Bank— the institutions and ideologies defining K.'s world and their various
enforcing interpreters and functionaries. Again, in a demonstration of the ways in which
novels can move from narrating the fullness of particular selves to simultaneously
detailing the social life of nations, Kafka dramatises how History on every level is
always only human, in its institutions, abstractions and violations, in its processes and
politics. And all of its epic proportions— societies, upheavals, structures— arise from
the inextricably interactive immersions of human beings together in time and space: no
more and no less. In The Trial, historicising (i.e. situating and dynamically performing)
K.'s particular circumstances necessarily implies humanising the fullness of his world
as well. The next section will advance the implications of this idea through the work of
Lukacs and Tolstoy, but for now it is introduced as a particularly novelistic envisioning
of History: the infinitely multiple, dynamic and interactive co-existence of everything
human.
Kundera makes the bold claim that the novel "dealt with the unconscious before Freud,
the class struggle before Marx, it practised phenomenology (the investigation of the
essence of human situations) before the phenomenologists" (1990, 32). Novels in a
sense can go further than particular theoretical positions ever can (and also pre-empt
them, as The Trial appears to do with Foucault and Derrida), not by disproving or
outdating them as world-views and ideologies attempt to do to each other, but rather by
extending and exploring their insights. As with the various readings of The Trial above,
a thinker's particular insights can be re-dissolved into the rest of human performance
and their interactive implications can be observed, not in the more abstracted,
generalised or specialised conditions of philosophy or theory, but together with(in) the
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rest of human existence.7 Saul Bellow affirms that "the artist cannot avoid the disorder
of contemporary reality" because "he is bound, bitterly at the best of times, to the
amorfati, as Nietzsche calls it, the imperative to embrace what is":
Such an embrace is not a surrender; it is the necessary acceptance of a mass of
complexities. To limit himself to any one of these single views would result in
his segregation, would cut him off from seeing and understanding what he sees.
This mountain of complexities is the supreme datum. It is our great given. And
it is ours (1994, 142).
The emphasis is on the "necessary acceptance of a mass of complexities", as well as
the danger of limiting oneself to any one of these single views. But for all dogmatic
claims to full and final versions of the world proffered by "the serious essayists of the
last fifty years", Bellow can muster only scant respect:
Essay after essay, book after book, confirms the most serious thoughts—
Baudelarian, Marxian, Psychoanalytic, etc. etc.— of these most serious
essayists... But how poorly they represent us. The pictures they offer no more
represent us than we resemble the reconstructed reptiles and other monsters in a
museum of palaeontology. We are much more limber, versatile, better
articulated, there is much more to us (95-96).
Kundera describes why for instance, purely 'political' theory can never grasp the full
existential import of even a 'political' situation, because being-in-the-world (history)
must be narrated and interpreted much more fully as "a growing existential situation"
(1990,38):
When the culture is reduced to politics, interpretation is concentrated completely
on the political, and in the end no one understands politics because purely
political thought can never comprehend political reality (New York Times, 29-
04-84).
7
This is how Bakhtin and Pavel Medvedev formulate the distinction between the multivalent fullness
evoked by a literary work and the boundaries and categories of ideologies, philosophical systems and
theses:
Literature does not ordinarily take its ethical and epistemological content from ethical and
epistemological systems or from outmoded ideological systems [...], but immediately from
the very process of generation of ethics, epistemology, and other ideologies. This is the
reason that literature so often anticipates developments in philosophy and ethics
(ideologemes), admittedly in an undeveloped, unsupported, intuitive form. Literature is
capable of penetrating into the social laboratory where these ideologemes are shaped and
formed. [...] The generation of ideas, the generation of aesthetic desires and feelings, their
wandering, their as yet unformed groping for reality, their restless seething in the depths of
the so-called 'social psyche'— the whole as yet undifferentiated flood of generating ideology-
— is reflected and refracted in the content of the literary work (1978, 17).
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This study will argue (and attempt to demonstrate through its engagement with non-
novelistic theories, histories and formulations of post-colonial nationhood) that fiction
is perhaps the fullest form of 'polysemic interdisciplinarity' available in written
discourse, in how it evokes the elemental sheerness of human Being by filling in the
infinitely intricate (dynamic and multidimensional) webs of connection between
separate ideas, world-views, and bodies of knowledge. How do the truth-claims of any
one system of thought, however internally consistent, square up to the far larger
'actuality' that believers who live by absolutely opposite principles also exist in the
world in full and free play with itself and everybody else besides, in the sum
performance of human existence? The novel can evoke the incommensurable
irreducibility involved in a conception of earthly life which will never be a merely
intellectual choice between two or more philosophical theories, ideologies, or
specialised disciplines, no matter how coherent or persuasive any of them are, but each
such position embodied and enacted and every other besides. Again, this is not to
suggest that the methods or the outcomes of disciplines based on more specialised,
generalised, or theoretical foundations are less valid or more limited than those of
fiction. But novels are a site of performance where many dimensions may be evoked
simultaneously through the simple act of narrating a self's story. The resulting re-
interpretability may be termed the novel's inbuilt demand for its own 'deconstruction'.
What ideology of insect is it that Gregor Samsa finds himself transformed into when
he awakes one morning in The Metamorphosis "from uneasy dreams": Marxist,
Althusserian, or Freudian? There is no one answer, but the text contains amply
suggestive evidence for each reading, and many others. Again, it becomes impossible to
contain in any final version the fullness of all that a self is during its living, and
everything that living-in-the-world does with it. This is why the novel finds existence
itself to be so fundamentally and endlessly re-interpretable. Such uniquely flexible yet
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'worlded' discourse demands (and itself can give rise to) a uniquely flexible, worlded,
and yet entirely 'literary' criticism, which is what this first chapter will finally consider.
Implications for Criticism: A Demand for Radical Polyphony.
Novels are just words. We respond to them in various critical modes in words alone.
Yet our work is founded on the premise that words and worlds have a uniquely
inseparable relationship within the texts of novels, as inseparable perhaps as that
between beings and their worlds within the great 'text' of existence, the one text there is
certainly no getting outside of. We have seen how by simply telling stories that portray
selves as the dynamic resultants of bodies, languages, societies, ideologies, institutions
and histories (inner and outer, private and collective), the novel in narrating a Joseph K
or a Leopold Bloom can develop a multi-layered vision of socio-historical becoming to
a fuller extent than any particular theoretical/specialised discourse could ever go. This
last section, building on arguments primarily from the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, is then
the place to introduce the critical project of which this study will be a demonstration: a
conception of a 'novelistic criticism' where theoretical, 'worlded', and 'literary'
discussions do not have to be considered mutually exclusive options any longer.
It ought to be sufficiently evident by now that when this study argues that novels
undertake a distinct kind of human discovery which in turn demands an especially
attuned and flexible criticism, it is far removed from re-creating the world-proof, 'pure'
formalist solipsism championed by the New Critics and their heirs.8 On the other hand,
it explicitly seeks to distance itself from advocating any single theoretical/ideological
s
Bellow dismisses any notion of aesthetic transcendence for the writer as impatiently as he rejects all-
encompassing theorists. "As for Hegel's art, freed from 'seriousness' and glowing on the margins,
raising the soul above painful involvement in the limitations of reality through the serenity of form,
that can exist nowhere now, during this struggle for survival". But out of this "struggle" from within
our inextricable immersions he also detects "an immense, painful longing for a broader, more flexible,
fuller account of what we human beings are, who we are" (1994, 96).
For an extended critique of the formalist "severing of the [literary] work from real social intercourse"
see Bakhtin and Medvedev (1978, 146-158).
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persuasion that would claim to exclusively encompass every aspect of a fictional text.
For instance, Bakhtin and Medvedev make clear that "the content of literature reflects
the ideological purview, i.e. other, non-artistic ideological formations" (1978, 18). But,
they insist, this does not mean that the nature of literary mediation is to be simplistically
understood as being mere passive reflection; nor can its workings be equated with those
of other discursive practices:
In reflecting these other signs, literature creates new forms, new signs of
ideological intercourse. And these signs are works of art, which become a real
part of the social reality surrounding man. Reflecting something external to
themselves, literary works are at the same time in themselves valuable
phenomena of the ideological environment. Their role cannot be reduced to the
merely auxiliary one of reflecting other ideologemes. Literary works have their
own independent ideological role and their own type of refraction of socio¬
economic existence (1978, 18).
They go on to list some of their objections to reductive and dogmatic evaluations of
literary works, "in studying the reflections of the ideological environment in literary
content":
[They] limited literature to reflection alone; that is, [they] lowered it to the
status of a simple servant and transmitter of other ideologies, almost completely
ignoring the independently meaningful reality of the literary work, its
ideological independence and originality. |... |
[They] finalised and dogmatised basic ideological points reflected by the artist
in his work, thus turning active and generating problems into ready theses,
statements, and philosophical, ethical, political, religious, etc. conclusions.
[They] did not consider or understand the vital fact that the essential content of
literature only reflects generating ideologies, only reflects the living process of
the generation of the ideological horizon. [... [
Almost all critics and historians of literature committed these same mistakes
with varying degrees of crudeness. The result was that literature, an independent
and unique ideology, was equated with other ideologies and vanished in them
without a trace. Analysis squeezed the literary work for poor philosophy,
superficial political declarations, ambiguous ethics, and short-lived religious
doctrines. What remained after this squeezing, i.e. the most essential thing, the
artistic structure of the literary work, was simply ignored as mere technical
support for other ideologies (Bakhtin & Medvedev, 1978, 18-19).
In a similar vein, Edward Said lists some of the either-or camps involved in the battle of
attrition that to him comprises much of contemporary criticism. There is the school of
"criticism as scholarship, humanism, a 'servant' to the text, [...[ versus criticism as
revisionism and as itself a form of literature" (1991, 229). There are the related debates
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of "criticism as detached from the political/social world versus criticism as a form of
philosophical metaphysics, psychoanalysis, linguistics, or any of these, versus criticism
as actually having to do with such "contaminated" fields of history, the media, and
economic systems" (229). He continues:
In the absence of an enclosing domain called literature, with clear outer
boundaries, there is no longer an authorised or official position for the literary
critic. But neither is there some new sovereign method, some new critical
technology compelling allegiance and intellectual loyalty. Instead there is a
babel of arguments for the limitlessness of all interpretation; of ideologies that
proclaim the eternal yet determinate value of literature or 'the humanities'; for
all systems that in asserting their capacity to perform essentially self-confirming
tasks allow for no counterfactual evidence. You can call such a situation
pluralistic if you like or, if you have a taste for the melodramatic, you can call it
desperate" (229-230).
This study wishes to situate itselfpost- all of the above positions, because it believes the
novel ontologically encompasses and exceeds them all. In The World, the Text, and the
Critic, Said is looking for a way beyond both "the great literary text" of "self
delighting humanism" as an "isolated paddock in the broad cultural field" (1991, 225)
as well as the option of having to choose any exclusive hermeneutic horizon. In Culture
and Imperialism twelve years later, he describes his conception of a 'secular critic', a
"liminal figure", producing work that is "sceptical, secular, reflectively open to its own
failings". The secular critic carries the responsibility of contrapuntally mediating a
"hybrid cultural work":
We must be able to think through and interpret together experiences that are
discrepant, each with its particular agenda and pace of development, its own
internal formations, its internal coherence and system of external relationships,
all of them co-existing and interacting with others (1993, 36).
With such principles in mind, we wish to formulate a reading practice that derives from
the singular characteristics of novelistic discourse itself and its uniquely 'worlded'
words such as we have hitherto outlined, that would include aspects of diverse
intellectual disciplines and interpretative paradigms, and yet work as an alternative to all
mutually exclusive categories and systems. As an example, in our examination of the
extract from Kafka (or in Gregor Samsa's predicament in The Metamorphosis), we
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saw how a fiction is irreducible to any one critical dogma, even though (and precisely
because) it can generate so many readings simultaneously. A novelistic criticism would
attempt to be as flexibly interactive in its approaches as the fictional material itself
demands. It would comprise thoroughly 'worlded' critical performances (i.e. readings
that include cultural, political, socio-economic and historical dimensions) that are at the
same time entirely 'literary'; and yet it would have no claim to mastery over the text,
just as any particular novel itself is only a story among numberless other possible
stories.
More than any other, it is Bakhtin's conception of a "sociological stylistics" that
points us towards such a criticism. Bakhtin argues that if "at any given moment of its
historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom, [representing] the
coexistence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past,
between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the
present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so on" (1996, 291), then all of them
"may be juxtaposed to one another, mutually supplement one another, contradict one
another and be interrelated dialogically" (292) in the world of the novel. He discovers
the "language of the novel [to be] a system of languages that mutually and
ideologically inter-animate each other" (47), a performance of the world's living
heteroglossia:
As a living, socio-ideological concrete thing, as heteroglot opinion, language, for
the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and the
other. The word in language is half someone else's. It becomes 'one's own'
only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when
he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive
intention. Prior to this moment of appropriation, the word does not exist in a
neutral and impersonal language [...], but rather it exists in other people's
mouths, in other people's contexts, serving other people's intentions: it is from
there that one must take the word and make it one's own. And not all words for
just anyone submit equally easily to this appropriation, to this seizure and
transformation into private property [...]: Language [...] is populated—
overpopulated— with the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it to
submit to one's own intentions and accents, is a difficult and complicated
process (293-294).
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But of course, portraying such live, seething 'dialogics' is inseparable from portraying
the material/social relationships, structures, processes and imbalances of power
pervading these collisions of selves in the world. Writing with Medvedev, Bakhtin
expresses vividly the thorough sociality and historicity of all communication:
Every ideological product (ideologeme) is a part of the material social reality
surrounding man, an aspect of the materialised ideological horizon. Whatever a
word might mean, it is first of all materially present, as a thing uttered, written,
printed, whispered, or thought. That is, it is always an objectively present part of
man's social environment (Bakhtin & Medvedev, 1978, 8).
This implies that "every concrete utterance is [also necessarily] a social act" (1978,
120):
At the same time that it is an individual material complex, a phonetic,
articulatory, visual complex, the utterance is also a part of social reality. [...] Its
individual reality is already [...] the reality of a historical phenomenon. Not
only the meaning of the utterance but also the veiy fact of its performance is of
historical and social significance, as, in general, is the fact of its realisation in the
here and now, in given circumstances, at a certain historical moment, under the
conditions of the given social situation. [...] [Thus] an organic, historical, and
actual connection is established between the meaning and act (utterance),
between the act and the concrete socio-historical situation (120).
Based on such a conception of the involved, interactive, multivalent existence of words
in the actual world, Bakhtin conceives the task of the novelist:
The novelist working in prose [...] welcomes the heteroglossia and language
diversity of the literary and extraliterary language into his own work, not only
not weakening them but even intensifying them (for he interacts with their
particular self-consciousness). It is in fact out of this stratification of language,
its speech diversity and even language diversity, that he constructs his style
(1996,298). [...]
The prose writer as a novelist does not strip away the intentions of others from
the heteroglot language of his works, he does not violate those socio-ideological
cultural horizons (big and little worlds) that open up behind heteroglot
languages— rather, he welcomes then into his work (299).
It is an argument that describes how novels derive directly from, and thereby reflect,
contribute to, and describe other social, ideological and historical inter-animating
conflicts and contexts (in Saidian terms, their 'worldedness'). Bakhtin and Medvedev
never claim that there is any more to fiction than language(s), but because language to
them is never separable from its inextricable involvement in the totality of being social,
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they extend both lines of argument to discover that the multivalent struggles involved in
its uses can be performed and evoked within the text of a novel: "[languages]
encounter one another and live in the consciousness of real people [...]. These
languages live a real life, they struggle and evolve in an environment of social
heteroglossia" (Bakhtin, 1996, 292). Thus this fictional capacity to commingle voices
also necessitates representing the dynamic interaction of conflicting perspectives,
world-views and socio-historical standpoints:
The speaking person in a novel is always, to one degree or another, an
ideologue, and his words are always ideologemes. A particular language in a
novel is always a particular way of viewing the world, one that strives for a
social significance. It is precisely as ideologemes that discourse becomes the
object of representation in the novel, and it is for the same reason novels are
never in danger of becoming a mere aimless verbal play. The novel, being a
dialogised representation of an ideologically freighted discourse [...] is of all
verbal genres the one least susceptible to aestheticism as such, to a purely
formalistic playing about with words (1996, 333).
It is the performance of such thoroughly socialised and 'embodied' heteroglossia that
inevitably implies that the novel is always 'worlded' from within. Further, Bakhtin's
argument is double-layered, because after demonstrating the distinctiveness of
novelistic discourse, he posits that it demands (and itself provides the basis for) an
especially adapted criticism, one that at least attempts a similar kind of soluble
flexibility in its reading approaches. And just as fictionalised polyphony does not occur
between disembodied voices in an ideologically neutral vacuum, the critical analysis of
such discourse can never be a matter of linguistics and/or formalist stylistics alone.
This is where (in a manner analogous to the Saidian formulation of a "contrapuntal"
cultural criticism that always foregrounds its 'worldedness') Bakhtin calls for a
"sociological stylistics":
Any stylistics capable of dealing with the distinctiveness of the novel as a genre
must be a sociological stylistics. The internal social dialogism of novelistic
discourse requires the concrete social context of discourse to be exposed, to be
revealed as the force that determines its entire stylistic structure, its 'form' and
its 'content', determining it not from without, but from within; for indeed social
dialogue reverberates in all aspects of discourse, in those relating to 'content' as
well as the 'formal' aspects themselves. (1996, 300).9
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The principles and approaches expressed above are closely analogous to our
envisioning of how a 'novelistic criticism' would operate: as a form of critical
mediation thoroughly 'worlded' and yet literary at the same time because it arises out
of and refers to the unique ontological perspectives and working practices of novels.
Bakhtin's conception of a "sociological stylistics" firmly eschews the formalism that
"defines itself as a stylistics of 'private craftsmanship' and ignores the social life of
discourse outside the artist's study, discourse in the open spaces of public squares
streets, cities and villages, of social groups, generations, and epochs" (259), in favour
of "empty, evaluative terms for the characterisation of language, such as
'expressiveness', 'imagery', 'force', 'clarity', and so on" (260). In the same terms as
Kundera characterises the novel, a 'novelistic criticism' would attempt to be
"polyhistorical" in its "powers of incorporation" (1996, 64), and flexible to various
interpretative approaches and dimensions. Hence, as for fiction, so for its criticism:
"everything becomes theme (existential questioning)" (Kundera, 1996, 165).
Thus, by building on and adapting aspects of Bakhtin's conception, the rest of our
study will attempt to demonstrate that there might exist a criticism derived from the
9
This is how Bakhtin together with Medvedev formulates his conception of a literary/linguistic
analysis of novels that will also simultaneously mediate as a "social evaluation":
It is this historical actuality, which unites the individual presence of the utterance with the
generality and fullness of its meaning, which makes meaning concrete and individual and
gives meaning to the word's phonetic presence here and now, that we call social evaluation.
[...] It determines the historical physiognomy of every action and every utterance, its
individual, class, and epochal physiognomy (1978, 121). [...]
It is social evaluation which inseparably weaves the artistic work into the general canvas of
the social life of a given historical epoch and a given social group (125).
Yet if we are to indicate directions of thought comparable to our project, it is advisable to point out
simultaneously our points of departure. At the time of composing this text, the authors were
convinced that "only Marxism can bring the correct philosophical direction and necessary
methodological precision to the problems [they have] raised" (26). Even though it is an
extraordinarily undogmatic version of Marxism that they espouse, any such avowal runs counter to
our own novelistically derived commitment to interpretative flexibility. Nor do we ever claim to
uncover, as they do through the dialectics of "social evaluation", "the major historical aims of a whole
epoch" (121).
Bakhtin himself in later phases was to significantly alter direction and conviction upon this point.
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nature of novelistic narrative itself that is never more or less than literary, but that can
fuse various concerns— political, historical, psychological, formal, feminist etc.— and
perform them together, without ever having to claim fidelity or finality on behalf of one
or the other position.10 We will establish that such a reading approach (where
everything becomes "existential questioning") might be especially relevant to nation-
building fiction, just as fiction itself might be an exceptionally encompassing mode of
discourse when it comes to narrating nations. As Joseph K's narrative and the readings
of the 'inexhaustible' parable demonstrate, such a criticism would have to be as
intellectually flexible as his fullness and his fate are variously interpretable. It would
have to be as methodologically accommodating as it is plastic to keep pace with the
radical re-readability of its material, because after all, "the right perception of any
matter and a misunderstanding of the same matter do not wholly exclude each other"
(Kafka, 1992, 238). Such a criticism will be an effort to realise Said's generous claim
for critical consciousness, which far from erecting walls around systems, to him is
nothing "if not an unstoppable predilection for alternatives" (1991, 247).
10
Of course we recognise that much contemporary theory itself has begun to articulate analogous
forms of hermeneutic flexibility, as many thinkers now implicitly seek to avoid the dangers of
exclusivity and systematising. For instance, Fredric Jameson enunciates a critical strategy that is one
of "interdisciplinary transcodings", which makes attempts at "cognitive mappings" of "open
totalities". Or there is Lyotard's "paralogy" between "heterogeneous language games", Spivak's ever-
watchful openness to textual "aporia", and Said's conception above of a "secular critic" who can read
the hybrid realities of the world "contrapuntal ly".
Perhaps Bakhtin would consider such evolving flexibility as symptomatic of the "novelisation of
other genres" which would entail that:
They become more free and flexible, their language renews itself by incorporating
extraliterary heteroglossia and the 'novelistic' layers of literary language, they become
dialogised, permeated with laughter, irony, humour, elements of self-parody and finally—
this is the most important thing— the novel inserts into these other genres an indeterminacy,
a certain semantic openendedness, living contact with unfinished, still-evolving
contemporary reality. (1996, 7).
But the distinction in both premise and method between such formulations and ours remains, in that
none of them are derived novelistically; i.e. from a mode of discourse uniquely 'worlded' from
within, and premised upon the dynamic fullness of beings-in-their-worlds.
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Chapter 2): Narrative and Imperialism: Intersecting Histories, Inter-Related
Methodologies?
There isn't The Novel': There are only Novels.
Yet there would remain an inescapable air of bad faith about the rest of this study if it
was based solely on foundations of narrative 'potential' that presented 'the novel' as
some ideal narrative democracy, as if every actual text has always been potentially open
to everybody's story. Of itself, such a conception would be misleading and inadequate.
While not relinquishing what has been argued above about its intrinsic ontological
openness to fullness, to new stories as well as heterogeneous re-readings, of course we
remain aware of how disingenuous it would be to claim that actual novels are as open to
the world as their formal capacities would allow them, of forgetting the implications of
their production and situation, that there are always processes of (de)selection at work,
by a novelist who is him- or herself a being-in-the-world creating a thing for a world, all
of which embody discourses and their prejudices and limits. As Said establishes in so
much of his work, all such processes are 'worlded' from without; they come implicated
in ideologies and politics, and demonstrate and extend power and its imbalances,
whether the lacks and omissions are self-aware or not. The novel may well be
'worlded' from within and might carry implicit acknowledgement of its limits and
specificities, but that cannot excuse us from ignoring the issues involved in its being a
discourse in and of the world around it. Addressing questions of such imbalances has
particular relevance to any post-colonial discussion of the novel's heritage, before we
can move on to exploring its use and extension by African and Indian writers. The
novel has after all a European, primarily bourgeois provenance, and non-European (not
to mention non-bourgeois or non-male) characters have often been subjected to
exclusions and distortions at the hands of illustrious past practitioners. As we shall
explore in more detail in this chapter, for many post-colonial critics, inheriting the novel
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form is a problem (and a potential) comparable to inheriting the paradigm of
nationhood as a partially "derivative discourse", which in its earlier incarnations is so
inextricably associated with a high-industrial, imperialist, bourgeois Europe.
The given-ness of all human fullness and its being equally worth including and
examining, that we stated as the novel's basis, irrespective of sex or race or mental
health or any other ground of difference between those with the power to narrate and
publish and those without, has not been a working conviction for all novelists by any
means: again, this may be compared to how post-enlightenment modern nations
promising legal equality, liberty and justice to all their citizens, at least originally (and
perhaps even now) did not really ever mean all of their citizens, certainly not their black
population, their slaves, or women, to name just a few instances. In the same vein,
neither has doing everybody's supposedly infinite facets 'narrative justice' always
been a priority. Neither the novel nor the modern nation-state has ever been the Utopian
blank slate for everybody's equal and distinct humanity to inscribe itself upon, even if it
has ontologically (or constitutionally) promised such a potential. In fact there never is
or has been anything like 'the novel': there have only been particular novels and
novelists whose works are as error- and prejudice-prone as in any other field of
discourse.
As we draw nearer to the main body of this work, the post-colonial novel and its
attempts to interrogate the post-colonial nation, we will briefly examine some questions
to do with the legacy of the European novel, and the circumstances of its origins and
development, and extend these to asking about the very will to novelise, and the nature
of the power involved in a novelist's opportunity to represent. In later chapters such
questions will be examined more exhaustively in analogous relation to a nation's
capacity to exclude, violate or misrepresent sections of its citizens, as examined (or
reflected) in particular narratives. But for now, primarily through the work of Edward
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Said, we introduce the question of whether a narrative capacity is itself inherently
'colonialist'? Is there more than a coincidence in how the novel arose to pre-eminence
at the same time as European colonial domination was at its height? Is a fiction a
comparably 'imperialist' domain where characters only live and speak at the mercy of
their narrating master? Such questions create grave and complicated ironies for any
post-colonial novelistic project, and must be addressed at the outset of such a study.
Just as many post-colonial critics and thinkers argue about the perpetuation of
paradigms of nationhood which continue to repress and violate people rather than
liberate them because of basic structural and ideological issues that were never
addressed or altered after independence, we wish to ask how any writing can be truly
post-imperial if it is true that the same patterns of representational violation and control
are implicitly perpetuated through the very basis of novelistic narrating?
The Novel and 'Narrative Imperialism'.
In a chapter of Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said explicitly equates the will to
novelise with the 18th and 19th century European will to colonise, in an illustration of his
'contrapuntal' ideal of reading all texts as thoroughly 'worlded' interventions with
socio-economic and political origins and interpretative consequences. "Every novelist
and every critic or theorist of the European novel notes its institutional character. The
novel is fundamentally tied to bourgeois society" (1993, 83). And if global imperialism
was inseparably intertwined with Western bourgeois industrial modernity, then for Said
to make the diagnostic connection between the novel's bourgeois basis and the
imperialist implications of such origins, is but a short step:
Without empire, I would go so far as saying, there is no European novel as we
know it, and indeed if we study the impulses giving rise to it, we shall see the far
from accidental convergence between the patterns of narrative authority
constitutive of the novel on the one hand, and on the other, a complex
ideological configuration underlying the tendency to imperialism (82).
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He clarifies that he is "not trying to say that the novel— or the culture in the broad
sense— 'caused' imperialism, but that the novel as a cultural artefact of bourgeois
society, and imperialism are unthinkable without each other". He concludes that
"imperialism and the novel fortified each other to such a degree that it is impossible, I
would argue, to read one without in some way dealing with the other" (84):
The appropriation of history, the historicisation of the past, the narrativisation
of society, all of which give the novel its force, include the accumulation and
differentiation of social space, space to be used for social purposes [...].
[And | underlying social space are territories, lands, geographical domains, the
actual geographical underpinnings of the imperial, and also the cultural contest.
To think about distant places, to colonise them, to populate or depopulate them:
all this occurs on, about, or because of land. [...] Imperialism and the culture
associated with it affirm both the primacy of geography and an ideology about
control of territory. The geographical sense makes projections— imaginative,
cartographic, military, economic, historical, or in a general sense cultural. It also
makes possible the construction of various kinds of knowledge, all of them in
one way or another dependent upon the perceived character and destiny of a
particular geography (93).
It is an extraordinary claim, one that develops from the already broad charge against
two centuries of the European novel into an epistemological accusation against the form
itself. Said would presumably find naive (and Western-bourgeois) Saul Bellow's claim
that the novel is a "series of moments" where as writer or reader, "we are willingly
engrossed in the experiences of others" (1994, 62), because according to his line of
argument, the novelist does not confer voices on his or her various subjects or allow
their interactive multi-dimensionality to reveal itself; rather he or she controls and
regulates those voices with the same violence to produce narrative as a colonist would
have employed his slaves to produce sugar. For Said, the wills involved in either case
are comparable: "in both realms we find common values about contest, surmounting
odds and obstacles, and patience in establishing principle with profit over time" (83).
In this particular chapter of Culture and Imperialism, much of his substantiation of
these large charges rests upon a single point in a single work: why does Jane Austen in
Mansfield Park pay such little attention— no more than ideologically 'neutral' passing
mentions— to Sir Thomas Bertram's slave holdings in Antigua? This, for Said,
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establishes her complicity with the colonial project, in her unquestioning assumption of
its 'normality':
The nineteenth-century English novels stress the continuing existence (as
opposed to revolutionary overturning) of England. Moreover they never
advocate the giving up of colonies, but take the long-range view that since they
fall within the orbit of British dominance, that dominance is a sort of norm, and
thus conserved along with the colonies (88).
Of course it is as appropriate (and valuable) for Said to point out and re-interpret the
repressions within and around Austen's apparently self-contained, enclosed universe,
as it is for him to situate any cultural production in the context of the diverse currents
producing it; but even if we take the thoroughly valid point about the omissions in her
text, is it enough evidence to establish his indictment of the form itself as collaboratively
colonialist in its very methods? He demonstrates convincingly that no novelist is
immune to his or her immersion in the ideologies and 'normalised' assumptions of
their age, and no work uninfected by incompleteness.11 But are Austen's particular
lacks reflective of a fundamental lack within fiction itself, because if it is so, it would
imply crucially ironic consequences, potentially paralysing even, for any post-imperial
inheritors of such a 'tainted' tradition? These charges question the very basis of
fictionalising, and therefore require ontologically premised responses. We will here
begin to articulate a defence building on the work of the previous chapter, even though
any credible defending must inevitably stand or fall on the substance of our actual
readings of post-colonial texts themselves.
"
This is not to undercut Said's point about the exclusion of Antigua, but within the bounds of
Mansfield Park itself, we do see the performance and the implications of Sir Bertram's 'benevolent'
patriarchy at home on his wife and family, which might metonymically allow us to imagine what sort
of slave-master he may be. For instance, his tyranny drives both his daughters to desperate
elopements just to get away from their home, thus portraying a degree of desperation rare in Austen's
world.
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Refuting 'Narrative Imperialism': a) Fiction's Irreducible Polyglossia, and
the Question of Textual Ideology.
As an important initial point of dissent, we must point out how throughout this book,
Said conflates different genres in his excavation of the blind spots in Western high
culture that condone or ignore imperialism. Thus an Austen or Conrad novel is
interpreted in the same way as a racist speech that Ruskin once made in Oxford, or an
essay of Carlyle's. This is entirely consistent as a critical approach where the novel is
only considered a discourse among discourses with nothing ontologically distinct about
itself. But alternatively we could re-employ Bakhtin and his conception of the novel's
unique capacity to contain raucous, unresolved heteroglossia, that is irreducible to a
monologic authorial voice or intention in the way a speech or an essay might be. For
Bakhtin, such "authoritative discourse" as the latter "demands that we acknowledge it,
that we make it our own; it binds us, [...] we encounter it with its authority already
fused to it" (1996, 342):
[Such "centripetal" modes of] discourse permit no play with the context
framing [them], no play with [their] borders, no gradual and flexible transitions,
no spontaneously creative stylising variants on [them], [Such discourse] enters
our verbal consciousness as a compact and indivisible mass; one must either
totally affirm it, or totally reject it. It is indissolubly fused with its authority—
with political power, an institution, a person... (343).
Yet if existence is viewed from an embodied, dialogic, and thereby thoroughly
relativised perspective such as we have argued always underlies the speaking voices
within any fiction, if it is believed that any "living utterance, having taken meaning and
shape at a particular historical moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to
brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological
consciousness around the given object of an utterance, [and so] cannot fail to become
an active participant in social dialogue" (Bakhtin, 1996, 276), then the novel, as the
discursive medium most committed to representing such multivalent meaningfulness, is
inevitably "penetrated by this dialogic play of verbal intentions [...]; such [a form]
need not stifle these forces, but on the contrary may activate and organise them" (277):
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For the writer of artistic prose, [...] the object reveals first of all precisely the
socially heteroglot multiplicity of its names, definitions and value judgements.
Instead of the virginal fullness and inexhaustibility of the object itself, the prose
writer confronts a multitude of routes, roads and paths that have been laid down
in the object by social consciousness. Along with the internal contradictions
inside the object itself, the prose writer witnesses as well the unfolding of social
heteroglossia surrounding the object (278).
Bakhtin goes as far as to assert that since "both object and language are [always]
revealed to the novelist in their historical dimension, in the process of social and
heteroglot becoming, for [him] there is no world outside his socio-heteroglot
perception— and there is no language outside the heteroglot intentions that stratify that
world (330). This degree of "internal dialogisation" (284) implies that the "descriptive
and expressive means" employed within novels forever "so to speak, criticise
themselves" (45). We have seen how he anticipates the critical problems involved in
attempting to force such "centrifugal" narratives to fit any one interpretative intention,
as well as in treating the novel as being exactly equivalent to any other mode of
discourse:
The utter inadequacy of literary theory is exposed when it is forced to deal with
the novel. In the case of other genres literary theory works confidently and
precisely, since there is a finished and already formed object, definite and clear.
[... J Everything works as long as there is no mention of the novel. Faced with
the problem of the novel, genre theory must submit to a radical re-structuring.
(8).
A novel can include alternative envisionings of the same questions simply by dissolving
disagreeing selves, their autonomous voices and interrelated contexts, and performing
their conflicts within the same story. In the 'polyphonic universe' of The Brothers
Karamazov for instance, Dostoyevsky can portray contests of perspectives over every
element he explores (selfhood, sovereignty, God), and the narrative still carries the
implications of the resulting conflicts and paralyses. Is all such unresolved dialogic
cacophony, where we encounter in near equal proportions atheism and the consequent
existential agonies in one brother (Ivan), and faith and its consoling, justifying rewards
in another (Alyosha), not to mention murderers, monks, gluttons and bastards besides,
really reducible in our readings to one dominant ideology espoused by the text (which
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would 'prove' some thesis or dogma, in the way that all 18th and 19th century English
novels prove to Said the "far from accidental convergence between the patterns of
narrative authority on the one hand, and, on the other, complex ideological
configurations underlying the tendency to imperialism" (1993, 82)?12 To consider even
a much more 'univocal' instance, isn't the narrative T of Notes from Underground
instantly embodied, located, and relativised precisely by the voice admitting to its
narration, so that there is never any illusion about its omniscience?
Medvedev and Bakhtin describe the limitations of all those rigid interpreters of
novelistic narrative who would reduce or arrest its dynamic capacity to generate
readings into any final statements of 'textual ideology':
[They | finalised and dogmatised basic ideological points reflected by the artist
in his work, thus turning active and generating problems into ready theses,
statements, and philosophical, ethical, political, religious, etc. conclusions.
[They ] did not consider or understand the vital fact that the essential content of
literature only reflects generating ideologies, only reflects the living process of
the generation of the ideological horizon. [...]
For in the ideological horizon of any epoch and any social group there is not
one, but several mutually contradictory truths, not one but several diverging
ideological paths. [...] Even within the limits of a thesis, party or belief, one is
not able to 'rest on his laurels'. The course of ideological generation will
present him with two new paths, two truths, and so on. The ideological horizon
is constantly developing— as long as one does not get bogged down in some
swamp. Such is the dialectic of real life.
12
Kundera for one argues that very different interpretative implications are opened up by the
irreducibly 'dialogic' nature of novelistic narrative:
Creating the imaginary terrain where moral judgement is suspended was a move of enormous
significance: only there could novelistic characters develop— that is, individuals conceived
not as a function of some pre-existent truth, as examples of good or evil, or as
representations of objective laws in conflict, but as autonomous beings grounded in their
own morality, in their own laws. Western society habitually presents itself as the society of
the rights ofman; but before a man could have rights, to consider himself as such and to be
considered such; that could not happen without the long experience of the European arts and
particularly of the art of the novel, which teaches the reader to be curious about others and to
try and comprehend truths that differ from his own (1996, 7-8).
This is an entirely alternative genealogy of the link between the novel and its worldly and political
implications, one which proposes that such narrative is potentially voice-conferring, rather than
colonising, even in its representations of otherness (again, without taking away from Said's point
about numerous exclusions and misrepresentations). The question of such ontological 'voice-
conferring' potential even when confronted by radical difference, and its implications for post-colonial
writing, are investigated below.
40
And the more intensive, impetuous, and difficult this process of generation is,
and the more substantially and deeply it is reflected in a genuine work of art, the
more ideological, interested and attentive the reaction of the critic |... ] will be.
[...]
But it is bad if the critic imposes a thesis on the artist, a thesis in the sense of
the 'last word', and not as the generation of an idea. It is bad if the critic forgets
that there is no philosophy in literature, only philosophising, no knowledge, but
only the process of cognition (1978, 19-20).
b) The Question of Authorial Ideology.
Of course, closely related to questions of the dominance of any particular ideological
horizon within a novel, are doubts regarding the role, power and position of authorial
intervention. For instance, referring to Bakhtin's exposition of Dostoyevskian
'dialogics' Simon Dentith qualifies that "while it is certainly true that [...]
Dostoyevsky's novels go to extraordinary lengths to grant authority to the word of his
characters, it is hard to agree that no effort is made to sort them into some kind of
hierarchy (1995, 45). He continues:
It would be a strange reading of The Brothers Karamazov, for example, that did
not recognise the massive weight of authorial authority lying behind the
discourses of the elder Zossima and Alyosha, or the intense unease surrounding
Ivan's anguished atheism. These overarching commitments remain over and
above the internal dialogisation to which they are subject within the novel, and
are strikingly reinforced by the structure of the book, by the narrative outcomes
(however inconclusive), in short by the whole overall force of the novel. [...] In
fact is impossible to imagine a novelist who does not sort the words of his or
her characters into some sort of hierarchy of significance (45).
Elsewhere, Bakhtin and Medvedev point out the refracted ideological presence of
authorial perspective as embodied in (and shaping) the characters and horizons of a
fiction: "the hero of a novel [...] if taken out of the novelistic structure, is not at all a
social type in the strict sense, but is only the ideological refraction of a given social type
[...], the ideological refraction [...] in the social consciousness of a definite social
group [... | to which [the author] belongs" (1978, 21).13
13
They use the example of Turgenev and his hero Bazarov in Fathers and Sons. For an extended
discussion see Bakhtin and Medvedev (1978, 21-22).
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It is with such complications in mind that we must respond to Said's implication that
authorial control might be analogous to colonial authority; and needless to add, we must
do so on novelistic grounds alone, without ever lapsing into arguments of aesthetic
'purity' and/or ideological 'neutrality'. Bakhtin and Medvedev themselves go on to
provide the basis of a response:
It is true that this ideologeme [i.e. the presence of a particular type of hero as
refracted by the perspective of the author's specific socio-ideological
standpoint! [...], upon entering the novel and becoming a dependent structural
element of the artistic whole, in no way ceases to be an ethical, philosophical
ideologeme. On the contrary, it brings to the structure of the novel all its extra-
artistic ideological meaning, all its seriousness, and the fullness of its
ideological responsibility (1978, 22).
Yet, not only is it both essentialist and simplistic to judge the author or his work thereby
according to any pre-determined ideological bind without taking detailed account of
specific depictions (i.e. the argument that an author thus socially situated can only
create a certain manner of character and put forward a defined range of perspectives), it
would be premised upon a crucial misunderstanding of the nature of novelised material.
Bakhtin and Medvedev themselves attach the following caveats against any manner of
interpretative determinism:
But, without losing its direct meaning, the ideologeme, in entering the artistic
work, enters into a chemical, not mechanical, relationship, with the features of
artistic ideology. Its ethical, philosophical spirit becomes an ingredient of poetic
spirit, and its ethical-philosophical responsibility is absorbed by the totality of
the author's artistic responsibility for the whole of his artistic statement. The
latter, of course, is as much a social statement as an ethical, philosophical,
political or any other ideological statement is [...]
[Thus] the unquestioned presence of the ethical-philosophical ideologeme in the
composition of the artistic whole far from guarantees its correct and
methodologically pure extraction. It is in chemical combination with the artistic
ideologeme. [...]
The extra-artistic ideologeme, in chemical combination with the artistic
construction, forms the thematic unity of the given work. [...] All of this admits
of special study following special methods (21-22).
Once again, they specifically warn that "it |becomesJ necessary to take still stricter
account of the fact that the ideologeme itself and the ideological horizon which enfolds
it are in the process of generation (1978, 23), and that in most cases the work of
isolating "extra-artistic ideologemes from artistic structures" (in the way that Said
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presents evidence separated from its novelised context) is possibly "baseless and
futile" (22). Besides, such extrapolation risks committing the added error of confusing
the "reflection of the ideological purview to be the direct reflection f...] of life itself':
[Such work] does not take into account the fact that the literary reflects only the
ideological horizon, which itself is only the refracted reflection of real existence.
To reveal the world depicted by the artist is not to penetrate into the actual
reality of life (1978, 18).
Bakhtin does not leave unconsidered the question Dentith raises— of authorial
prejudice/ideological orientation didactically weighting the structure of the novel or
privileging a particular hierarchy of perspectives:
Even when [...] the novelist comes forward with his own unitary and fully
affirming language (without any distancing, refraction or qualifications) he
knows that such language is not self-evident and is not in itself incontestable,
that it is uttered in a heteroglot environment, that such a language must be
championed, [...] defended, motivated. In a novel even such unitary and direct
language is polemical and apologetic, that is, it inter-relates dialogically with
heteroglossia. It is precisely this that defines the utterly distinctive orientation of
discourse in the novel-— an orientation that is contested, contestable and
contesting— for this discourse cannot forget or ignore, either through naivete or
by design, the heteroglossia that surrounds it. [...]
Thus when an aesthete undertakes to write a novel, his aestheticism is [...]
revealed [...] in the fact that in the novel there is represented a speaking person
who happens to be an ideologue for aestheticism, who exposes convictions that
are then subjected [...] to contest (1996, 332-333).
Thus, for any voice that has entered this particular terrain of discourse— no matter how
opinionated or evidently authorial— it is impossible to escape its inevitable
characteristics: of being situated, specific, immersed in and conflicting with other voices
and perspectives, and all the resulting implications of interpretative relativity and
multiplicity that are released thereby. The very form, by containing the unresolved
aggregate of all of these conflicting voices, and at the same time only some such
possible voices, will always deny itself any fullness or finality: even an apparently
14
This last objection also underlies our insistence in this thesis that our discussion confines itself
solely to the issues raised by the worlds within novels, rather than attempting to mediate in any
simplistic way between literary argument and 'actual' socio-historical/ideological analysis of the
worlds (and national 'realities') these novels describe. All such analysis will be performed only upon
fictionalised subjects, also because proving the possibility and extent of such work is after all one of
our primary purposes.
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'omniscient', disembodied narratorial voice is instantly contextualised by the fact that
after all it can only concentrate on a few stories and situations. For all these reasons, no
statement uttered within (or about) the multiple yet particular, dynamic and open-ended
world of a novel can ever be treated as absolute or universal. In distinguishing a
polyphonic work from any mode of monological discussion, Morson and Emerson
describe "a change in the author's position" because the "form-shaping ideology
itself demands that the author cease to surrender monologic control (1990, 238):
Polyphony demands a work in which several consciousnesses meet as equals
and engage in a dialogue that is in principle unfinalisable. [...] The direct power
to mean, which in a monologic work belongs to the author alone, belongs to
several voices in a polyphonic work. [...] [ItJ embodies dialogic truth by
allowing the consciousness of a character to be truly 'someone else's
consciousness'. [...]
In order to create a truly polyphonic work, the author must be able to confront
his characters as equals. His own ideology may receive expression in the work;
[... | it may be defended passionately by one or the other character or by the
narrator. What is new [...] is that others may and do contest the author's
ideology as equals (1990, 239).15
And of course, such unique characteristics demand a corresponding change in our
position as critics. The diverse voices and life-trajectories represented within the novel
that continually interact to perform their own 'deconstruction', that are seen and heard
autonomously and yet delineated along with all their limits and oppositions, allow for
(invite) an equivalently Barthesian release of readings. Even the novelist's attempts at
arresting the implications of his own narrative through certain forms of resolution or
closure do not need to be accepted by the reader, because in adopting this medium he
has surrendered the privilege of sole 'authority', and accepted to be a mere version
among versions. It is precisely the dynamism and diversity of the dialogisation
unleashed throughout a novel's course, as well as the self-evident limits of its inevitable
15
They go on to develop these ideas in a theory of the authorial 'surplus' as renounced by the
novelist (defined as the "knowledge of essential facts unavailable to the characters" (1990, 241) yet
held by their creator), where only "such a renunciation can enable characters to be relatively free and
independent" (241). For a fuller discussion see Morson and Emerson (241-243).
For the fullest performance of these ideas as demonstrated within this study, see our analysis of
Ngugi's novels in Chapter 3.
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specificities, that provide critics with more angles of dissent and re-entry than any other
mode of discourse. It would require a very mechanical conception of the relationship
that exists between author, text, and reader to distil the transmission of interpretations
that occur between them into predictably didactic patterns (according to which the writer
sends and each individual reader receives similar messages, based deterministically on
their respective social locations and transmitted clearly and faithfully by the novel).
None of these processes or entities can be essentialised and resolved into any final
programme of textual/authorial ideology.
c) The Invitation to Re-Inscribe.
Further, the novel's invitation to being re-read is also a stage in the equally open
invitation it offers to being radically re-written. In a famous critique of Heart of
Darkness, Chinua Achebe cannot accept Conrad's novella being considered "a great
work of art", because in his reading he finds that it "celebrates" the
"dehumanisation" of its black non-characters, and no novel is a great one "which
depersonalises a portion of the human race" (1988, 8-9). But if more than the
individual misrepresentations of Austen or Conrad, it is fictionalising itself that is
inherently imperialist, how did Achebe manage to turn his grievance with Conrad's
'dehumanisation' of Africans in a novel, into an alternative rendering of them through
other novels? Surely the form itself, if it was so fundamentally implicated in Euro-
imperialist ways of narrativising, should have rendered such re-inscriptions
impossible?16 Or do Achebe and other such re-inscribers (Rhys, Coetzee, Peter Carey)
also become 'narrative imperialists' the moment they begin to re-present? Achebe
16
Said himself recognises this re-inscriptive potential in the same chapter, though his doubts about
the novel's implicit tendencies towards narrative imperialism have not disappeared: "on the one hand,
when in a celebrated essay Chinua Achebe criticises Conrad's racism, he either says nothing about or
overrides the limitations placed on Conrad by the novel as an aesthetic form. On the other hand,
Achebe shows that he understands how the form works when, in some of his own novels, he rewrites-
— painstakingly and with originality— Conrad" (1993, 91).
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displays an acute awareness of what it implies to possess the potential for
representation (which always includes the potential to misrepresent):
In the end I began to understand. There is such a thing as absolute power over
narrative. Those who secure this privilege for themselves can arrange stories
about others pretty much where, and as, they like. Just as in corrupt, totalitarian
regimes, those who exercise power over others can do anything (2000, 24).
But as part of the same process of recognition he re-affirms his conviction in the re-
inscriptive invitation made possible by narrative:
It began to dawn on me that although fiction was undoubtedly fictitious it
could also be true or false, not with the truth or falsehood of a news item but as
to its disinterestedness, its intention, its integrity... And reading came to mean
reading with greater scrutiny and sometimes rereading with adult eyes what I
had first read in the innocence of my literary infancy and adolescence [... J.
[YetJ I am glad to reassure everyone about my abiding faith in the profession
of literature, and further to suggest that the kind of careful and even cautious
mode of reading that I am impliedly advocating does not signal despair; rather it
is the strongest vote of confidence we can give our writers and their work (33-
34). |... 1 Everywhere new ways to write about Africa have appeared, reinvesting
the continent and its people with humanity, free at last of those stock situations
and those stock characters, 'never completely human', that had dominated
European writing about Africa for hundreds of years (49).
None of this is intended to challenge Said's particular points about Mansfield Park,
Vanity Fair, or Heart of Darkness, but is it really possible to make the large and
ultimately essentialising claim, when we survey a trans-historical, trans-national history
of the novel, that fiction has always been a kind of 'narrative colonialism'
deterministically defined in each local instance by some inherently conservative
bourgeois-imperialist limits, both in its subjects and in the value-systems it propagates?
Perhaps these are questions impossible to settle theoretically here and now, but our
readings of individual novels throughout this study will revisit these doubts and attempt
repeatedly to engage with them, because they are fundamental to deciding if novelistic
vision creates as distinct and potentially inclusive a discourse as we have claimed for it,
and if the novelist's will to narrate multiple, conflicting selves and worlds is more than
the will to subjugate them.17
17
Oddly enough, Said is a novel-lover himself and he contradictorily cautions us in the same chapter:
"for all their social presence, novels are not reducible to a sociological current and cannot be done
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d) The Novel's Demand for Novelty, and its Post-Colonial Relevance.
Our final point in this statement of dissent is to do with this potential for radical re-
inscription and its particular relevance to the post-colonial writer: the possibility always
asking to be appropriated by any fiction's own implicit tensions— of transforming
through re-performing. Based on the example above (of Achebe among numerous
others) and the more general propositions of the chapter before, we will argue that the
novel, in its ontological openness to existential fullness and its formal flexibility
towards being inscribed by various voices and trajectories of narrative, offers— to
anyone in a position to utilise it— an opportunity to seize such a potential and re-
embody it, re-write again and again new attempts to realise it. If existence is beyond
encompassing, and all there ever is by way of narrative are the stories of variously
situated particular selves (by variously 'worlded' particular authors, as Said correctly
demonstrates) then the novel, rather than extending and confirming 'narrative
colonialism' by imposing the illusions of omniscience or finality, can be seen as ever-
open to the possibility of its own retellings, with the centering of a new subject, new
voices and the imagining of new perspectives. Achebe disagreed deeply with the way
Conrad, Joyce Cary and Karen Blixen had depicted Africans, so he went ahead and
novelised Africans in his own way. (There is an easily imaginable novel that could be
written imagining Austen's Sir Thomas Bertram in Antigua managing his plantation,
thereby filling out the suppressions in the earlier narrative. Nothing about the form
disallows this: in fact the demand is implicit for any novelist interested, only he or she
in turn would inevitably omit narrating some other worlds, stories, and dimensions, and
still more novelising would ensue).
Oskar Matzerath, a confessed asylum inmate, or Saleem Sinai, who is physically
crumbling to bits by the end of Midnight's Children, and any other marginal voice can
justice to aesthetically, culturally, and politically as subsidiary forms of class, ideology, or interest
(1993,87).
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be realised by a novelist within a work of fiction, with no effect whatsoever on its
validity as a work of fiction. If the novel's domain is as open and de-centred as
Bakhtin's heteroglossic readings find it to be, then anybody in that melee can occupy a
page and start talking, either within the same novel (in its 'dialogic' inner universe), or,
if a certain voice has been misrepresented or excluded altogether, in a new one. Though
the novelist's subjectivity is a given limit, its limits only exist until next redefined. But
there is also the privilege of his positioning, of subjecthood. This has been the
opportunity it offers the post-colonial writer, for anybody ever written out and
objectified by another's 'objectivity'.
Saul Bellow grants that literary styles and fashions might wear out, like Sensibility,
Realism, or Symbolism do, "without exhausting either the mystery of mankind or the
capacity of the novel to narrate it" (Bradbury, 1978, 69). If the history of fiction has
created and survived a Finnegan's Wake, and can accommodate with equal validity
everything distinct a Ngugi and a Nabokov have to bring to it, it is because it allows
quarrel with itself relentlessly, in form and in focus; because no novel needs to agree
with any other's openings or apparent closures, its subjects or its styles. The novel is
always novel because subjectivity can never be transcended, which means it is forever
open to revision. We wish to argue that this capacity has been part of its fundamental
potential for the post-colonial novelist (and that this has meant much more than their
merely becoming 'native' bourgeois 'narrative imperialists' in their turn, as Said's
essentialist generalisation would imply). Within our thesis, the novel survives because it
bases its capacity for re-inscription on an ontological openness to life's infinite re-
interpretability. Carlos Fuentes surmises that the novel is able to be and do all it can
because it can be "the genre without genre, or the genre of all genres" (1989, 77),
because "its formal definition is uncertainty and this lack of certainty leads it to look
for openings" (88):
The novel, if it is a genre at all, is an open genre, and openness means, again in
Bakhtinian terms, dialogue, but not only dialogue of characters; it also means
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dialogue of genres, of languages, of historical times, of civilisations, of
unpublished possibilities.
The novel both reflects and creates an unfinished world made by men and
women who are also unfinished. Neither the world not its inhabitants have said
their last word. The potential novel is thus the announcement and perhaps even
the guaranty of a potential history. Of a potential life (88).
This potential novel forever able to announce new potential histories is the ontological
opportunity every writer is always free to heterogeneously re-realise, and what this
chapter will finally focus on as being particularly relevant to post-colonial narratives.
The Novel, the Nation, and the Post-Colonial: Themes and Aims.
This is the point at which the rest of the study devotes itself exclusively to post-colonial
issues and fictions. Through all the foundation-laying hitherto and the readings that are
to come, this thesis will propose that when the novel narrates nations, it can pay an
especially comprehensive attention to the various possible multivalent and co-existent
implications of nationhood. Fictional narrative can put the diverse details of
'nationhood' (as state and society) through uniquely exhaustive existential
engagements in ways cultural/political theory, sociology or general historiography
cannot (of course, such a claim would include applying and examining numerous non-
novelistic theories and conceptions of post-colonial nationhood through the fictions we
will analyse). This is particularly relevant to post-colonial societies, for most of whom
the popular post-independence organising paradigm, for better or for worse, has been
the nation-state. We will argue that the post-colonial novel, as evidenced in the work of
certain Indian and African writers, has been used to comprehensively interrogate
'nationhood' as a specific set of ways/premises by which to direct and structure
societies, by demonstrating how various novels have dissolved together in simultaneous
performance the spectrum of disparate agents, processes, trajectories and existential
dimensions (selves, families, ethnicities, locations, cultural values, class formations,
economic choices, institutions and competing ideologies) that national becoming
involves— through their capacities for performing Bakhtinian 'heteroglossia', and what
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Tolstoy argues in War and Peace to be fiction's capacity for creating a 'narrative
calculus' (a term we define in the next section). Bakhtin posits that "the national
literary language of a people with a highly developed art of prose, especially if it is
novelistic prose with a rich and tension-filled verbal-ideological history, is in fact an
organised microcosm that reflects the macrocosm [...] of national heteroglossia,"
(1996, 295). Because of its uniquely versatile capacities of form and content, we will
argue that such discourse can rigorously inspect nations through various simultaneous
levels while voicing its subject matter from a great range of perspectives and locations—
- considering the impact of inhabiting nations from the point of view of the individual
self (as with Leopold Bloom), to examining the nation as a dynamic terrain composed
of the interactive becomings of variously situated selves (again, as with Bloom's
Dublin). Through the modes of 'novelistic criticism' we have tried to establish, we will
explore how the post-colonial novel has tried to narrate the immense, interactive range
of human content disguised under the sign 'nation'— simultaneously political, social,
psychic, economic and interpersonal— and thereby study how the novel can
experimentally examine the existential coherence of nations, or deconstruct any such
appearance. Our thesis is based on the premise that what is most valuable about fiction
is that it can treat these questions not only theoretically, but in their interactively
'worlded' and dynamic fullness, and evoke them all together at once. And moreover, in
the very process of doing so, it can simultaneously foreground questions and problems
relating to its own strategies of interpreting and representing and perform them as part
of the same narratives, often to the point of crisis.
Yet we will also ask if these novels find nationhood to be the only political paradigm
under which to organise post-colonial existence. A section of this study (Section 4) will
examine how certain novelists have envisioned alternative trajectories of being-in-the-
world and heterogeneously premised terms of self-conception and fraternity, thus
creating histories that do not look to 'national history' or the structures of modern
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statehood for their validation. This last query applies also to the narratives about and by
the women in these societies: another section (3) will examine fictions that focus on
their particular relationships with their national histories, as well as distinct dimensions,
voices and trajectories that cannot be encompassed within such categories.
The above questions will comprise the material for separate sections, but if the
performance throughout of our critical interrogations will be novelistic, it will also
contain everywhere the self-deconstructive doubt implicit in all the questions above,
implicit most of all in the best novels. This is the last of the inter-related aims of this
study: putting the novel through the test of its own narratives. Perhaps the exhaustive
examination works both ways, and it is not just the novel that puts the construction of
the post-colonial nation through uniquely demanding interrogations? How elastic (and
plastic) does the transplanted form itself prove to be under the strain of narrating the
immense heterogeneity of post-colonial national life, along with all the violence and
disjunctures such historical becomings have often included? Is representing such
diverse fullness beyond even the novel's capacities? In the range and depth of their
narrative engagements, we propose that post-colonial novels have been uniquely poised
not only to utilise and demonstrate various aspects of the discursive potential that
fiction possesses, but also to perform in a singularly demanding way the question many
critics and theorists seem to consider already answered— regarding the 'death' of the
novel. There seems to us to be only one test worth taking of whether the history of the
novel is over, or whether History itself has terminated the novel. How much of the
relentless interactivity of human beings in and as history in diverse trajectories, voices,
and locations, can such narrative continue to include without imploding on its own
contents? How fully the post-colonial novel can confront this doubt is everything that
this study is about.
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A Note about the Canon, and the Boundaries of our Study.
We will restrict ourselves to discussing selected African and Indian novels written in
English as illustrative/representative of the 'post-colonial' in this study. It will become
evident that it is the post-colonial novel, and the demonstration of the range of (stories
and) issues raised by its diverse engagements with national existence in these societies,
and not any particular novelist or national literature, that is the true protagonist and
purpose respectively of this thesis. That is why this study is deliberately comparative,
rather than organised under the sign of any one writer or country. It is meant to be
guided and held together by its own themes and preoccupations leading to a
demonstration of the novel's distinct nation-narrating capacities and the extent of its
'worlded' narrative engagement, and its discoveries and their implications.
Yet a suspicion of arbitrariness cannot of course be avoided. The novels I have picked
seemed to me to contain complex, multi-layered responses to the themes of national
becoming, out ofmy (inevitably limited) reading. Yet there is no effort to be exhaustive,
only illustrative. Other works probably carry the points we make from out of these
novels or dispute them, but that would not contradict our primary thesis-purpose, that of
demonstrating the post-colonial novel's general capacity to evoke such a wide complex
of worlded, formal, hermeneutic, historiographic, and theoretical issues simultaneously
as they emerge from out of the depth and range of its narrative engagements with these
societies.
Perhaps it would be easier to define at the outset what we imply in our use of the term
'post-colonial'. Broadly then, we intend to investigate only texts comprising narrative
trajectories that occur within the geographical territories of certain African nation-states
and India. Our interrogation will also be limited in time to novels involved with the
post-independence phases of such histories, as opposed to those written after
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independence but investigating pre-colonial pasts or the colonial period.18 These
boundaries also imply that within the scope of this study we do not intend to investigate
'post-coloniality' in the sense of, for instance, themes to do with the hybrid
postcolonial metropolis in Europe or the status of the postcolonial intellectual in the
Western academy. Furthermore, implicit in comparative criticism is the
acknowledgement of differences in the texts compared, and one of the primary critical
methods of this study will be to make constant, mobile thematic connections between
novels, theories, and histories without collapsing or subsuming radical heterogeneity
under the same interpretative categories. We will also thereby be implicitly asking if
these narratives of certain post-independence African societies and India display
existential features, themes and details, that are mutually shared enough to justify being
collectivised as 'post-colonial'? Or are these novels more specific both in form and
content than such an overarching term could ever contain?
The Question of English?
Perhaps any note on the language restrictions defining this study needs to be prefaced
with a qualification. We have clarified already that the 'worldly' implications (in the
Saidian sense)— of interrogating the extra-textual contexts and consequences of
fictional production and consumption— are not among our pre-occupations; that this
thesis, for reasons of purpose as well as size, can only limit itself to discussing the
'inner worlds' and 'worldedness' of novels— the depth and range of their engagement
with national life, rather than studying novels as historical events in the worlds they
arise from. The latter would clearly form the subject for numerous other alternatively
premised studies, requiring historical, political and sociological research of the actual
conditions surrounding these novels in their particular societies, in order to come up
18
There are three exceptions to these principles: Burger's Daughter by Gordimer, Coetzee's Life and
Times ofMichael K, and Rushdie's Shame. The first two are set during the apartheid era in South
Africa: Shame is set in Pakistan (rather than India). In each case, the reason for our choice was their
exemplary exposition of a range of themes essential to our study of individual and social processes of
decolonisation.
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with ways of calibrating their social influence. Thus, without insinuating for a moment
that the choice of a specific language over others is ever socio-politically neutral, we
would have to insist that (for instance) debating extremely legitimate questions
regarding the class boundaries of the readership for these fictions do not really fall
within our purview. And so when Ngugi argues regarding "the whole area of literature
and audience, and hence of language as a determinant of both the national and the class
audience" (1986, 6), that European-language writing in Africa remains "caged within
the linguistic fence of its colonial inheritance", and that this is its "greatest weakness"
("the petty-bourgeoisie readership automatically assumed by the very choice of
language" (21-22)), it would require an expertise (and focus) different from our own to
enter into prolonged debate with him.
Since it is not our purpose then to prove the depth of the 'actual' national impact these
fictions have had on their societies, we have to accrue our 'nation building' credentials
on different terms. The terrain upon which our study can and will implicitly take up
debate throughout its course is that of the novels themselves. In a famous and extended
polemic against the use of European languages in African literatures, Ngugi represents
language as being one of the primary carriers of any culture: "the collective memory
bank of a people's experience in history" (1986, 15). He then goes on to argue that
there occurred under colonialism a "dissociation of the sensibility of [a] child from his
natural and social environment, what we might call colonial alienation":
The alienation became reinforced in the teaching of history, geography, music,
where bourgeois Europe was always the centre of the universe.
This dissociation, divorce, or alienation from the immediate environment
becomes clearer when you look at colonial language as a carrier of culture.
Since culture is a product of the history of a people which it in turn reflects, the
child was now being exposed exclusively to a culture that was a product of a
world external to himself. He was being made to stand outside himself to look
at himself. |... ]
[Further], since culture does not just reflect the world in images but actually,
through those very images, conditions a child to see that world in a certain way,
the colonial child was made to see the world and where he stands in it as seen
and defined by or reflected in the culture of the language of imposition.
But obviously it was [made] worse when the colonial child was exposed to
images of his world as mirrored in the written languages of his coloniser.
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Where his own native languages were associated in his impressionable mind
with low status, humiliation, corporal punishment, slow-footed intelligence and
ability or downright stupidity, this was reinforced by the world he met in the
works of such geniuses of racism as a Rider Haggard or a Nicholas
Montserrat; not to mention some of the giants of Western intellectual and
political establishment (17-18).
Combining this historical portrait with an analysis of the relationship between class and
language persisting throughout post-colonial Africa, Ngugi makes a compelling case
for what he sees as the inevitable lacks and limits in the content of European-language
African fictions, written by and for the petty bourgeoisie:
Because of its indeterminate economic position between the many contending
classes, the petty bourgeoisie develops a vacillating psychological make-up.
[...] This lack of identity in its social and psychological make-up as a class, was
reflected in the very literature it produced [...]. In literature as in politics it
spoke as if its identity or the crisis of its own identity was that of society as a
whole. The literature it produced in European languages was given the identity
of African literature as if there had never been literature in African languages.
Yet by avoiding a real confrontation with the language issue, it was clearly
wearing false robes of identity: it was a pretender to the throne of mainstream
African literature. [... ]
In the process this literature created, falsely and even absurdly, an English-
speaking (or French or Portuguese) African peasantry and working class, a
clear negation or falsification of the historical process and reality. This
European-language-speaking peasantry and working class, existing only in
novels and dramas, was at times invested with the vacillating mentality, the
evasive self-contemplation, the existential anguished human condition, or the
man-torn-between-two-worlds-facedness of the petty bourgeoisie (22).
All of which leads Ngugi to his well known conclusion: "African literature can only be
written in African languages, that is, the languages of the African peasantry and
working class, the major alliance of classes in each of our nationalities and the agency
for the coming inevitable revolutionary break with neo-colonialism" (27).
Such accusations— of class hegemony leading to exclusions and misrepresentations
that combine to form a distorted national picture— are closely comparable to those
levelled often against English-language literature in India, both by commentators
sharing and others outside of Ngugi's particular ideological convictions;19 and taken
19
Salman Rushdie lists some of the more common charges: "its practitioners are denigrated for being
too upper-middle-class; for lacking diversity in their choice of themes and techniques; for being less
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together, they constitute a fundamental challenge to our project. Would all the inclusive
qualities we have claimed on behalf of fiction in general, and the post-colonial nation-
building novel specifically, founder on the choice of language? Within these contexts,
would the adoption of English with its related socio-ideological implications affect
(distort) the content of such novels to the extent that they are cut off at source from all
their plastic, radically reinscriptive, exploratory potential? And yet, such questions beg
their inevitable corollaries: are we not re-asserting that language can be a guarantor of
an untranslatable 'authenticity', and conversely, that the adoption of a European
language (which to such critics can never be indigenised or re-directed in any
meaningfully comprehensive way), automatically and rigidly determines the ideological
attitudes and social range portrayed within a text? Is there not implied various modes of
essentialism in premising the range and quality of novelistic depiction achieved a priori
upon factors such as language, or even the class of the writer and his readership?
Ngugi clarifies that while a "writer's handling of the material [is] affected by his
material base in society, that is his class position and standpoint", this "does not
necessarily produce good or bad writing, or rather a consciously held outlook does not
necessarily make for bad or good writing" (78). Of course, Achebe implicitly disagrees
with Ngugi's position when he defines a "national literature" as being "one that takes
the whole nation for its province and has a realised or potential audience throughout its
territory" (1975, 56), "in other words a literature that is written in the national
language", only to argue that in the multi-ethnic nation-states comprising most of
Africa, English and other European languages, for better or for worse, are often the only
national languages. Rushdie adds another dimension to this position when he posits
that "one of the most absurd aspects of this quest for national authenticity is that [...] it
popular in India than outside India; for possessing inflated reputations on account of the international
power of the English language, and of the ability of Western critics and publishers to impose their
cultural standards on the East; for living, in many cases, outside India; for being deracinated to the
point that their work lacks the spiritual dimension essential for a 'true' understanding of the soul of
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is completely fallacious to suppose that there is such a thing as a pure unalloyed
tradition from which to draw" (1991, 67). And he also affirms the further consequence
of his non-exclusivist vision of Indian reality, that "in his own case" as with various
others, "knowing and loving the Indian languages in which [he| was raised has
remained of vital importance [...], an essential aspect of [his] sense of self": "as a
writer I have been partly formed by the presence, in my head, of that other music, the
rhythms, patterns, and habits of thought and metaphor of my Indian tongues" (Rushdie
& West, 1997, xvi).
But neither of these arguments, though valid in themselves, really confront the class-
based charges of exclusion, misrepresentation, and hegemony, that for Ngugi are
almost inevitable consequences of the alienation brought about by the adoption of a
European language in a post-colonial setting. We concede that we could never
satisfactorily settle such a charge by any means of theoretical argument. But the
substance of our entire study, that will demonstrate the range of national voices,
subjects, locations, and issues investigated by (some) English-language novels of Africa
and India, will implicitly refute his contentions. It is far removed from our intention to
set up any manner of adversarial relationship between English-language literatures and
the other literatures of these societies: after all, any argument based on Bakhtinian
premises must inevitably recognise that the richness of social heteroglossia achieved
within a novel can only be enhanced by even more nuanced attention to the varieties of
language employed throughout a nation (though Ngugi himself concedes that this does
not mean all African-language writers are necessarily 'good' at achieving this). And
besides, novels in any language that succeed in fictionalising a wide range of their
national life would only illustrate our general thesis better, since we emphatically do not
argue that English-language novels accomplish such national engagement more
successfully than other literatures. Finally, contrary to Ngugi's pessimism, we will
India; for being insufficiently grounded in the ancient literary traditions of India (Rushdie & West,
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demonstrate that the very struggles (political, ideological, class-based) that he believes
are obscured or ignored by the English-employing classes of these societies, are
actually performed within their novels as part of Bakhtinian enactments of the struggles
defining all communication:
As a living, socio-ideological concrete thing, as heteroglot opinion, language, for
the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and the
other. The word in language is half someone else's. It becomes 'one's own'
only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when
he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive
intention. Prior to this moment of appropriation, the word does not exist in a
neutral and impersonal language [...], but rather it exists in other people's
mouths, in other people's contexts, serving other people's intentions: it is from
there that one must take the word and make it one's own. [... ] Expropriating it,
forcing it to submit to one's own intentions and accents, is a difficult and
complicated process (Bakhtin, 1996, 293-294).20
I have used writing in English for simple purposes of self-definition and limits, and
also due to the fact that apart from literature in Bengali, Hindi and French, all other
writing from India and Africa would be closed to me personally except in translation.21
But neither can I accept Ngugi's implication that English-language literature in these
societies is necessarily doomed to the boundaries of subject and perspectives that he
outlines. It requires a very rigid, unchanging view of the social and aesthetic
implications of using a language, a view in which particular realities remain as elusively
untranslatable from one medium to another as its users (the writer and his readership)
are mechanistically defined by the boundaries of their class: after all, by the same
criteria, could an international readership (like our own) unfamiliar with the life and
languages of a particular society ever have any basis for forming their own inevitably
'translatory' interpretations of texts? We will establish (ironically using Ngugi's own
1997, xiii)
20
In this regard, see especially our studies of Maru and Life and Times of Michael K in Chapters 7
and 9 respectively.
21
Which would form a fascinating comparative exercise, though again it would have to deal with
questions of translatability and untranslatable 'authenticity'. Unfortunately, wide-ranging enough as it
already is, this can only be a study limited in size: therefore we have chosen to define our limits
using the English language as a basis.
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fictions as outstanding examples) that 'the English language [is] able to carry the
weight" (Achebe, 1975, 62) of as diverse a range of African and Indian experiences as
the novel form is capable of including. Perhaps our choice of language is not so
arbitrary after all: if we can prove the depth and range of engagement of such fictions, it
would only strengthen our case for the flexibility and re-inscriptive potential implicitly
offered by the novel, even in a language with as tainted a colonial legacy and (in many
ways) questionable post-colonial perpetuity as English.
Section 2: The Post-Colonial Novel as National Narrative.
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Tolstoy, History, and the Novel's Capacity for 'Narrative Calculus'.
Throughout the narrative of War and Peace and as the focus of its second epilogue,
Tolstoy inserts essays reflecting on both the 'causes' behind the unfolding of history,
as well as passages of historiographic/hermeneutic meditation on how such an
immense, dynamic interactivity of human becoming is to be interpreted. His immediate
purpose is to comprehend what forces could have motivated millions of people, both
Russian and French, in the Napoleonic campaign of 1812-13, to perpetrate "against
one another such innumerable crimes, frauds, treacheries, thefts, forgeries, issues of
false money, burglaries, incendiarisms, and murders, as in whole centuries are not
recorded in the annals of all the law courts of the world, but which those who
committed them did not at the time regard as crimes? What produced this extraordinary
occurrence? What were its causes" (1942, 663)? But by the time of the epilogue, the
scope of his questions have become more general: "what is the power that moves
peoples" (1308)? "What force moves the nations" (1309)?
He goes on to consider and reject several kinds of all-encompassing explanatory
narratives: first, the "biographical historians" for whom "events occur solely by the
will of a Napoleon, an Alexander, or in general the persons they describe" (1309).1 But
then he also refuses as inadequate the versions of "the so-called historians of culture"
(1311) who would attribute for instance, the events of the French revolution entirely to
the influence of poets and philosophers, "in what is called culture— in mental
activity"( 1311), such as the ideas of Voltaire and Rousseau:
1
"Instead of men endowed with divine authority and directly guided by the will of God, modern
history has given us either heroes endowed with extraordinary, superhuman capacities, or simply men
of very various kinds, from monarchs to journalists, who lead the masses" (Tolstoy, 1942, 1305).
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Of the immense number of indications accompanying every vital phenomenon
these historians select the indication of intellectual activity, and say that this
indication is the cause. But despite their endeavours to prove that the cause of
events lies in intellectual activity, only by a great stretch can one admit that there
is any connection between intellectual activity and the movement of peoples, and
in no case can one admit that intellectual activity controls people's actions, for
that view is not confirmed by such facts as the very cruel murders of the French
revolution resulting from the doctrine of the equality of man, or the very cruel
wars and executions resulting from the preaching of love (1311). [...]
Undoubtedly some connection exists between all those who live
contemporaneously, and so it is possible to find some connection between the
intellectual activity of men and their historical movements, just as such a
connection may be found between the movements of humanity and commerce,
handicraft, gardening, or anything else you please. But why intellectual activity
is considered by the historians of culture to be the cause or expression of the
whole historical movement is hard to understand (1312).
And finally with equal emphasis Tolstoy rejects both grand narratives based on
overarching teleological abstractions, whether they are Hegelian expositions of
"universal history" whereby modern historians have posited the "existence of a
known aim to which these nations and humanity at large are tending" (1306), "or a
definite explanation of the meaning of the force producing historical events and termed
power" (1314):
Instead of the formerly divinely appointed aims of the Jewish, Greek or Roman
nations, which ancient historians regarded as representing the progress of
humanity, modern history has postulated its own aims— the welfare of the
French, German, or English people, or, in its highest abstraction, the welfare and
civilisation of humanity in general, by which is usually meant that of the peoples
occupying a small north-westerly portion of a large continent (1305).
In the second case, he goes on to define power provisionally "as the collective will of
the people transferred, by expressed or tacit consent, to their chosen rulers" (1315).
But such a definition only opens up new questions and ironies:
Do palace revolutions— in which sometimes only two or three people take part-
— transfer the will of the people to a new ruler? In international relations, is the
will of the people also transferred to their conqueror? Was the will of the
confederation of the Rhine transferred to Napoleon in 1808? Was the will of
the Russian people transferred to Napoleon in 1809, when our army in alliance
with the French went to fight the Austrians (1316)?
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And, so without an understanding of the ever-altering conditions under which "the will
of the people" is to be considered as delegated to and expressed through one person,
which could then explain why particular historical events evolved in the way they did,
"power is ljustj power: in other words, power is a word the meaning of which we do
not understand" (1321).
Ultimately, in none of these exclusive explanations, and not even in all of them
considered together, does Tolstoy find enough "component forces equal to the
composite or resultant force" (1310), which is the fact of how "millions of Christian
men professing the law of love of their fellows" (1306) were moved to go first
eastwards, and then westwards, to murder one another.
Of course, closely related to the question of interpreting history is Tolstoy's pre¬
occupation with narrating it, so that these essays are as much simultaneous meta-
narrative reflections on his own novelistic practice 2 as they are repudiations of one or
other methods of historical analysis. He has already explicated the problem of
attempting to extricate static strands of coherent and causal 'history' from out of the
immense dynamic of becomings that he is trying to represent and can yet never situate
himself outside of:
Absolute continuity of motion is not comprehensible to the human mind. Laws
of motion of any kind only become comprehensible to man when he examines
arbitrarily selected elements of that motion; but at the same time, a large
proportion of human error comes from the arbitrary division of continuous
motion into discontinuous elements. [...] To understand the laws of this
continuous movement is the aim of history. But to arrive at these laws, resulting
from the sum of all those human wills, man's mind postulates arbitrary and
disconnected units. The first method of history is to take an arbitrarily selected
series of events and examine it apart from others, though there is and can be no
beginning to any event, for one event always flows uninterruptedly from
another.
2
Arguably an instance of Linda Hutcheon's self-reflexive "historiographic metafiction", that
recognises histories to be selective acts of interpretative constructions, practised within a 'traditional,
realist' novel long before she 'discovers' and names the trend among her post-modern contemporaries.
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The second method is to consider the actions of some one man— a king or a
commander— as equivalent to the sum of many individual wills; whereas the
sum of individual wills is never expressed by the activity of a single historic
personage (909-910).
After articulating his dissatisfactions with the explanatory means and results of many
separate branches of historiography, Tolstoy's alternative is to conceive of a manner of
what we shall hereafter term 'narrative calculus', of which thereby his novel becomes a
performance and a demonstration:
A modern branch of mathematics, having achieved the art of dealing with the
infinitely small, can now yield solutions in other more complex problems of
motion which used to appear insoluble.
This [...] admits the conception of the infinitely small, and so conforms to the
chief condition of motion (absolute continuity) and thereby corrects the
inevitable error which the human mind cannot avoid when dealing with separate
elements of motion instead of examining continuous motion (909).
And then follow the implications of this analogy for the novelising of history:
Only by taking an infinitesimally small unit for observation (the differential of
history, that is, the individual tendencies of men) and attaining to the art of
integrating them (that is, finding the sum of these infinitesimals) can we hope to
arrive at the laws of history (909-910). [...] To study the laws of history we
must completely change the subject of our observation, must leave aside kings,
ministers, and generals, and study the common, infinitesimally small elements
by which the masses are moved. No one can say how far it is possible for man
to advance in this way towards an understanding of the laws of history; but it is
evident that only along that path does the possibility of discovering the laws of
history lie (911).
War and Peace ranges over thirteen hundred pages following precisely such a method,
and radiates outward from the aristocratic families and the inter-related spiritual,
personal and historical adventures of his principal characters: soldiers' lives and high
strategy in the French and Russian war-camps (including brief meetings with Napoleon
himself), vast battles and retreats, encounters with prisoners and peasants and much
more are juxtaposed to demonstrate the implications of attempting such a 'calculus'.
The novel thereby performatively poses the question: should history be read as the
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dynamic 'sum' of everything human? Should human elements and processes on
various levels, as lived and experienced by diversely placed characters, including their
'inner' and 'outer' lives, be considered as entering into and making history?
Paradoxically too, the narrative carries significant traces of all of the elements of
historical analysis it individually repudiates: there are scenes with great generals and
historical personages, as well as numerous discourses on ideas deliberating individual
conduct as well as the general direction of a nation's history. Of course, the significant
difference from the approaches Tolstoy has rejected is that these are performed
simultaneously, interactively and always provisionally within the novel, with no
encompassing claim ever made on behalf of any one stratum of happenings as
exclusively explaining the events of 1812-13. War and Peace is thus a Bakhtinian
demonstration of how much social heteroglossia fiction can contain, how much
dynamic national interrogation a novel can undertake, that yet at its end emphatically
does not claim narrative resolution or interpretative finality for itself or any other
approach.
This section, which is sub-divided into three chapters, will demonstrate (and is premised
upon) the post-colonial novel's realisation of the same formal potential that Tolstoy
argues for and performs, its capacity to perform 'narrative calculus' by containing
various co-existent themes and dimensions— ethnicity, location, kinship, family,
political systems, individual selves, cultural values, economic conditions— all examined
together in their interactive implications for a nation's becoming. We will also at each
stage consider various non-novelistic perspectives and theories on African and Indian
national formation, as well as conflicts about questions of historiographic interpretation
and narrative representation, and compare such conceptions as performed inter-relatedly
in the fictions. For instance, the next chapter (Chapter 3) will be structured around a
theoretical opposition— between different points of view on precisely the novel's
capacity for 'narrative calculus', and two major branches of arguments about the
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nation-representing implications of such discourse. As we have seen, Tolstoy never
pronounces any full or final understanding of the events of fifty years before through
the act of writing War and Peace, but in the chapters below we will also consider the
much more positivist and unified knowledge- and purpose-yielding claims made on
behalf of the novel (and its narratives of historical totalities and nations) by critics such
as Benedict Anderson, Edward Said and Georg Lukacs. These will then be set against
counter-arguments by Homi Bhabha, Bakhtin and Walter Benjamin (with the example
of Tolstoy's work and ideas in the background); the viability of both positions will be
examined through our readings of chosen fictions, and by the conclusion the nation-
narrating implications of each of these perspectives will be compared and evaluated.
Chapter 3: National Narratives: 'Performative' or 'Pedagogic'?
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Benedict Anderson, and the Nationalist Novel of "Sociological Solidity".
Benedict Anderson famously attributes a central role to the novel in helping to narrate
the foundations of European nationhood. Besides the fact that novels were written in
one language and not another (after print-capitalism had already codified and
standardised some dialects at the expense of many others), which thereby created an
automatic and particular community of readership, there are two major narrative ploys
he locates at the very basis of fictionalising which he interprets as crucial to how people
come to imagine themselves as national communities. The first is to do with the
fashioning of the novel's landscapes, which in various European and non-Western
examples Anderson finds fully, vividly peopled but also with horizons "clearly
bounded" (1991, 30). It is only England that is so comprehensively evoked in
Fielding's Tom Jones, for instance, and Spain in Don Quixote: for all their free-ranging
movement, neither novel is a "tour du monde" (30). To Anderson, these (and other)
picaresque narratives are unambiguous on this matter:
We see the 'national imagination' at work in the movement of a solitary hero
through a sociological landscape of a fixity that fuses the world inside the novel
with the world outside. This picaresque tour d'horison— hospitals, prisons,
remote villages, monasteries, Indians, Negroes— is nonetheless not a tour du
monde. The horizon is clearly bounded [...]. Nothing assures us of this
sociological solidity more than the succession of plurals. For they conjure up a
social space full of comparable prisons, none in itself of any unique importance,
but all representative of [... | this [particular nation] (30).
And related to his idea about a novel's specified spatial limits, Anderson underlines the
narrative- (and consequent) nation-building importance of a sense of 'shared' time. He
theorises the significance of another of fiction's fundamental ontological assumptions,
that of "homogeneous, empty time" (24), which opens up the realm of the 'shared
simultaneous' that the "communities" represented in both novels and "imagined"
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nations require. Anderson demonstrates how such a conception creates the zone of
"temporal coincidence" which all such paradigms use to narrate landscapes and
communities in their respective worlds, "in which simultaneity is, as it were, transverse,
cross-time, marked not by pre-figuring and fulfilment, but by temporal coincidence and
measured by clock and calendar" (24).3 In Anderson's argument, the crucial insertion
in both cases, in the inner world of the novel's narrative as well as the world in which
exists the reader, is the sense of 'meanwhile', which together with the familiar spaces
and characters being written about, "gives a hypnotic confirmation of the solidity of a
single community, embracing character, author and reader, moving onward through
calendrical time" (27). He provides as an example the opening to an Indonesian novel
in which a young man reads a newspaper report about the very town that he lives in, to
illustrate how such spatially particular and temporally shared representations co-operate
in constructing a sense of nationhood for an 'imagined community' of readers who
participate in the same world though the activity of reading about it. The young man
inside the novel would feel a "broad, horizontal comradeship" with millions of other
fellow countrymen because of the certainty that they are reading the same newspaper as
he is, as much as with the anonymous destitute vagrant (another fellow countryman)
that he reads about and feels sympathy for.4 And, by extension, "we-the-Indonesian-
readers are [also| plunged immediately into calendrical time and a familiar landscape;
some of us may well have walked those 'sticky' Semarang roads" (32).
3
As opposed to the 'Messianic time' Anderson postulates as being the prevailing pre-modem
temporal paradigm, borrowing the term from Walter Benjamin and the conception from Erich
Auerbach, which assumes "the simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present" (1991, 24)
under the omnisciently unifying gaze of God.
4
Anderson posits that newspapers derive from and consolidate on a daily basis the same 'imagined'
conception of a community inhabiting a shared contemporary, as does the novel:
Each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated
simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet
of whose identity he has not the slightest notion. Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly
replicated at daily or half-daily intervals throughout the calendar. What more vivid figure for
the secular, historically clocked, imagined community can be envisioned? At the same time,
the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his
subway, barbershop, or residential neighbours, is continually reassured that the imagined
world is visibly rooted in everyday life. As with [novels], fiction seeps quietly and
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Anderson argues that novels powerfully impress upon imaginations in the early stages
of national consciousness a conception of a shared nationhood, by narrating a
recognisably particular, contemporary world in a particular language. This has dual and
related nation-imagining implications: the very act of reading about it confirms one's
participation in the vibrant but specific world within the novel (which is also the world
one knows), as well as with an imagined community of readership in that outside world,
which by such means is thus set on its way to becoming an 'actual' nation.
Edward Said, and the Bourgeois Determinism of Narrative.
Leela Gandhi is right in stating how "in general, post-colonial theory subscribes
whole-heartedly to Benedict Anderson's insistence upon the textual underpinnings of
nation-ness" (1998, 151). In Culture and Imperialism Edward Said brings out more
historically specific aspects and further dimensions to Anderson's argument. We have
seen in a different context in the previous chapter his demonstration of the novel's
"institutional character" (1993, 82), and how it is "fundamentally tied to bourgeois
(and capitalist, nationalist, imperial) society" (82). Said finds the eighteenth and
nineteenth century European novel to be "an incorporative, quasi-encyclopaedic
cultural form, packed into [which| are both a highly regulated plot mechanism and an
entire system of social reference that depends on the existing institutions of bourgeois
society, their authority and power" (84). Not only does it derive from such
foundations, he argues, any novelistic vision in Victorian England is moreover part of
"the normative pattern of social authority" (84), that helps reinforce and consolidate
such authority by "projecting" a "knowable community" and shaping the "idea of
England in such a way as to give it identity, presence, [and] ways of reusable
continuously into reality, creating that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity
which is the hallmark of modern nations (35-36).
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articulation" (85), thereby gaining an "important [...] place in the 'condition of
England' question" (85). And novels are not just homogenising in this regard, they are
also conservative: "the nineteenth century English novels stress the continuing
existence (as opposed to revolutionary overturning) of England" (88). For Said then,
the "history of the novel" has "the coherence of a continuous enterprise" whose
'"consolidated vision' came in a whole series of overlapping affirmations, by which a
near unanimity of view was sustained" (90). In near-Andersonian terms he elaborates:
The crucial aspect of what I have been calling the novel's consolidation of
authority is not simply connected to the functioning of social power and
governance, but made to appear both normative and sovereign, that is, self-
validating in the course of the narrative. This is paradoxical only if one forgets
that the constitution of a narrative subject, however abnormal or unusual, is still
a social act par excellence, and as such has behind it the authority of history
and society. There is first the authority of the author— someone writing out the
processes of society in an acceptable institutionalised manner, observing
conventions, following patterns, and so forth. Then there is the authority of the
narrator, whose discourse anchors the narrative in recognisable, and hence
existentially referential, circumstances. Last, there is what might be called the
authority of the community, whose representative most often is the family but
also is the nation, the specific locality, and the concrete historical moment (92).
Anderson's account emphasises mostly the benevolent and creative aspects of how
narrative helps fashion such an imagined sense of "broad, horizontal comradeship"
and "sociological solidity" (425).5 Of course we can extrapolate from our discussion
in the opening section of this study, that where Said diverges from Anderson is in the
extent of his doubts about the ultimate creativity, radicalism and 'benevolence' of such
a process, when he considers the imperialist, exploitative underpinnings and
assumptions of all such eighteenth and nineteenth-century national and narrative
projects. But he agrees almost entirely with Anderson's basic premises about the
essentially affirmative and homogenising role narration plays in national self-
imag(in)ing, which to us (as it does to Said) would make all novels part of a class-
bound, conservative, at best complacent and at worst clearly coercive, 'majoritarian'
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literature, in a Deleuzian sense, with seriously debilitating implications for post-colonial
writing.6 Yet if we have given so much room to elaborating these particular positions on
the relationships between novelistic narratives and nations, it is only to be able to bring
out our fundamental reservations against them more clearly. While taking nothing away
from the particular points Said7 and Anderson make about novels lending imaginative
(and imaginable) tangibility to both their material and their readers, we submit, and will
establish presently through the study of novels by Ngugi, Nadine Gordimer, and
Achebe, that such accounts are limited, reductive and ultimately misleading. Their
arguments about the implications of shared languages, environments and links between
the world of the text and the reader's world around him are in themselves valuable, but
to stop there is to fall short of discussing more than half the matter, and to risk missing
out on the implications of analysing the actual, detailed content of a novel by privileging
a summary of its most superficial formal conventions.
Refuting Saidian Determinism.
Our first objection is familiarly Bakhtinian. We will argue and demonstrate that the
novel's ontological (and characteristic) capacity for performing social heteroglossia is
irreducible to any one imperial author-intention or purpose, no matter what the actual
author's intentions and purposes (we will see this established most clearly by
contrasting the work of Ngugi as novelist with his other writings). The unresolved,
5
Not to mention radical, in the sense of helping create a whole new model of imagined political
community (in the individual and collective mind as well as in the world), whether defined (in
Europe) against medieval feudalism, or in non-Western territories against European colonialism.
6
Just to rapidly sketch some of the significant problems involved by way of an example, if we elect
not to regard such narrativising as benevolently as Anderson does: in a society of any manner of
diversity at all (i.e. India and most national societies in contemporary Africa), it would raise the
question of who is performing (and sanctioning) the narrating of novels, and therefore promoting (or
enforcing) a certain "homogeneous shared time"? Which 'non-horizontal' comradeships are being
excluded in any such "horizontal" conception? At what un-represented expense is such a nation being
'built' and such a "coherent", "continuous" community being 'imagined'?
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variously re-interpretable dialogic cacophony within the covers of his novels cannot be
assumed to cohere into any single, monologic "normative pattern" or "continuous
enterprise". Tolstoy, who demonstrates the novel's capacity to analyse various
interactive dimensions of historical becoming through its performance of a 'narrative
calculus', also emphasises that "no one can say how far it is possible for man to
advance in this way towards an understanding of the laws of history" (1942, 911). He
cautions us that all we are ever capable of is postulating "arbitrary and disconnected
units", and that "while laws of motion of any kind only become comprehensible to
man when he examines arbitrarily selected elements of that motion", "at the same time,
a large proportion of human error comes from the arbitrary division of continuous
motion into discontinuous elements" (909-910).
Besides, the further implications of both Said's and Anderson's descriptions, not just
of the inner world of a novel but of its links to any and every reader, are of
essentialising each of these separate entities— author, work and reader— as
deterministically predictable in every instance. Yet we find embedded within Tolstoy's
nineteenth century, 'realist' novel profound levels of scepticism and caution about the
problems of historical interpretation and representing, rather than another reiterative
instance of the "consolidated vision" of a conservative and coercive social authority,
which is broadly Said's case against two centuries of novelistic work. Perhaps he
would counter that his examples refer mostly to the English and French novel, but the
Russia in which Tolstoy wrote his novel, even if it was not bourgeois-capitalist in the
way of these two societies, also had an empire and a very conservative monarchy, and
therefore many reasons to enforce both complacency and coercion. Our point is not
that novels have never done this; we are arguing simply that they cannot be reduced to
such a singular pattern. Through the various discussions that comprise this study, we
7
To challenge Said's argument about all eighteenth and nineteenth-century novels being part of a
"normative pattern", and a "coherent" "continuous enterprise" of bourgeois, imperialist consolidation
71
will establish that any interpretative method derived for and from the novel's own
unique discursive practices (whether envisioned as a Tolstoyan 'narrative calculus' or a
Bakhtinian "sociological stylistics") uncovers numerous problems with any
conception resembling an Andersonian "sociological solidity" or a Saidian "coherent
enterprise". We shall thus attempt to demonstrate that such stylistics rarely confirm or
encourage any convictions of such 'solidity'. Said himself issues the caveat:
When we read the novels attentively, we get a far more discriminating and subtle
view than the baldly 'global' and imperial vision I have described thus far. [...]
This obliges critics to read and analyse, rather than only to summarise works
whose paraphrasable content they might regard as politically and morally
objectionable (90-91).
And earlier, he has also stated that "for all their social presence, novels are not
reducible to a sociological current and cannot be done justice to aesthetically, culturally,
and politically as subsidiary forms of class, ideology, or interest" (87).
The textual extracts Anderson uses to make his case (for the novel's potential to create
"sociological solidity" and "horizontal comradeship" through narrating readily
recognisable times, places, and characters) are always (and only) openings from
different novels, in which a milieu is being sketched in rapidly through general details
of street-life, population, shared habits, and weather, in a way long established in realist
practice. Hence they are in themselves perfect illustrations of his arguments. Yet while
his ideas are demonstrable on this immediately identifiable level, we may also object
that he considers his case proven before the novel has really begun, before its focus on
a particular set of characters, situations, voices and perspectives has even started.8 In
through the detailed study of specific fictions is tempting, but is matter enough for another thesis.
h
An analogous argument might apply against his example of the daily newspaper. Perhaps the date
on top of the page, and the fact of so many disparate items being held within the same
institutionalised sheets of paper, and the same newspaper being held in so many hands
simultaneously, all demonstrably contribute to a certain level of 'imagined community', but what
happens when this community of readers actually enters into the disparate details of some of the
news-items within that shared newspaper? Is it really so sociologically solidifying and "horizontal"
camaraderie-fostering to read of civil war, terrorist strikes, drought and famine, beauty pageants,
cricket scores, and monsoon flooding (by way of examples) just because they are all within the pages
of the same newspaper? In such a case the fact that all the readers (and the events) may be Indian is a
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this chapter, we shall presently prove through the work of Ngugi that Anderson
concludes with clear evidence of the novel (only) establishing a sense of "horizontal
comradeship" through broad familiar generalities, because he concludes his analysis
before the novel has even begun any of its particularising.
Homi Bhabha: Contrasting 'Performance' and 'Pedadogy' in National
Narrative.
Homi Bhabha would classify the passages that Anderson exclusively privileges as
"pedagogical"— that dimension of nationalist discourse in which '"the people' are
the historical 'objects' of a "continuist, accumulative temporality" that draws for
authority on "pre-given or constituted historical origins in the past", and attempts
"repeatedly" to turn all "the scraps, patches and rags of daily life (...] into the signs
of a coherent national culture" (1997, 145). Before we move on to considering the
evidence offered by Ngugi's novels themselves, Bhabha's is an alternative theoretical
articulation that we will introduce, of other possible interpretations of the novel's
narratives of a national contemporary. For him, there is an important splitting in the
sign of 'the people' that he would consider ignored by both Anderson and Said.
Bhabha's counterpoint to their essentialist, static "imagined community" is a
conception of a narrative as "performative", a process of signification with the people
as subjects, that erases "any prior or originary presence of the nation-people to
demonstrate the prodigious, living principles of the people as contemporaneity" (145).
It is "another time of writing" (141) that Bhabha calls for, which would, in Said's own
words, perform "the non-sequential energy of lived historical memory and
subjectivity" (quoted in 1997, 141); "a 'time' of narrative that is disavowed in the
superficial formality, but the actual details are too mutually irreconcilable (and yet simultaneous) to
allow most readers the complacent certainties of feeling that they belong to one nation bound in
imagined 'solidity'. Besides, how can the reactions of millions of readers be described as predictably
convergent?
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discourse of historicism where narrative is only [...] the medium of a naturalistic
continuity of Community or Tradition" (151):
The people will no longer be contained in that national discourse of the
teleology of progress; the anonymity of individuals; the spatial horizontality of
community; the homogeneous time of social narratives; the historicist visibility
of modernity, where "the present of each level (of the social) coincides with the
present of all the others, so that the present is an essential section which makes
the essence visible" (151).
In clear contrast to Anderson and Said, this thesis will argue that the post-colonial
novel ontologically has the means, and a demonstrable record moreover, of enunciating
and performing this alternative conception of non-homogeneous 'national time', and
has in a great range of narratives repeatedly and variously undertaken the "difficulty"
of the Fanonian task that Bhabha outlines: that of "writing the history of the people as
the insurmountable agonism of the living, [and] the insurmountable experiences of
struggle and survival in the construction of a national culture"(152). Bhabha insists
that what he terms "cultural difference" "must not be understood as (merely) the free
play of polarities and pluralities in the homogeneous empty time of the national
community" (162). Bakhtin and Tolstoy (and as we will establish, Ngugi, Gordimer,
Achebe and Rushdie) too would claim no such simplistic liberal resolution to the
relentlessly contesting, interactive visions of thoroughly socialised heteroglossia that
their novels perform and unleash. Also, where Anderson interprets the nation as coming
to know itself through the immediately familiar contents and boundaries of the novel's
landscapes (that are thereby contrasted against all the otherness that presumably lies
beyond), Bhabha, and we, will read the novelistic "performative" as splitting the nation
within itself, articulating the heterogeneity of its own "contending peoples, antagonistic
authorities, and tense locations of cultural difference" (148).9
9
Perhaps it is relevant to acknowledge that Bhabha locates his aspirations towards such
'performative' writing not in an actual 'post-colonial' national territory as we have defined it, but in
and for the Britain he then inhabited. But we will demonstrate how his 'metropolitan' theory has been
practised in African and Indian settings through their fictions long before his enunciation of it,
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Bhabha's disagreements with Anderson over the irreducible multiplicities performed
under the sign of the 'nation' inevitably extend to dissent over their conceptions of the
novel.10 He quotes Walter Benjamin: "to write a novel means to carry the
incommensurable to extremes in the representation of human life. In the midst of life's
fullness, and through the representation of this fullness, the novel gives evidence of the
profound perplexity of the living" (quoted in 1997, 161). For Bhabha therefore, far
from reinforcing an imagined "homogeneous time" and "sociological solidity", the
novel takes us to the incommensurable at the heart of the national everyday: the novel, if
'national' at all, may be read as the narrative of its disjunctures. It reveals the apparently
"homogeneous" as being actually "non-synchronous" (161): it carries traces of all
the violence, the elisions of memory, and the discontinuities that Ernest Renan reminds
us constitute the obscured heart of the "daily plebiscite" that is national existence.
These then are the contesting propositions on the back of which we enter our
examination of post-colonial national narratives in this chapter. Have they functioned as
the inherited "derivative discourse" unchanged in form or 'purpose' from Said's
picture of nineteenth-century bourgeois, capitalist/imperialist European novels, that
operate monologically as coherent (and potentially coercive) consolidations of "the
monumentality of historicist memory, the sociological totality of society, [and] the
homogeneity of cultural experience" (Bhabha, 157)? Or are post-colonial novels rather
more often versions of the "minority discourse" that Bhabha interprets as contesting
"genealogies of 'origin' that lead to claims for cultural supremacy and historical
proving therefore that one does not have to be hybrid, emigrated or 'cosmopolitan' (in the sense of
inhabiting a multi-ethnic London) to recognise the potential or the need for such narrative.
10
"Anderson fails to locate the alienating time of the arbitrary sign in his naturalised, nationalised
space of the imagined community. Although he borrows his notion of the homogeneous, empty time
of the nation's modern narrative from Walter Benjamin, he misses that profound ambivalence that
Benjamin places deep within the utterance of the narrative of modernity. Here, as the pedagogies of
life and will contest the perplexed histories of the living people, their cultures of survival and
resistance, Benjamin introduces a non-synchronous, incommensurable gap in the midst of
storytelling" (Bhabha, 1997, 161).
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priority, [and that] acknowledges the status of national culture— and the people— as a
contentious performative space of the perplexity of the living in the midst of the
pedagogical representations of the fullness of life" (157)?
De-Constructing 'Communities': The Experiments of Ngugi as Novelist.
In the context of the debate outlined above, the fictions of Ngugi wa Thiongo are
particularly ambivalent, given how outspokenly certain he appears in anything non-
novelistic he has written of exactly what ails Kenya, economically, politically and
socially, and how things might be redressed,11 and for the fact that he explicitly
integrates the artist's role in a post-colonial African society within his vision of the way
towards socio-economic liberation. Like Achebe, Nadine Gordimer and many other
African writers, Ngugi forefronts the question of literary 'worldedness': both in terms
of novelists being a particular sort of historical agent themselves, and of their texts
being a dynamic intervention in their society's history. "African Art, we can generally
say, used to be oriented to the community. And because of its public nature, culture, in
its broad as well as its narrow sense, helped to weld society together" (1972, 7). He
quotes W.E. Abrahams approvingly on the "integrative function of culture" in
"traditional societies":
By uniting the people in common beliefs, actions and values, culture fills with
order that portion of life which lies beyond the pale of state intervention. [... ] It
fills it in such a way as at the same time to integrate its society, on the basis of
common attitudes, common values. It creates the basis for the formulation of a
common destiny and co-operation in pursuing it (7).
"
E.g.: "The real snake was surely monopoly capitalism, whose very condition of growth is cut¬
throat competition, inequality, and oppression of one group by another. It was capitalism and its
external manifestations, imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism that had disfigured the African
past" (Ngugi, 1972, 45).
"We must break with capitalism [...]. Capitalism can only produce anti-human culture, or a culture
that is only an expression of sectional, warring interests. African culture used to be most communal
when and where economic life and the means of production were communally organised and
controlled... My thesis, when we come to today's Africa, is then very simple: a completely socialised
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Ngugi's insistent socio-political certainties, as well as his reiterated emphases on
creating "common values", attitudes and a "common destiny", are terms reminiscent
of Anderson's thesis about the novel being useful as a pedagogical instrument in
helping to build a nation's sense of "broad horizontal comradeship". Yet the principal
characters of A Grain of Wheat and Petals of Blood, Mugo and Munira, within whose
voices and self-justifying states of mind we spend large sections of the narrative, are
both portrayed as cowards who would prefer to be as far away as possible from the
tasks and burdens of either the struggle for freedom or the responsibilities of post-
colonial nation-building. The reader is scarcely allowed any assumption of essentialist
homogeneity about the rallying symbols of independence or national construction,
primarily because large portions of both novels are refracted through Mugo and
Munira's alienation and weariness. Both of them view social and historical
responsibility as an intrusive obligation (almost as self-violation): Mugo in A Grain of
Wheat insists on reading "events in his life as isolated", where things had been fated
to happen at different moments" with one having no choice in anything "as surely as
one had no choice on one's birth" (1970, 195). To him, even in the immediate
aftermath of Kenyan Uhuru (independence), on the verge of the huge tasks of nation-
construction and in the midst of celebrations and near-universal enthusiasm, "life itself
seemed a meaningless wandering [where] there was surely no connection between
sunrise and sunset, between today and tomorrow" (198). And yet Ngugi
simultaneously foregrounds the irony of how he has become a much admired symbol
of heroic resistance, when in truth, he actually betrayed Kihika to the police. Even at the
time of doing so, his feelings are a mixture of panic, rage and self-pity at his own
isolation, and what he sees as his victimisation, by Kihika, the events of his own life and
by history itself; but playing his part in his country's freedom movement (or his
economy, collectively owned and controlled by the people, through the elimination of all exploitative
forces, is necessary for a national culture" (12-13).
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responsibility to his community) is nowhere on his list of concerns.12 He defines his
predicament only in the narrowest personal terms:
What shall I do, he asked himself. If I don't serve Kihika he'll kill me. [...] If I
work for him the government will catch me [...] and they'll hang me. My God,
I don't want to die, I am not ready for death, I have not even lived. Mugo was
deeply afflicted and confused, because all his life he had avoided conflicts: at
home, or at school, he rarely joined the company of other boys for fear of being
involved in brawls that might ruin his chances of a better future. His argument
went like this: if you don't traffic with evil, then evil ought not to touch you; if
you leave people alone, then they ought to leave you alone. That's why, now,
[...] Mugo only moaned inside, puzzled: have I stolen anything from anybody?
No! Have I ever shat inside a neighbour's courtyard? No! Have I killed
anybody? No! How then can Kihika to whom I have done no harm do this to
me (221)?
Not only is there lacking any exultant sense of participating in a grand, Hegelian,
historical trajectory that has finally arrived on the verge of national self-realisation,
Mugo does not even feel part of his immediate community in the village. And yet he is
frequently haunted by the consequences of his betrayals, even if they have not come to
light as yet (and would never have, if he himself had not confessed them):
He was conscious of the graves beside the trench. He shuddered cold, and the
fear of galloping hooves changed into the terror of an undesired discovery
(195). (...] His lower lip dropped: he felt energy leave him. [...]. It is not me,
he whispered to convince himself. It is not me, it would have happened... the
murder of women and men in the trench [...]. Christ would have died on the
cross, anyway. Why did they blame Judas, a stone from the hands of a power
more than men? [...] Mugo saw thick blood dripping from the mud walls of his
hut (199).
Mugo is clearly an unusual choice of central character for a novelist so explicitly
committed to a self-defined cultural project of creating the basis for "a common
destiny and co-operation in pursuing it" through outlining "common attitudes" and
"common values" (1972, 7). But any conception of narrating a "sociological solidity"
or a shared "homogeneous time" for the nation is further complicated when we see
how such characters are neither alone nor singular in either novel in being
12
For a very similar crossroads of external, historic expectations and inner despair and eventual
betrayal with similar consequences, consider Razumov's situation in Conrad's Under Western Eyes.
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discontinuously placed within this apparently 'shared' moment of national liberation.
In A Grain of Wheat Gikonyo recalls how there were numerous times while he was in
detention when he would have gladly confessed whatever he knew about his comrades
just to be allowed to return home to his wife:
You know a time came when I did not care about Uhuru for the country any
more. I just wanted to come home. And I would have sold Kenya to the
whiteman to buy my own freedom. I admire people like Kihika. They are strong
enough to die for truth. I have no such strength. That's why in detention, we
were proud of you, resented you and hated you— all in the same breath. You
see, people like you, who refused to betray your manhood, showed us what we
ought to be like— but we lacked true bones in the flesh. We were cowards (79).
To which Mugo, who of course has actually betrayed Kihika, honestly replies that "it
was not cowardice. I would have done the same" (79). Karanja, because of his own
history of willing and active collaboration with British rule, dreads the day the white
man will finally hand over power. Also, both he and Gikonyo from their opposed
positions desire the same woman, and this personal dimension works as another
instance of a conflicting motivation that further undermines any possibility of a
'shared' national commitment. And the novel is full of other voices (including its
women, and the parents of some of the freedom-fighters), who all broadly support
Uhuru and look forward to the work of liberation that lies ahead, and yet are
simultaneously haunted by various doubts, fears and disparate private histories, some of
which resulted in them preferring to continue in complicity with the colonial status quo
rather than risk losing loved ones in the struggle.
Thus, for a dedicated (and didactic) anti-colonial polemicist, the extraordinary choice, in
terms of both structure and narrative volume, that Ngugi makes as a novelist is to situate
so much of both narratives within an unresolved heteroglossia of disunited and
discordant voices and perspectives (thus undermining any simplistic sense of a shared
national moment), rather than devote them monologically to the heroic opinions and
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stories of revolutionary martyrs such as Kihika. Nadine Gordimer writes of A Grain of
Wheat that Ngugi "succeeds in placing the so-called Mau-Mau movement in the
historical, political, and sociological context of the African continental revolution. [...]
| It] is shown to be a terrible guerilla war in which freedom was won, and which brought
with its accomplishment a high price for the people who waged it" (1973, 27). In fact,
the Uhuru celebrations at the novel's climax are narrated through frequent cross-cutting
between disharmonious yet co-existent streams of consciousness within different
characters, non-synchronous not only with each other but also with the external context
of the significant'national' occasion they are supposedly sharing. Karanja, Koinandu,
Mumbi, Gikonyo and Mugo are all silently engaged in inter-related personal conflicts
even as they participate in or watch the race, almost none of which have anything to do
with either the immediate rejoicing or any long-term plans of communal 'nation-
building'. Thus, contrary to Anderson's sense of the novel helping pedagogically to
build a homogeneous "imagined community", contrary even to his own declared aims
as a participant in his new nation's "common" culture, it is as though Ngugi were
deliberately foregrounding the texture of co-existent discontinuities and traumas that
comprise a single national moment.
Petals of Blood is even more explicitly structured, through a continual layering of
private pasts and presents that are remembered and interpreted differently by different
characters and then narrated in their own voices, to reveal how inter-related yet
traumatically discordant their histories are for even this small 'community' of
characters. As with Mugo in A Grain of Wheat, the character Ngugi spends most time
narrating is the schoolmaster Munira, who has only come to Ilmorog to "forget his
fears, his guilt, his frozen years" (1977, 16), because he feels that "some of us who
had a schooling [... ] tended to leave the struggle for Uhuru to the ordinary people, |... |
but now with independence, we have a chance to pay back" (10). Yet he is still
"fidgety" whenever anyone talks of the effects of colonialism or even current politics:
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"he would ask yet other questions hoping for a conversation that would not make
demands on him to choose this or that position in politics" (18). Just as with Mugo, so
for this 'protagonist', life appears "a series of unconnected events" (49), and he feels
similarly alienated even within this small village, "doomed to roam this world, a
stranger" (18). Ngugi describes his near-constant state of mind:
He looked forward to the unwilled immersion into darkness. He would then be
part of everything: the plants, animals, people, huts, without consciously
choosing the links. To choose involved effort, decision, preference of one
possibility, and this could be painful. He had chosen not to choose, a freedom
he daily celebrated | 1 (71).
Every major character in the novel remarks at some point how little they can ever know
of anyone else, because "everybody has his own secret past" (160). Yet ironically
Ngugi also constructs an interconnectedness of pasts between them whereby they have
all been directly or otherwise involved in each other's life-stories in various roles and
periods. And because each of these connections has left these characters damaged in
various ways rather than connected in any metonymic national fraternity, they move
themselves and each other towards worse consequences, often in reaction to those
shared pasts. These novels are thus the sites where Anderson's and Bhabha's
differences on the nature of national narrative are ultimately refused a mutually
satisfactory resolution. By juxtaposing many inter-related stories and perspectives
within the same worlds (that represent symbols of the nation), Ngugi evokes
performances of how a new Kenya searches for purpose and coherence— the
"perplexed", "contemporary" Bhabhan performance of what Timothy Brennan has
called "the national longing for form". Yet some of the most important implications of
such inter-relatedness are shown to be hauntingly unresolved, fractured private histories
that lead to conflict and further damage, rather than any facilely persuasive "solidity"
or "comradeship" that might have ensued (in an Andersonian conception) once the
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common external enemy has left and the nation-building novelist has started his work
in earnest.13
Ebele Obumselu argues that A Grain of Wheat is a "deeply divided work": while on
the one hand Ngugi's own authorial approval might seem to reside with Kihika, his plot
also seems to point towards "the futility and ironic contradictions of revolutionary
nationalism" (Irele, Spring '98, 140). Petals ofBlood carries within its narrative even
more clearly the tension between the nation-building novel's dual roles as
'performative' as well as potentially 'pedagogic'. There are many passages where we
are offered straightforwardly didactic diagnoses by characters of post-colonial Kenya's
economic and social predicament, and what needs to be done to ensure meaningful and
effective liberation. Ngugi also inserts a collective 'we' voice that begins many chapters
with narratives not only of Ilmorog's shared past and their contemporary condition, but
also attempts to add a wider historic-mythic dimension by framing their story within a
greater African saga. These voices are of course to be seen as deliberately pedagogic
and attempting to narrate broad national/racial solidarities, but they never dominate the
entire novel (they do not even make up half its pages). Rather, the pedagogic passages
come embodied within the voices inhabiting the rest of the narrative, and are thereby
shown to co-exist unresolved, despite the best intentions of some of the characters, with
the actual performance of these inter-related yet conflicting lives. Byron Santangelo
writes that these two novels reveal a "profoundly anti-nativist" conception "of how
culture and collective identity are produced, [...] in that [they] suggest they suggest
neither is fixed and that both evolve in a reciprocal relationship" (Irele, Spring '98,
147). Frederick Buell argues that A Grain of Wheat "attacks the very notion that an
originary, essential African culture which could be returned to even exists". A truly
lj
For another example of participation in a war of national liberation and its variously ambivalent
post-colonial legacies, consider Shimmer Chinodya's Harvest of Thorns set in post-independence
Zimbabwe.
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post-colonial Kenyan nation necessitates the forging of a culture and consciousness
through an evolving history "defined by the interrelated histories of its members"
(Irele, Spring '98, 147). We do not intend at all to deny Ngugi's constant emphasis on
the impact of historical and material conditions on individual existence and vision (and
we return to his exploration of these dimensions in the next chapter). Yet we hope to
have demonstrated that there is a clear slippage between Ngugi the dialogic novelist14
and Ngugi the monologic nationalist,1'' and that the novels reflect this tension
throughout— between the 'pedagogue' trying to inspire mass uprising and change, and
the novelist in "performance", where most of his characters refuse to be encompassed
by his own doctrines. Both novels allow in and perform too many other perspectives,
too much irreducible heteroglossia, for either any one homogenising myth of history, or
a single coercive political doctrine or 'majoritarian' conception of community, to
emerge as their nationalist moral. And it is in this sense that his work is closer to
Bhabha's ideal of acknowledging the status of national culture and "the people— as a
contentious, performative space of the perplexity of the living in the midst of the
pedagogic [nationalist] representations of the fullness of life" (1997, 157).
Can Nations Learn From Their Novels?
As part of a book on Salman Rushdie, Timothy Brennan adds to Anderson's
conception of how the novel has historically worked as the blueprint and the
embodiment of a "national longing for form", by actually reversing some of his central
propositions, and building instead on a Bakhtinian vision of the novel as the unique
14
In fact, it is not only co-existent yet contradictory Kenyan voices that are performed together in this
extremely dialogised novel: Ngugi even allows the unfolding of the voices and self-examining, self-
justifying streams of consciousness of British colonists within the same narrative.
15
Later on, Ngugi has admittedly gone on to write fictional narratives in a much more
unambiguously monologic vein, such as Matigari, where the binaries of righteous and wronged,
justice and injustice are unambiguously depicted. Of course monologic novels are also possible, when
framed solely within the perspective of a didactic central character, and Ngugi, writing by now in
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discursive terrain for the performance of ceaseless 'polyglossia'. If we accept, as
Ernest Gellner has famously asserted, and Brennan affirms by quoting him, that
"nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness" but rather "it
invents nations where they do not exist", (quoted in Brennan, 1989, 9), then according
to Brennan, it was the novel "that historically accompanied the rise of nations by
objectifying the 'one, yet many' of national life, and by mimicking the structure of the
nation, a clearly bordered jumble of languages and styles" (9). He argues that it was in
the novel that "previously foreign languages met each other on the same terrain,
forming an unsettled mixture of ideas and styles, themselves representing previously
distinct peoples now forced to create the rationale for a common life". Brennan thus
redirects the implications of Bakhtin's work from the text back into the world it arises
from, by arguing that this narrative capacity for "heteroglossia" "implicitly" answered
how Europe was to prevent a "continual, chaotic splintering" of former empires and
papal realms, by "objectifying" in its very form "the nation's composite nature" (10).
Further, he argues, in the novel's hands 'tradition' becomes an "useable past", "and
the evocation of deep, sacred origins—instead of furthering unquestioning, ritualistic
affirmations of a people (as in epic)—becomes a contemporary, practical means of
creating a people" (9).
Brennan's synthesis thus brings Anderson and Bhabha together: to him, the novel is
pedagogic because of being "performative" in its unique Bakhtinian way. By
embodying and performing "a hodgepodge of the ostensibly separate 'levels of style'
corresponding to class; a jumble of poetry, drama, newspaper report, memoir and
speech; a mixture of the jargons of race and ethnicity" (10), it demonstrates to the
various members of the nation that if they can co-exist interactively within one textual
narrative, perhaps they could inhabit history together as well under the rubric of a single
Gikuyu and translating his own work into English, has argued that this is currently the most effective
way to be of service to the cause of social liberation.
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nation. Chinua Achebe has himself spoken of a dual role as novelist and "teacher"
within his society: "the writer cannot expect to be excused from the task of re¬
education and regeneration that must be done. In fact he should march right in front"
(1988, 30). And Bhabha too has written of the possibilities of political solidarity arising
from his envisioning of 'performative' 'minority discourses'.16 These are positions we
shall revisit at the conclusion of this thesis, but for now, we reserve judgement on both
the nature and the extent of the novel's capacities for nationalist pedagogy. So far, all
we have established is that novelistic narrative treats its heteroglossic material in ways
irreducible to any single, pre-determined, coercive purpose, against what Anderson and
Said contend above. Yet, in the next two chapters and indeed over the course of this
study, there remain many more extremely 'performative' and thoroughly 'worlded'
instances of narrative engagement to be considered in our survey of fictional treatments
of the various agents, processes and dimensions that comprise post-colonial national
becomings.
Embodying and 'Worlding' Polyglossia.
For instance, in his novels it is not just the "incommensurable" incompatibilities of
private perspectives and histories that Ngugi uncovers as the fundamental problem
hindering a collective national becoming. If that were all fiction could establish, it would
not amount to much more than a restatement of basic, 'derivative', Western liberal-
individualist principles, certainly not the comprehensively dynamic multi-dimensional
social examination Tolstoy and Bakhtin claim that the novel is capable of. As Bhabha
puts it: "the perplexity of the living must not be understood (merely) as some
existential, ethical anguish of the empiricism of everyday life in the 'eternal living
16
"Now there is no reason to believe that such marks of difference cannot inscribe a 'history' of the
people or become the gathering points of political solidarity" (Bhabha, 1997, 157). [...] For it is by
living on the borderline of history and language, on the limits of race and gender, that we are in a
position to translate the differences between them into a kind of solidarity" (170).
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present'" (1997, 157). For fiction, no present can be 'eternal' if it is indeed living, and
there is much more to what novels uncover about diverse beings inhabiting nations than
any conception of purely private histories in worlds that remain static around selves.
We established in the opening chapter that for the novel, narrating the stories of selves
is epistemologically inseparable from narrating the worlds they are always inextricably
immersed in. The relationship is implicitly dialectical: what are selves, the novel asks,
and how are we to interpret these beings in bodies in worlds? Kundera reminds us that
"to exist means: 'being-in-the-world'. Thus both the character and his world must be
understood as possibilities" (1990, 42):
Man does not relate to the world as subject to object, as eye to painting; not
even as actor to stage set. Man and the world are bound together like the snail to
its shell: the world is part of man, it is his dimension, and as the world changes,
existence (being-in-the-world) changes as well (35).
Thus, for fiction, every conceivable existential dimension, everything that could be part
of a human situation, "becomes theme (existential questioning)" (1996, 165). For
Kundera, we have seen, the novel must examine history not only in how it creates
"revelatory existential situations" (1990, 36) for its characters, but also "history itself
must be understood and analysed as an existential situation" (38). And as we saw in
the case of Leopold Bloom or Joseph K, so it is with the characters and worlds of post-
colonial fictions: theTolstoyan 'narrative calculus' of the novel dissolves, or at least
throws into crisis, any such simple distinctions and binaries (between historic and
private, social and personal), in its interactively dynamic, entirely 'worlded' visions of
human becoming.
Basil Davidson quotes Marc Bloch to argue that "historical facts [...] are in their
essence psychological facts". He continues:
History in other words is not a calculating machine. It unfolds in the mind and
the imagination, and takes body in the multifarious responses of a people's
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culture, itself the infinitely subtle mediation of material realities, of underpinning
economic facts, of gritty objectivities (1978, 205).
In Ngugi too, the disparate conflicting voices are shown to arise from selves embodied
in and shaped by many other co-influential social, political and material dimensions,
such as ethnicity, cultural values, class divisions, State structures, physical location,
economic models, and gender. We have argued that when the post-colonial novel
undertakes to perform social heteroglossia, it simultaneously initiates an interrogation
of many levels of existential inquiry. In the next chapter we will examine the mechanics
(and results) of such examination, as evidenced primarily in the work of Achebe and
Ngugi, to evoke something of the range of multi-dimensional discussion that fiction is
capable of containing, thereby filling out, extending and redefining our interpretative
categories through each such performance of 'narrative calculus'.
Chapter 4: Examining Society Through 'Narrative Calculus'.
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Conflicts Between Modernity, Individuality and Kinship in No Longer at
Ease.
It appears initially that Obi in Achebe's No Longer at Ease could not have come back
from England with more determination to influence the future of his society (which is
on the verge of political independence): "it was in England that Nigeria first became
more than just a name for him. That was the first great thing that England did for him"
(1972, 13). He has strong familial loyalties as well as gratitude towards his community
for sponsoring his education. Yet there has developed within him a coexistent loyalty to
an idea of the multi-ethnic heterogeneity of Nigeria that is powerful enough to make
him "argue very heatedly about [its] future" (20) with his friends, speak at a meeting
of his kinsmen about "men who are prepared to serve her well and truly" (32), and
lead him to wish that all Nigerians could have a common African language to unite
them so that they would not have to use English. He feels "like a tiger" after refusing
his first bribe: "he had won his first battle hands down [though] everyone said it was
impossible to win" (87). He has even titled the only poem he has ever written
'Nigeria', and we are told that calling him "a stranger in his [own] country was the
most painful thing one could say to Obi" (71-72).
But as Adewale Maja Pearce points out, perhaps Obi is "altogether too superficial to
carry the burden of the rigorous moral choices which the author happens to foist upon
him" (1992, 42). By immersing him in his new environment thoroughly and
confronting him with various simultaneous, conflicting worlds and choices, Achebe
rapidly exposes his naivete on many counts. Obi has a theory that it is only the older
generation without "intellectual foundations to support their experience" (Achebe,
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1972, 20), who perpetuate the disease of corruption within Nigerian society and that a
new nation-building generation of meritorious civil servants would not require to be
bribed. But such an analysis is proved hollow when he comes to realise for himself
how easily unscrupulousness can be adopted as a social 'imperative'. Achebe also
reveals how Obi's thinking on any social or public matter is never either committed or
prolonged: once, after being castigated for trying to interfere in an incident of casual
bribery, he re-considers the advisability of a democratic for a new Nigeria:
"What an Augean stable!" he muttered to himself. "Where does one begin?
With the masses?" He shook his head. "Not a chance there. It would take
centuries. A handful of men at the top. Or even one man with vision— an
enlightened dictator. People are scared of the word nowadays. But what kind of
democracy can exist side by side with so much corruption and ignorance?
Perhaps a half-way house— a sort of compromise" (43-44).
And that is where his train of thought culminates, not because he has convinced himself
of either position with any thoroughness, but because his mind, "not really in the mood
for consecutive reasoning [...] was impatient to roam in a more pleasant landscape"
(44). Obi's adolescent idealism is again exposed through his inability to marry Clara,
when despite his determination to hold on to his individuality against the will of his
community, his family and even his Western-educated urban friends, he has to confess
to himself he cannot stir up the passion or the conviction to go through with any action,
even though he is firmly convinced of his own moral and rational correctness:
His mind was troubled not only by what had happened but also by the
discovery that there was nothing in him with which to challenge it honestly. All
day he had striven to rouse his anger and his conviction, but he was honest
enough with himself to realise that the response he got, no matter how violent it
sometimes appeared was not genuine (137).
Nadine Gordimer traces Obi's downfall to his "extending himself docilely on the rack
of bourgeois values his society has taken over from the white man; values totally unreal
in the economic and social conditions of that society" (1973, 23). She continues, in a
critique of his unquestioning acceptance of the external signifiers of urban modernity:
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It is not that Obi cannot do his work efficiently; but that he accepts the necessity
for the trappings of a European bourgeois life that, during a European
administration, went along with it. Even the obligation to support his family is
not measured in accordance with their actual needs, but with what is thought to
befit the family of a man who lives according to white collar values (23-24).
In tracing the development (and decline) of his protagonist, Achebe can narrate the
existential implications of inhabiting disparate dimensions and worlds simultaneously,
as well as portray Obi's inability to orient himself along so many contrary axes. We
see enacted through him the effects of the conflicting demands of kinship and a wider
loyalty to the new nation, and the confusions that result from inhabiting at least three
different worlds at the same time without a deep enough understanding of or
commitment to any: the world of obligations to his village and his kinsmen, the
membership of a modern urban elite and its demands and temptations, and the
individualist within Obi, who cannot balance these separate worlds and yet also would
not surrender his will and freedom to his father or his community. Achebe implicitly
critiques the superficiality of his professional principles: at first Obi derides the practice
of using traditional proverbs to justify cowardice and sycophancy as evidence of a
"colonial mentality". Yet one day not much later, when asked to start paying back his
debts to his community, he thinks of defaulting on his car insurance as an act almost as
"unthinkable as a masked spirit in the old Ibo society answering another's esoteric
salutation" (98) by taking off his mask and breaking the sanctity of the ritual: "Obi
admitted that his people had a sizeable point. What they did not know was that, having
laboured in sweat and tears to enrol their kinsman among the shining elite, they had to
keep him there" (98). Not paying his insurance premium within the context of the new
urban world he now inhabits "would be letting the side down in a way that was quite
unthinkable" (98).
Near the end, Obi relinquishes the mounting burdens of his responsibilities and
mistakes by deciding that it is only the "impatient idealist" who says: "give me a place
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to stand and I shall move the earth. But such a place does not exist. We all have to
stand on the earth itself and go with her at her pace" (166-7). Such formulations
"release his spirit" until "he no longer [feels | guilt" (166). Maja Pearce finds it
surprising that such a "miserable specimen of manhood [... J has sufficient backbone to
contemplate resisting in the first place" (1992, 44). Similarly in A Man of the People,
the protagonist Odili is condemned by him for his immorality, the corruption at the
centre of his professed nation-building dreams. For Maja Pearce this makes the novel
itself "partake of the corruption which the author otherwise imagines himself to be
exposing" (36). Yet such a critique seems curiously blind to the interrogative
possibilities Achebe opens up through narrating precisely such unreliable, immature,
and flawed protagonists. (Perhaps Maja Pearce would prefer a 'pedagogic' national
literature with model protagonists who can inspire commitment to nation-building, over
a polyglossic literature that chooses to explore 'performatively' the various difficulties
that are part of any such collective becoming). As Ngugi does with Mugo and Munira,
such crisis-ridden central characters allow Achebe to examine the implications of
inhabiting post-colonial Nigeria— portrayed as the site of conflicting locations,
systems and processes— through their effects on certain selves. Also, such a strategy
enables him to critique those selves, as well as dialectically interrogate the worlds, social
structures, discourses and classes they inhabit, influence, and are shaped by, the
unfolding of which is what we next examine.
Partha Chatterjee: Nationalism's Cognitive Dichotomies.
Writing in Calcutta, Partha Chatterjee traces how a conception of an undamaged,
'authentic', and 'timeless' cultural and spiritual continuity was essential to the Indian
nationalist project from its nineteenth-century inception. He disagrees strongly with
Benedict Anderson's suggestion that African and Asian nationalisms "have [had| to
choose their 'imagined community' from certain 'modular' forms already made
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available to them by Europe and the Americas" (1993, 5). Making clear that his
objections are not for any "sentimental reasons" (5), Chatterjee argues "that the most
powerful and creative results of the nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa are
posited not on an identity but rather on a difference with the modular forms of the
national society propagated by the modern West" (5). To him, theorists like Anderson
miss crucial distinctions because they take the claims of post-colonial nationalisms as
being purely political movements "much too literally and [...] seriously (5). Chatterjee
uncovers another 'domain' that he terms the "spiritual". According to him this was
refashioned by nationalists in Asia and Africa "as an 'inner' domain" (6), and
included the propagation of native-language literatures, education and media, the
autonomous realm of the family, and the inviolable symbolic sanctity of the nation's
womenfolk. The nationalists now present this new "true and essential" domain as one
where "the nation is already sovereign" (6), even when the state, its effective material
control, and its ideologies are entirely those of the colonial power:
The material is the domain of the 'outside', of the economy and of statecraft,
of science and technology, a domain where the West had proved its superiority
and the East had succumbed. In this domain, then, Western superiority had to
be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully studied and replicated. The
spiritual, on the other hand is an 'inner' domain bearing the 'essential' marks
of cultural identity. [...]
The colonial state, in other words, is kept out of the 'inner' domain of
national culture; but it is not as though this so-called spiritual domain is left
unchanged. In fact, here nationalism launches its most powerful, creative, and
historically significant project: to fashion a 'modern' national culture that is
nevertheless not Western. If the nation is an imagined community, then this is
where it is brought into being (6).
Yet Chatterjee does not direct his dissent towards any uncomplicated celebration of
such radically 'original' nationalism, but rather utilises it as a premise upon which to
mount a critique of such cognitive separation, the consequences of which he sees as
being structural, socially pervasive and extending well into the post-independence
contemporary. R. Radhakrishnan, commenting on Chatterjee, illuminates the self-
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divisive implications of conceiving social existence, national identity, and historical
agency within the terms of such a dichotomy:
[Thus] the place where the true nationalist subject really is and the place from
which it produces historical-materialist knowledge about itself are mutually
heterogeneous. The locus of the true self, the inner/traditional/spiritual sense of
place, is exiled from processes of history while the locus of historical
knowledge fails to speak for the true identity of the nationalist subject. The
result is a fundamental rupture, a form of basic cognitive dissidence, a radical
collapse of representation (Castle, 2001, 197-198).
In the section below, we transplant certain aspects of their diagnoses to our reading of
Achebe's novels, and locate his performative illustration of similar nationalist failures,
and the range of resulting social "ruptures" in his portraits of Nigeria on the verge of
independence and soon after.
The Failure of Nationhood in No Longer at Ease.
In an interview, Achebe makes clear the scale of the disseminatory, nation-building
effort that is required if various peoples within an African society are really to think of
themselves as a 'nation': "something must be done, to make people feel they want to
sacrifice their lives if necessary for this other unit, because it is so exciting, so powerful,
so strong" (Irele, Fall '93, 64). He examines in his novels the possibilities of such
national 'imagined communities' arising, and a range of assumptions and suspicions as
well as entrenched structural and social divisions, that the various classes and ethnicities
of the nation would have to overcome for this to happen. With extraordinary irony, he
casts the aims which the UPU see themselves and their mission working towards in No
Longer at Ease in terms immediately recognisable to any nation-builders working to
fashion and disseminate a sense of shared nationhood within a new country. Obi's
community and its self-helping representatives in the federal capital feel great pride in
Umuofia's past, and often speak of themselves as "pioneers building up [their]
families and their towns" (1972, 82), with historic responsibilities of duty and sacrifice
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upon them. The tragicomic paradox of course is that it is precisely this clarity of
'village-building' purpose that renders them most unsuited to any wider national
commitment. At one of their meetings, Obi's nationally-oriented idealism utterly fails to
ignite their Umuofia-oriented imaginations. They are aware in their own way that they
are living through a "momentous epoch in [their] political evolutions" (32); hence the
scholarship scheme to have as many village sons as possible educated and in high
places. But Achebe simultaneously makes obvious that this heightened sense of
inhabiting a historic turning point has nothing to do with any thought for their
contribution to a national effort, just to ensure as much "national cake" gets to
Umuofians as possible:17
He spoke of the great honour Obi had brought to the ancient town of Umuofia
which could now join the comity of other towns in their march towards political
irredentism, social equality and economic emancipation.
"The importance of having one of our sons in the vanguard of this march of
progress is nothing short of axiomatic. Our people have a saying "Ours is
ours, but mine is mine". Every town and village struggles at this momentous
epoch in our political evolution to possess that of which it can say: "This is
mine". We are happy that today we have such an invaluable possession in the
person of our illustrious son and guest of honour" (32).
Elsewhere, he further clarifies how "in Nigeria the government was 'they'" (33), far
removed from any real, 'invented' or 'imagined' conception of a "collective subject"
that nationalist discourse aims for the population to feel part of (as we will see John
Breuilly argue presently): "it had nothing to do with you or me. It was an alien
institution and people's business was to get as much from it as they could without
getting into trouble" (33).
17
In Destination Biafra, one of Buchi Emecheta's characters explains that this is why a "responsible
person" in Nigeria necessarily enters politics: "[not] to introduce reforms but to get what one could
of the national cake and to use part of it to help one's vast extended family, the village of one's
origin, and if possible the whole tribe (1994, 16), the rationalisation being that "at least in this way
much of the ill-gotten money returned to the society" (16).
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Achebe traces carefully Umuofia's sense of itself in the 'alien' world around (which is
the capital of their 'own' nation) to show the implications of such cognitive separation.
In his novel, these alternatively defined communities based on ethnicity or kinship have
aims that either emerge directly out of the cognitive and disseminatory failings of
nationalist ideology similar to those Chatterjee points out in India (as well as
disenchantment at the failings of its new economic and political structures and
institutions), or they might be seen as more 'traditional' aims that are never
transformed into newer, broader national objectives because of such failings. To the
Igbos of Umuofia, Lagos is a strange land with alien gods, and they are only here to
partake in any material opportunities that might ensue. Furthermore, the clarification
that they are there for money and not merely to work hard is reiterated at one of their
meetings in case any member has the wrong impression:
"It is money, not work [...] we left plenty of work at home. Anyone who likes
work can return home, take up his matchet and go into that bad bush between
Umuofia and Mbaino. It will keep him occupied to his last days". The meeting
agreed that it was money, not work, that brought them to Lagos" (79).
Such a distinction, and a sense of advantage and benefit so narrowly defined seems to
validate, almost necessitate, their corruption as a 'pioneer' responsibility. What Achebe
makes also clear through such a delineation is that any symbolic terrain that could
conceivably be occupied by ideologies of nationalism within the mental and emotional
landscapes of Nigerians is already (or still) firmly in the grip of village, community, and
family. It is only as and around Umuofians, or (at best) other Igbos, that these people
feel any 'real' security, identity and a sense of past and future. And very crucially, such
a sense is certainly not all 'invented' or 'imaginary' either; there is institutional and
material underpinning that vindicates these emotional loyalties. We see how the weekly
meetings of the UPU are a democratic forum where dissent is heard and voiced, and
where members can count on seeking any manner of material or social assistance and
seldom being denied. They even engage a lawyer for Obi despite all their
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disappointment in him, "for as the President pointed out, a kinsman in trouble had to
be saved, not blamed; anger against a brother was felt in the flesh, not in the bone" (5).
Of course, the other implication of such a limited and clearly bounded sense of
fraternity is obvious: as 'Nigerians' (or as Ngugi's ordinary rural Kenyans), there are
few such national institutions that they can appeal to or are even aware of. And as we
have seen, even among Obi's own educated, patriotic friends and his colleagues, the
urban bureaucratic elite, the only one who does not advocate dishonesty as a social duty
and redistributive necessity is his anachronistically imperialist British manager, Green.
Within an Indian post-colonial context, Chatterjee himself traces the consequences of
such "cognitive dissidence (and the resulting) radical collapse of representation" of the
new nation:
The continuance of a distinct cultural 'problem' of the minorities is an index of
the failure of the Indian nation to effectively include within its body the whole
of the demographic mass which it claimed to represent. The failure assumes
massive proportions when we note [...] that the formation of a hegemonic
'national culture' was necessarily built upon a system of exclusions. Ideas of
freedom, equality, and cultural refinement went hand in hand with a set of
dichotomies which systematically excluded from the new life of the nation the
vast masses of people whom the dominant elite would represent and lead, but
who could never be culturally integrated with their leaders [...]. The
inauguration of the national state in India could not mean a universalisation of
the bourgeois notion of 'man' (1993, 134).
Are Nation-States 'Material' or 'Emotional' Entities?
Theorising primarily with reference to European national formations, Ernest Gellner
has famously argued that nation-states are most importantly the minimum political unit
that can generate the large-scale educational infrastructure required to create modern
citizens— those acceptably equipped to function in a modern, industrialising economy.
This capacity, to Gellner, was their fundamental raison d'etre, rather than "the
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awakening of an old, latent, dormant, force, though that is how it does indeed present
itself' (1983, 48).18 He claims provocatively:
Contrary to popular and even scholarly belief, nationalism does not have any
very deep roots in the human psyche (34). [...] Time was when education was a
cottage industry, when men could be made by a village or clan. That time has
now gone, and gone forever. [...] Exo-socialisation, the production and
reproduction of men outside the local intimate unit, is now the norm, and must
be so. The imperative of exo-socialisation is the main clue to why state and
culture must now be linked, whereas in the past their connection was [...] often
minimal. Now it is unavoidable. That is what nationalism is about, and we live in
an age of nationalism (38).
So, to Gellner "nationalism is not what it seems, and above all it is not what it seems to
itself' (56). In his account, political activity that appears ethno-emotionally motivated is
actually always a strategically mobilised demand for more social and economic
participation and opportunity whenever it becomes obvious that such is being denied to
a clearly identifiable group: there is nothing deeper to any such unity:
People really become nationalists because they find that in their daily social
intercourse, at work and at leisure, their 'ethnic' classification largely
determines how they are treated, whether they encounter sympathy and respect,
or contempt, derision or hostility. The root of nationalism is not ideology, but
concrete daily experience (Balakrishnan, 1996, 123).
But theorists such as Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith, and John Breuilly variously
contend that such absolutely rationalised, functional explanations do not take into
account various dimensions of nationalism: its political, cultural and emotive effects, for
instance. Smith has argued constantly and publicly against a Gellnerian position,
reiterating that materialist, functionalist accounts always overstate the role of
18
See Gellner (1983, especially 32-38, and also 39-62).
Perhaps it is relevant to point out Edward Said's reservations about their Eurocentrism when
discussing in non-Western contexts theorists such as Gellner, Hobsbawm and Elie Kedourie. Said
detects "a marked (and [...] ahistorical) discomfort [in their work] with non-Western societies
acquiring national independence, which is believed to be 'foreign' to their ethos. Hence the repeated
insistence on the Western provenance of nationalist philosophies that are therefore ill-suited to, and
likely to be abused by Arabs, Zulus, Indonesians, Irish, or Jamaicans (1993, 261). But part of our
point is precisely that Achebe's fiction explores yet subverts aspects of such theories in its specific
(and novelistic) attention to Nigeria.
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industrialisation, capitalism and the need for unifying infrastructure, and reduce (or
conflate) all nationalisms in disparate times, places and historical circumstances to mere
ideological masking or pragmatic strategies for political mobilisation. According to
Smith, "there is considerable evidence that modern nations are connected with earlier
ethnic categories and communities and are created out of pre-existing origin myths,
ethnic cultures, and shared memories; and that those nations with a vivid, widespread
sense of an ethnic past, are likely to be more unified and distinctive than those which
lack that sense" (1996a, 385).19 And so:
This myth of the modern nation has to be recognised for what it is: a semi-
ideological account of nations and nationalism, one that chimes with modern
preconceptions and needs, especially with those of a mobile, universalist
intelligentsia [...]. It is as much a myth [...] as the myth of nationalism itself;
and it should be treated with similar caution (1996b, 41).
Anderson attempts to demonstrate the emotional significance of belonging to a national
narrative, that purports to provide each citizen with existential meaning and purpose, in a
way religion (as well as the feudal class system) would have done in an earlier epoch.20
Breuilly argues for a political theory of nationalism that views it as arising out of the
mobilising of cultural and ethnic solidarities, because most of all it seeks to dissolve the
dichotomy between the (Gellnerian) impersonal state and the living population, and
represent the modernist nation-state as a collective, continuous, 'organic' entity where
these two distinct spheres attain self-realisation and legitimise one another.21
19
See Smith (1998, 27-46) and (1996b, 29-50).
20
See Anderson (1991, 9-12)
21
The Indian historian Sunil Khilnani argues a similar motive in the partition of the sub-continent:
"for those who wished to separate and establish their own state, the promise of partition was the
promise of a state made less alien" (1998, 203). In a more general vein he continues:
Since the end of the 18th century, all efforts to make the state less impersonal have invoked
the idea of the nation: a form of solidarity usually specified in terms of a common religion,
language, culture, race or history. It does not require too much historical delving to
demonstrate the fictive, spurious character of all nations; and yet no modern idea has
managed to summon up stronger, if erratic, feelings of identification with the alien apparatus
of the state (203).
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"Logically the two concepts of the nation-- a body of citizens and a cultural
collectivity— conflict. In practice, nationalism has been a sleight-of-hand ideology
which tries to connect the two ideas together" (Balakrishnan, 1996, 166).
Yet, as we argued from the parable from The Trial in our opening chapter (and how it
can evoke disparate critical responses and hermeneutic horizons simultaneously without
being reducible to any one explanation, a capacity we posited as being characteristic of
novelistic narrative) Achebe also manages to perform in his novels aspects of such
opposed theoretical positions together. If a Gellnerian infrastructural modernisation is
what 'all' modern nations really are for, then Achebe implicitly narrates the failure of
the Nigerian state to perform any such restructuring function in society. It hardly
occurs to his Umuofians that the state is meant to provide them with regulated facilities
and infrastructure, or anything more than the opportunistic pickings gathered by their
kinsmen in the capital. But he goes further and makes evident that the utter failure of
the state's emotional appeal as an 'imagined community' is inextricably related to its
failures in the material sphere to provide enabling opportunities for its citizens. He thus
demonstrates a more complex scenario in both his novels— for which aspects of the
various theoretical positions above have to be utilised interpretatively together, rather
than as mutually exclusive 'options'— in how his characters consistently turn to local
and ethnic affiliations for moral, cultural as well as material and institutional support.
Achebe establishes that if kinship and ethnicity command primary loyalty, this does not
arise just out of the fact of a shared birthplace and traditions, but is reconfirmed each
time his characters find they can rely on the UPU for material support in any way they
might require.
Perhaps this was part of Hegel's project in the 18th century itself; an attempt to 'humanise' the new
political structures and paradigms he saw evolving around him, by discovering in the nation-state the
final philosophical and historical consummation of earthly existence.
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Where No Longer at Ease focuses on the institutional and structural failures of the
fledgling, nearly post-colonial Nigerian state, and relates them to their accompanying
cognitive and emotional causes and implications, A Man of the People (set five years
after independence) extends its investigation to the new nation's politics. Again, as we
next demonstrate, by a similar strategy of narrating selves-in-worlds as a confluence of
various agents, classes, processes and structures, Achebe's novel dramatises and can
explore many simultaneous dimensions relevant to his society's becoming.
National Politics and Class Divisions in A Man of the People.
As with Ngugi's much satirised members of the new political and economic elite in
Petals of Blood, Raymond Chui, Kimeria and Mzigo, who are portrayed as venal,
treacherous, lustful, and murderous, Achebe's chief Nanga is an easily recognisable
portrait of the new leadership in a post-colonial African state, in his frequent, ruthless
and rapid lapses into greed and corruption. He engineers elections, and organises
rioting in towns and villages whenever his political calculations so require; he lives in
great, imported luxury, and sells off the nation's assets to foreign companies in return
for huge "dashes". Achebe reveals how Nanga manipulates political life both at a
parliamentary level as well as in his own constituency, where he energetically plays the
ethnic card and promises his voters ever larger shares of the "national cake", and yet
blackmails his own community by taking away the water pipes he has promised them
when their support threatens to turn against him.22
2"
In The Wretched of the Earth Fanon sketches a portrait that anticipates at length and in near-
novelistic detail the evolution of this political class after the achievement of independence. See
Fanon (1985, 122-144).
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Yet it is the protagonist Odili through whom Achebe narrates a more nuanced,
dialectically complex portrait of the relationship between power and individual
conscience in this society, as well as that between the political (and educated) elite and
the wider population. For most of the first-person narrative that forms A Man of the
People, Odili is not blind to the unreliability of his own motives, both in joining Nanga
and then in opposing him later on a political stage. He realises even as he is being
charmed into accepting Nanga's offer that dubious forces within him are overcoming
his usual defences of scepticism and irony. He also watches himself continually make
downward adjustments to the extremely high standards of political conduct he starts off
espousing, so that he can accommodate Nanga's obvious manipulations more
charitably. "Perhaps it was their impatience" that saw through the hypocrisies of
proud modesty "that made men like Nanga successful politicians while starry-eyed
idealists strive vaingloriously to bring into politics niceties and delicate refinements that
belong elsewhere" (1966, 12).
The trivial sexual rivalry, from which originates the central conflict with Nanga that
soon assumes national proportions, is in fact an essential dimension to understanding
not just the character of Odili, but also the political culture of this particular society.
Sexual envy and possessiveness are clearly the initial catalysts that cause him to oppose
Nanga and remain so late into the election campaign, if not until the very end: he thinks
of the support of Max's Common People's Convention merely as "a second string to
[his] bow" (88). But besides exposing a youthful, cavalier masculinity that is obviously
of dubious reliability in any social cause or political movement requiring sustained
commitment, Achebe also makes important indirect points about the near-farcical
shallowness of the political structure of such a society. It is testimony to how thin the
political culture of the country is that a paltry, machismo-driven, inter-personal sexual
rivalry can be amplified into a dispute involving the electoral destiny of an entire
constituency. Odili, without any preparation or previous evidence of political dedication,
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can enter overnight the race to manipulate the people of his community in an election.
There is nobody he has to establish any credentials before, because there is a
structurally entrenched and cultivated distance between the population he should be
answerable to, and the political class he briefly becomes part of.
Yet, despite making compromise after compromise in what turns increasingly into the
narrowest of personal vendettas with all pretence abandoned of any broader principles
or plans of reform, Odili ends his narrative with a reflection of great bitterness. He
decides that in Nanga and the rest of the government, the people have the leader they
deserve, because the leader and the people have come to reflect each other: the people
themselves had become "even more cynical than their leaders and were apathetic into
the bargain" (161). In this light the new military regime with its promises of stabilising
the country, abolishing multi-party democracy, and vigorously prosecuting corruption
seems to him a preferable option. Moreover, watching at the end how fickle public
opinion and memory seem to be, Odili decides that it is just as well that Max was
avenged "not by the people's collective will but by one solitary woman who loved him.
Had his spirit waited for the people to demand redress it would have been waiting still,
in the rain and out in the sun" (167). He concludes that personal (and inter-personal)
redemption is the only honest alternative left in such a society:
For I do honestly believe that in the fat-dripping, gummy, eat-and-let-eat regime
just ended— a regime which inspired the common saying that a man could only
be sure of what he had put away safely in his gut, [...] in such a regime, I say
you died a good death if your life had inspired someone to come forward and
shoot your murderer in the chest— without asking to be paid" (167).23
2j
Such disenchantment, with the wider population as much as with the new elite and the leadership,
is often to be found in the idealists and nation-builders portrayed in much African literature. It recurs
prominently as a theme in the work of Ayi Kwei Armah, to name another well-known instance, as
well as in Soyinka's novel The Interpreters. Armah's nameless protagonist in The Beautyful Ones are
Not Yet Born, and Baako in Fragments reach similarly despairing conclusions about their once
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The Elite and 'the People': Structural Divides and Cognitive Failures.
Through Odili, Obi, Munira and other members of the educated or political nationalist
elite, the novels above provide overwhelming textual evidence that illustrates various
implications of Partha Chatterjee's thesis about this class (even in its most apparently
idealistic, nationally-oriented, and principled individuals) being ultimately isolated,
inadequate and superficial, and lacking both the integrated interpretative capacities as
well as the sustained will necessary to act towards realising their nation-building
dreams. While all the texts make a clear distinction between these members of the
'interpretative' elite and their rapacious class brethren— the politicians, bureaucrats and
local capitalists whom we might collectively call the 'exploitative' elite— they
demonstrate other critical failures of analysis and action that have proved to be barriers
in building an (emotional or civil) sense of nationhood throughout a population. We
realise that these self-appointed social critics, activists and interpreters often simply do
not comprehend the scale and range of their worlds, which is crucial to why their
dreams of directing their societies towards new becomings founder.24
Another peculiar strain running through the intellectuals and idealists of these novels—
Ngugi's Mugo and Munira (both of whom turn to religious messianism and believe
themselves to be prophets, which only leads to more destructive consequences rather
than any successful community-building), Baako in Fragments, Chris in Anthills of the
Savannah, and Soyinka's 'interpreters'— is the involuntary fear they betray faced
idealised national brethren. But such cynicism and desperation reach a nadir of simplistic, binary
prejudice in Armah's Why are We So Blest?
"4
For a comprehensive critique of such a 'literature of disillusionment', see Neil Lazarus's book-
length study of the novels of Armah (1990), especially Chapters 1 and 2 (1-45) in which he argues
that such despair fails on multiple levels in its understanding and historical diagnosis, and often
reflects only a superficial and inadequate 'messianist', revolutionary idealism that members of the
'conscientious', educated bourgeoisie in many African societies imagine to be active and sustainable
socio-political engagement.
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with absolutely ordinary people going about ordinary daily business. They are
constantly in terror of being attacked criminally or out of simmering social resentments.
Yet apart from Chris's murder by a drunken policeman in Anthills... (who does not
know that Chris is not an even lower 'subaltern' than he is), no such violence ever
occurs. Instead, we see Chris' revelatory first-time journey out of the capital, and Baako
watching the fishermen engaged in hard labour. After an accident, "the people" in
Fragments fish out and bury their own dead, with no help from any state apparatus,
with no space for the luxury of grief, just "small sounds of regret" (Armah, 1987, 142)
at their losses, and their "knowing fear of the immensity of the long hazard ahead"
(23).
Their 'own' societies simply bewilder these self-appointed 'builders' in its
unfamiliarity. Karega in Petals ofBlood, lecturing a schoolroom about the land and the
history that every African should be proud of, comes to see in the children's expectant
eyes that he is merely passing on platitudes, abstract and futile; these children too
would have to flee this orphaned "drought-stricken depopulated wasteland" to become
cooks and cleaners like their parents in Nairobi. Yet among the educated intellectuals
portrayed in these fictions, Karega alone is shown to have broken away from the
privileges of his schooling as well as the confines of his class and the city. In
accordance with his political beliefs, he actually lives and works among 'the people'
about whom he has such vivid transformatory dreams. Karega leads the people of
Ilmorog to their MP in the capital, and goes from being a scholarship student and
lawyer's assistant to a school-master in Ilmorog, and then a street-vendor, a dockside
worker, and an agricultural labourer, "since the only thing that he had now was his two
hands, he would somehow sell its creative power to whoever would buy it and then join
with all the other hands in ensuring that at least they had a fair share of what their
thousand sets of fingers produced" (Ngugi, 1977, 302). Despite every reason for
104
despair "he would not, could not accept the static vision of Wanja's logic. It was too
ruthless, and it could only lead to [...] self-or mutual annihilation" (303).
But no intellectual steps forward to lead the people of Abazon in Anthills of the
Savannah when they come to place their futile petition before the President in the
capital after years of neglect. And yet Ngugi portrays the irony that recurs right until
Mugo denounces himself at the end of A Grain of Wheat, in that everybody in the
village reveres him as a symbol of integrity almost as meaningful to them as Uhuru
(independence) itself. No matter how much Mugo retreats or denies it, these retreats
themselves are re-interpreted as inspirational instances of humility and detachment. It is
a village full of cripples, survivors, and families who have lost members in the armed
struggle for liberation, but there remains a 'spontaneous' national enthusiasm that is
dimmed only when the likes ofMugo are revealed to have been cowards, and shown to
be gradually destroyed later in Petals of Blood when independence does nothing to
improve their daily lives.25
25
Fanon (and other revolutionary leaders like Amilcar Cabral in Guinea) anticipate this mass
disenchantment and post-independence dissipation, in various passages besides the 'messianic' strain
that Neil Lazarus shows Armah to have primarily inherited. Fanon's "messianism" is nowhere near as
unilateral as Armah translates into his fiction. In the chapters on 'Spontaneity: Its Strengths and
Weaknesses' (1985, 85-118), and 'Pitfalls ofNational Consciousness' (119-165) which describes a
scenario after independence has been won, he makes clear that all the initial enthusiasm to overthrow
oppression that characterises easily incited anti-colonial "peasant revolts" can only be transformed into
deep and lasting liberation through slow, daily nation-wide work and political education.
This work is what Fanon sees as the essential "national liberation" without which independence is a
symbolic nothing. Indeed, such symbols (and nationalism itself) are fatal distractions, which, as the
politicians in Ngugi and Achebe repeatedly demonstrate, are effectively manipulated by leaders and
the elite to obscure the non-occurrence of any actual transformation.
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Ngugi: 'Subaltern Re-inscription' in Petals of Blood.
Criticising Wole Soyinka's novel The Interpreters in particular, (although the
objections could apply to Armah's fictions and even to an extent to Achebe), Ngugi
points out how 'the people' hardly make an undifferentiated appearance except as a
crowd or an object of discussion throughout his narrative. His criticism is that such a
mass portrait amounts to an essentialist, inadequately imagined national envisioning,
that provides evidence of the failure of such novels in their engagements with the
multiple circumstances and agents who are involved in any collective social evolution.
To him, such fictions narrate landscapes where "the ordinary people, workers and
peasants [...] remain passive watchers on the shore or pitiful comedians on the road"
(1972, 30-31). Ngugi writes of Soyinka's vision (and this would definitely apply to the
despair and cynicism arrived at in Armah's narratives by Ocran, 'the man' or Juana, or
to Odili's conclusion in A Man of the People), that confronted with the apparent
impossibility of collective political effort, the author's "good man" becomes the
"uncorrupted individual: his liberal humanism leads him to admire an individual's lone
act of courage, and thus he often ignores the creative struggle of the masses" (65).
Aijaz Ahmad makes a similar critique of Rushdie's novel Shame (that we shall return to
in Section Three). Ahmad argues that the novel by focussing solely on "the experience
of a decadent class" the "ruling elite", and presenting the history of its "corruption
and criminalities" (1994, 138) "as the experience of a country'" (140), excludes:
The dailiness of lives lived under oppression, and the human bonding— of
resistance, of decency, of innumerable heroisms, of both ordinary and
extraordinary kinds— which makes it possible for large numbers of people to
look each other in the eye, without guilt, with affection and solidarity and
humour, and makes life, even under oppression, endurable and frequently
joyous (139).
In an introductory essay to the Subaltern Studies project, Ranajit Guha famously
argues that the "unhistorical historiography" of colonial India excludes the "politics
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of the people" (Guha and Spivak, 1988, 40) in their homogenising focus on the
activities and ideologies of the nationalist elite, as if this was the only trajectory
comprising the nationalist movement:
For parallel to the domain of elite politics there existed throughout the colonial
period another domain of Indian politics in which the principal actors were the
[...] subaltern classes and groups constituting the mass of the labouring
population and the intermediate strata in town and country— that is, the people.
This was an autonomous domain, for it neither originated from elite politics nor
did its existence depend on the latter. It was traditional only in so far as its roots
could be traced back to pre-colonial times, but it was by no means archaic in the
sense of being outmoded (40).
In a diagnosis analogous to Chatterjee's (but premised upon the divergent historical
experiences of various classes, rather than upon the material/spiritual divide within elite-
nationalist cognition), Guha traces as a consequence of this dichotomy "the historic
failure of the nation to come into its own", which makes "the study of this failure [...]
the central problematic of the historiography of colonial India" (43). In this vein, we
might interpret Ngugi's work as an instance of 'subaltern re-inscription' that explicitly
redirects its focus from the ruling (and intellectual) urban classes alone.26 The span of
his narrative canvases is recognisably broader than Achebe's or Armah's, and his casts
of characters are culled from a much wider cross-section of society. Both Petals of
Blood and A Grain ofWheat are set primarily among peasantry and herdsmen in small
villages, thus de-privileging the city as the site of national formation.27 Further, Mugo,
Abdullah, Wanja, Nyakinyua, Mumbi, and many other major characters in Ngugi's
work do not belong to the tiny, urban 'interpreting' class that Soyinka's, Achebe's and
Armah's narratives are located almost entirely within. Therefore, keeping in mind
Odili's disenchantment with the wider population itself as being corrupt beyond any
possibility of resuscitation, we will now consider the themes that arise through the far
more differentiated portrayals of "the-people-who-comprise-the-nation" (Gandhi,
~6
In different thematic contexts in Sections 3 and 4, we return to more examples of such narrative
projects (Rohinton Mistry, Bessie Head, J M Coetzee), and their nation-representing implications.
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1998, 119) in Ngugi's work. Who is it that the nation-builders in Achebe and Armah
give up on when they contemplate their disenchantment with 'the masses'? How
dynamically have they been imagined and fictionalised? What transformative
possibilities have characters from outside the urban elite been shown to possess: what
is their view of the national project?
Ilmorog in Petals ofBlood is a village almost entirely deserted by its young. The old
who are left behind cannot understand the outlandish lure of Nairobi, that can carry
away sons and daughters to become cooks, house servants, and cleaners: "our young
men and women have left us. The glittering metal has called them" (7). They are
gratefully astonished when young outsiders like Munira and Abdullah decide to stay
and look after the school and the village shop. Their only other relationship with the
processes and institutions of Kenya's post-independence modernity is through an MP
they never see except before elections, and 'taxes' (and other illegal payments) that
they are forced into paying annually without ever receiving any benefits or
explanations. They are promised roads and water pipes that never arrive, and in a time
of prolonged drought it never occurs to them, before Karega points it out, that they need
not feel completely abandoned in matters of survival or dying; they have a right to
petition their MP and expect help from the State.
Yet after their long trek to Nairobi, when aid and 'development' do come to Ilmorog, it
is imposed upon them without the slightest sensitivity to local requirements or any
appearance of inclusiveness. Where Fanon envisions nation-building as a process
where even a bridge should not be built before the local population has internalised
every principle behind its necessity (1985, 162), Ngugi portrays how banks seize land
from locals until they are forced again to work for wages on their own land, just as
27
Something Fanon also argues as being vital in the course of post-colonial liberation (1985, 150).
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during the colonial period. Outside entrepreneurs, from the same cliques that run the
rest of the country, have taken over all the new and old shops, and even a traditional
drink is now manufactured on an industrial scale with no dues whatsoever paid to its
original producers:
Within only ten years [...] Ilmorog peasants had been displaced from the land;
some had joined the army of workers, others were semi-workers with one foot
in a plot of land and one foot in a factory, while others became petty traders in
hovels and shanties they did not even own, along the Trans-Africa Road, or
criminals and prostitutes [...]. The herdsmen had suffered a similar fate: some
had died; others had been driven even further out into drier parts away from the
new enclosed game-parks for tourists, and yet others had become hired
labourers. [...] And behind it all, as a monument to the changes, was the Trans-
Africa Road and the two storied building of the African Economic bank Ltd
(1977, 302).
Nyakinyua dies after the bank seizes her land; Abdullah is reduced from being the
owner of the local bar to selling oranges on the roadside. Mumbi prospers, but only
after she decides to become first a prostitute and then the expensive Madam of her own
brothel, where among her most lucrative clients is the man who once used and
abandoned her.
It is against such a backdrop of exploitation and abandonment that we should review
the disenchantment of the central characters in Achebe and Armah, and perhaps it will
now be clearer why Achebe's Umuofians are so eager to make the most of the
opportunities of being in the capital and having their kinsmen in important posts. If, as
Ernest Renan has put it, "a nation is a large-scale solidarity constituted by the feeling
of sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make
again in the future, [that] pre-supposes a past; [but that] is summarised, however, in the
present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a
national life" (Bhabha, 1995, 19), Ngugi portrays starkly the paradox of immense
sacrifices made, but no solidarity constituted and no tangible national deeds achieved,
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except those of violation and exploitation. Renan goes on to state that the existence of a
nation is "a daily plebiscite: just as an individual's existence is a perpetual affirmation
of life" (19). Yet the people of Ilmorog are shown to have absolutely no stake in any
'plebiscite' involving the new society, material or political, except when its builders and
leaders periodically descend to exploit them, with a degree of force against which even
their collective resistance has no meaning. And again, by way of corollary we see why
Achebe's Umuofians remain loyally bound to the UPU (rather than to any idea of
Nigeria)— at least they have a clear and ongoing emotional and material stake in a
'plebiscite' conceived on such a premise.
Yet it is in Ngugi's novels, where the portraits of neglect and violation of ordinary
people by the nation's elite are developed most fully, that we see evidence of more
creative and resistive individual and collective efforts materialise, rather than the
complete despair that Achebe's and Armah's protagonists arrive at. For instance, Petals
ofBlood assembles the only multi-ethnic cast among these novels and narrates a range
of their encounters, as well as the encounters it portrays between the various classes and
locations that comprise the Kenyan nation, to explore both the resulting exploitation
and traumas but also the possibilities of solidarity that emerge. Besides, Ngugi also
inserts several pedagogic voices in the novel, which preach exhortative lessons ranging
from Marxist diagnoses to songs and fables recalling the ancient glory as well as the
ongoing struggle of all black people in Africa. But while this may be seen on one level
as a mobilising 'strategic essentialism' of the kind that Benita Parry28 and Spivak have
argued to be vital at a certain stage of any struggle for liberation, it also problematically
descends occasionally into 'nativist' xenophobia, if not along the lines of ethnicity, then
along the lines of race. There is a lot of prejudice against Asians expressed by different
characters (and pedagogic voices) throughout Ngugi's fiction, even though his
response would probably be that it is more a class antagonism that is being expressed
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in these terms, because Asians controlled many small and large businesses in Kenya
and formed part of the country's exploitative merchant class. Still, it highlights the
point that perhaps every gathering under a nationalist banner, however necessary and
even progressive, must at some stage inevitably work through strategies of
homogenising, excluding, and 'othering' sections of its own population as much as
outsiders.29
But related to exploring the political and material conditions of vast sections of their
society's population amid the uneven dynamism of post-independence transitions,
these novelists have always gone further and examined the resulting cultural, moral, and
inter-personal implications of such profound structural changes and historical upheaval,
and it is these explorations we now consider.
Post-Independence Social and Cultural Upheavals in Achebe, Armah and
Ngugi.
Ben Okri, speaking generally of traditional rural life in Nigeria, claims that there remain
large tracts of consciousness almost entirely unaffected (and undamaged) by the
colonial encounter, which thus preserve intact, indigenous ways within communities of
conceiving the world around them and productively inhabiting it. Okri's further point is
that these heritages should now be mined and synthesised to fashion both an
indigenous spiritual and national modernity for Nigeria (Wilkinson, 1992, 86-7). Yet
the novelistic evidence from the works we have been discussing hardly bears out such
optimistic portraits of an unassailable and 'timeless' moral and cultural state of good
health. While both Achebe and Ngugi trace the absence of a widely disseminated
28
See her essay on 'Resistance Theory...' in Mongia (1996, 84-109)
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nation-building sense ultimately to entrenched class divisions and divergences of
interests, as well as acute failures of leadership even in its most idealistic and well-
meaning forms, their works discover consequent problems within levels of daily social
existence that are as pervasive as they are ultimately 'anti-national'— that is, non-
conducive to any collectively undertaken nation-building project. For instance, in the
proverbs and fables that lace almost everybody's speech in especially the novels of
Achebe and Armah, characters frequently find the forms in which to draw on the
heritage of their community as an interpretative guide for their own lives in the new
worlds they find themselves inhabiting. But besides the danger of treating what are
sometimes merely cliches as easily available pills of wisdom that guarantee moral
sanction from immutably relevant cultural authorities, what is ironically questioned
throughout these novels is how such sayings often seem to be conveniently drawn from
a very narrow cross-section of life-experience, and more importantly, the manner of
their application to contemporary situations. The narratives thus investigate whether
such memories of cultural inheritance actually indicate currents of undamaged,
undisrupted continuity, or whether these proverbs represent the debris that survive as
hints of a profound perplexity? How do these characters apply their heritage to their
contemporary condition, when the world around them is no longer the familiar,
bounded setting from which such wisdom was once derived?
In the fictional landscapes of Achebe, Armah and Ngugi we hardly ever witness that
idyllic, composed, unbroken understanding of myth and tradition that Ben Okri (and
Chatterjee's nineteenth-century Indian nationalists) so often extol. Also, if Chatterjee is
right, and the cultural (and 'spiritual') project was at least as significant to the
nationalists as undertaking the struggle for eventual political liberation, then once again
the novelistic evidence in these African societies illustrates both a failure to disseminate
29
The dangers of which Said warns against repeatedly in Culture and Imperialism, as does Fanon in
The Wretched of the Earth. For fuller discussions see Said (1993, 252-265) and Fanon, especially
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any constructive sense of national identity within this domain as much as on the
ideological and material fronts, as well as further damaging implications of the
unsustainably dichotomous cognitive separation between the spiritually 'timeless' and
the materialist-historical domains of nationalist identity. Far from facilitating an organic
cultural modernity, the texts reveal the extent of confusion, and indeed moral and
cultural damage, done by the violence of the colonial encounter (and the uneven
transitions of the post-independence aftermath) to the traditionally held value-systems
of different communities within the population, and how such upheavals actually prove
a major hindrance in fashioning modern national myths and institutions. Basil
Davidson, for one, would disagree almost entirely with Okri's vision. His historical
portrait is much closer to the worlds the novels provide evidence of:
Generally the pre-colonial and pre-nationalist African community offered the
individual a moral and psychological identity within his world, and a guide to
reality that was rounded and complete, encompassing past, present and future.
In a decisive cultural sense, this was the basis on which Africans met the
colonial experience. The community of the founding charter within which they
stood was firm and trusted ground. Now it shifted beneath their feet, and slid
towards what seemed increasingly like chaos. The world they knew 'turned
upside down', throwing a tried security into a void of sickening doubt. [...]
Modernisation duly came. But it came in no fortunate way. Its overall impact
of the first half-century or so was to undermine this African community in its
myriad forms, attack and often destroy its modes of social control, dislocate its
moral systems (1978, 51-52).
Any hope of a sense of Nigerianness disseminating among the Igbos of Achebe's
novels is wrecked upon an apparently bedrock belief in "ours is ours, but mine is
mine", that has not only remained untransformed by any new sense of multi-ethnic
national collectivity, but actually appears to have been consolidated within this new
atmosphere. But besides the sayings and fables that always seem to surface when
required to vindicate any dishonesty, nepotism, or apathy, there are those that are
revealed to be fatally misdirected in the context of any shared nation-building if such
might ever be undertaken.30 In A Man of the People Achebe explores the morality
(1985, 114-118).
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within a small community that justifies thieving as long as the owner does not notice.
Odili argues that even if the saying might be pertinent to village life, in that "the owner
was the village, and the village had a mind; it could say no to sacrilege. But in the affairs
of the nation there was no owner; the laws of the village become powerless" (1966,
167). Elsewhere contemporary life has inspired its own cynical aphorisms phrased in
contemporary terms: "you chop, me self I chop, palaver finish" (167).
The novels expose other attitudes that serve as evidence of how the resilient abilities
within individuals and groups to assess their situation in an altered, even fractured
environment and then to be able to re-orient themselves, have suffered noticeable injury
in Ghana, Ilmorog and in the Igbo world. Throughout Ngugi's narratives, we
continually come across 'casualties' of the violent suddenness and the imbalances of
cultural encounter during the colonial period. For instance, there are many characters in
disproportionate awe of one or another aspect of Western power— either the gun, the
cross, or rank and wealth— to the point where these have become their only criteria for
evaluating human worth. Yet they are by no means depicted as simple collaborators: the
confusion runs far deeper than that. Once, in a casual analysis of a popular song, Obi in
No Longer at Ease realises how it can be interpreted as reiterated bafflement at the
many ways in which worlds have been turned upside down. Achebe portrays Obi's
father's obsessive reverence for every manifestation of the English printed word that he
hoards in his room indiscriminately. Yet he is ultimately not courageous enough to be
progressive within the frameworks of either a traditional or a Christian identity. Despite
"(Achebe provides numerous examples: "the village of Anata has already eaten, now they must make
way for us to reach the plate. No man in Urua will give his paper to a stranger when his own son
needs it; if the very herb we go to seek in the forest now grows at our very backyard are we not saved
the journey" (1966, 141)? Or again, as one man says at a political meeting of their leaders: "we know
they are eating [...] but we are eating too. They are bringing us water and they promise to bring us
electricity. We did not have those things before; that is why I say we are eating too" (1966, 139).
Odili describes how this is "a regime which inspired the common saying that a man could only be
sure ofwhat he had put away safely in his gut" (167), and where any idea of protest or transformation
can always be quelled by another proverb: "our people have a saying that if you respect today's king
others will respect you when your turn comes" (70).
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being aggressively (and defiantly) Christian in every other aspect, Obi's father cannot
allow his son to marry an osu, a category he should have rejected long ago because of
his adopted religion. Instead he evokes the ancient taboos of their past as well as the
near-certain prospect of Obi's ostracisation in the future, as if it is already a given
immutable. But the greater irony lies in the fact that Obi himself, and his modern
promiscuous friends in the city, have little more revolutionary stamina than the older
generation. His friends counsel him to wait for a future where everybody is
"civilized": such foolhardy exertions are not for pioneers.
In Fragments, Baako's grandmother Naana, initially so assertive in her traditionalism,
also confesses by the end that her sense of the world has been shattered into " a
thousand and thirty useless pieces" (Armah, 1987, 196). Armah's protagonist Baako
theorises elaborately how a traditional conception of the dead interceding with the
ancestors to win favours for the living has been comprehensively reformulated into
terms that suit contemporary pragmatic practice. He calls it the "cargo cult", and finds
parallels within this new 'morality' that justify to his family why there is nothing
wrong in their expecting him to return from Europe with cars and refrigerators. In this
kind of valorisation, whereby aspects of an older value-system are re-oriented to
legitimise and even glorify the status quo, Baako detects "a pure rock-bottom kind of
realism, the kind that accepts what happens at this moment in this place and raises it to
the level of principle. A reality principle par excellence" (156). He notices how various
levels of people in Ghana get hostile at any talk of a "changed approach" (156), and
explains this near non-existence of any sense of transformatory possibility by arguing
that it is not "makers" the new "cargo cult" wants, only intermediaries. "Making
takes too long, the intermediary brings quick gains", and besides, "to think of being a
maker oneself could be sheer unforgivable sin" (157).
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Thus, rather than any sweeping, a priori dismissals of ethnicity-based nationalism as
always being 'nativist', xenophobic and regressive,31 these various fictional
explorations reveal an entire spectrum of meanings and dimensions to the post-
independence roles of such nationalism within a modern nation-state paradigm. We
have examined both its function as an alternative (and often damagingly rival) gathering
point of collective solidarity, as well as its continuing importance as a source of vital
material and emotional sustenance, frequently because of the failure of the new state to
provide its citizens with such opportunities. But these novels have also examined the
use (and abuse) of such identities in mobilising political activity within a modern
framework. And finally, we see how they have questioned the enduring relevance of
pre-modern cultural heritages within a transformed social environment in ways that
reveal both positive and negative dimensions. These novels posit that it is certainly not
in the new, tiny power-holding bourgeoisie's interest to foster within the people a wider
sense of non-ethnic unity, through disseminating consciousness or forging the bonds
of new mythologies, or entering into the slow, organised work of actual material
development (because the people would then realise they have a rightful stake in the
building and the benefits of the new nation). In fact as Neil Lazarus points out, Baako
comes to discover in Fragments, (as do Soyinka's protagonists in The Interpreters)
that the "gap" between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' in their societies is not an
'empty' space; it is "patrolled by an army of institutions and apparatuses functioning
to insure that no modern-day would-be Prometheus L-.-J is able to smuggle sparks [...]
to the 'have-nots' " (1990, 189), even if they are institutions set up ostensibly to
promote precisely such dissemination, such as the universities, the civil services, and
Ghanavision. Also, the fact that a 'spontaneous', 'untutored' mass national
consciousness simply does not exist (or cannot be sustained without continued further
post-independence work), is evident not only through the writings of Neil Lazarus and
31
As is common among 'cosmopolitan', Marxist and/or modernist theorists and thinkers, both
European and non-Western: Gellner, Hobsbawm, and to an extent even Said and Bhabha, just to name
a few examples.
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Fanon, but also when we examine the emotional and symbolic orientations that grip the
imaginations and sanction the actions of ordinary Igbos in Achebe's Nigeria, Armah's
Ghanaians and Ngugi's Kenyans. The extraordinary, Kafkaesque distances between
the rulers and the ruled as revealed in these novels, lead quite logically to ordinary
people taking on both individual and collective identities in the only palpable forms they
recognise as 'natural' to their positions. In Achebe, there are always the ancient and
secure affiliations to community and village, and as far as any conception of
individuality is entertained, the "ours is ours, but mine is mine" dictum that people see
in practice everywhere around them is guidance enough: besides, they are only
emulating the examples set up above them by their leaders. But as Ngugi complains of
Soyinka and Armah and attempts to rectify through the re-inscriptions in his own
fiction, there is often nothing deeper presented as a conception of resistance and
creative agency for ordinary people either as individuals or as groups, beyond the
options of passivity or active acquisition and survivalist dishonesty. When there is any
individual rage, it is taken out impotently on rabid dogs or trucks or TV sets fas in
Fragments). During angry rioting, Odili confesses to feeling a complete lack of moral
culpability, because there is not seen to be a national fabric to damage:
We were exhilarated like everyone else by the heady atmosphere of impending
violence. [...] After seven years of lethargy any action seemed welcome and
desirable; the country was ripe and impatient to shed in violent exercise the lazy
folds of flabby skin and fat it had put on in the greedy years of indolence. The
scandals that were daily exposed in the newspapers— far from causing general
depression in the country— produced a feeling akin to festivity [...] for the rest
of us who thought we had nothing to lose" (Achebe, 1966, 112-113).
Questioning the State?
Chatterjee's diagnosis, in the case of India, is that the dimension of culture is just
another area where an inadequately imagined coupling of the coexistent, divergent, yet
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equally dynamic realities of community and State (as well as culture and nationalist
history) is at the root of much "post-colonial misery" (1993, 11):
Nationalist texts were addressed both to 'the people' who were said to
constitute the nation and to the colonial masters whose claim to rule nationalism
questioned. [...] Nationalism denied the alleged inferiority of the colonised
people: it also asserted that a backward nation could 'modernise' itself while
retaining its cultural identity. It thus produced a discourse [...] which, even as it
challenged the colonial claim to political domination [...] also accepted the very
intellectual premises of 'modernity' on which colonial domination was based.
How are we to sort out these contradictory elements in nationalist discourse"
(1986, 30)?
Chatterjee has written repeatedly on this subject, not only in questioning the premises
of nationalist cultural identity, but also examining the framework of the modernising
nation-state as being an inadequately imagined, insensitively imposed "derivative
discourse". He has interrogated the implications— questionable at best, destructive at
worst— of perpetuating the contradictions underpinning such a paradigm:
The trouble was that the moral-intellectual leadership of the nationalist elite
operated in a field constituted by a very different set of distinctions— those
between the spiritual and the material, the inner and the outer, the essential and
the inessential. That contested field over which nationalism had proclaimed its
sovereignty and where it had imagined its true community was neither
coextensive with nor coincidental to the field constituted by the public private
distinction. In the former field, the hegemonic project of nationalism could
hardly make the distinctions of language, religion, caste or class a matter of
indifference to itself. The project was that of cultural 'normalisation', like [...]
bourgeois hegemonic projects everywhere, but with the all-important difference
that it had to choose its site of autonomy from a position of subordination to a
colonial regime that had on its side the most universal justificatory resources
produced by post-Enlightenment social thought.
The result is that autonomous forms of imagination of the community were,
and continue to be, overwhelmed and swamped by the history of the post-
colonial state. Here lies the root of our post-colonial misery: not in our inability
to think out new forms of modern community but in our surrender to the old
forms of the modern state. If the nation is an imagined community and if
nations must also take the form of states, then our theoretical language must
allow us to talk about community and state at the same time. I do not think our
present theoretical language allows us to do this (1993, 11).
In arguing thus, he forms part of a long, ongoing and heterogeneous tradition of
sceptical debate among African and Indian thinkers, that has included figures as
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different as Gandhi, Tagore,32 Said, and Fanon. There are several aspects to their
scepticism: some have seen it as a tragically paradoxical continuation of a governing
model that was put in place within colonies for the clear and related purposes of
economic exploitation and civil repression, because even if the nation-state system
promised and partially delivered liberty, equality, fraternity and opportunity in its
European incarnations, the colonial state never even set out in principle any such aims
for those under its domination.33 What would be inherited instead with such a
hierarchic structure of governance would be the side effects (or strategies) of imperialist
(and contemporary bourgeois-capitalist) policy: sowing artificial and arbitrary social
categories and national boundaries, promoting divisive ethnocentric binaries both within
the state and against other peoples outside it, ruling through the threat and use of
authorised state violence, and perpetuating hierarchies within society, both horizontally
between the capital city and the majority of the population in the countryside, and
vertically between a tiny ruling class of politicians, bourgeoisie and bureaucrats, and the
rest of the people. Others have argued that a structure that emerged out of the
requirements of a certain historical epoch in bourgeois, capitalist Europe might not
apply to India or societies in Africa, because both a bourgeoisie and a capitalistic
modernism might be irrelevant and/or harmful in these conditions. For many in this
tradition of anti-statist thinkers, the inheritance of and persistence with such structures
is what has fundamentally undermined, to the point of destroying, any possibility of
actual progress and evolution. Applying such ideas hypothetically to the fictionalised
African societies we are studying, it is not only the neglect and/or active abuse of the
wealth, machinery, and opportunities of the post-independence State by the tiny ruling
'2
Gandhi famously advocated the disbanding of the Congress Party as well as all inherited modernist
state infrastructure after the achievement of independence, so that India might be transformed into a
vast collection of small-scale, economically self-sufficient villages. Tagore, in a lecture series given
during the 1920s considered the nation-state to be a conformity-enforcing and divisive "prison-house
of consciousness".
33
For a fuller discussion of the implications of African nationalists overlooking such contradictions,
see Kwame A. Appiah's book In My Father's House (1992, 264-267).
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class (whom Davidson has called the "inheritance elites") that is responsible for these
various crises, but its existence itself that logically continues to foster such abuse.
Yet we also know that for Nehru, Nkrumah, Kenyatta, Nyerere, Mandela, Senghor, and
numerous other leaders, thinkers and prominent nation-builders, both Western and
non-Western, it was only as a nation-state that each of them could envision inhabiting
and navigating their post-independence history. Even if there were other significant
ideological differences— some of them opted for a model of centrally planned state-
directed economic development whereas others were much more welcoming of foreign
investment and the idea of developing conditions for local capitalism— structuring a
new society around and through the State was the one paradigm most post-colonial
leaderships adopted in common.
Conclusion: Reading Novels as Thoroughly 'Worlded'.
So far in the two chapters of this second section, we have attempted to demonstrate the
substance of the thesis laid out theoretically in its introduction— that fiction can
simultaneously narrate (and thereby inter-relate) a range of social, political, cultural and
material dimensions through its unique means of exploring beings-in-their-worlds. We
have begun to indicate how its ontological capacity for 'narrative calculus' can add up
to a comprehensive and dynamic examination of various levels of a nation's life; and
further, because of its Bakhtinian properties, how different stories— within the same
novel or arising out of the disagreements of one novelist's preoccupations with another
(such as Ngugi's with Armah and Soyinka)— can provide contradictory yet valuably
supplementary voices and perspectives, which cumulatively evoke the multi-dimensional
spectrum of becoming that constitutes national history. The next chapter, the last one in
this section, will continue with this underlying objective, of establishing the thorough
'worldedness' and the existential relevance thereby of the novel. But for now we will
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focus on differing formal investigations of the questions we have raised immediately
above (on the vital issue of constructing nations around and through the building of
states), considering not just the themes that arise in the novels we will analyse, but also
the modes of novelising themselves. First we will examine more thoroughly the
mechanics, processes, and agents of state-building in a narrative of Nadine Gordimer's
(.A Guest ofHonour), that performs simultaneously conflicts between various structural
and economic theories and the political personalities behind them as part of its analysis
of a fictional state's history. Then we give our investigation a further turn through our
readings of two novels by Salman Rushdie, where he examines in forms very different
from Gordimer's, both the individual existential impact of inhabiting the Indian nation-
state, as well as the presence of many heterogeneous histories, trajectories, and
connections within that framework. Yet the overarching theoretical presence in the
chapter will be that of Georg Lukacs, and his admiring elaboration of a 'critical realist'
fictional standard against which he dismisses less 'objective' and historicised modes of
social envisioning. It is such a dismissal that the chapter centrally takes issue with,
arguing instead (through juxtaposing the very different themes and means of Gordimer
and Rushdie, both of whom attempt comprehensive analyses of a nation's history), that
diverse formal methods and thematic priorities challenge and supplement each other in
enriching, if conflicting ways, rather than some fictions being more 'objective' or
'historicised' than others. And it is precisely because the novel extends an ontological
invitation to be inscribed by particular voices and stories, and also to be formally
metamorphosed in each instance, that such discourse works cumulatively as a thorough
engagement with the fullness of a society's existence, because it expands the range of
voice, perspective and trajectory it is able to encompass with each new (mode of) re-
inscribing.
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Chapter 5: Alternative Narratives for Alternative Envisionings.
Gordimer, Lukacs, and Narrating 'Totalities'.
Writing about post-independence African novels in 1973, Nadine Gordimer expresses
a general reservation that "in African writers' interpretations, where African societies
fail, the blame lies with the individual, the political ideology is hardly questioned"
(1973, 44). She argues against the literature of Armah, Peter Abrahams, Achebe, and
Soyinka that they never "suggest a reordering of society in political terms as a possible
solution", and points out how no creative writer in English has yet dealt with, for
instance, "the ideology of African socialism" (44):
In these novels, as in those of others in which politics is fate— 'environment,
fetter and goal'— there is little to indicate that that fate seeks to determine itself
in terms of profound social change. |...| At most there is a concurrence of
opinion that the Western brand of democracy may not do, and that tribalism
must be abolished if it cannot be pressed into the service of unity in any other
way. [...] For this reason, the post-colonial political novel [...] seems scarcely
to have scratched the surface of the African situation. The theme of Let My
People Go has not come near its ultimate expression yet; African writers have
still to deal with characters faced with the necessity of an historical choice by
political means (44-45).
Gordimer's own most comprehensive novelistic attempts at portraying such processes
(in A Guest of Honour and None to Accompany Me, for instance) are clearly
constructed within the tradition of what Lukacs has famously called "critical realism",
and about which she has written so often and admiringly. To Gordimer such novels
constitute a line of "work in which the social changes that characterise our era are most
truly reflected, character is not sacrificed to artistic pattern and the human condition is
understood dynamically, in an historical perspective" (32). For Lukacs, if "man is
zoion politikon, a social animal" (1964, 19), then "society is the principal subject of
the novel, that is, man's social life in its ceaseless interaction with surrounding nature,
which forms the basis of social activity, and with the different social institutions and
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customs which mediate the relations between individuals in social life" (Lukacs, 1989,
139).
The novel has the task of evoking directly the full span of life, the complexity
and intricacy of its developments, the incommensurability of its detail. [...] This
whole includes not simply the dead objects through which men's social life
manifests itself, but also the various customs, institutions, habits, usages, etc.,
characteristic of a certain phase of human society and of the direction it is
taking (1989, 139).
So far we recognise echoes of both Bakhtin and Tolstoy: if we recall the former in the
way that Lukacs also finds the novel thoroughly 'worlded' from within and containing
diverse characters, worlds and existential dimensions inextricably performed in
narrative together, we remember Tolstoy's statement on the inevitable limits of this
capacity for novelising the fullness of a phase of history through 'narrative calculus'.
Lukacs acknowledges that the task he has conceived for fiction is actually "Sisyphus¬
like", because "the span of [even] the hugest novel is limited [...] [and] would only
give an infinitesimal fraction, even in breadth, of the incommensurable reality of its
time" (1989, 138-139). But he then moves in a different positivist direction from either
of the two other thinkers in his affirmation nevertheless of the novel's cognitive and
synthetic capacity for performing "totalities". And this is where he formulates and
valorises the particular 'critical realist' 'tradition' that Gordimer admires, because these
novels to Lukacs overcome the problems of selection and containment by giving
"central place throughout to all that is typical in characters, circumstances, scenes, etc."
(139). But to achieve this "requires a real grasp of the essential and most important
normative connections of life, in the destiny of individuals and society [...1 [so that]
these essential features and all-important laws of life [... J appear in a new immediacy as
the unique personal features of and connections of concrete human beings and concrete
situations" (1989, 92).
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It is this argued capacity for performing what Lukacs calls the "totality of life" (1989,
221) that Gordimer puts to the service of comprehensive nation-state-building
interrogation in a novel such as A Guest of Honour. Further, as we shall see, such
fictional experiments are also extraordinary demonstrations of the variety of discourses
and themes that the form can accommodate, co-perform and thereby novelise.
Some Theoretical Debates about Post-Colonial Statehood, Development
and Nationalism.
The Nigerian general and former leader during one of its phases of military
government, Yakubu Gowon, has accurately characterised a common African post-
colonial predicament: "a newly independent African state struggles against great odds
of history, geography, ethnography, and evil effects of imperialism to build a nation in
less than a fiftieth of the time it took European states to build theirs" (Hutchinson and
Smith, 1994, 235). In considering the difficulties that Gowon thus outlines, it is perhaps
possible to formulate a more generous assessment of African nation-states and the
efforts of their builders than the novels we have so far examined. For instance, while
Ngugi in Petals ofBlood is acutely critical not only of the corruption of independent
Kenya's political and merchant class, but also of their role in allowing what he sees as
the unambiguously harmful influence of Western capital to dictate the development of
the new state, Tom Nairn takes his analysis of the conjuncture between capitalist
influence and national(ist) development efforts in an alternative and more
accommodating direction. He puts forth a less hostile and suspicious proposition in
suggesting that nationalism's "real origins [...] are located not in the folk, nor in the
individual's repressed passion for some sort of wholeness or identity, but in the
machinery of world political economy" (1977, 335), and the uneven development it
leads to: "the shambling, fighting, lop-sided, illogical head-over-heels fact, so to speak,
as distinct from the noble uplift and phased amelioration of the ideal" (337). Such
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processes have "inevitably generated an imperialism of the centre over the periphery"
(340), and for Nairn, nationalism is a pragmatically mobilised yet emotionally charged
field of ideological forces that are inevitably generated by and inextricable from the
struggles undergone during this unavoidable "ordeal of development", as well as a
potentially positive source of strength and energy that can be drawn upon to help
endure difficult, unfamiliar, and rapid collective becomings.34
The impact of those leading countries was normally experienced as
domination and invasion. [...] There was never either time or the sociological
space for even development. The new forces of production, [...] were too
dynamic and uncontrolled, and the resulting social upheavals were far too rapid
and devastating [...]. There was to be no 'due time' in modern history. [...]
Huge expectations raced ahead of material progress itself. The peripheric elites
had no option but to try and satisfy such demands by taking things into their
own hands (338-339). [...] Mobilisation had to be in terms of what was there;
and the whole point of the dilemma was that there was nothing there— none of
the economic and political institutions of modernity now so needed.
All that there was was the people and peculiarities of the region: its inherited
ethnos, speech, folklore, skin colour, and so on. Nationalism works through
differentiae like those because it has to. It is not necessarily democratic in
outlook, but it is invariably populist. People are what it has to go on: in the
archetypal situation of the really poor or 'under-developed' territory, it may be
more or less all that nationalists have going for them (340).
Such a perspective may be compared to the functionalist viewpoints of theorists such as
Gellner, for whom ethno-nationalist mobilisation only occurs as a reaction when a
certain identifiable ethnic group is denied full economic and civic participation, and
opposed to the image Eric Hobsbawm proposes of non-European, late-century
nationalisms, as "being essentially negative, or rather divisive [... ] rejections of modern
modes of political organisation, both national and supranational", and "reactions of
weakness and fear, attempts to erect barricades to keep at bay the forces of the modern
world" (1993, 170). Continuing in their functionalist vein, both Gellner and
Hobsbawm have argued that nation-states have been superseded in the modern world
'4
See Nairn (1977, 334-341) for a fuller discussion. See also Matossian on 'Ideologies of Delayed
Development' in Hutchinson and Smith (1994, 218-225).
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by more global modes of economic exchange and organisation, which call for
corresponding updates of both socio-political infrastructure as well as nationalist
ideology around the world. This is part of the reason why post-colonial nationalisms
are to them regressive and reactionary.
Of course, one obvious flaw in such a characterisation of a 'shared' global
contemporary is its exclusively Western provenance, that ignores the realities of
overwhelmingly uneven development and the implications of being at the receiving end,
which Nairn recognises, rather than the controllers of such planetary forces. What if the
legal and social structures of the nation-state are the only defences newer countries, that
are not in the same phase of development as the apparently 'post-national' West, have
against the volatile, overpoweringly transformative effects of global capital? Opposed to
such dismissive castings of nationalism as always being reactionary, negative, and
atavistic, what Nairn (and numerous others— Sunil Khilnani, Mary Matossian etc.)
bring out instead are the complex, at least potentially positive, and most of all essentially
modern aspects of most forms of political identity and activity that are based on
nationalist underpinnings. Basil Davidson questions the factors that might lie behind
such frequent state disintegration in post-colonial Africa: "did these breakdowns derive
from some inferiority of human nature? Were they caused by Tack of honest
politicians', or because there was 'no ideology'? Such explanations were often made,
but missed the point" (1978, 292). He continues:
A familiar contemporary impression that Africans had suddenly acquired the
means of harmonious progress, guaranteed by parliamentary systems and
'established Western values', and had then as suddenly thrown them away or
mislaid them by incompetence or graft, leaving only a sterile chaos, was wide of
the truth. There is plenty of chaos and sterility of thought accompanied by
clamorous uproars, incredible disasters, sad defeats. Frustration can often make
it seem that even the smallest improvement in the quality of life has gone out of
reach [...]. Yet through all this crookery and in spite of it, burrowing often out
of sight, persisting even in a desert of discouragement, the search for new and
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valid forms of community such as can relay but enlarge and modernise the
communities of the past, somehow continues on its way (296).
With these claims and counter-positions in mind, we now turn to Gordimer for a
heteroglossic state-building experiment— a Lukacsian demonstration of how
contradictory ideologies and politics, the leaders enunciating and enacting them, and the
lives and societies upon which their multiple implications are unleashed, can be
performed together in the novelising of a country's history.
Development, Leadership, and State-Building in A Guest of Honour.
Gordimer includes, both in terms of frequent debate between characters as well as
through the actual dramatic unfolding of events in A Guest ofHonour, various specific
social, structural and material issues relevant to the building of a new state— the
economic development choices facing a newly independent African country between
nationalisation on the one hand and utilising Western capital and the imminent dangers
of neo-colonialist domination on the other; particular, local solutions to the questions of
administration as well as improving and extending educational infrastructure at all
levels; the effects of Western corporate control on mining and fisheries; what the role
of the Independence Party should be in disseminating consciousness and maintaining
contact among the rural masses through regular grassroots work after independence;
the part trade unions might play in an economy gradually industrialising.3"1 What
transforms subjects such as these into novelistic material in Gordimer's work are the
ways in which they are seamlessly woven into the life-stories of her individual
protagonists, and portrayed as integral to narrating them. Where Armah's Modin and
Solo (in Why are we so Blest) are wanderers seeking to restore to some nebulous
35
For just a couple of instances of the extent of detail in the debates within the novel on other
specific state-building issues, see Gordimer (1973, 29) and (214).
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'Africa' all her glory and rightful deserts in ways totally unspecified, Gordimer
performs in detail the sheer magnitude and various levels of a new state's tasks and
establishes how gradual and often interrupted they are, how painstakingly particular
each 'nation-builder' must be even to get one adult education centre working in one
provincial capital. She also captures how the alternative national beginning promised by
the aftermath of independence is slowly tarnished, by including within her narrative the
first violent beatings up of the mildest voices of Opposition, the first Preventive
Detention bill, the first instances of the Party bullying its own population in politically
engineered rioting and unions silencing their own members on behalf of the
government and the company management, the first foreign companies allowed to set
up private armies, all of which orders are issued and justified in the name of unity,
development, and national harmony.
But Gordimer, and we, imply much more in arguing that she thoroughly 'novelises' her
nation-interrogating material. For instance, we witness frequent and protracted
arguments between the positions of Mweta and Shinza on the social and economic
choices facing the new state, where the latter is entirely against signing up to any form
of dependent partnerships with Western capital: yet, unlike Ngugi's novels, the evil of
the opposite position is not always and unambiguously taken for granted. In different
public and private settings Shinza elaborates his Fanonian stance at length, on the place
of the government in the life of the new society.36 We also hear him articulate his
opposition to the ways in which unregulated foreign investment and the unaltered
perpetuation of a purely capitalist structure overseen by a tiny bourgeoisie is retarding
the state's development. But Gordimer also develops extensively the President's
defence of his developmental policy choices, as well as a list of his government's
36
See Gordimer (1973, 270-275) and (360-362) for elaborate articulations of Shinza's position in his
own voice. For an equally detailed voicing ofMweta's opposed stance, see Gordimer (324-329).
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(Gellneresque) fulfilment of its infrastructural obligations towards its citizens (1973,
327). Through Mweta, Gordimer examines the choices facing a post-colonial
leadership attempting to navigate their new nation through the transitions and upheavals
of rapid development (such as Nairn and Mary Matossian discuss above). The
President considers a partnership with Western capital to be indispensable at this stage
of his country's evolution, and it is on this basis that he justifies the suppression of the
miners' strike, as well as the introduction of preventive detention.
Yet while such fictionalised discussion (carried on at several levels throughout the
novel) is immediately a demonstration of Bakhtinian "internal dialogisation" put to the
purpose of debating the options available for nation-building, it is also established
through these characters that neither ideologies nor intellectual positions occur in the
world as disembodied theoretical abstractions. As a novelist Gordimer can go further
than mere debate, by including within the same narrative details of the complex mix of
personal histories and emotional motivation colouring any such confrontation—
thereby uncovering how ideological disagreement is influenced by inter-personal
rivalry, and how what appears to be powerful idealism (such as Shinza's) might also be
contaminated by a thirst for power. As Tolstoy argues in the essay framing War and
Peace, her novel demonstrates that it is always programmes, structures and ideas, the
personalities enunciating and executing them, as well as the worlds in which they are
released and in which their implications are variously realised by other selves on
different levels, that all come together in an immensely multi-layered performance of
national becoming, rather than privileging any single explanation, personality or
hermeneutic horizon by which the direction of history is theoretically decided. Shinza's
tirades against the neo-colonial dangers of allowing too much European capital to
dictate the terms of investment, manipulate the infrastructure and exploit the wealth of a
new country seem motivated by genuine apprehension that the basic aspirations of
independence are thereby being undermined. But we also see him mobilising violence
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along ethnic lines to destabilise the countryside, unscrupulously entering into deals with
neighbouring insurgents, and planning linked coups without any evidence of
ideological agreement, all of which results ultimately in national breakdown. Mweta the
President, who can always disarm Bray with his sincerity in private conversation and
claims to be the responsible 'pragmatist' who owes it to his society to make choices
that will be unpopular in the short-term, also allows European firms their private armies,
imposes more and more restrictive and permanent preventive detention laws, chooses to
ignore how ordinary workers are murdered by Party hooligans for protesting or
rallying, and finally has to call in British troops to keep himself in power when
resistance to the anti-trade union laws of his regime develops into numerous nationwide
rebellions, provoking the question asked by Time magazine in the novel:
Will the invasion-by-invitation of the former colonial master keep him in his
seat and the country's gold and other valuable mineral resources in the hands of
British and U.S. interests (509-510)? 37
Perhaps critics such as Aijaz Ahmad (and Ngugi) would complain of Gordimer's novel
that its over-emphasised focus on the conflicts between the personalities and ideologies
of a tiny cartel of nation-builders risks ignoring the numerous other levels on which
national life does go on despite high-level, structural 'macro-failures'. But each novel
can only commit itself to engagements with particular locations and dimensions of
existence at the expense of others, and Gordimer through her focus can expose and
critique precisely the fragility and the structurally un-democratic exclusiveness of a
political culture where three or four individuals can exert such disproportionate
influence upon a society's history (just as Achebe does in A Man of the People through
portraying the consequences of the conflict between Odili and Nanga). In Gordimer's
vision, it is clearly Mweta's unreserved embrace of the dictates of foreign capital and
'7
Gordimer's account of the constructions, transformations and impasses involved at each social
level, from debates in national conferences to daily life in the cities and the countryside, in fashioning
a post-apartheid South Africa (in None To Accompany Me) is no less dialogic, multi-layered, and
specific.
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the repressive re-organisation of the law and state machinery that follows in its wake,
that is part of what leads to the new nation's disintegration. But neither are Shinza's
Fanonian convictions ultimately presented as being much more impressive than an
opposition politician's well-calculated rhetoric, which can be expediently jettisoned in
his quest for power. Such a novel, rather than lacking stories of the lives of ordinary
people, demonstrates the almost total absence of the people from the politics of their
country, and actually mirrors the extent of their abandonment and violation. This
continuing post-colonial non-involvement, this distance— which implies that all the new
nation's choices have been made for it by a tiny, self-seeking, alienated and arrogant
elite, structurally perpetuated by choosing a particular paradigm of centralised statehood
and a model of dependent capitalism— is revealed to be the new nation's real tragedy.
'Interactive, Embodied Theories': Co-performing Diverse Ideas in Narrative.
As a historian, Basil Davidson traces the development of the political structures and
choices underpinning such abandonment, covering in his account the same period in
which most of the novels we have examined were written. He establishes how in the
1950's nationalists across Africa preparing for independence, had "with a few
uninfluential exceptions"(1978, 228):
accepted the complete orthodoxy of the would-be bourgeois nation-state in
wholesale and in detail [...] [arguing] that a privileged leadership, potentially a
ruling middle class, should direct an economy of private capitalism and of state
capitalism [...].
This being so, their duty was not to fill in the gap or widen the bridge across it,
but to make sure that they became strong and numerous enough to dominate the
crossing. With no gap and no close guard upon the bridge, there could be no
middle class, or none that would be capable of holding power and deciding the
future. On the contrary, there would be egalitarian confusion as the many
invaded the privileges of the few; worse still, there might even be revolution. So
it must be wise to call on mass support with a prudent eye to its dangers [...].
Their prudence and its consequences called forth a corresponding prudence
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among the many, and this is what explains the atmosphere of doubt in villages
and urban slums when independence came (229).38
Davidson's historical narrative goes on to include substantial accounts of how the tiny
ruling classes in many African societies, apparently for the purpose of preparing the
entire nation for genuinely widespread capitalist 'take-off into the "age of high mass
consumption", embarked on the rapid and "ruthless policies" (315) of first
accumulating the necessary capital for themselves, and the profoundly destabilising
ramifications of such processes that led to coups and/or collapses into civil conflict in
state after African state.39
We have used aspects from various theories of nationalism and post-colonial nation-
building throughout this section to find how our chosen novels have dissolved in
narrative and investigated those same dimensions in their unique ways. In A Guest of
Honour, we saw how the mutually exclusive interpretative possibilities offered by the
functionalist perspectives of Gellner and Hobsbawm (in which nation-states are the
infrastructure-creating engines of modernity, or the facilitating adjuncts of bourgeois
capitalism), Tom Nairn's more integrated vision of nationalist solidarity being the
essential ideological cushioning necessary to survive the uneven passage into a
globalised capitalist modernity, as well as Fanon's and Ngugi's scathing analyses of
Davidson's account stresses the essentially good faith in which such structural and distributive
decisions might have been taken by the class assuming leadership. Reading him, it appears almost as
if it was despite their best intentions not to betray the nationalist promise of betterment for the many
after the end of foreign rule, that "they found themselves pushed increasingly into a colonialist
posture towards all who were outside their ranks but who, in theory, were supposed to benefit from
their labours" (305). For a fuller exposition see Davidson (1978, 305).
Ironically enough, in the matter of the behaviour of post-independence leaderships, everything Fanon
anticipates as possibility Davidson later records as historical actuality. But very often, the same
developments that make Fanon (and Achebe, Ngugi and Armah) entirely mistrustful of the motives of
the ruling classes, Davidson interprets more generously.
39
For a much fuller account, see Davidson (1978, 317-318).
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both bourgeois nationalism and capitalist development, can be dialogically performed
within the same novel, along with the numerous lives and worlds in which such ideas
are enunciated and where the conflicts between them are enacted. In the same
Tolstoyan/Bakhtinian/Lukacsian vein, many of the themes and questions Davidson
raises through historical analysis, have also been examined thoroughly and variedly in
these works. We have studied narrative envisionings of the leaders and the classes
ruling these nations (in Achebe, Gordimer and Ngugi), as well as the devastating
material implications of their decisions and actions upon the wider population—
enacted in detail through the stories and voices of individually imagined characters. We
have been able to explore the destabilising moral and cultural consequences (for
individuals and groups) that result from the widely perceived failure of any idea of the
nation as a shared undertaking. Most of all, we have witnessed all these aspects to a
nation's life explored inextricably together, through the novel's ontological capacity for
weaving the fullness of variously placed selves and their conflicting situations within
the same narrative.
Of course, every novel is always only fictional and thereby 'experimental', with no
possible claim to historical truth or accuracy in any immediately scrupulous sense.
Besides, novels carry explicitly their acknowledgement of being both particular and
partial, and can thereby always be supplemented with alternative re-tellings. But we do
not mean to argue the historical actuality of a novel's content, only establish its
existential relevance, which does not arise out of any claims of objective omniscience,
factual accuracy or interpretative correctness, but out of being thoroughly engaged and
'worlded' despite 'only' being a fiction.
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Stephen Clingman draws out another important implication of this particular mode of
'critical realist' fictionalising. In the novel, Bray's friends in London view his murder
as inevitable, given their Conradian picture of Africa's unique, impenetrable, atavistic
capacities for receding into cycles of violence. Yet, in calling Gordimer's novel a work
of "African socialist realism" (1986, 127), Clingman makes the point that in its
methods as well as in its vision of an African society's history, it could not be more
different from the outlook of a novel such as Heart of Darkness. The landscapes that
are presented in Conrad's novel as sites of primordial, savage mystery, are for
Gordimer material to be thoroughly detailed, politicised and historicised— in a word,
humanised. Clingman distinguishes how "the 'unspeakable horror' Conrad projects
onto Africa as its supposedly archetypal embodiment is here broken down into
questions of historical struggle" (127). Gordimer thus establishes that a new nation's
becoming— however complex, multi-layered and utterly in process (or crisis) it may
be— can be narrated through specific and dynamic portraits of its multiple contexts,
and proves how suited the novel might be for such an undertaking. This is a vital
political and ultimately human point for such novels to be demonstrating, in response to
the prejudices of Eurocentric narratives that go back to Hegel and Marx (and long
before them), and extend beyond Conrad, Joyce Cary and Isak Dinesen even to Marxist
historians such as Eric Hobsbawm, all of whom, despite the differences between them,
have in common varying degrees of characterising African existence as static, childlike,
outside of any processes of historical transformation and thereby beyond analysis at
best, and inexpressibly primordial, irrationally atavistic, and unquantifiably violent at
worst.40
40
It should also be added that such novelising also explicitly responds to the disillusionment of
writers such as Armah, in whose work even the physical environment of Ghana is found to be
irredeemably conducive to corruption, as well as the judgements of 'travellers' such as V.S. Naipaul,
the sheer variety of whose dismissals of entire environments, societies, and histories, would be ill-
served by a single footnote, though we encounter it in more detail in an Indian setting in Section 4,
when discussing the work of R K Narayan.
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The Fictionality of Lukacsian Objectivity.
Lukacs would argue that in her portrayal of the cognitive limits and crises of each of
her major characters, Gordimer proves herself to be an exemplary 'realist', who depicts
exactly the dynamic relationships between each individual story and how it arises from
and is to be understood within the vast portrait she has created of the 'totality of life' in
this society. He has written admiringly of Thomas Mann in this regard:
Precisely because [Mann] is a true realist, [...] he knows exactly who Christian
Buddenbrooks is, whoTonio Kroeger and who Hans Castorp, Settembrini and
Naphta are [...]. He knows it after the manner of a creative realist: he knows
how thoughts and feelings grow out of the life of society and how experiences
and emotions are parts of the total complex of reality. As a realist he assigns
these parts to their rightful place within the total life context. He shows what
area of society they arise from and where they are going to (Leitch et al, 2002,
1039).
Lukacs's well-known rejection of what he saw as the 'surrealist' and 'expressionist'
distortions in much of the art of his time are premised on precisely the absence (in such
works) of an apparently 'objective' underlying world-vision, that would always locate
any subjective particularities within a greater 'realist' portrait of that society's
dynamics. Thus his mistrust of the significance of writers such as Joyce and Woolf
may be traced to the fact that their novels seem to identify subjective states of mind
"directly and unreservedly with reality itself'. By placing so much of their narrative
within the consciousnesses of particular characters without providing any counter¬
balancing 'objective' frame of reference for the reader's orientation, such modernism
"equates the highly distorted image created in this state of mind with the thing itself,
instead of objectively unravelling the essence, the origins and the mediation of the
distortion by comparing it with reality" (Leitch et al, 2002, 1038). For Lukacs, 'true
realism' and such limited 'subjectivist' modernism are therefore "opposed views of
the world— dynamic and developmental on the one hand, static and sensational on the
other" (1964, 19). Man, for such modernist writers, "is by nature solitary, asocial,
unable to enter into relationships with other human beings" (20). Yet "this implies
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(... ] also that it is impossible to determine theoretically the origin and goal of human
existence. Man, thus conceived, is an ahistorical being" (21). But when Lukacs'
admired realists, (Tolstoy, Mann, etc.) portray solitude or isolation:
It is always merely a fragment, a phase, a climax or anti-climax, in the life of a
community as a whole. The fate of such individuals is characteristic of certain
human types in specific social or historical circumstances. Beside and beyond
their solitariness, the common life, the strife and togetherness of other human
beings, goes on as before. In a word, their solitariness is a specific social fate,
not a universal condition humaine (20).
Yet we shall argue that through such a qualitative distinction between modes of
novelising, Lukacs elides fully acknowledging not only the fictionality and the limits of
his own prescribed methods for constructing comprehensive and apparently 'objective'
totalities, but also misses a quality fundamental to fiction itself which overarches and
subsumes the differences between one kind of novelising and another, and is crucial to
its capacity for evoking the multiplicity of human voices, perspectives, and trajectories.
In the opening chapter, we presented (as an implicit extension of fiction's ontological
orientation towards the fullness of existence) the corollary that any voice, perspective,
existential dimension or life-history may find equally valid accommodation within the
pages of a novel. Thus voices and world-views coloured by madness, error, or delusion,
for instance, are all equally worthy subjects (and subjectivities) for a novel, just from the
sheer 'truth' of their existence as expressible dimensions of being human. We also
argued that this inclusive capacity has significant (and at least potentially radical) re¬
ordering implications, especially though by no means exclusively for a post-colonial
writer; because anyone ever written out by another's conception of an 'objective
totality' can be re-inscribed equally validly within the ambit of an alternative narration.
In fact, we posited that it is one of fiction's singular attributes, perhaps uniquely among
discourses, that various mutually contradictory envisionings can co-exist with equal
legitimacy (both within the same novel and as separate works on the same subjects)
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precisely because fiction cannot claim, and does not require, either fullness or finality in
order to justify its existence.
It would be besides our purpose to refute at length Lukacs' conceptions of either
'objectivity' or all-encompassing 'totalities', the illusion of which he claims is
achievable within the limits of a novel through the narrating of what is "typical",
"fundamental" and "enduring". We need only indicate how subjective, constructed,
and illusory (not to mention coercive) all such conceptions must be, unless we
understand them to be deterministic, didactic essentialisms which bind the transmission
of interpretations that occur in a novel into predictable, pedagogic relationships, where
each writer and reader always sends and receives the same world pictures of 'objective
totalities'.41 We argue the contrary— that it is only after the abandoning of such
characterisations (and ambitions) that the true range of the novel's narrative
possibilities can begin to be recognised, when multiplicity for its own sake, rather than
totality, is our criterion, and when we look for aspects of the fullness of existence to be
evoked, not for all of it to be apparently circumscribed. This is not to deny that
Gordimer's novel does not manage to perform together many inter-related aspects of a
nation's life, but merely to point out that no matter how comprehensive her content, she
cannot ever claim completeness. Both Bakhtin and Tolstoy, who share in different ways
Lukacs' belief in the unique narrative capacities of the novel, explicitly warn against
pressing any such claims in the direction of finality or even positivist historical
'knowledge'. Though Lukacs accuses virtually every 'modernist' work that he does
not admire of the offences of being ahistorical, reductive, and static, it is actually such
prescriptive writing paradigms and fixed interpretative schema as he proposes that risk
being thus characterised, in always demanding the same methods in every diverse
narrative instance.
41
Also, how many fully 'objective totalities' can there be, after one has been achieved?
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Through our study of Rushdie in the next section we build on such disagreements, to
demonstrate not only the significance of rejecting any such restrictive (and illusory)
interpretative absolutes, but also to prove that the range of existential examination
achieved by 'non-realist' modes of narrating are no less comprehensive or 'worlded'.
In fact, such variety actually allows the novel to be thoroughly specific and historicised
by being inclusive of voices and locations in all their individual inflections and
circumstances. We will show through our readings of Midnight's Children and The
Moor's Last Sigh how each distinct narratorial vision may be seen as an existential
essay, another perspective on interpreting and inhabiting history that also foregrounds
its own status as both experiment and fiction, rather than pretending any achievement of
an 'objective totality'. Further, different narrative castings both challenge and
supplement the worlds uncovered by each other, and taken together, the greater the
range of voice, perspective and trajectory encompassed by post-colonial novels, the
more such discourse might cumulatively work as an enhanced evocation of the fullness
of a society's existence.
How Content Transforms Form in the Novels of Salman Rushdie.
In a much contested proposition that we return to at length in another section, Fredric
Jameson presents what he confesses to be a "sweeping hypothesis", apparently
encompassing "what all third-world cultural productions seem to have in common"
(2000, 320):
Third-world texts, even those which are seemingly private and invested with a
properly libidinal dynamic— necessarily project a political dimension in the
form of national allegory: the story of the private individual destiny is always
an allegory of the embattled situation of the public third-world culture and
society (320).
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To Jameson, political commitment "conventionally", "in the culture of the Western
realist and modernist novel" (320), is always "recontained and psychologised or
subjectivised [...] and accounted for in terms of the subjective dynamics of
ressentiment or the authoritarian personality" (322). The premise for such a
hermeneutic tendency lies in the "radical split" he detects within wider Western
culture: "between the private and the public, between the poetic and the political,
between what we have come to think of as the domain of sexuality and the unconscious
and that of the public world of classes, of the economic, and of secular political power:
in other words, Freud versus Marx" (320). He continues:
We have been trained in a deep cultural conviction that the lived experience of
our private existences is somehow incommensurable with the abstractions of
economic science and political dynamics. Politics in our novels therefore is,
according to Stendhal's canonical formulation, a "pistol shot in the middle of a
concert" (32).
Jameson then argues the "inversion" of such a proposition in "third-world culture",
where, to him, "psychology, or more specifically, libidinal investment, is to be read in
primarily political and social terms" (322).
Each of Jameson's formulations in this essay have been severely challenged on various
grounds,42 but whatever legitimate disputes might continue about the self-confessedly
"sweeping" range and absoluteness of their categories, they certainly bear relevance to
introducing Rushdie's narrative project in the two novels we examine. The related
problems of inhabiting, interpreting, and simultaneously attempting to represent in
narrative a national atmosphere in which the actions, choices and becomings of lives
unrelentingly translate/reverberate on multiple levels — the inner, the inter-personal, the
familial, the political and national-historical— form the central thematic of both The
Moor's Last Sigh and Midnight's Children. Through his first-person entirely 'non-
objective' narratives, Rushdie interrogates the implications of inhabiting the post-
42
This falls outside the ambit of our argument, but see Aijaz Ahmad's well-known critique
'Jameson's Rhetoric of Otherness and the National Allegory' (1994, 95-122).
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colonial nation from the perspective of the individual self, as both Moor and Saleem
Sinai attempt to interpret their own lives despite being immersed in what they portray as
the irrepressibly multiple nature of "the torrential reality of India" (Rushdie, 1995, 45).
It is the strain of such attempts to articulate viable interpretations both of themselves
and their irresistibly influential national environments that is shown to affect everything
in their narrating: tone, perspective, genre. Thus the themes Rushdie interrogates are
bound up integrally with his chosen forms and adopted voices, and allow him to ask his
preoccupying question: how can nations hold together as stable, coherent entities if they
are merely the overwhelmingly indivisible, aggregate worlds composed of selves
interacting in relentlessly dynamic becoming? Any formal pretence of Gordimeresque
omniscience would be at odds with Rushdie's distinct thematic purpose. Moor defends
his narrative practice against any attackers who might seek 'realistic' 'objective
totalities':
Banished from the natural, what choice did I have but to embrace its opposite?
Which is to say, unnaturalism, the only realism of these back-to-front and
jabberwocky days. Placed beyond the Pale, would you not seek to make light of
the Dark? Just so. Moraes Zogoiby, expelled from his story, tumbled towards
history" (1995, 5).
The Personal as the National: India as Existential Environment in The
Moor's Last Sigh and Midnight's Children.
In both novels, it is primarily the family that is revealed to be the deepest threat to the
narrator's being, the focal point of his severest examination. This is partly because their
families are inseparable from their most intimate circumstances, but further, in all of
Rushdie's households, familial loves, hates, and conflicts are shown to amplify into
wider dimensions of consequence and implication that merge with unusual violence the
public and the private, the familial and the historical. Both Saleem and Moor, by ties of
blood or acquaintance, are related to an entire spectrum of public figures ranging from
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rulers of the underworld to the leader of a Hindu nationalist party, and including coup-
plotting generals as well as some of the country's most important painters and singers.
Not only does such a strategy enable Rushdie to explore the conflicts, workings, and
failings of those social classes that assumed leadership in various sectors of the post-
independence nation, he also puts their versions of India through further examination
by having his protagonists metamorphically inhabit each of their alternative national
envisionings during the enactment of their own lives. And most of all, dissolving so
many conflicting agents, world-views and dimensions within the same narratives allows
Rushdie to interrogate some of the heterogeneous yet concurrent themes and histories
operating within a society that might otherwise be subsumed under official histories of
the nation— such as the influences of inhabiting the family, the city, the particular
social classes (mis)ruling the new country, as well as the histories of various minorities
(Jews, Muslims, Christians) and their multiple roles within society. In a Deleuzian
formulation, Moor further articulates his novelistic right not to conform to any imposed
model of'objective totality' and to go about portraying his environment from his own
particular 'minoritarian' perspective, that will eventually, and inevitably, include
engagement with the more obviously 'major' themes of national history:
No. Sahibzadas. Madams-O: No way. Majority, that mighty elephant, and her
sidekick, Major-Minority, will not crush my tale beneath her feet. Are not my
personages Indian, every one? Well, then: this too is an Indian yarn. That's one
answer; but there's another: everything in its place. Elephants are promised for
later. Majority and Major-Minority will have their day, and much that has been
beautiful will be tusked and trampled by their flap-eared, trumpeting herds.
Until then, I continue to guzzle this last supper (1995, 87).
Even as a little girl, Aurora in The Moor's Last Sigh portrays through her very first
mural her latent sense that privacy "was an illusion and this mountain, this hive, this
endlessly metamorphic line of humanity was the truth" (1995, 60). It is an impression
of "the great swarm of [Indian| being" (59) created within her just from being a child
in an explosive, divided family. For her father, who is viewing the mural:
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The rapid rush of the composition drew him onwards, away from the personal
and into the throng, for beyond and around and above and below and amongst
the family was the crowd itself, the dense crowd, the crowd without boundaries;
Aurora had composed her giant work in such a way that the images of her own
family had to fight their way through this hyper-abundance of imagery [..
And it was all set in a landscape that made Camoens tremble to see it, for it
was Mother India herself, Mother India with her garishness and her
inexhaustible motion, Mother India who loved and betrayed and ate and
destroyed and again loved her children, and with whom the children's
passionate conjoining and eternal quarrel stretched long beyond the grave (60-
61).
It is an image of the unbounded interactivity of Indian existence that is repeated almost
verbatim at the end ofMidnight's Children, and both narratives are suffused with an
awed awareness of the inexorably multiplying implications and rate of becomings
generated by such Being. In Moor's family, which in its infighting resembles the
"largest, hottest dish of curry ever cooked" (38), "the grave settles no quarrels", and
the living must find what space they can alongside the "giant dead", the "unended,
endlessly ending dead" (136). For Rushdie's narrators, everything human, past and
present, familial and historical, is hybrid in both source and potential and full of
multivalent layers of possibility and meaning; and their narratives examine the
destabilising implications of inhabiting worlds made up exclusively of such
overwhelming multiplicity. The most idealistic dream expressed by Moor is the
possibility of love as the containment and celebration of being immersed in the all-
dissolving dynamism of human becoming: "as the blending of spirits, as melange, as
the triumph of the impure, mongrel, conjoining best of us over what there is in us of the
solitary, the isolated, the austere, the dogmatic, the pure" (289). But within his story,
love is only another current of "relentless, inexhaustible" involvement in the
unpredictable transitions of other lives that can provide no basis on which to build
either any conception of the self or any form of community. On the contrary, 'love'
proves to be the pretext for further violation, more evidence of the "polymorphous
power of the perverse" (124), that progressively reduces him until he has been
"flayed" into "a shape without frontiers, a self without walls" (288). His mother
Aurora more than anyone comes to embody this failure. Once she attains adulthood, the
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entire cast of the novel is gathered around her as lovers of one sort or another, filial or
sexual— and in Moor's version of events everything that follows, resulting in the
ultimate destruction of the entire city (and by implication, the Indian nation), are various
reactive translations of these loves and their miscarriages.43 But such a degree of
immersed and multivalent 'worldedness' works both ways: just as often as familial
incidents and agents magnify outwards to influence history, outside events also initiate
domestic upheavals, forever altering the direction of the narrators' lives. Most of
Saleem Sinai's family is annihilated in the 1965 war during a single night of Indian
bombing. And it is a pattern that runs pervasively throughout society, all the way to the
Prime Minister:
Mrs. Gandhi returned to power, so it turned out that there was no final morality
in affairs of state, only Relativity. I remembered Vasco Miranda's 'Indian
variation upon the theme of Einstein's General Theory: Everything is for
relative. Not only light bends, but everything. For relative we can bend a point,
bend the truth, bend employment criteria, bend the law. D equals mc squared,
where D is for dynasty, m is for mass of relatives, and c of course is for
corruption, which is the only constant in the universe (1995, 272).
Thus Rushdie's novelistic investigations that interactively juxtapose the familial with
the national-historical through its focus on the nation's ruling, shaping and interpreting
classes, also work to illustrate the implications of Partha Chatterjee's argument
concerning the problematic separation of existential 'domains' by nineteenth-century
(and contemporary) Indian nationalists, into the dynamic but less 'significant' material-
political and the 'timeless' spiritual-familial, (where, according to Chatterjee,
nationalism considered itself to have forged its own irreducible, 'essential' identities).
We have seen how R. Radhakrishnan, commenting on Chatterjee, illuminates the
dichotomy Moor and Saleem confront unrelentingly throughout their narratives:
The place where the true nationalist subject really is and the place from which it
produces historical-materialist knowledge about itself are mutually
heterogeneous. The locus of the true self, the inner/traditional/spiritual sense of
place, is exiled from processes of history while the locus of historical
4j
Moor's characterisation of Aurora is re-examined in more detail in the next section.
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knowledge fails to speak for the true identity of the nationalist subject. The
result is a fundamental rupture, a form of basic cognitive dissidence, a radical
collapse of representation (Castle, 2001, 197-198).
By examining precisely those domains of social existence, the home and the family, and
by portraying their roles in shaping national history as multifarious and dynamic to the
point of being entirely destabilising, Rushdie's narratives demonstrate some of the
fundamental fallacies resulting from such a cognitive separation, and perform their
continuance in a post-independence Indian environment. Lukacsian 'objective realism'
would be entirely misplaced here.
The Impossibility of Building Nations.
As we have noted already, these narrators' lives take them through many concurrent yet
entirely contradictory enactments of the multiple possibilities that form part of the
nation's becomings— various opposed social dimensions as well as would-be nation-
builders and the performance of their visions. At one time or another Moor and Saleem
consider them all as possible 'parents' and try out each of their world-views
experimentally, thereby narrating both horizontally their experience of going from one
such envisioning to another, as well as vertically in moving downward from their
wealthy upbringings to the city's prisons and pavements. Thus we get dynamic and
comprehensive portraits of their worlds even if viewed from entirely subjective
perspectives, in watching Moor embrace both Nehru's plural, hybrid, tolerant India
which he affirms to his dying breath, as well as Mainduck's violent and exclusivist
vision of a purely Hindu India, for which he becomes a contracted hitman, while Saleem
evolves from being the head of the Midnight Children's Conference planning new
destinies for the Indian nation into a human bloodhound for the Pakistani army during
a war against India. Yet, when the communal malevolence expressed during Bombay's
Hindu-Muslim riots is revealed by Abraham to have actually been orchestrated
underworld showdowns between himself and Mainduck (who are also possibly rivals
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for the love of his mother Aurora), it confirms for Moor an image of the nation's multi-
layered infinity, as impossible to interpret as it is to inhabit. Such themes, subjects and
perspectives must radically and decisively affect form and narration. It would be absurd
to impose either 'critical objectivity' or narratorial omniscience upon subject matter
thus envisioned:
The city itself, perhaps the whole country, was a palimpsest, Under World
beneath Over World, black market beneath white; when the whole of life was
like this, when an invisible reality moved phantomwise beneath a visible fiction,
subverting all its meanings, [...] how could any of us have escaped that deadly
layering? [...] How could we have lived authentic lives? How could we have
failed to be grotesque (1995, 184-185)?
In such an environment, Moor finds that everyone is "trapped [...J in the hundred
percent fakery of the real" (184), and that the expedient collaborations necessitated by
organised crime form the only "dark, ironic victory for India's deep-rooted
secularism" (332). On the eve of independence, Vasco drunkenly declares that
corruption is the only force that could defeat fanaticism in an independent, multi-ethnic
India. But even if that were true as the diagnosis of a dominant 'national essence', it
holds out scarcely more hope for any directed or regulated formation of the new nation.
The infinitely translatable capacity for corruption that Moor uncovers in the Bombay
underworld is as solvent as the human potential all around him for multivalent
becomings; neither can ever be made to cohere into the irreducible stability essential for
any nation-building (just as it cannot be narrated in any form of unproblematic
realism).
Yet despite every definitional crisis, Saleem in Midnight's Children is far less prepared
than Moor to leave off the "longing for form": for a credible self, an all-encompassing
meaningful narrative as well as a directed and purposeful Indian nation. He sees
himself at the head of an age of builders that he has great ideas for. He never ceases to
wring meaning from the coincidence of his hour of birth, and wonder about what it
implies to be "handcuffed to history" (1981, 11), and how "may the career of a single
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individual be said to impinge on the fate of a nation" (232)? Thus a thousand
contemporaneously born children with nothing else in common between them become
through his mediation a nation-building conference, as "a thousand and one
possibilities which had never been present in one place at one time before" (197). His
consciousness of the possibilities of such a conference is immense: if India was the
"new myth— a collective fiction in which anything was possible", "a country which
would never exist except by the efforts of a phenomenal collective will— except in a
dream we all agreed to dream" (111), then "all over the new India, the dream we all
shared, children were being born who were only partially the offspring of their parents-
— the children of midnight were also the children of the time: fathered, you understand
by history" (117).
But his attempts to impose parliamentary purpose and meaning disintegrate when the
children reveal nothing unusual about themselves except for their gifts: "their heads are
full of all the usual things, fathers mothers money food land possessions fame power
God. Nowhere, in the thoughts of the conference, could I find anything as new as
ourselves" (223). And when the State machinery during the Emergency reveals its
purpose in destroying this conference of potential nation-builders, Saleem (in an
Armahesque vein of disenchantment) is moved to conclude that perhaps their true
meaning might have lain in their "annihilation", "that [they] would have no meaning
until [they| were destroyed" (223).
Much more than Moor's, Saleem's narrative realises the possibility of individual
instances of love: Mary Pereira, Padma, Parvati (the only other midnight's child to love
him). But fleeting links of inter-personal love cannot add up to the construction of
nations, when they do not even hold selves together with any degree of permanence.
Saleem's last expressible image is of "the crowd, "the dense crowd, the crowd without
boundaries" (445), in which he is "alone in the vastness of the numbers, his body
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being "buffeted right and left while rip tear crunch reaches its climax" (445). It is a
crowd that includes both family and strangers, but that will trample over generations of
selves and aspiring nation-builders:
Until a thousand and one midnights have bestowed their terrible gifts and a
thousand and one children have died, because it is the privilege and curse of
midnight's children to be both masters and victims of their times, to forsake
privacy and be sucked into the annihilating whirlpool of the multitudes, and to
be unable to live or die in peace (446).
Crises of Representation: Co-performing Formal and Thematic Crises in
Narrative.
In various arguments throughout Culture and Imperialism Edward Said wonders if the
power to narrate always implies the power to dominate the subjects being narrated. But
through ironising Saleem and his ultimately woeful incompetence at either inhabiting or
interpreting his world, Rushdie can expose the limits of any such attempt at what we
earlier termed Said's conception of 'narrative imperialism'. It is finally the failure to
establish either a credibly autonomous and irreducible portrait of individual selfhood or
any smaller-scale form of human community (even within inter-personal relationships
and families), that for Rushdie underlies the failure to establish any kind of willed,
creative, organised community on a national level. If all Being is only the aggregate of
infinite becomings and their reactive implications, with no autonomous human units
demonstrably able to initiate, fraternise, or redirect anything in their lives against such a
relentless onrush, how can any stable community (or even a conception of individual
selfhood) ever cohere even momentarily? Aurora proclaims: "human perversity is
greater than human heroism, [...] or cowardice [...J or art. [...] For there are limits to
these things, there are points beyond which we will not go in their name; but to
perversity there is no limit set, no frontier that anyone has found. Whatever today's
excess, tomorrow's will exceed-o it" (1995, 124). For Rushdie's narrators, India as an
existential environment is an overwhelming given, but the question of India as a nation-
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state or any manner of community that can overcome or endure chaos remains entirely
unresolved. In both novels, in trying to locate the evidence for autonomous selfhood
and possibilities of community through their lives and their attempts to interpret them,
the protagonists performatively examine if being-in-the-world ever amounts to more
than the pervasive impinging of the world upon their beings. What is the primary
motoring force behind the inexorable becomings that constitute the lives of human
beings—the will of the active self or the mere sum of its reactions to the rest of
existence?
A young Moor has two visions of a dream of complete autonomy—or even more—of
attaining to a state of pure Being: one is of "peeling off [his] skin plantain-fashion, of
going forth naked into the world, [...J set free from the otherwise inescapable jails of
colour, race and clan" (1995, 136). In the other he is "able to peel away more than
skin, [...] [and| float free of flesh, skin and bone, having become simply an intelligence
or a feeling set loose in the world, at play in its fields, like a science-fiction glow which
needed no physical form" (136). But Moor never achieves the bodiless potentiality he
aspires to; for Rushdie's narrators is reserved the unrelenting implications of being
thoroughly immersed in the world. In both novels, Rushdie creates 'magic realist'
conceits to be able to evoke such an overwhelming sense of subjective existence: Moor
physically deteriorates twice as fast as his actual age, while Saleem Sinai's body begins
to crack up even as he is telling his story until by the end of the novel, large bits of him
are falling off. For both Moor and Saleem, the activity of narrating itself becomes their
desperate performance of self-establishment, and the surrealist exaggerations attempt to
describe what it is to be the paranoid, obsessive focus of such a perspective. Is there a
self outside of its inextricable immersion— Saleem and Moor ask through the
simultaneous activities of inhabiting, interpreting and representing in narrative— is
there anything irreducible about their being-in-the-world that is distinguishable from
the influences of the world? Rushdie's investigations stand at the opposite end from
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solipsism or what Lukacs reductively characterises as 'modernist' alienation: the fact
that there are selves dynamically making up the world around his narrators is
indisputable, but the nature of human autonomy remains no less of an enigma. There
comes a time in both novels when Saleem and Moor are wiped clean by disaster and
remake themselves towards entirely new purposes— of perpetrating violence and
committing murder— to see if this would lead to an emergence of their 'true' natures.
But in neither case does this prove to be a final phase of becoming, and even such
capacity for existential metamorphosis brings no lasting certainties.
In a sense, these narratives reverse, and by their persistent refusal of 'realism',
challenge and 'delegitimate' the priorities of a 'nation-building novel', as Kwame
Appiah would argue,44 by negatively demonstrating that stable nations can only be
constructed towards definite purposes if there are irreducibly autonomous and stable
selves, and other social structures and relationships, to gather together, form the
material, and provide the basis for such building. Both Rushdie's protagonists include
worlds in their storytelling, narrate events as if their lives affect entire eras, and their
actions begin and end epochs. But such self-aggrandisement barely conceals the
opposite obsession— the possibility that they might not even be selves at all. Saleem
Sinai's exaggerated conceit of "being mysteriously handcuffed to history, [his]
destinies indissolubly chained to those of [his] country" (1981, 11), is simultaneously
a narrative effort to contain and confront an equally extreme paranoia, that arises from
44
This refers to Appiah's distinction between what he classes as 'realist' novels of the "first stage" of
African decolonisation, among which he includes Things Fall Apart, that he then characterises
sweepingly as being "realist legitimations of nationalism"; "celebratory" narratives that "authorise a
'return to tradition' while at the same time recognising the demands of a Weberian rationalised
modernity" (1992, 242). Even though we argue its applicability in the case of Rushdie, it is an
ultimately unsatisfactory distinction, slightly facile in its binary opposition. Appiah's argument
carries echoes of (and updates for a post-independence African nationalist purpose) Said's casting of
the English nineteenth-century realist novel as being essentially a predictably coercive affirmation of
bourgeois-capitalist principles in each individual instance. We return to his argument and its
succeeding stages in Section Four, but for now it is enough to point to all the evidence gathered from
our readings of Achebe and Gordimer that their work is 'realist' enough, but certainly not celebratory
or legitimating of nationalist positions in any explicit or dogmatically consistent ways.
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"the terrible notion that I, alone in the universe, had no idea of what I should be, or how
I should behave" (152). But his panic is about more than purposelessness—only by
such outrageous displays of egotism can he exist amid the outrageous pressures and
violations of the world that he is immersed in. Saleem, in hindsight, comes to
acknowledge "that the spirit of self-aggrandisement" which seized him was "a reflex,
born of an instinct of self-preservation. If I had not believed myself in control of the
flooding multitudes, their massed identities would have annihilated mine" (172).
As much as Moor, Saleem examines if there is more to the Indian self than the
historical-political-familial— if the self is infinite or if it is actually nothing, there being
no stable sum to all these extrinsic components. But where a later and older Moor
cannot conclude that there is anything irreducible about his individual being apart from
the chaos-ridden resultant of its multiple becomings, Saleem's central ploy against his
paranoia is his conceit of "swallowing": "I have been a swallower of lives, and to
know me, just the one of me, you'll have to swallow the lot as well" (11). He defies the
likelihood of being nothing with the audacity of claiming that he might be infinite. This
involves incorporating diverse lives and incidents if there is the slightest chance they
may have impinged on his own story, and then recasting them in his telling as having
flowed out from or towards him in the first place. There is as much helpless irony as
there is egotism in his description of events that took place even before his birth as
having been part of his "beginning to take [his] place at the centre of the universe",
and his life as the conferring of "meaning to it all" (126). He wonders often at the
extent of his self-importance, asking why Saleem Sinai, "perennial victim, persists in
seeing himself as protagonist" (232). If he is indeed "the sort of person to whom
things have been done" (232), if his is the sort of life where "most of what matters
takes place in [his] absence" (230), he confronts such actuality head-on with his
interpretative swallowing: "if I seem a little bizarre, remember the wild profusion of my
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inheritance... perhaps, if one wishes to remain an individual in the midst of the teeming
multitudes, one must make oneself grotesque" (108).
In thus recreating himself as the "mirror" of the nation (122), Saleem finds he can
enter into the "illusion of the artist", that he is "somehow creating a world, that the
thoughts fhe] jumps inside are [his], that the bodies he occupies act at [hisj command",
that the "multitudinous realities of the land" are "the raw unshaped material of [his]
gift" (172). Now, armed with the novelistic right to re-present thus, perhaps he can
counter the influence of his immersion within his world, as well as the possibility that
he is nothing apart from such immersion. Again, the activities of inhabiting, interpreting
and narrating are shown to be intimately related, and the impossibility of representing
convincingly autonomous selves or regulated directions in national history is reflected
formally through the complete absence of either 'objectivity' or 'reliable' realism:
There are imperatives, and logical-consequences, and inevitabilities, and
recurrences; there are things-done-to, and accidents, and bludgeonings-of-fate;
when was there ever a choice? When options? When a decision freely-made, to
be this or that or the other? No choice; begin. — Yes (1981, 407).
Nationalist Art and National Representation.
By tracing the phases of Aurora's development as one of the nation's leading artists in
The Moor's Last Sigh— which allows Moor to discuss various possibilities for the
representation of the new nation through its artworks— Rushdie performs even further
a Tolstoyan, meta-fictional meditation on the diverse formal modes and envisioning
possibilities explored within his own fictionalising. After the earliest mural by Aurora
which captures godlessly the "great swarm of being itself' (1995, 59), of India past,
present and limitless in all "her garishness and inexhaustible motion", as a young
adult she moves into the Chipkali phase which portrays the variety and disaffection of
lower class Bombay life. As in Moor's own narrative Aurora returns repeatedly to
depicting India in "the mythic-romantic mode in which history, family, politics and
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fantasy jostled each other" (203) in one great throng. We witness conflicting
depictions of the worlds around her, in the way that Aurora moves from the "vivid
surrealism" and "dynamic acceleration" (227) of her "Mooristan" or "Palimpstine"
period— which are places "where worlds collide, flow in and out of one another, and
washofy away; [...] one universe, one dimension, one country, one dream, bumpo'ing
into another, or being under, or on top of' (226)— to her later collages that include
every manner of found urban "jetsam" thrown together, but also visualise humanity
itself as "reduced to the status of junk" (302), where "the people's lives, under the
pressure that is only felt at the bottom of a heap, had also become composite, as patched
up as their homes"(302). Correspondingly, in her pictures as much as in his own
narrative, we watch Moor's transformation by degrees as an approximate symbol for
the new nation. From being portrayed "as a romantic myth of the plural, hybrid
nation" (227), "a unifier of opposites [and] a standard-bearer of pluralism" (303)
during the Palimpstine phase, in these later pictures he too becomes "a semi-allegorical
figure of decay", "a creature of shadows" (303):
Aurora had apparently decided that the ideas of impurity, cultural admixture and
melange which had been, for most of her creative life, the closest things she had
found to a notion of the Good, were in fact capable of distortion, and contain a
potential for darkness as well as for light. This 'black Moor" was a new
imagining of the idea of the hybrid— a Baudelarian flower, it would not be too
far-fetched to suggest, of evil (303).
Conclusion: Discourse that is Situated and Comprehensive, Experimental
and Self-Reflexive.
Considered from a more 'objective' perspective than Rushdie's narrators, it is as
possible to characterise his narratives by their limits and exclusions as by their thematic
pre-occupations. We might disagree with his valorisation of the city as the vital site of
national formation and point at the obvious class boundaries of his casts (though part
of his project is to expose this 'nation-controlling' elite and its limitations— as artists,
politicians, generals and businessmen). There is his often ahistorical insistence on the
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pervasive and incommensurable uncontrollability of human becoming as the primary
reason for the failure of the nation on every level. And finally, there is the question in
both narratives of what emerges as a paranoid suspicion of the 'subaltern', as well as
an inability to invest such characters with any degree of creative agency or complexity.
Among others, Leela Gandhi takes such criticisms forward in two distinct but related
directions. In the work of novelists such as Rushdie as well as thinkers such as Bhabha
and Said, she detects a "theoretical faith" reserved only for "counter-narratives of the
nation" that, "far from producing the nation out of its fictional plenitude [...]
endeavour, instead, to betray the fictionality of nationhood" (1998, 162):
In Rushdie's Midnight's Children, the nation is narrated by an impostor—
whose unreliable narration systematically distorts the chronology and
significance of national history. So also Shame gives the lie to the national
achievements of Pakistan— leaving in its place, a hollow and corrupt landscape
bereft of hope and meaning (164).
Gandhi points to, and then questions, how "the evacuated and fictional space of
nationalism is now animated by the new fictions of exile and migrancy":
To put this differently, need we concede the necessary 'politics of migrancy'?
Especially when we consider that the migrancy of writers like Rushdie is
predicated upon the luxuries of mobility. [...]
In the absence of any solidarities— whether nationalist or socialist— the
postcolonial novel finds it provenance in the small pleasures of subjectivity; its
content is almost entirely shaped by personal journeys, attachments, memories,
losses. Accordingly, it seems more than a little curious that these iterative and
skilful portraits of artists as young— and not so young— men should be
authorised to represent the public voice of the postcolonial world. [...] This is
not to suggest that postcolonial writing is obliged to be unthinkingly 'patriotic'.
Rather we might consider the fact that Rushdie's narrative renditions of the
Indian nation have always been pathologically and unequivocally reductive.
What he offers in novel after novel is a lament, or a complaint against the
culture he has eschewed for the transitions of migrancy. [...] This, then, is the
governing paradox of the postcolonial canon: that metropolitan culture has
acquired a romantic investment in a literary narrative which is markedly anti-
romantic in its perception of the post-colonial world. Here we can only find the
language of critique; a hybridity that is predicated precisely upon an abrogation
of the postcolonial nation. And yet, despite the influential liberal enmity towards
nationalism, this abstract and imaginary force bears [...] the traces of countless
histories of struggles— histories which, in turn, continue to inform the ethical
apparatus of countless peoples (164-166).
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We have quoted Gandhi extensively because her severe critique contains many points
on which we might build (by our refutation) an alternative rendering not just of
Rushdie's novels, but of the cumulative implications of post-colonial literary
production more generally. While the charge that Saleem and Moor are both
"unreliable narrators" who "systematically distort the chronology [...] of national
history" is undeniable and obvious, it cannot by any means extend to saying that
therefore "Rushdie's narrative renditions [...] have always been pathologically and
unequivocally reductive" (165). On the contrary, through our readings we have tried to
demonstrate exactly how much comprehensive national interrogation his work
undertakes, in terms of including diverse, conflicting social agents and various
existential dimensions simultaneously within the same narratives. Not only do his
novels thereby realise the potential for evoking the fullness of existence that we have
argued to be intrinsic to fiction (and press such capacities into the services of national
examination), they also foreground throughout the limits of their own 'fictionality'
rather than pretend the opposite— which would involve assuming the omniscient
authority of constructing an apparently 'objective totality'. In Rushdie, there is no
effort to conceal the limits of the inevitable (and unreliable) particularism of all fiction
behind the Lukacsian ploys of claiming to concentrate on only what is 'typical' or
'enduring' or 'universal', which means that his fictions confront much more directly
the diagnostic implications of their particular social situation, their specific modes of
'worldedness'. Thus there is no grand contention— that is not immediately ironised by
Saleem and Moor themselves— that sets up either narrative as an alternative "national
history" in the sense that Gandhi criticises, by pretending to be "authorised to
represent the public voice of the postcolonial world" (1998, 164). Rather, as both Moor
and Saleem proclaim frequently at different points:
"I told you the truth", I say yet again, "Memory's truth, because memory has
its own special kind. It selects, eliminates, alters, exaggerates, minimises,
glorifies, and vilifies also; but in the end it creates its own reality, its
heterogeneous but usually coherent version of events; and no sane human being
ever trusts someone else's version more than his own" (Rushdie, 1981, 207).
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Gandhi's criticism censures Rushdie's work for mutually exclusive offences— by
acknowledging that he foregrounds the explicit unreliability of his narratives but not
accepting the eccentric consequences of such unreliability, and condemning the absence
(as well as the delusory appearance) of historical objectivity in his writing. Further,
there occurs a problematic conflation of textual and biographical criticism in Gandhi's
charge that these novels valorise a historically irresponsible, privileged, cosmopolitan
migrancy at the expense of the Indian nation.43 If we consider just the textual worlds of
these two novels for our present purposes, not only do we note situated and
comprehensive engagements with wholly Indian histories and environments (albeit
engagements not suited to Gandhi's taste), but the only migration that eventually
happens— when Moor flees to Spain— is portrayed as a final failure compounding his
(interpretative and existential) failures on Indian territory.
If, as we argued in the first chapter, a fundamental possibility offered by novelistic
discourse is the opportunity to re-write fictions impelled by the lacks and limits in the
fictions of others, then every succeeding writer must be equally liable to fresh
examinations of his or her particular methods and exclusions. But the crucial basis of
any such process is the freedom that the form allows in the first place— of envisioning
existence experimentally from any expressible perspective. Surely Rushdie is only
exercising fiction's implicit invitation to speak in any voice and construct his story in
the specific sequence he chooses. We are free to disagree with the selection of histories
constituting Saleem's India; in fact, it would run counter to his own fore-grounded
unreliability and to the very fictionality of the medium if we accepted his depiction as
'objective'. But we cannot obstruct his right even to be entirely 'wrong' without
seriously undermining (and misunderstanding) the inclusive potential of the novel, by
imposing upon it Lukacsian constraints and criteria for what constitutes a more
45
Timothy Brennan makes this particular 'cosmopolitan' case in detail in his book-length study of
Rushdie. For a fuller account see Brennan (1989, 35-38).
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'objectively' accurate portrayal of national history. In fact, through the range of
investigations undertaken by the novels in this second section, we have attempted to
demonstrate the discursive fertility of each novel's particular portrayals, as well as that
generated by dissent with the limits of a particular portrayal. It is often disagreement
with the exclusions or methods of one novel that leads to alternative explorations in
another, and such a re-writing might just as easily be directed against another post-
colonial novel by a compatriot, not just in response to a European's prejudiced
depictions. And cumulatively, we have attempted to show in these three chapters, is
thereby created a spectrum of thoroughly 'worlded' existential inquiry that proves to
have engaged flexibly with various histories, trajectories, agents, and themes that
comprise national becomings, as well as embodied diverse theoretical and
historiographic versions and disagreements, and 'meta-fictional'/hermeneutic
problematics in performance within the same narratives.
Rather than any essentialist casting of either the post-colonial novel's narrative modes
or its thematic preoccupations, it is fiction's implicit formal capacity to embrace re-
inscription, narrative experiment and a potentially unlimited range of thematic inquiry,
that allows it its unique openness to different aspects of a society's fullness. In the next
section we extend our study to discussing how such capacities have been utilised in the
portrayal of a range of issues exploring the inhabitation of post-colonial nations by
their women. But for now, we conclude by returning to the disagreement with which we
began this section, with Anderson and Said about the irreducibly dialogic nature of the
novel. If all the post-colonial novel did was to adapt a Western discursive form to
reinforce coercively the mythologies and rationalisations of a borrowed nation-state
paradigm— which would be the implication of their arguments— it would only turn
itself into a doubly "derivative discourse", to borrow Partha Chatterjee's phrasing.
This is the contention we have begun to refute by means of our 'novelistic criticism',
and will continue to do in this study.
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Section 3: Women, Narratives, and the Post-Colonial Nation.
Introduction: Proposing a Model of Feminist Historiography.
In an essay on 'Nationalism, Gender and Identity', R. Radhakrishnan considers the
implications of Partha Chatterjee's argument regarding the conjuncture of Indian
nationalism and women's politics during the colonial period, in which Chatterjee
asserts:
The 'women's question' was a central issue in some of the most controversial
debates over social reform in early and mid-nineteenth-century Bengal [...J.
[But] what has perplexed historians is the rather sudden disappearance of such
issues from the agenda of public debate towards the close of the century. From
then onwards, questions regarding the position of women in society do not
arouse the same degree of passion and acrimony as they did only a few decades
before. The overwhelming issues are now directly political ones— concerning
the politics of nationalism (1993, 116).
Radhakrishnan presents and debates the numerous ramifications that arise out of such
displacement "of 'one' politics in terms of an 'other'" (Castle, 2001, 192), especially
when, as Chatterjee points out, "the [prevailing] hypothesis of critical social history
today is that nationalism could not have resolved these issues; rather, the relation
between nationalism and the women's question must have been problematical"
(Sangari & Vaid, 1993, 234):
Why is it that the advent of the politics of nationalism signals the subordination
if not the demise of women's politics? Why does the politics of the 'one'
typically overwhelm the politics of the 'other'? Why could the two not be co¬
ordinated within an equal and dialogic relationship of mutual accountability?
What factors constitute the normative criteria by which a question or issue is
deemed 'political'? Why is it that nationalism achieves the ideological effect of
an inclusive and putatively macropolitical discourse, whereas the women's
question— unable to achieve its own autonomous macropolitical identity—
remains ghettoised within its specific and regional space? In other words, by
what natural or ideological imperative or historical exigency does the politics of
nationalism become the binding and overarching umbrella that subsumes other
and different political temporalities (Castle, 2001, 191).
Radhakrishnan goes on not only to challenge the 'colonising' displacement of one
mode of discourse and activism by the priorities of another, but also to formulate an
alternative envisioning of all discursive limits and horizons:
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The questions that I've raised lead to still others, which will be posed here in all
their political and epistemological generality. [...] How is a genuinely
representative national consciousness [...] to be spoken for by feminism and
vice versa? Is it inevitable that one of these politics must form the horizon for
the other, or is it possible that the very notion of a containing horizon is quite
beside the point? Can any horizon be 'pre-given' in such an absolute and
transcendent way? Isn't the very notion of the horizon open to perennial
political negotiation? (...] In other words, isn't the so-called horizon itself the
shifting expression of equilibrium among the many forces that constitute and
operate the horizon: gender, class, sexuality, ethnicity and so on? If one specific
politics is to achieve a general significance, it would seem that it has to possess
a multiple valence, that is, enjoy political legitimacy as a specific constituency
and simultaneously make a difference in the integrated political or cultural
sphere. Without such access to an integrated cultural politics, any single
subject-positional politics risks losing its interventionary power within that total
field (2001, 192).
Both dissatisfied with and curious about the historical processes and
discursive/interpretative preferences that lead to nationalist subsuming, Radhakrishnan
turns to Kumkum Sangari and Suresh Vaid for their outlining of a model of "feminist
historiography", that would ontologically orient itself precisely towards interrogating
these processes and simultaneously re-integrating diverse perspectives "without at the
same time resorting to another kind of totalising umbrella" (2001, 192):
Historiography may be feminist without being, exclusively, women's history.
Such a historiography acknowledges that each aspect of reality is gendered, and
is thus involved in questioning all that we think we know, in a sustained
examination of analytical and epistemological apparatus, and in a dismantling of
the ideological presuppositions of so-called gender-neutral methodologies. A
feminist historiography rethinks historiography as a whole and discards the
idea of women as something to be framed by a context, in order to be able to
think of gender difference as both structuring and structured by the wide set of
social relations [and] in this sense, f...] is a choice open to all historians. Not as
a choice among competing perspectives, or even as one among personal
predilections [...]. Nor is the issue here the tokenist inclusion of women or the
numerical or even qualitative evaluation of their participation in this or that
movement. Rather as a choice which cannot but undergird any attempt at a
historical reconstruction which undertakes to demonstrate our sociality in the
full sense (Sangari & Vaid, 1993, 3).
It is in such a spirit that we shall read the novels of this chapter, claming that their
distinctive means of social and national examination actually perform the re-inscriptive
modes of multivalent narrativising such as Vaid and Sangari envision. We have argued
throughout this study that (reading and writing) novelistic narrative inevitably "not only
involves knowledge of and working at the interface of various disciplines, but also
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[implicitly! a simultaneous questioning of the histories and assumptions of those
disciplines" (Sangari & Vaid, 1993, 3). Here we extend these contentions to claiming
that the novelistic activity "of understanding our construction as agents and subjects of
social processes [might] itself [work as] a kind of intervention in the creation of
exclusive knowledge systems" (1993, 3), in the ways that Sangari and Vaid wish to
perform against nationalist discourses which subsume other histories and voices.
Further, we intend to demonstrate that novels are uniquely able to evoke the various
potential interpretative implications that Radhakrishnan draws from the 'feminist
historiography' project:
[It] boldly and relevantly raises questions concerning the 'full' and 'total'
rethinking of historiography as such. [...] The very openness of the 'choice'
(that of 'feminising' all historiography) is conceptualised as a form of
historical and political inevitability. For the choice is not just any choice, but a
choice that cannot but be made. In repudiating the very notion of gender
neutrality, they integrate the category of gender into every aspect of reality; and
in opening gender out to all historians, they make it impossible for other
historians (who, for example, historicise along axes of nationality, class, race,
and so on) not to integrate the feminist imperative within their respective
projects. [...] As I have suggested, the strategy of locating any one politics
within another is as inappropriate as it is coercive. [...] Nationalist totality, we
have seen, is an example of a 'bad totality', and feminist historiography secedes
from that structure not to set up a different and oppositional form of totality, but
to establish a different relationship to totality. My objective here [...] is to
suggest both that no one discourse or historiography has the ethico-political
legitimacy to represent the totality, and that the concept of 'totality' should be
understood not as a pre-given horizon but as the necessary and inevitable
'effect' or function of the many relational dialogues, contestations, and
asymmetries among the many positions (and their particular-universal
ideologies) that constitute the total field (Castle, 2001, 193-194).
With the ambitions of such a methodology before us, our discursive means in this
section will once again operate through presenting a spectrum of existential possibility
as narrated in the novels we will examine. Over the course of its two chapters, we move
from considering various implications of women inhabiting a restrictive (but
emphatically not presented as ahistorical or static) domesticity, as uncovered by writers
ranging from Vikram Seth (1994) to Rushdie (1984) and Armah (1987), to examining
the possibilities of moving beyond such boundaries in works by Anita Desai (1977),
Arundhati Roy (1998), and Rohinton Mistry (1996). The final section of the second
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chapter will consider novels by Gordimer (1980), Achebe (1988) and Buchi Emecheta
(1994) to explore the performances of feminine agency and self-enunciation by their
central characters, both individually and collectively, but without the pre-defined
premises, definitions or restrictions imposed by the domains of home and family. We
will conclude with a study of similar themes in a novel by Bessie Head (1987), where
the focus has shifted to exploring such possibilities as fashioned by a rural subaltern
woman. Our aim throughout will be to understand the extent to which the female
characters (and the novelists) envision and enact heterogeneously premised and directed
conceptions of their particular worlds and the multifarious histories they comprise, as
well as the degree of influence upon them of the history, structures, and discourses of
their societies and nation-states. In reading for the possibilities of feminine self-
performance in such worlds, we would of course simultaneously be exploring the
diverse possibilities such narrative trajectories perform of communication and
community, and the transformations wrought on various social levels by such
performances.
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Chapter 6: The Implications of Domesticity.
A Suitable Boy. Feminine Domesticity and its Creative Conservatism.
In another context in the next section, we argue that Vikram Seth's A Suitable Boy is
rooted in the familial, both for its narrative themes and form as well as the fundamental
premise of its world-vision. For some women characters of the older generation, Mrs
Rupa Mehra, Mrs Mahesh Kapoor and others, it appears as though their family forms
the entire content of their identities and their worlds, and that they are indistinguishably
dissolved in the 'greater' purpose of preserving the family's continuity and harmony.
Seth appears to perform, and affirm, what Partha Chatterjee posits as the nineteenth-
century nationalist resolution of the dichotomies of Indian identity within a colonial
state. If Indian nationalists argued that "not only was it not desirable to imitate the
West in anything other than the material aspects of life, it was not even necessary to do
so, because in the spiritual domain the East was superior to the West" (1993, 121),
then Chatterjee presents the corollary implication of such a position for the 'women's
question':
Applying the inner/outer distinction to the matter of concrete day-to-day living
separates the social space into [...] the home and the world. The world is the
external, the domain of the material; the home represents one's inner spiritual
self, one's true identity. The world is a treacherous terrain of the pursuit of
material interests [...]. It is also typically the domain of the male. The home in
its essence must remain unaffected by the profane activities of the material
world— and woman is its representation. And so we get an identification of
social roles by gender to correspond with the separation of the social space
(120).
Further, Chatterjee goes on to caution that, when seen from a nineteenth-century
nationalist perspective, it would be " a grave error " (for us today) to interpret such a
conception "as 'conservatism', a mere defence of "traditional' norms" or a "total
rejection of the West" (121):
The world was where the European power had challenged the non-European
peoples and, by virtue of its superior material culture, had subjugated them. But,
the nationalists asserted, it had failed to colonise the inner, essential identity of
the East which lay in its distinctive, and superior, spiritual culture. Here the East
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was undominated, sovereign, master of its own fate. [...] No encroachment by
the coloniser must be allowed in that inner sanctum [...].
Once we match this new meaning of the home/world dichotomy with the
identification of social roles by gender, we get the ideological framework within
which nationalism answered the women's question. [...J The nationalist
paradigm in fact supplied an ideological principle of selection. It was not a
dismissal of modernity; the attempt was rather to make modernity consistent
with the nationalist project (121).
For the most part, Seth's spectrum of female portraits (set nearly a century after
Chatterjee's period of anti-colonial nationalism) affirmatively recognises an entire
range of conservative containment as well as the potential for creative continuity within
feminine domesticity. Further, as Seth demonstrates through the choices of Lata and
Savita, it is not merely an anachronistic legacy that will fade away with the dawning of a
reformed, post-independence, feminist, modernist or individualist outlook. Lata, whom
unreasonable passion always makes uneasy (because it might require expressing
potentially disharmonious individualism), devises a formula for happiness from her
observations of Savita. In her marriage to Pran they recognise "limits and
possibilities":
Their yearning did not stretch beyond their reach. They loved each other—or
rather had come to do so. They both assumed without ever needing to state it—
or perhaps without even thinking explicitly about it—that marriage and children
were a great good (1994, 952).
At Pran's bedside in the same hospital where in another room Savita has just had their
baby, Lata comes to feel that "with life and death so near each other here in the
hospital, [...] all that provided continuity in the world or protection from it was the
family" (952). In this light her mother appears to Lata for a moment as a "domestic
goddess" (952), and she no longer resents Mrs Mehra's arbitrations on everything
'suitable' to Lata's life. Again, Seth appears to affirm a century later what Chatterjee
terms the "characteristic nationalist answer" to the 'women's question' that lies in
redefining "the natural and social principles which provide the basis for the 'feminine'
virtues " (1993, 125).1 And by reconfirming its validity for the educated and
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independent-minded women of a younger generation, Seth, like Chatterjee's nineteenth
century nationalists, also presents such domesticised femininity as neither a regressive
nor a conservative conception. Chatterjee presents his version of the nationalist
resolution:
The 'new' woman defined in this way was subjected to a new patriarchy. In
fact, the social order connecting the home and the world in which nationalism
placed the new woman was contrasted not only with that of modern Western
society: it was explicitly distinguished from the patriarchy of indigenous
tradition (127) [...]. It is this particular nationalist construction of reform as a
project of both emancipation and self-emancipation of women (and hence a
project in which both men and women had to participate) that also explains why
the early generation of educated women themselves so keenly propagated the
nationalist idea of the 'new woman' (129). [...J Once the essential femininity
of women was fixed in terms of certain culturally visible spiritual qualities, they
could go to schools, travel in public conveyances, watch public entertainment
programmes, and in time even take up employment outside the home. [...] The
new patriarchy advocated by nationalism conferred upon women the honour of
a new social responsibility, and by associating the task of female emancipation
with the historical goal of sovereign nationhood, bound them to a new, yet
entirely legitimate, subordination (130).
The Consequences of Repression: A Suitable Boy and Shame.
But there is more to Seth's envisionings of the limits and implications of domesticity
than his cross-generational endorsements of its capacity to forge a creative, continuous,
and yet conservative "thread of love" (1994, 1458), even if his narrative emphasises
this particular theme. Even though A Suitable Boy demonstrates exactly such distinctive
separation between 'domains' enacted in a post-independence setting by most of its
characters, one significant consequence of such separation that Seth's narrative makes
evident repeatedly is how often these women remain unknown to the men around whom
they have fashioned their lives— husbands and sons who are able to take on their
duties in the dynamic, 'material' world outside only because they are certain of this
reliably stable feminine presence at home. We even encounter a fictionalised prime
minister (Nehru) who is portrayed as never having made any effort to know his wife.
1
For a fuller discussion of the nationalist agenda (and its limits and prescriptions) on the 'women's
question' in nineteenth-century India, as well as diverse voices and testimonies from women of the
163
Such acknowledged instances of ignorance, incomprehension and isolation at the heart
of the 'familiar-familial' recur frequently as undeveloped traces throughout the
narrative's margins. The lifelong nation-builder of impeccable political integrity, Mr
Mahesh Kapoor, is described by the omniscient narrator after his wife's passing as " a
poor, ignorant, grieving fool" (1332), who deserves to suffer all his regret: "too late,
and perhaps because of the love everybody else round him so clearly bore her, he began
to realise fully what he had lost, indeed, whom he had lost— and how suddenly"
(1337). As he looks around at the funeral gathering after she has disappeared on the
pyre, he notices the evidence of her legacy everywhere:
She was the garden at Prem Nivas [...], she was Veena's love of music, Pran's
asthma, Maan's generosity, the survival of some refugees four years ago, the
neem leaves that would preserve quilts stored in the great zinc trunks of Prem
Nivas, the moulting feather of some pond-heron, a small unrung brass bell, the
memory of decency in an indecent time, the temperament of Bhaskar's great
grand-children (1332).
There are many such absences at the heart of Seth's immensely conceived world,
women apparently deeply stable whose very life-performances cover over any ruptures
in the family fabric (as well as providing the material in which the ruptures appear).
Also, the neglect (or benevolent domination) by husbands of their spouses is not
always idiosyncratically harmless. Professor Durrani is so affectionately absent-
minded that he never realises the implications of his ignorance, but in this particular
instance (which the narrator mentions but never develops in a separate scene, as per his
usual practice), their lack of communication possibly drove his wife insane so that she
is kept in a dark locked room at her sister's, visited by her two sons each week though
never by her husband. In another incident, only Lata, after her encounter with Mr
Sahgal in the middle of the night, comes to understand the extreme tension at the
breakfast table as originating in an ongoing, recognised but unmentionable history of
domestic abuse.
period, see Chatterjee's chapters on 'The Nation and its Women' (1993, 116-134), and 'Women and
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Shame advances such interrogation much further by fore-grounding the complex of
various possible relationships between home and the wider world in post-independence
Pakistan— and exploring some of the multiple, dynamic consequences of inhabiting
the paces and processes of two worlds simultaneously, especially for women with
nation-builders for spouses and fathers.
Rushdie devotes as much of his narrative to the women who never leave their houses as
he does to the stories of Raza, Iskander Harappa and Omar Khayyam, their husbands
struggling with each other to direct and dominate the new nation. The novel is Seth-like
in the way that it is spread out over an entire cast composed of inter-related families.
The other similarity between the novels is that both contain a whole spectrum of
domestic possibility and crises, but this is where any valid resemblance ceases. Rushdie
never affirms domestic conservatism as being replete with its own imperturbable vitality
in the way Seth does: for him, as for Arundhati Roy, domesticity is only an apparently
'inviolable' or 'timeless' disguise in which historical upheavals and social violations
descend. Rushdie also re-inscribes the narratives that Seth intimates only in his
margins— the locked-up mentally ill wife is released and re-centred in Sufiya Zinobia,
as is the Sahgal home of domestic abuse that Seth visits for only a single scene—
thereby questioning the price of a domestic patriarchy that is premised upon and itself
underlies a wider puritan-authoritarian nationalism:
Repression is a seamless garment; a society which is authoritarian in its social
and sexual codes, which crushes its women beneath the intolerable burdens of
honour and propriety, breeds repressions of other kinds as well. Contrariwise:
dictators are always— or at least in public, on other people's behalf—
puritanical. So it turns out that my 'male' and 'female' plots are the same story,
after all (1984, 173).
The overarching thematic link in Rushdie's conception of homes and worlds (and the
domains of 'masculine' and 'feminine') in Pakistan is 'shame', which is his term for
the will towards Sethian domestic conservatism as well as the premise upon which its
the Nation' (135-157).
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builders hoped to erect Pakistan— as an inviolable (Andersonian) solidarity under the
unifying omniscience of a shared God:
Once upon a time there were two families, their destinies inseparable even by
death. I had thought, before I began, that what I had on my hands was an almost
excessively masculine tale [...]. But the women seem to have taken over; they
marched in from the peripheries of the story to demand the inclusion of their
own tragedies, histories and comedies, obliging me [...] to see my 'male' plot
refracted |... J through the prisms of its reverse and 'female' side (173).
In Rushdie's version of Pakistani history, diverse modes of 'shame'— religious,
moral, familial, sexual— were meant to provide collectively both the guidance and the
insulation, as well as secure the bases of self-definition, by which individuals, families,
and the nation itself could conduct their course together in "broad, horizontal
comradeship" amid the multi-directional dynamism of history. But 'shamelessness' is
the term for Rushdie's critique of the violence and repression involved in the
enforcement of such an ideal, at both familial and national levels:
Between shame and shamelessness lies the axis upon which we turn;
meteorological conditions at both these poles are of the most extreme ferocious
type. Shamelessness, shame: the roots of violence (116).
In the course of these two chapters, we explore various Rushdian characters embodying
different reactions, implications, as well as trajectories of resistance to the limits of such
repressive domesticity, but for now we focus on his delineation of some of the
distorting consequences of absolute confinement.
After watching her father burn alive for his intransigence before the demands of history,
Bilquis Hyder is reduced from being one of a generation of "ordinary decent
respectable ladies [...] to whom nothing ever happens, to whom nothing is supposed to
happen except marriage children death" (65), to being one of many who now had
" this sort of strange story to tell " (65). For a while, "she stands in a gully, denuded
by the suicide of her father" (64), before attaching herself to Major Raza to be the
"wife of a hero with a great future" (64), which is a move intended to help her push the
past away and secure herself against any further exposure to the violations of history.
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Yet despite becoming the wife of a future dictator, for the rest of her life, "she took to
pacing about, slamming and locking doors, [...] developed a horror of movement, and
placed an embargo on the relocation of even the most trivial of household items" (68).
Because though "for a long time, she [remained] suspicious of history " (64), the veiy
premise upon which Bilquis resurrects her dream of an inviolably stable domestic
dominion is subverted again by history, in the form of her husband and the
consequences of his desire to be his country's sole ruler. The novel ends with Bilquis
fleeing once more with her husband:
Her behaviour was that of a woman who has gone far enough already, too far, a
woman who has ceased to believe in frontiers and whatever-might-lie-beyond.
Bilquis was barricading herself against the outside world in the hope that it
might go away (272).
A similar erosion-by-domestic-repression takes a different direction with Bilquis's
friend Rani, who is married to Raza's rival autocrat and history-maker Iskander
Harappa. Rani lives unvisited by Iskander, but she is regularly intimidated and her
home looted whenever his political fortunes dip or an opponent decides to settle scores;
and her name is mentioned every time new rumours break out about her husband's
political or sexual immorality. Yet it is Rani alone in the abandoned estate who weaves
unillusionedly diverse aspects of his period in power across eighteen tapestries
portraying the country's becoming with her husband at its centre. "Locked in their
trunk, they said unspeakable things which nobody wanted to hear" (192); and she
accomplishes all this despite her lifelong exile from both a 'normal' domesticity as well
as history:
This was a great difference between her and Bilquis Hyder: both women had
husbands who retreated from them into the enigmatic palaces of their destinies,
but while Bilquis sank into eccentricity, not to say craziness, Rani had subsided
into a sanity which made her a powerful, and later on a dangerous, human being
(152).
But of course no one will ever see Rani's tapestries, no matter how radical or visionary
they are. Both history as well as daily social life in the novel's Pakistan are separated
and structured along distinct tiers:
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For instance at the time of the pan-Islamic conference when Heads of State
arrived from all over the globe, and they all brought their mothers along, so that
all hell broke loose, because the mothers in the zenana wing embarked at once
on a tooth-and-nail struggle for superiority, and they kept sending urgent
messages to their sons, interrupting the conference's plenipotentiary sessions to
complain about mortal insults received and honour besmirched (246).
Thus Rushdie depicts the location and the bounds of feminine expression as being
always restricted— all such energies and conflicts have to be confined within the
sanctioned space of the zenana. Even though domestic and female narratives occupy as
much space in his novel as do male transactions within the 'outer' domain of national
history, he always demarcates the limits of the impact these women are able to have on
the wider fate of 'their' society, however endowed with irrepressible personality they
might be. Women are narratively centred without being allowed much wider
historical/national centrality in Rushdie's version of Pakistan's becoming.
Confinement and Complicity: Armah, Seth, Roy.
Writing of wives and mothers in post-independence Accra, Armah explores further
implications of this same theme— confinement within a repressive domesticity. In both
The Beautyful Ones are Not Yet Born and Fragments it is the hero's wife and Baako's
mother respectively who are their most disappointed critics and the harshest judges of
their incorruptibility. Any sense of achievement and social worth in these women seems
entirely premised upon (the lack of) material possessions, the "cargo-cult" standard
they appear to have unquestioningly adopted from the society around them. Through
them Armah portrays the possibility of feminine complicity with the values of the
'masculine' 'outer' world and its resulting dangers, especially in periods when such
values are severely confused under the combined stresses of emerging from the
colonial era, as well as coping with the transitions (and disappointments) that followed
in the aftermath of independence.
168
Vikram Seth, in an analogously complex vein, portrays Begum Abida, the courageous
sister-in-law of the Nawab who chooses not to follow her family into Pakistan (and
purdah), and instead becomes a member of the State Assembly. The abiding irony of
her situation is that she always argues vehemently against land reform and
redistribution, thus upholding aspects of the very patriarchies that she has rejected in
her personal life— the semi-feudal structure of landlords and the caste system it
generates and relies upon, with landless labourers at the very bottom. And in another
instance, in the rural Kerala of Arundhati Roy's The God ofSmall Things, even though
her women characters— Mammachi, Baby Kochamma— are often the victims most
vulnerable to violation domestically and socially with no "Locusts Stand I" even in
their own homes or in the businesses they set up, they are also willing and convinced
collaborators in the violation or repression of others including their own daughters and
grand-children. More than being passive upholders like Armah's wives and mothers,
some of Roy's female characters participate actively in the processes involved in
"putting history right", thinking of their efforts as being part of "collecting [its ] dues
from those who broke its laws" and "inoculating a community against an outbreak"
(1997, 308). Even though it remains men who commit the actual violence (that
considers itself "history in live performance", the "impersonal" force of "an era
imprinting itself on those who lived in it" (309)), Roy's conception of such patriarchal
processes is more 'androgynous' in that they are enacted in the 'inner' and 'outer'
domains of home and society simultaneously, and their standards are enforced actively
even by women whose own lives have been repeatedly violated by similar repressions.
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Complicating 'Patriarchy'.
In common with much recent feminist (and post-colonial-feminist) work, Nira Yuval-
Davis and Floya Anthias reject the 'notion of patriarchy' in itself as a "much too crude
analytical instrument" (Yuval-Davis, 1997, 7). They argue that:
[Such an absolute notion| does not allow, for instance, for the fact that in most
societies some women have power at least over some men as well as over other
women. Nor does it take into account the fact that in concrete situations
women's oppression is intermeshed in and articulated by other forms of social
oppression and social divisions.
This is the reason why [...] [we] have rejected the notion of patriarchy as a
distinct social system which is autonomous of other types of social systems
such as capitalism and racism. Rather, we argued that women's oppression is
endemic and integral to social relations with regard to the distribution of power
and material resources in the society. Gender, ethnicity and class, although with
different ontological bases and separate discourses, are intermeshed in each
other and articulated by each other in concrete social relations. They cannot be
seen as additive and no one of them can be prioritised abstractly. [...] Contrary
to what the notion of patriarchy suggests, women are not just usually passive
recipients and non-participants in the determination of gender relations.
Probably most importantly, not all women are oppressed and/or subjugated in
the same way or to the same extent, even within the same society at any specific
moment (7-8).2
Sangari and Vaid draw out further implications of acknowledging the non-essentialist,
non-universalist, (and sometimes) non-biologically determined subject-construction of
gender along various simultaneous, heterogeneously-directed yet inter-related axes:
Women's studies and feminist movements feel impelled to construct a positive
and inspirational history. The danger here is both of literalising and simplifying
the 'model' woman as well as legitimising the way in which reform and
nationalist movements took up the woman question. [...] Women may
sometimes exceed or violate the prescriptions of a particular set of ideologies
precisely because they are members of a dominant group. The national
movement too constructs an inspirational model of the past, and if feminism is
to be different, it must acknowledge the ideological and problematic significance
of its own past. Instead of creating yet another grand tradition or a cumulative
history of emancipation, [...] we need to be attentive to how the past enters
differently into the consciousness of other historical periods and is further
subdivided by a host of factors including gender, caste, and class (1993, 18).
2
Again, Roy makes evident that for some of her characters simply being biologically male does not
imply any special insurance against the violations of society. Despite his bold successes at extending
the limits of his Paravan status, Velutha remains an 'untouchable' in the eyes of even his own father,
and is physically broken by the legislators and enforcers of social restrictions to remind him of the
price of transgression.
For a more comprehensive discussion of the critical imperative to recognise the complex
constructedness of the social implications of 'gender' along various simultaneous axes, see Talpade
Mohanty (1998, 255-277), Yuval-Davis (1997, 6-8), and Sangari and Vaid (1993, 1-26) among
various others arguing such a case.
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Acknowledging the possibility of active feminine 'collaboration' with patriarchal
elements when we also consider their simultaneous implication within categories such
as caste and class, constitutes a vital part of the novelistic investigation of differently-
situated women who have in common their confinement within domesticity. It is
impossible, for instance, to separate one part of Begum Abida's fullness from another
in A Suitable Boy. her staunch defence of the privileges and values of the landlord class
to which she belongs is part of the same subjectivity (and specifically-located historical
agency) that refuses to follow most of her family to Pakistan, and successfully enters
politics instead. All of this co-exists within the same irreducible being-in-her-world, and
the novel can enact the inter-active expressions of the various contradictions that
simultaneously construct her.
Locating the Home in History: Armah, Roy, Rushdie.
Further, such fictions dismantle the superficially conceived binaries drawn to separate
the home and the world— the mythologies of a timeless 'inner' domain governed by
'domestic goddesses' so beloved of certain models of nationalism. On the contrary,
domesticity without the option of entering the 'outer' world is revealed to be far less
insulated from history than such nationalists claim it to be: in fact, as Rushdie and
Arundhati Roy demonstrate, the family home can often become its focused
intensification, made all the more difficult to inhabit because the women are entirely
vulnerable to the descent of historical upheavals without being freely able to resist them.
The tighter the bind of repressive domesticity, the greater is the degree of vulnerability
arising out of such an enforced passivity. Baako's blind grandmother Naana in
Armah's Fragments embodies this agony of inhabiting a changing world whose
currents she cannot enter, comprehend or influence. The novel opens and closes with
two of her interior monologues: she is the only one shown to possess clear memories
of a more 'whole' past in which one's various identities would have appeared
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integrated rather than in mutual conflict. Yet Armah portrays the impossibility of
retrieving such epochs (or such conceptions) by placing this memory within the
unvoiced consciousness of a blind old woman whom not even her own family takes
seriously:
I have lived too long. The elders I knew and those who came travelling with me,
they are all on the other side, and I myself am lost here, a stranger unable to find
a home in a town of strangers so huge it has finished sending me helpless the
long way back to all the ignorance of childhood. [... | The larger meaning which
lent sense to every small thing and every momentary happening years and years
ago has shattered into a thousand and thirty senseless pieces. Things have
passed which I have never seen whole, only broken and twisted against
themselves. What remains of my days will be filled with more broken things
(1987, 195-196).
And it is not as if Naana is serene at least in her silence: she is haunted at night by
accusing ancestors, and by day sees only the evidence of damage and confusion in her
grandson and her relatives. She is even led to doubt that the past was as 'whole' as she
recalls it, and is only certain she will die alone, closing one by one the holes through
which the world around enters her:
From the world and the life around me, nothing comes to me. My eyes are no
longer windows through the wall of my flesh but a part of this blinding skin
itself. Soon my ears too will be shut, and my soul within this body will be
closed up, completely alone (195).
Far from the illusion of a timelessly inviolable, creatively conservative repository of
national tradition, Armah reveals restrictive domesticity as being potentially one of the
worst ways of being trapped in history, one of the most paralysing forms of the double-
bind of being immersed within its changes and yet excluded from influencing it at the
same time.
In The God of Small Things, the familiar and the familial similarly become barely
disguised focal points for the upheavals of history. For Roy, domesticity is a domain
within which the same "Love Laws" and timeless sanctities of caste and birth enforce
themselves with as much violence as in the rest of society, until 'transgressing' selves
are reduced by their own family and community to being just "[self|-shaped holes in
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the universe" (1998, 188). By interpreting social (caste- and gender-based) oppression
as entirely continuous with a context of domestic repression, like Rushdie she dissolves
not only the binary of a home set apart from the world, but demonstrates that the
violence of history does not necessarily come from somewhere distant (such as the
nation-state and its structures and agencies); rather, it is often entirely local and specific.
Also, as Sangari, Vaid, Yuval-Davis and numerous other critics argue, in Roy's novel
the implications and performance of individual roles within a society's history emerge
as simultaneous and always multivalent, as she shows how the apparently contradictory
agendas of casteism, communism and Christianity unite in a shared reactionary outrage
to uphold the same 'timeless' values, and how their sanctions are then enacted through
the modern, public institutions of trade unions and the police as well as within the
domain of the family, with men and women often collaborating in this restorative effort.
Related Exclusions: The Nation's Women and its People.
Aijaz Ahmad criticises Rushdie's novel in terms that subaltern historians would
approvingly recognise, for creating a narrative supposedly encompassing the history of
an entire society that nevertheless reads like "a sort of spiritual biography of the [...]
elite" who lead (or fail to lead, in the case of Shame) 'the people' "from subjugation
to freedom" (Guha & Spivak, 1988, 38). Ahmad argues that Rushdie's novel, by
focussing solely on "the experience of a decadent class" (1994, 138) and presenting
the history of its "corruptions and criminalities" (138) "as the experience of a
'country'" (140), excludes:
The dailiness of lives lived under oppression, and the human bonding— of
resistance, of decency, of innumerable heroisms, of both ordinary and
extraordinary kinds— which makes it possible for large numbers of people to
look each other in the eye, without guilt, with affection and solidarity and
humour, and makes life, even under oppression, endurable and frequently
joyous (139).
Ahmad is right to point out the novel's missing portraits of other levels and trajectories
of social 'fullness'. Rushdie's exclusive focus on the 'makers' of State history implies
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that he too is succumbing to the terms of that history and the distorting effects of its
forces, that by their violence appear to deprive the majority of ordinary human beings
of their agency and fullness, and reduce them to the status of passive victimhood. 'The
people' make only two appearances in the text— violated, passive and non-individuated
on both occasions. To Ahmad, Rushdie's failure lies in not utilising any narrative space
to re-inscribe such lives and agencies, not by creating unconvincing role models or
impossible heroes of resistance, but merely by telling more stories. This could have
been the novel's form of restorative resistance— to 'resist' the reductiveness of official
history by re-inscribing more histories,3 and performing thereby through its unique
mode of 'narrative calculus' how human becoming and resistance on every level could
be seen as influencing a society's history.
Ahmad also relates the social fullness missing in the novel to the fullness he finds
missing in Rushdie's women. He reads these women as metonymically "standing in"
for all the social strata missing in the novel— ordinary people, workers, peasants,
political militants— and therefore being its only representations of the potential of the
"oppressed" to be "oppositional". And here again Ahmad finds further evidence of
Rushdie's social-imaginative vision being deficient. In all the spectrum of the novel's
women, he traces one shared theme, "the frustration of erotic need, which drives some
to frenzy and others to nullity" (1994, 144), and goes on to critique Rushdie's
"overvalorising" of the erotic as determining their entire humanity. Ahmad finds
missing in these female characters any depiction of how women "have survived against
very heavy odds, and they have produced history":
Madness, sexual frenzy, nullity of being, fevers of the brain, have been by and
large, very uncommon: the vast majority of women have consistently performed
productive (and not only reproductive) labour; and like those men who also do
Of course we mean 'resist' only metaphorically rather than materially: we have no wish to
exaggerate the 'actual' social influence of the novels we are studying in any way: such claims lie
outside of our focus, beyond our research and our knowledge. This issue also emerges in our
conclusion. But for a fuller critique of such valorisation of textuality, see Leela Gandhi's discussion
of Jonathan White (1998, 156-161).
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productive work, they have retained with society and history a relation that is
essentially imaginative, visionary, communal and regenerative. Erotic need has
been, for women as for men, often important, but only in rare cases is it the lone
desire, outside loves and solidarities of other kinds: work, in any case, has been
for the majority far more central. So [...] there is something fatally wrong with
a novel in which virtually every woman is to be pitied, most are to be laughed at,
some are to be feared, at least some of the time, but none may be understood in
relation to those fundamental projects of survival and overcoming which are
none other than the production of history itself (150-151).
Yet even if we concede the validity of most of Ahmad's reservations, it could still be
maintained that Rushdie demonstrates many of his themes precisely through such
exclusionary focusing. First, to an even greater extent than his Indian novels, his
narrative is able to establish the misrule, and the limits, structural divides, and cognitive
and material failures of various nationalist discourses as well as governing models, and
therefore demonstrate the sheer distance between the nation's ruling classes and those
they rule over. In Shame, ordinary Pakistanis of either sex are nowhere near central to
the becomings forced upon their country by its leaders. Thus, building on Ahmad's
critique while simultaneously departing from it, we propose that Rushdie achieves a
double-edged deconstruction of nationalist discourse. He exposes the paltry fictionality
of nationhood being a shared, collective project by demonstrating how removed most of
its population (i.e. the nation's ordinary people and its women) are from any
opportunity to direct its political development, even though both 'the people' and
'women' constitute such crucial tropes in nationalist rhetoric. Thus there is seen to be
as little effective reality to such nationhood as there is to nationalism's glorification of
womanhood.
Conclusion: Further Consequences of Cognitive Failures.
We have already encountered in the previous section (in the works of Rushdie and
Achebe) various implications of "how nationalist ideology deploys the inner/outer split
to achieve a false resolution of its identity" (Castle, 2001, 198). Writing about post-
colonial India, both Chatterjee and Radhakrishnan make explicit connections relating
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the interpretative and historical failures of nationalism and the nation-state on the
'women's question' to the question of the state fully representing the heterogeneity
and specificities of its population. For Radhakrishnan, "the ideological disposition of
nationalism towards its people or its masses is fraught with the same duplicity that
characterises its attitude to the woman's question" (Castle, 2001, 200). Commenting
on Chatterjee, he illuminates the consequences of such cognitive dichotomy:
The result is a fundamental rupture, a form of basic cognitive dissidence, a
radical collapse of representation. Unable to produce its own history in
response to its inner sense of identity, nationalist ideology sets up Woman as
victim and goddess simultaneously. Woman becomes the allegorical name for a
specific historical failure: the failure to coordinate the political or the
ontological with the epistemological within an undivided agency (197-198).
And Chatterjee himself draws out what he sees as the actual historical consequences of
such conceptual failures for the project of the nation-state:
The new patriarchy which nationalist discourse set up as a hegemonic construct
culturally distinguished itself not only from the West but also from the mass of
its own people. [...] This raises important questions regarding the issue of
women's rights today. We are all aware that the forms and demands of the
women's movement in the West are not generally applicable to India. This
often leads us to slip back into a nationalist framework for resolving such
problems. A critical historical understanding will show that this path will only
bring us to the dead end which the nationalist resolution of the women's
question has already reached. [...] A renewal of the struggle for the equality
and freedom of women must [...] include within it a struggle against the false
essentialisms of home/world, spiritual/material, feminine/masculine propagated
by nationalist ideology (Sangari & Vaid, 1993, 251-252).
With such a re-articulated discursive programme as Chatterjee outlines and its inbuilt
cautions in mind, the second chapter comprising this section will consider some
fictional treatments of the heterogeneous histories of feminine self-orientation,
resistance, and agency, both individually and as part of different possibilities of
community and solidarity— at first against the context and confines of domesticity and
then further out beyond such boundaries. Operating against the immense odds of such
restriction and violation as this chapter has established, these novels also demonstrate
how some instances of feminine agency can therefore only be partial or severely
problematic. Rushdie himself acknowledges elements of Ahmad's critique within his
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novel (even though he does not do enough to develop such an affirmation into
narrative):
I hope that it goes without saying that not all women are crushed by any system,
no matter how oppressive. It is commonly and, I believe, accurately said of
Pakistan that her women are much more impressive than her men (1984, 173).
But in the very next line he cautions: " their chains, nevertheless, are no fictions. They
exist. And they are getting heavier. If you hold down one thing you hold down the
adjoining. In the end, though, it all blows up in your face" (173).
It is with the implications of such a caveat before us— twinned with his affirmation of
the possibility of agency beyond the determinism of various repressions— and yet
refusing the concluding note of all-encompassing despair, that we proceed into the
following chapter.
Chapter 7: Women's Agency and Resistance.
in
Resistance Against Social Hostility: Rushdie and Roy.
Through the three sisters of Nishapur, Rushdie dramatises in Shame the possibility of
how an exclusively feminine dominion over an unwavering domesticity might itself be
asserted as a basis for resistance against both the repressive norms of society as well as
the undesired transformations wrought by history. In Nishapur, the three sisters live as
one without husband or father, defended by a dumbwaiter fitted with long knives to
discourage the world from entering. Within the domain of their home they raise their
son together refusing him circumcision, religion, or the identity of his father (or even
his actual mother). "Their closing of ranks was absolute" (19) on every issue: they
share each symptom of pregnancy indistinguishably through to the moment of giving
birth, bring Omar up without ever needing to go out into the city, and then repeat the
process just as mysteriously two decades later. Yet their boundaries raise many
questions: does inviolability only come at the price of complete insularity? Are they
enacting a significant revolt that denies their society hegemony over them while
simultaneously fashioning their own 'nation' and laws to inhabit (such as retaining
independent control over their reproductive and child-rearing capacities), as well as
achieving a uniquely intimate, feminine solidarity that dissolves the limits of separate
bodies and consciousnesses between them? Or are they succumbing after all to
reactionary principles of patriarchy: does their isolation confirm that it is impossible to
freely inhabit their world as women and be autonomous selves at the same time— that
these must be mutually exclusive options? Also, after Omar effects his successful
rebellion and is allowed to go to school, the indivisible sisterly unity seems to waver,
and the narrator reports that "they were never properly reunited until they decided to
repeat the act of motherhood" (40). Thus motherhood is affirmed as the most
significant (shared and individual) expressive experience of womanhood, which is the
primary functional role for women that most versions of patriarchal discourse
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(including many nationalisms) reiterate. Yet the novel ends with Omar's return to
Nishapur, bringing with him his father-in-law the fugitive President disguised in a
burqah, whom his mothers nurse back to health only to murder him afterwards, thus
avenging his killing of their second son. This event remains their only entry into
history— to avenge themselves triumphantly within their own terrain and on their own
terms, before they disappear forever.
Also in many of these fictions, any manner of resistance to or redefinition of patriarchal
norms, no matter what the particular means or location might be, invariably invites
hostility and counter-violence from various quarters in society and even within the
family. The last event in the history of Nishapur is its storming by the people of Q.,
when they breach its defences for the first time and overcome their awe to destroy eveiy
last item. Even though they are appalled by their own violence afterwards, it is obvious
how much the city has always resented its impenetrability; its apparent exemption from
the terms of society, with its domain of feminine rule presided over by the inviolable
solidarity of the sisters and the unknowability underpinning that solidarity.
Within her village in The God ofSmall Things, Ammu faces the same levels of hostility
both from the wider community as well as from her own family (including her mother
and aunt). Her first offence was that she violated her ordained place in the world (and
hence threw into disarray that world itself) by running away to marry someone outside
the community, acting on the purely individualist spur of love. Her return after the
failure of her marriage, even if eternally remorseful, might not have constituted enough
atonement, but not only does she come back as irrepressible and irreverent as ever—
determined to love her fatherless twins "double" and absolutely unconcerned with how
little credibility she has within her home and society— she then commits her second
crime in repeating her earlier transgression, but this time with a lower-caste Paravan in
the village. Her misdemeanours leave everyone wondering "where she had learnt her
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effrontery from", "because she had not had the kind of education or read the sorts of
books, nor met the kinds of people, that might have influenced her to think the way she
did" (1998, 180). It just proves, everybody concludes, that "she was just that sort of
animal" (180) 4
And even after those patriarchs (including policemen, communists, and family
members) whose social responsibilities necessitate ensuring the restoration of these
breaches of 'shame' have done the needful, Ammu refuses to be cowed and threatens
to confess that she willingly participated in her 'crime'. This is the "unsafe edge" to
her that no one can interpret or accept, her "unmixable mix" of "infinite tenderness"
and her "reckless rage of a suicide bomber" (321). But Ammu has to endure
policemen tapping her breasts "like mangoes" and dies anonymous and wrecked, her
children lost to her forever. Even if Roy manages to portray through her an
irrepressible capacity for autonomy, and the possibility of performing a selfhood that is
not entirely reducible to the imposed terms of history or society no matter how
immersed or violated one is, her end is as wretched as Moor's or Saleem Sinai's. The
woman confronting her world fares no better than Rushdie's men: Ammu is
remembered only by her twins with love, but it is a love that haunts them into paralysis,
a loss they find impossible to build new lives around.
Resistance Against Self-Hatred: Rushdie and Desai.
Rushdie and Anita Desai also explore how it is not just social or external aggression
that feminine resistance has to overcome: self-hatred can often be just as determining an
implication of a lifetime influenced by repressive norms and definitions. In Shame,
Arjumand, Iskander Harappa's only daughter, considers her mother responsible for
4
Of course the novels discuss such hostility as faced by women in post-colonial contexts, but in
Chatterjee's accounts of nineteenth-century Indian nationalism and its treatments of the 'women's
question', there are numerous instances of the hostility and criticism faced by those women who defy
the ideals or step out of the roles and domains assigned them, from men as well as from other
women. For a fuller discussion see Chatterjee (1993), Chapters 6 & 7.
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giving birth to her as a woman and therefore hates her, because her sex prevents her
from being able to fully embrace her only passion— the shaping (and running) of her
country's history alongside her father. Despite her lifelong preparation for such a role,
during which she re-invents herself thoroughly according to her image of how such a
(male) leader would have to be (which includes squeezing in her breasts and earning the
title of "Virgin Ironpants" over the years, though her father had to make no such
sacrifice of his sexuality to attain power), when she finally gets her opportunity, she
perpetuates her father's misrule in every way and even places her mother under official
house arrest for life.
Nanda Kaul's long-repressed epiphany on the last page of Anita Desai's Fire on the
Mountain seems to devalue the entire narrative that has come before it, when it is
revealed to her (and to us) that all her bold actions might perhaps have been purely
reactive. In the wake of Ila's murder her own life stands before her "as a lie",
especially the "fabrication" she inhabits here in Carignano: "she did not live here
alone by choice—she lived here alone because that was what she was forced to do,
reduced to doing" (1977, 145). Her married life was spent lovelessly with a husband
who had a lifelong mistress; her many children are "all alien to her nature. She neither
understood nor loved them" (145). Desai's narration makes explicit that there may be
nothing positive at all to her retreat from that earlier period and her self-reinvention
within a new world invented exactly to order, because her retreat might be reducible to
terms of total defeat and failure.
Until we arrive at this final page, Nanda Kaul's journey appears a remarkable one, in
which she manages to break free of the limits of self-definition imposed by her role
within family and domesticity, and invents an identity out of isolation, a becoming
performed beyond a pre-fabricated Being. It is as if one of the domestic doyens
underpinning Vikram Seth's world suddenly withdraws from her position, reveals
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herself to be intensely unhappy in her roles as wife and mother, and finds a cottage in
the Himalayas to be alone forever after. Desai's unambiguous ending does Nanda a
disservice by detracting from the depth and courage of her self-recreation, in suggesting
it might all have been a falsehood and a confession of utter failure. She thus implies
that no woman could wish to extricate herself from the limits of domesticity and re¬
define her identity as an active choice, which amounts to no more than a restatement of
the essential vitality of existential conservatism that Vikram Seth endorses in his novel
(according to which selves flourish best in the worlds pre-designated for them, and only
failures such as Rasheed could long for something different).
The Feminine as Scapegoat: Aurora, Saeeda and Sufiya Zinobia.
In The Moor's Last Sigh, despite his narrative demonstration that nations, selves, and
families mutually destroy each other because human becomings on various levels
combine to create an unsustainably contradictory and irresistibly violent existential
environment, Moor still succumbs to the temptation of positing a prime cause (or a
primal force) behind his vision of universal catastrophe. Predictably enough, though he
is an unorthodox nationalist in almost every other aspect of his narrative, for this
purpose he chooses Aurora. "Motherness", Moor "underlines the point— is a big
idea in India, maybe our biggest: the land as mother, the mother as land, as the firm
ground beneath our feet" (1995, 137). But if it is "Mother India, with her garishness
and her inexhaustible motion, [...] who loved and betrayed and ate and destroyed and
again loved her children, and with whom the children's passionate conjoining and
eternal quarrel stretched long beyond the grave" (60-61), his mother Aurora, through
an unjustified merging of tropes, comes to represent the nation's history in all these
aspects. She becomes the "too bright" star who blinds if looked at directly, and "her
bending of other people's light, her gravitational pull which denied all hope of escape,
the decayed orbits of those too weak to withstand her, who fell towards her sun and its
consuming fires" (136), is what leads to conflicts between her children and her various
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(suspected but never proven) lovers, that culminate in the destruction of the entire city.
Together Aurora and his lover Uma become (for Moor) the twin embodiments of the
nation's "polymorphous power of the perverse" (124). Of course, there is much more
to Rushdie's characterising of Aurora than such scapegoating alone, but it is one of the
novel's most prominent analogies. And besides, it is revealing in itself— of the
contradictions within masculine nationalism— that while he is compelled to
acknowledge Aurora's irrepressible capacity for autonomous self-definition, creativity
and action, Moor considers those same qualities responsible for devastation on so
many levels, from the familial to the national, as if homes, families and entire cities
inevitably collapse violently whenever wives and mothers fail to be reliable, predictable
and passive.
Another instance of such scapegoating occurs with Saeeda Bai, the courtesan in A
Suitable Boy, who is presented as the living archive of much illicit knowledge about
fathers and sons of the 'best' families in Brahmpur, because her home has been the
locus of all the illegitimate masculine desire and activity outside the limits of what
domesticity can ever validate or contain. Saeeda's silence thus constitutes as important
a basis (and a shield) upon which familial respectability is premised as do the wives and
mothers of Seth's narrative. Yet despite her best efforts to contain such dangerous
knowledge and protect her daughter from its implications, even though it means lying
about her father's identity, Saeeda's world collapses not from any indiscretion on her
part, but because the family men involved unwittingly unlock secrets she has kept
sealed for decades, thus exposing the 'shame' of each other. But even after the families
have come together to erase any stain upon their official worldly honour, Saeeda by
collective agreement is cast out forever. She is forced to become a repository of
responsibility that no one else will claim while a mutually co-operative and beneficial
cleansing of various family names is enacted; a fetish upon which to project everyone's
shared guilt and shame which can then be buried so that affirmative renewals of
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domesticity can proceed under conditions of recovered innocence. Saeeda thus
becomes another marginalised absence forming the unspoken basis of Seth's cheerful
conception of a conservative social wholeness that always takes for granted the
infinitely enduring preservative powers of its women, and depends entirely on the
assumption that women within or outside the family will expand or contract themselves
with absolute, unquestioning elasticity to suit the roles they are expected to perform,
without collapse or resistance.
In Shame, Bilquis' father Mahmud, himself nicknamed 'the Woman' for his
implacable religious tolerance, a designation the import of which is to be interpreted as
"Mahmoud the Weakling, the Shameful, the Fool" (1984, 62) says of the word
'woman': "what a term! Is there no end to the burdens this word is capable of bearing?
Was there ever such a broad-backed and also such a dirty word" (62)? Through his
portrayal of Sufiya Zinobia, Rushdie performs the possibility of fetishising and
scapegoating the feminine on a national scale, where she enacts (or has enacted through
her) the perversion of nationalist discourses and ideals into their absolute opposites.
In an article that develops Gayatri Spivak's well known exposition of the
historiographic crises that accompany any attempted 'recovery' of subaltern voices or
agencies, Lata Mani re-examines the colonial-era accounts of satis in India, written from
the perspectives of British administrators and Indians (both conservatives as well as
would-be social reformers). She finds that the interpretative horizon all such discourses
have in common is that "tradition [...] is posited as a timeless and structuring principle
of Indian society enacted in the everyday lives of indigenous people. 'Tradition',
interchangeable for the most part with 'religion' and 'culture', is designated as a
sphere distinct from material life" (Sangari & Vaid, 1993, 116). Mani goes on to
evaluate the implications of such a casting:
Firstly, it produces analyses of sati in purely 'cultural' terms that empty it of
both history and politics. Secondly, this notion of culture effectively erases the
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agency of those involved in such practices. (...] [The widow] is consistently
portrayed as either a heroine [...] or an abject victim [...]. These poles,
'heroine' and 'victim', preclude the possibility of a complex female
subjectivity. [...] This representation of the widow makes her particularly
susceptible to discourses of salvation, whether these are articulated by officials
or the indigenous elite. [...] We can concede then, that women are not subjects
in this discourse. Not only is precious little heard from them, but [...] they are
denied any agency. This does not however imply that women are the objects of
this discourse; that this discourse is about them. On the contrary, I would argue
that women are neither subjects nor objects, but rather the ground of the
discourse on sati. For [...] analysis of the arguments of participants veiy
quickly indicates that women themselves are marginal to the debate. Instead, the
question of women's status in Indian society posed by the prevalence of widow
burning becomes the occasion for struggle over the divergent priorities of
officials and the indigenous male elite (117 118).5
To relocate to Rushdie's portrait of post-independence Pakistan, the narrative of Sufiya
Zinobia allows him to investigate the implications of such repressive silencing (exerted
to the point that she barely speaks throughout the novel). While recognising the
exclusions that Aijaz Ahmad criticises the novel for, we present Rushdie as performing
aspects of Gayatri Spivak's formulations of the problems involved in retracing and
representing subaltern "effacement", thus opening up an alternative interpretative
perspective within which to frame the narrative's imaginative limits. By denying us
access to the "testimony of [Sufiya's or 'the people's'] voice consciousness "
(Williams and Chrisman, 1993, 93), perhaps Rushdie is acknowledging through his
narrating itself that within the conditions of certain histories "there [remains] no
itinerary we can trace" of the subaltern subject (98). Borrowing and adapting from
Pierre Macherey, Spivak challengingly redefines the limits of historiographic
intervention ('on behalf of the subaltern hitherto effaced from history):
What is important in a work is what it does not say. [...] A method might be
built on it [...J. What the work cannot say is important, because there the
elaboration of the utterance is carried out, in a sort of journey to silence. [... ]
This can be a description of 'investigating, identifying, and measuring... the
deviation from an ideal that is irreducibly differential'.
5
The same line of argument leads Spivak to her well-known formulation: "white men are saving
brown women from brown men" (Mongia, 1993, 93). For further discussion of the politics of such
representations of sati and female immolation, see both Spivak's 'Can the Subaltern Speak'?
(Mongia, 1993, 66-111) and Rajeshwari Sundar Rajan's article on 'Represnting Sati...' (Castle, 2001,
167-189).
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When we come to the concomitant question of the consciousness of the
subaltern, the notion of what the work cannot say becomes important. [...] The
sender [...] is marked only as a pointer to an irretrievable consciousness. The
historian, transforming 'insurgency' into 'text for knowledge', is only one
'receiver' of any collectively intended social act. With no possibility of
nostalgia for that lost origin, the historian must suspend (as far as possible) the
clamour of his or her own consciousness (or consciousness-effect, as operated
by disciplinary training [...]. The postcolonial intellectuals learn that their
privilege is their loss. [...] Subaltern historiography must confront the
impossibility of such gestures (81-82).
Also, if, as Mani argues, "at a symbolic level, the fate of women and the fate of the
emerging nation become inextricably intertwined" (Sangari and Vaid, 1993, 118), and
yet "women in fact" are reduced to being merely "the site on which tradition was
debated and reformulated" (118), Sufiya's silence (and her eventual course of
expression) allows Rushdie to examine the complex of relationships between the claims
of nationalist mythology and the actual unfolding of social history. For much of the
novel, Sufiya is presented as little else besides the symbolic embodiment of 'pure
shame'. Then the narrative develops to portray her as the eventual perversion of such a
principle, the misbegotten consequence of an ideal of (religious, social, familial, and
feminine) purity inhabiting an entirely 'impure' environment. The narrator informs us
that he conceived of her as "pure" because he "couldn't think of another way of
creating purity in what is supposed to be the Land of the Pure" (120). Even though he
confesses that embodying shame by using an "idiot" to stand for "innocence"
"might seem too romantic a use to make of mental disability" (121),6 Sufiya is
Rushdie's image of the destruction (or the exposure) by history and social actuality of
all abstractions imposed upon them, as well as the counter-violence that follows in
return: she stands for all the abused nationalist, religious and moral principles upon
which the nation was supposed to be based, and which were supposed to direct its
becomings.
6
It is nevertheless a tradition that includes at least novels such as Conrad's The Secret Agent and
Dostoevsky's The Idiot, though in both these cases the characters in question are male.
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Her first blushes occur as a newborn long before she could have consciously known
the sensation of shame, when her parents refuse to see the daughter before them
blinded by their desperation for a son. From this earliest blush at her essence being
thrown in doubt arises a stream of future occasions as she grows up "parched for lack
of affection" (121)— "her parents' burden, her mother's shame"— until she cannot
help "blushing uncontrollably whenever her presence in the world [is] noticed by
others" (122). But the narrator would have us believe that Sufiya blushes also "for the
world" (122), that she is the helpless barometer of all her society's "unfelt shame", a
"janitor of the unseen": accumulating within herself the shamelessness of the "lies,
loose living, disrespect to one's elders, failure to love one's national flag, incorrect
voting at elections, over-eating, extramarital sex, autobiographical novels, cheating at
cards, maltreatment of women folk, examination failures [and] smuggling" rampant in
Pakistan (122). Yet if Sufiya is intended to be the "broad-backed", infinitely elastic
embodiment of womanhood (and the upholder of the essential(ist) nationalist principles
associated with such a conception), her mental age and her "innocence" ensure that
she has not the barest defences of selfhood to keep the world from invading her
unchecked. Thus, for her there is no insulation from the actual "shamelessness" of
histoiy, not even at home, where her father is the country's dictator, responsible for so
many distortions of the nation's founding principles.
As powerless about her shame and its effects upon her as she is about its causes,
Sufiya murders four adolescent boys, and her nation-wide rampage begins. For the
only time in the narrative the ordinary people of the country are invoked and shown to
be united, not by any moral or nationalist principles, but by terror-struck rumours of
Sufiya. Yet she gradually evolves to become the people's "champion" through the
very act of slaying them brutally: "a rumour, a chimera, the collective fantasy of a
stifled people, a dream born of their rage" (263), until she brings about her father's
downfall and herself explodes in the killing of her husband. Sufiya is Rushdie's
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enactment of femininity transformed from nationalist principle to what Anne
McClintock would deem the nation's "fetish spectacle", the brutalised "champion" of
a brutalised people. McClintock goes on to posit:
Nationalism inhabits the realm of fetishism. Despite the commitment of
European nationalism to the idea of the nation-state as the embodiment of
national progress, nationalism has been experienced and transmitted primarily
through fetishism— precisely the cultural form that the Enlightenment
denigrated as the antithesis of reason. More often that not, nationalism takes
place through the visible, ritual organisation of fetish objects [...] as well as
through the organisation of collective fetish spectacle. [...] Far from being
purely phallic icons, fetishes embody crises in social value, which are projected
onto, and embodied in, what can be called impassioned objects. Considerable
work remains to be done on the ways in which women consume, refuse, or
negotiate the male fetish rituals of national spectacle (McClintock, Mufti and
Shohat, 1998, 102).
As with another fetish we have examined (the feminine domain of inviolable
domesticity in Nishapur that is performed to a logical extreme in Rushdie's portrayal
of the three sisters), Sufiya's only entry into history is to murder. The pessimism of
such a conclusion— the implied "crises in social value"— is impossible to ignore.
Rushdie suggests that even if an excluded subjectivity were to be hypothetically
resurrected and then allowed unchecked expression (including the opportunity for
'insurgency'), it would emerge so damaged from a lifetime of repression that it could
only express itself (i.e. "consume, refuse, or negotiate the male fetish rituals of national
spectacle") through violence against others equally (or more) vulnerable. Furthermore,
if, as Ahmad does, we interpret the conditions endured by the novel's women as the
metonymic representation of the repression suffered by the nation's people, their
options of resistance in such a context are shown to be limited to the extremes of
violated victimhood followed by retaliation through impassioned fits of murderous
psychopathology.
Alternative 'National Families' in A Fine Balance.
Of course, not all African or Indian novels conclude so darkly about the possibilities of
feminine resistance and agency, even if they explore in equally comprehensive detail the
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conjunction of gender-based repression and the violence unleashed in the course of
national history. In a different context, the next section investigates Rohinton Mistry's
A Fine Balance as a study of selves abandoned (and continually violated) by the politics
and 'progress' of the Indian nation-state, and the possibilities of survival and solidarity
that emerge in consequence. At the heart of his narrative lies the almost Utopian
community of Indians entirely different in background from each other, who manage to
come together for a year from combining their resistances to their conditions, survive
despite their own doubts and against immense external odds, before being forced apart
again by further violation. Yet the locus for this brief period is the flat of Dina Vakil,
and her own prior decision to survive independently is what makes it possible. Dina
takes on the challenge, after being widowed, of continuing not only as a lone woman in
Bombay, but as a member of a small minority community for whom even a journey to
the city's northern neighbourhoods is an unprecedented expedition. Mistry traces her
hesitations about being alone as honestly as he describes her determination, and
narrates all her initial doubts and prejudices about allowing Om and Ishvar into her flat
as workers. Also, at the start she is shown to have no conception either of the lives they
have known in their village (which included the burning alive of their entire family) or
the ones they inhabit presently in the slums and streets of the city, and it is not until the
middle of the novel that they trust her enough to tell her. But by then, she has allowed
them to move in on a semi-permanent basis onto her verandah because they have
nowhere but pavements to sleep on, and they cook and eat together. The middle-class
Dina even attends the funeral of a friend of theirs, a limbless beggar whose funeral
procession comprises one long march of the city's beggars. Even the rent-collector
Ibrahim, the instrument through which her landlord threatens Dina with eviction,
becomes in time a fatherly figure to her, as she sees his helpless implication within the
nexus of mutual oppression that is often the only strategy left for survival among the
city's subaltern classes. Dina, after suffering her brother's abuse and the absurdity of
her husband's accident, decides to inhabit her existence along with all its adverse
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circumstances, and confronts the imperative of self-reinvention without recourse to the
pre-fashioned identities of remarriage or servile sisterhood that her brother offers. Yet
in reinventing herself she also invents the basis for a unique form of 'imagined
community' in her flat, opening herself and her home to Indians hitherto entirely
unknown to her. Thus Mistry performs the possibility of a solidarity of diverse
'subalterns', and a 'national family' premised neither upon the norms of patriarchal
domesticity nor facilitated by the history of the nation-state, even though it has to
improvise continually against the pressures of both.
Minoo Moallem and Iain Boal theorise an analogous form of "oppositional
agency" that is able to "recognise the full range of lived experience as the ground of
practical struggle and solidarity":
Oppositional agency is not only intimately connected to a strategic politics that
simultaneously resists the assimilationist and homogenising technologies of
majority groups, but also struggles for more representative social institutions
within and beyond the community. [It| could at least open up spaces in which
identities, formed in the welter of political struggles, remain supple in
repertoires, not frozen or cast in official moulds (Kaplan, Alarcon and Moallem,
1999, 259).
The conclusion of Mistry's novel finds Dina as the unpaid, unofficial maid in her
brother's house, the fate she has resisted all her life. But such an 'end' does not by
any means degrade her journey (unlike the ending to Fire on the Mountain that
demeans Nanda Kaul in her own voice): Dina, and the 'family' she helped to fashion,
still have recourse to a back door, through which every afternoon she serves Ishvar and
Om lunch on her brother's nicest plates, and they share banter and humour, far more
irrepressible than the odds allow, and closer than ever.
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An Alternative 'Women's Time' Within National History: McClintock and
Bhabha.
Within the identity-reclaiming, wholeness-restoring violent resistance that he considers
an inevitable stage in the decolonising process (on a psychic level as much as the
political; both individually and as a 'national' collective) (1985, 73-74), Fanon also
envisions a significant role for the women of the colonised population.7 Yet it is here
that Anne McClintock objects at various points to the assumptions and prescriptions
underlying his characterisation of women's roles and their agency:
Theirs is a designated agency— an agency by invitation only. Before the
national uprising, women's agency was null, void, inert as the veil. Here Fanon
not only colludes with the stereotype of women as bereft of historical
motivation but also resorts, uncharacteristically, to a reproductive image of
natural birthing: "it is an authentic birth in a pure state". [...] Female militancy,
in short, is simply a passive offspring of male agency and the structural
necessity of the war (McClintock, Mufti and Shohat, 1998, 98).
Such a conception continues to have implications in the aftermath of achieving
independence (vis-a-vis the extent of attainment of women's, and thereby, actual
widespread social liberation):
Women's liberation is credited entirely to national liberation, and it is only with
nationalism that women 'enter into history'. Prior to nationalism, women have
no history, no resistance, no independent agency. And since the national
revolution automatically revolutionises the family, gender conflict naturally
vanishes after the revolution.8 Feminist agency, then, is contained by and
subordinated to national agency, and the heterosexual family is preserved as the
'truth' of society— its organic authentic form. [...]
In the post-revolutionary period, moreover, the tenacity of the father's
"unchallengeable and massive authority" is not raised as one of the 'pitfalls'
of national consciousness. [...] Deeply reluctant as he is to see women's
agency apart from national agency, Fanon does not foresee the degree to which
the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) will seek to co-opt and control
women, subordinating them unequivocally once the revolution is won (99).
7
For a fuller discussion see Fanon's essay 'Algeria Unveiled' (1967, 35-67).
s
Once again, for a thorough exposition of the long-term post-independence implications of
characterising popular anti-colonial resistance as having been 'natural', 'automatic', and
'spontaneously revolutionary', see Neil Lazarus' critique of Fanon's 'messianism' in his book on
Armah (1990), especially Chapter 2.
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Yet McClintock also sees how the problems involved in such conceptualising are by no
means particular to the instances of Algeria or Fanon:
All too frequently, male nationalists have condemned feminism as divisive,
bidding women to hold their tongues until after the revolution. [...] [But this]
serves merely as a strategic tactic to defer women's demands. Not only does it
conceal the fact that nationalisms are from the outset constituted in gender
power, but as the lessons of international history portend, women who are not
empowered to organise during the struggle will not be empowered to organise
after the struggle. If nationalism is not transformed by an analysis of gender
power, the nation-state will remain a repository of male hopes, male aspirations,
and male privilege (109).
Against the terms of such discourse, McClintock envisions an alternative "feminist
investigation of national difference" that is comparable to Sangari and Vaid's
conceptualisation of their project of 'feminist historiography':
[It] might, by contrast, take into account the dynamic social and historical
contexts of national struggles; their strategic mobilising of popular forces; their
myriad, varied trajectories; and their relation to other social institutions. We
might do well to develop a more theoretically complex and strategically subtle
genealogy of nationalisms (99).
Thinking along similar lines, Homi Bhabha refracts a discussion of Fanon's capacity to
evoke the 'performative' national "zone of occult instability where the people dwell"
in his writing through a reading of Julia Kristeva's conception of 'women's time',
which to Bhabha constitutes a "powerful critique and redefinition of the nation as a
space for the emergence of feminist political and psychic identifications" (1997, 153).9
Thus, if "the political effects of Kristeva's multiple women's time leads to what she
calls the "demassification of difference" (153), while "Fanon's 'occult instability'
signifies the people in a fluctuating movement which they are just giving shape to"
(153), then Bhabha envisions the consequences of these conceptions being performed
together:
[They would | seek to redefine the symbolic processes through which the social
imaginary— nation, culture or community— becomes the subject of discourse,
and the object of psychic identification. These feminist and postcolonial
temporalities force us to rethink the sign of history within those languages,
political or literary, which designate the people 'as one'. They challenge us to
9
For her own exposition, see Kristeva (1986, 187-213).
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think the question of community and communication without the moment of
transcendence: how do we understand such forms of social contradiction (153)?
And finally, such "a metonymic interruption in the representation of the people" (155)
as Kristeva's conception of 'women's time' inserts also constitutes a further challenge
to any potentially coercive Andersonian image of nations as 'sociological solidities'
inhabiting 'homogeneous, empty' time:
The 'singularity' of woman— her representation as fragmentation and drive—
produces a dissidence, and a distanciation, within the symbolic bond itself
which demystifies the 'community of language as a universal and unifying tool,
one which totalises and equalises'. The minority does not simply confront the
pedagogical, or powerful master-discourse with a contradictory or negating
referent. [...] Insinuating itself into the terms of reference of the dominant
discourse, the supplementary antagonises the implicit power to generalise, to
produce the sociological solidity. The questioning of the supplement is not a
repetitive rhetoric of the 'end of society' but a meditation on the disposition of
space and time from which the narrative of the nation must begin. [...] Its force
lies [...] in the renegotiation of those times, terms, and traditions through which
we turn our uncertain, passing contemporaneity into the signs of history (155).
Such experiments in "renegotiation", in which singular and irreducible conceptions of
'women's time' are narratively performed whilst simultaneously immersed within and
counterpointed to the ongoing histories of state and society, are what the novels and
characters discussed in the next section of this chapter attempt.
Burger's Daughter: 'Non-Synchronous', 'Non-Punctual' Self-Location in
History.
Gordimer's epigraph to Burger's Daughter immediately foregrounds that this will be a
narrative charting as yet unresolved becomings rather than affirming or reiterating a
pre-defined identity: "I am the place in which something has happened". The ' I-site'
is Rosa's, and it is far from being an uncomplicated, predictable Fanonian continuation
of the revolutionary trajectory that her father's friends would have expected, that would
end with her being in prison 'naturally' because she is Lionel Burger's daughter, part
of a family known to be "totally united and dedicated to the struggle" (1980, 12).
Gordimer reverses the polarities explored thus far in this chapter: it is no longer the
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domain of the home where inherited patriarchal discourses are challenged and
subverted. Throughout her childhood, Rosa has breathed in the activity, history,
mythology and rhetoric of the struggle against apartheid as part of the everyday life of
her home, but now she finds that she cannot step into 'her' role within the resistance
community as readily as her father's comrades expect her to, because she has also
always struggled against precisely that legacy and its limits:
When I was passive, in that cottage, [...] I was struggling with a monstrous
resentment against the claim— not of the Communist Party!— of blood, shared
genes, the semen from which I had issued and the body in which I had grown.
[...] My mother is dead and there is only me, there, for him. Only me. My
studies, my work, my love affairs, must fit in with the twice-monthly visits to the
prison, for life, as long as he lives [...]. My professors, my employers, my men
must accept this overruling. I have no passport because I am my father's
daughter. People who associate with me must prepare to be suspect because
I'm my father's daughter (62-63).
This constitutes Rosa's articulation of her refusal to accept unquestioningly the
'pedagogic', all-subsuming imposition of her role within someone else's schema of
convictions as the limits defining her own life-choices, even if Lionel is her own father,
even if she agrees with and admires him, and even if it implies for her the opportunity to
participate in revolution against her society's history. Even if it appears the precise
opposite of being restricted to the domain of the domestic, Rosa sees that she will
continue always to be interpreted merely as 'Burger's daughter'. Lionel, in his time,
found Marxism to be the ultimate interpretative and synthesising horizon within which
to analyse apartheid: "this contradiction that split the very foundations of my life, that
was making it impossible for me to see myself as a man among men, with all that
implies of consciousness and responsibility— in Marxism I found it was analysed in
another way: as forces in conflict through economic laws" (25).10 Marxism, in
Lionel's vision, allows him to engage beyond the limits of a superficial liberalism: he
would have been the first to agree that there was nothing special to commemorate about
his dying in prison, when thousands of blacks, revolutionary or otherwise, suffered the
10
For a fuller exposition of Lionel's Marxist convictions see Gordimer (1980, 25-26).
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same fate anonymously. And yet Rosa continually emphasises that it was neither
schooled ideology nor dogmatism that led Lionel down the path of such solidarity and
resistance in the first place:
Lionel— my mother and father— people in that house, had a connection with
blacks that was completely personal. In this way, their communism was the
antithesis of anti-individualism. Their connection was something no other
whites ever had in quite the same way. A connection without reservations on the
part of blacks or whites. The political activities and attitudes of that house came
from the inside outwards [...]. At last there was nothing between this skin and
that. At last nothing between the white man's word and his deed; spluttering the
same water together in the swimming pool, going to prison after the same
indictment: it was a human conspiracy, above all other kinds (172).
Yet if "[her parents] had the connection because they believed it possible" (172), for
Rosa, (even though she was part of that household throughout her childhood), it proves
not to have been learned and inherited unproblematically. She realises that though she
has known and mingled all her life with blacks in a variety of roles, she also remains
irreducibly distant from their experiences in ways that merely espousing Lionel's
beliefs will not alter. Rosa has lost the "connection", without ever ceasing to believe in
the correctness of the convictions. She actually feels liberated on hearing of her father's
death in custody:
Now you are free. The knowledge that my father was not there ever, any more,
[...] suddenly it was something else. Now you are free.
I was afraid of it: a kind of discovery that makes one go dead-cold and wary.
What does one do with such knowledge (62)?
Her own enunciation of her self within her world is catalysed by the need to 'perform'
autonomously either the recovery of such a 'connection' or the discovery of her own
motivations. Besides, there is her resentment of the expectations that the white anti-
apartheid movement and her own family impose upon her, and her reaction to the
arrogance of a lover who dismisses her position as impossibly inauthentic. And it is
because of this autonomously-premised self-performance that is neither "punctual"
nor "synchronous" with any larger movements outside herself, that her situation as an
under-trial in a South African prison at the end of the novel, despite its superficial
resemblance to her father's fate, does not constitute evidence of her eventually playing
195
out her part within a (Fanonian) conception of a "pedagogic", continuous, naturalised,
and homogeneous solidarity with the revolutionary movement. Rosa's trajectory
remains singular; for most of the narrative she is "uncounselled and unable to counsel
others", and the novel exists therefore in the "contentious, performative space of the
perplexity of the living" (1997, 162) that Bhabha formulates as an alternative to
Andersonian "sociological solidity".
Gordimer painstakingly establishes Rosa's efforts at self-relocation via three major
landmarks in the narrative— that cumulatively force her to question the limits of
individual action when confronted with the universal certainty of mortality, as well as
more specific appraisals of the socio-political implications of inhabiting her particular
circumstances as a white woman in South Africa. The first such moment is the death of
a man that goes almost unnoticed in a city park. This death to Rosa is the "mystery
itself" (79), beyond accident or cause, historical progress or revolutionary
emancipation. "Circumstantial causes are not the cause: we die because we live" (79).
In a manner reminiscent of the absurdist futility evoked by Beckett's plays and
Meursault in Camus' The Outsider, Rosa wonders if anything can actually be changed
when such inevitability will remain unaffected:
The revolution we lived for in that house would change the lives of the blacks
who left their hovels and compounds at four in the morning to swing picks,
hold down jack-hammers and chant under the weight of girders [...]. It would
change the days of the labourers who slept off their exhaustion on the grass like
dead men, while the man died. [...J Black children— it was promised— would
not have to live off the leavings we threw into the bin. [...] But the change from
life to death— what had all the certainties I had from my father to do with that?
[...] I was left with that. It had been left out. Justice, equality, the brotherhood
of man, human dignity— but it will still be there (79-80).
Her second 'epiphany' is more socially and historically specific, even though it is just
as despairing. After seeing a black man thrash his weary donkey, she feels unable to
stop him or to complain about him because of the selective blindness that she would
require to overlook his context in such a situation:
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I could formulate everything they were, as the act I had witnessed; they would
have their lives summed up for them officially at last by me, the white woman—
the final meaning of a day they had lived I had no knowledge of, a day of other
appalling things, violence, disasters, urgencies, deprivations which suddenly
would become, was nothing but what it had led up to: the man among them
beating their donkey (209).
This second confrontation with the limits of her situation (that any conception of
'agency' or 'autonomy' would have to negotiate) is no less absolute than the first, and
is moreover firmly located within the specific history of her society. It leads Rosa to
realise that she does not know "at what point to intercede makes sense" any more: " I
drove on because the horrible drunk was black, poor and brutalised. If somebody's
going to be brought to account, I am accountable for him, to him, as he is for the
donkey" (209-210). After feeling so completely implicated, she concludes that for the
present she does not know "how to live in Lionel's country" (210).
But the love and tranquillity she discovers in Europe is destroyed in the space of one
intemperate phone-call with her childhood playmate Baasie. More than resenting him
for his hostile insistence on how inalienably distant their lives are (because of the fact
of colour that could never be inter-personally overcome within the context of the society
they come from), Rosa despises herself for the hurt that overcomes her on a personal
level, because she also recognises that such hurt feelings have no basis and no future:
Repelled by him. Hating him so much! Wanting to be loved\— how I
disfigured myself. [...] To taunt him by reminding him that he is thousands of
miles away from the bush where I thought he might have died fighting; I! To
couple his kind of defection with mine, when back home he's a kaffir carrying a
pass and even I could live the life of a white lady (329-330).
Rosa realises that the implications of her once-friend's colour, his orphanhood and his
exile, the limits of his choices and the imperatives of his obligations can never be
equated with hers within the immense imbalances of the world they inhabit, and by
feeling rejected, she only confirms the roles that such a history has already pre-
fashioned for them— "him bitter; me guilty" (330).
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Lionel's "heroism" came from the certainty in the work that needed to be done for the
"Future". Rosa feels that she can never be a 'hero' in the same way, but what she
comes to locate is a role within her society, that confronts the implications of being
immersed in, and constructed by, its contradictions, which she can neither transcend nor
evade by defecting:
Nothing can be avoided... No one can defect.
I don't know the ideology:
It's about suffering.
How to end suffering.
And it ends in suffering (332).
Yet such an absurdist affirmation is followed neither by a Beckettian all-dissolving
despair nor any nihilistic action such as Meursault's killing in The Outsider. For Rosa
to return to South Africa and take up work in an hospital is the only way to inhabit
these contradictions, of the limits of mortality as much as the specific contradictions
within her circumstances that in such a world will forever define and simultaneously
undermine her 'agency'.
Resistance, Class, and the Re-Articulation of Community: Achebe,
Emecheta, Head.
In Anthills of the Savannah, the President's secretary Beatrice comes to realise that
those oblique inter-personal symbolic gestures that she has hitherto thought of as "acts
of rebellion"— "first to spurn a seat of honour and then to greet a mere driver first"
(Achebe, 1988, 72), amount to no more than "puny, empty revolts, the rebellion of a
mouse in a cage" (72) when considered against the context of the entrenched structural
imbalances and abuses of power within the regime of which she remains a functioning
agent, and the extent of political abandonment and material degradation suffered by the
majority of the country's people. After an incident at a dinner-party thrown in honour
of the President's European and American friends, she moves from feeling insulted on
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a personal level to seeing herself as a symbol of her " long-suffering people " (81):
"and them in the context was me. [...] Corny? So be it!" (79-80).
After realising the contradictions between her position within such an apparatus and her
presumptuous, self-important mode of discontentment, for a while she adopts an
attitude in which she excuses her own 'complicity' with the status quo by accepting her
relegation to being a passive consumer of her society's history, whose only priority is
to survive it: she argues that she couldn't "be blamed for the state of the world. [...]
Scepticism is a girl's number six [...]. You can't blame her; she didn't make her world
so tough" (88). But such a state of mind does not last long, and besides she is
compelled to reorder both her views as well as her entire life when the very structures
within which she has housed herself are uprooted by the violence of the coup and the
counter-violence that follows. Beatrice is affected so directly "that for weeks she
sprawled in total devastation" (218). But where "in earlier times" she would have
responded "by retreating completely into herself, [...] distrustful of the solace of [her]
fellows" (218), now, like Dina Vakil in A Fine Balance, she finds that "the bloody
events of November had thrown her into a defensive pact with a small band of near-
strangers that was to prove stronger than kindred or mere friendship" (218). And she
responds similarly, by creating a new domain that is not domestic in any predefined
sense and cuts across class, ethnicity, and gender, and has been fashioned out of a
solidarity born of surviving the severe upheavals of her society's history: "in the weeks
and months that followed, her flat became virtually the home of Emmanuel and
Braimoh and the girl Adammah" (219). Further, Beatrice finds herself capable of
returning "less and less timidly to relive aspects of the nightmare" and even of
reassessing "her reflexes, feelings and thoughts" (218). Like Rosa Burger, she moves
from a personal grief for the losses of Ikem and Chris to wondering analytically if such
a fate was not historically predetermined, as part of the consequences of the distances
and imbalances within the class and power-structures of their society:
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The image of Chris as just another stranger who chanced upon death on the
Great North Road or Ikem as an early victim of a waxing police state was no
longer satisfactory. Were they not in fact trailed travellers whose journeys from
start to finish had been carefully programmed in advance by an alienated
history? If so, how many more doomed voyagers were already in transit or just
setting out, faces fresh with illusions of duty-free travel and happy landings
ahead of them (220)?
And even though she mourns the irrecoverable loss of them as friends and invaluably
gifted individuals, and despite the continuing violence that never looks like it will be
succeeded by any re-ordering of either society or government, Beatrice recognises that
this remains a historical opportunity to reconstruct the nation on the basis of
reconceived premises: their deaths, and the death of their once-comrade the dictator,
could be turned into a lasting affirmation that "this world belongs to the people of the
world, not to any little caucus, no matter how talented" (232).
Around the middle of the novel, Beatrice also forces her self-righteous, elitist friend
Ikem to admit that his apparently radical rethinking of the 'women's question' within
the movement towards national liberation is in fact "unclear and reactionary" (96):
The way I see it is that giving women today the same role which traditional
society gave them of intervening only when everything else has failed in not
enough, [...] like the women in the Sembene film who pick up the spears
abandoned by their defeated menfolk. It is not enough that woman should be
the court of last resort because the last resort is a damn sight too far and too
late (92)!
Further, she compels Ikem to concede that is not for him or other male nationalists
belonging to the country's elite classes, no matter how principled or visionary, to decide
"what the new role for Woman will be" (98):
Thank you, BB. I owe that insight to you. [...] I don't know. I should never
have presumed to know. You have to tell us. We never asked you before (98).
But it would merely be the substitution of one mode of hegemonic presumption by
another if such novels were not to recognise the distinct voices and histories implied by
the differences of class, religion, socio-economic circumstances and ethnicity between
women, and instead forwarded any single perspective such as Beatrice's as being
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legitimately representative of all the women in her society. In Buchi Emecheta's
Destination Biafra Debbie Ogedembge, who has been raised within the same powerful
nation-building class as Beatrice is forced by the Biafran war to undergo comparable
upheavals— an enforced self-'unclassing' because of which she has to attempt to
overcome the boundaries of "her education, the imported division of class, [that] still
stood in the way" (1994, 201). She has to flee into the bush along with several village
women and their children, thereby meeting and working with people she has never
encountered before in the most trying of situations:
Again Debbie marvelled at the resources of women. She had seen Uzoma
Madako with her husband in Benin, seen the way she sat, her head resting
passively [... ]. And now look at the same woman, a few days after the death of
her husband, she had the courage to slap another woman, to tell another woman
to stop indulging in self-pity (203).
But these women are neither passively silent, nor are their opinions restricted to their
roles as wives and mothers. If Nigerian history has exposed through its upheavals the
superficiality of any distinction between an ahistorical, timeless domesticity governed
by imperturbable 'domestic goddesses' and the dynamic, 'masculine' domain of
national life, then the re-negotiations of these women's roles must inevitably include
engagement with all the different aspects of their situation:
Because the men also gave us their name, [...] and in the process of letting your
husband provide for you, you have become dumb and passive. Go back to
being yourself now. If you are too lazy to farm, you may have to sell your
body. But what is so new about that? Your children have to live (204).
When one of them wonders if death is preferable to continuing amid such conditions,
the response by another woman is sharp and immediate:
Have you been dead before? How do you know all these people dying before
their time are happy where they are? Our men! A few years ago it was
'Independence, freedom for you, freedom for me'. We were always in the
background. Now that freedom has turned into freedom to kill each other, and
our men have left us to bury them and bring up their children; and maybe by the
time these ones grow up there will be another reason for them to start killing
one another (204).
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Again, in a manner similar to Rosa Burger, though spoken from a perspective situated
entirely differently to hers, there is recognition both of the hollowness of (masculine)
nationalist discourse, as well as the possibility that the very children they are raising
might grow up to perpetuate the violence they are fleeing. But neither passive surrender
nor nihilism is an option.
Bessie Head's Maru\ 'Can the Subaltern Speak'?
Yet narrating evidence of such subaltern voices and their agency amid history is rarely
treated by African and Indian novelists as unproblematically representable. In a manner
comparable to Rushdie's portrayal of Sufiya Zinobia and to Coetzee's narrative of
Michael K as discussed in the next section (though with clear differences in her
narrative trajectory and its outcome), Bessie Head performs the difficulties and the
limits— of either achieving any undisrupted retrieval of 'subaltern' voices or of
interpreting 'subaltern' historical agency— that Spivak delineates as recognitions that
should be integral to any attempts at subaltern historicising:
For the true subaltern group, whose identity is its difference, there is no
unrepresentable subaltern subject that can know and speak itself; the
intellectual's solution is not to abstain from representation. The problem is that
the subject's itinerary has not been traced so as to offer an object of seduction
to the representing intellectual. [...] The question becomes, How can we touch
the consciousness of the people, even as we investigate their politics? With what
voice-consciousness can the subaltern speak? [...] To make visible the unseen
can also mean a change of level, addressing oneself to a layer of material which
had hitherto had no pertinence for history and which had not been recognised
as having any moral, aesthetic, or historical value. It is the slippage from
rendering visible the mechanism to rendering vocal the individual [...] that is
consistently troublesome (Williams & Chrisman, 1993, 80-81).
In Head's novel Maru, Margaret's status is repeatedly and explicitly underlined, even
as an adult teacher in a classroom full of children:
Children learnt it from their parents. Their parents spat on the ground as a
member of a filthy, low nation passed by. Children went a little further. They
spat on you. They pinched you. They danced a wild jiggle, with the tin cans
rattling: 'Bushman! Low Breed! Bastard (1987, 10)! [...] Ask the scientists.
Haven't they yet written a treatise on how Bushmen are an oddity of the human
race, who are half the head of a man and half the body of a donkey? [...] Or
else how can a tribe of people be called Bushmen or Masarwa? Masarwa is the
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equivalent of 'nigger', a term of contempt which means, obliquely, a low, filthy
nation (11-12).
Head also narrates the implications that inhabiting such a social position has for
Margaret as a little girl, when she is both an orphan and a Masarwa:
There seemed to be a big hole in the child's mind between the time that she
slowly became conscious of her life in the home of the missionaries and
conscious of herself as a person. A big hole was there because, unlike other
children, she was never able to say: 'I am this or that. My parents are this or
that'. There was no one in later life who did not hesitate to tell her that she was
a Bushman, mixed breed, half breed, low breed or bastard (15).
But what the narrative portrays increasingly in its development is that such a 'hole' is
never left empty: instead, it becomes a 'ground' (as Mani, Spivak or Sundar-Rajan
would put it) upon which various conflicts and experiments are conducted, with only
some bearing any direct relevance to Margaret but each decisively altering the direction
of her life. As with Rushdie's narration of Sufiya Zinobia, Head throws into crisis any
simplistic conception of representing Margaret's "pure, retrievable consciousness"
(Williams & Chrisman, 1993, 81), especially when as Spivak argues, "within the
effaced itinerary of the subaltern subject, the track of sexual difference is doubly
effaced" (82). On the contrary, the novel becomes a complex, self-reflexive
performance of what we have seen Spivak define above as the intellectually
'interventionist' "task of measuring silences, whether acknowledged or
unacknowledged" (81). Through her narrating that confronts and pushes against the
limits of such recognitions, Head re-positions her own role as the recorder of an
inevitably interrupted history, as if despite her awareness of all the implied difficulties,
the responsibility of attempting "representation has not withered away. The female
intellectual as intellectual has a circumscribed task which she must not disown with a
flourish" (Williams & Chrisman, 1993, 104).
Even for her well-meaning foster mother, "a scientist in her heart with a lot of fond, pet
theories" (Head, 1987, 15), whose intervention gives Margaret a home for the first time,
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the child is sometimes seen as no more than "a real, living object for her experiment"
(15): "who knew what wonder would be created" (15)? And even as an adult, Margaret
remains the "ground"— the pretext for conflict either as an instance of a despicable
Masarwa or as an "abject victim" needing rescue— upon which battles between the
"divergent priorities" of various discursive and social positions are conducted, rather
than an agent who is shown to possess a "complex female subjectivity" of her own.
We might reiterate and adapt Mani's formulation of the status of nineteenth-century
Indian satis in the histories of the period:
We can concede then that women are not objects in this discourse. Not only is
precious little heard from them, but [...] they are [also] denied any agency. This
does not imply however that women are the objects of this discourse; that this
discourse is about them. On the contrary, I would argue that women are neither
subjects nor objects, but rather the ground of the discourse [...]. For [...]
analysis of the arguments of participants very quickly indicates that women
themselves are marginal to the debate (Sangari & Vaid, 1993, 117).
In Head's narrative, it is after all the eponymous Maru who is the truly active
protagonist, and it is entirely through the performance of the struggle between his
"visionary" longings and motives that Margaret's fate is shown to be decided, rather
than through any act of her own. Margaret is never more than the forever-unconsulted
catalyst, and the means by which Maru enacts his unilateral decision to initiate radical
social transformation through making an example of his personal life. If "the battle
between Moleka and him was one of visionaries" (110), then Margaret's bed is taken
away as part of the same strategy in which Maru decides to make her his wife. Even her
exceptional talent at painting is never presented as an instance of active (or individual)
self-expression. It is ultimately doubly subsumed— when it is understood to have been
mysteriously directed by Maru himself (through some unexplained spiritual telepathy)
as a step towards the realisation of his emancipatory project11; or it is treated as a
"
Maru takes one of her paintings away "as if it were his rightful possession" (98). Later he wonders:
How had he done it? How had he projected his dreams on someone so far removed from
him? That sort of thing was meat and drink for Maru but it changed the picture when some
other living being was on the receiving end of his dreams, especially such a true and
sensitive recorder as Margaret (104).
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revolutionary "symbol of her tribe", its irrepressible "vitality" and its move towards
"eventual liberation" (108). Head ends the novel on a Utopian note, presenting the
marriage between Margaret and Maru as a symbolic union that inspires wider social
liberation:
When people of the Masarwa tribe heard about Maru's marriage to one of their
own, a door silently opened on the small, dark airless room in which their souls
had been shut for a long time. The wind of freedom which was blowing
throughout the world for all people, turned and flowed into the room. As they
breathed in the fresh, clear air their humanity awakened. They examined their
condition [...]. They started to run out into the sunlight, then they turned and
looked at the dark, small room. They said: 'We are not going back there' (126-
127).
Head's own attitude to such an apparently ideal consummation is ambiguous: she
seems to affirm that it is only through the unilateral, visionary actions of exceptional
individuals within the social elite that a nation's history can be redirected and attitudes
pervasively transformed. The Masarwa are presented as passive, languishing timelessly,
unconsciously and helplessly until they are 'awakened'. But buried underneath the
fairy-tale absoluteness of such a conclusion, Head also provides many hints of the price
Margaret personally pays in exchange for the honour of being co-opted into such a
crucial role for her people. Once she had defined her own life's project as a
performative experiment to "find out how Bushmen were going to stay alive on this
earth [...] except perhaps as slaves and downtrodden dogs of the Batswana. That half
she would be left alone to solve" (18). But even though "in her heart she [has] grown
beyond any definition" because of her education and her upbringing, and sees herself
as "a little bit of everything in the whole universe" (20), she never loses the sense that
"there was nothing to uphold her" (63): "there was a limit to which a human being
could be an experiment, [...] [but] should she even try to claim that she was human"
(62-63)? And though her experiences have trained her not to expect ever to be loved,
Maru's intervention ensures that she cannot be with the only man who made her feel
like "the most important person on earth" (113). She has to accept her fate: "I am
peaceful because I have nothing and I want nothing" (114).
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If Rushdie presents Sufiya Zinobia as her nation's scapegoat, the eventual consequence
of the various perversions of its fundamental building principles, Margaret's life, for
Head, is the symbolic ground upon which both the oppression of her people and the
processes leading to their liberation are enacted. The latter ending might appear more
optimistic than the former, but both novels perform aspects of the ironies and the crises
involved in a feminine subaltern habitation of history and the questions of its
representation in narrative. Margaret's passivity, her individual crises of self-cognition,
metonymically stand in for the social situation of her people; but there remain
unresolved ambiguities both in Head's apparent affirmation that Margaret's sacrifice of
will and agency is the necessary price that must be paid in order for any transformation
to happen, as well as in how the narrative presents the possibility of transformation only
occurring top-down through the 'self-unclassing' benevolence of an individual
patriarch, rather than through a demonstration of subaltern agency that actively
influences and re-articulates its own history. All this is why Head's concluding
statement of radical change remains ultimately unconvincing.
Conclusion: Novelistic Fullness and 'Feminist Historiography'.
Women are both of and not of the nation. Between woman and nation is,
perhaps, the space or zone where we can deconstruct these monoliths and
render them more historically nuanced and accountable to politics (Kaplan,
Alarcon and Moallem, 1999, 12). [...] Nationalism, or even [...] 'de¬
nationalisation' cannot bring us to this site of betweenness that allows us to
query these productions of modernity. How to imagine or re-theorise this space
of betweenness or relationality that structures [...] sexual politics and
geopolitics (14)?
The two chapters of this section have read these novels for the fullness of their
portrayals of women-in-the-world in order to establish how such fictionalising achieves
an inclusive mode of discourse in which discussions of any one dimension of human
existence (for instance, the political-national) does not imply the "subordination or
demise" of another (such as the 'women's question'). We wished to demonstrate the
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contrary— that the ontological demand implicit in novels for comprehensive narratives
of human being-in the-world are well suited to perform the aims set out in Sangari and
Vaid's manifesto of 'feminist historiography', whereby the issue is no longer "the
tokenist inclusion of women or the numerical or even qualitative evaluation of their
participation in this or that movement". Rather, such novelising as we have examined
"acknowledges that each aspect of reality is gendered" and compels us to "rethink
historiography as a whole [...] in order to be able to think of gender difference as both
structuring and structured by the wide set of social relations, [...] [and thereby] as a
choice which cannot but undergird any attempt at a historical reconstruction which
attempts to demonstrate our sociality in the full sense" (Sangari& Vaid, 1993, 3).
Yet these novels avoid another danger, by not succumbing themselves to the temptation
of constructing any monolithic homogeneities (or delusory 'solidarities') along the
lines of the 'third world woman' that critics such as Spivak and Talpade Mohanty have
famously dismantled in the works of various Western feminists. Talpade Mohanty
outlines the fundamental premises underlying such a construction— "the assumption
of women as an already constituted and coherent group with identical interests and
desires, regardless of class, ethnic or racial location, implies a notion of gender or
sexual difference or even patriarchy which can be applied universally and cross-
culturally" (McClintock, Mufti and Shohat, 1998, 259)— which then allows similar
methodologies to be applied everywhere to discover more-or-less identical examples of
the 'oppressed woman' throughout the 'third world'. In many instances, we found
narratives of female characters that ultimately conclude pessimistically. Yet our
objective was not to establish that these are novels about uniformly successful role
models of feminine resistance, but rather the extent of existential engagement
undertaken by them in their exploration of diverse locations, voices, and trajectories of
women in African and Indian societies. Further, as Kaplan, Alarcon, and Moallem go
on to argue, "the figure of 'woman' participates in the imaginary of the nation-state
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beyond the purview of patriarchies" (12). National discourses and their mythologies
and iconographies, under the terms of a 'feminist historiography', are found never to
be gender-neutral:
In these respects, notions such as country, homeland, [...] locality, and ethnicity
and their construction through racialisation, sexualisation, and genderisation of
female corporeality become crucial sites of inquiry and investigation (Kaplan,
Alarcon, and Moallem, 1999, 14).
Thus the narratives of characters such as Rushdie's Sufiya Zinobia, Head's Margaret
Cadmore, Rosa Burger or Achebe's Beatrice, and Ammu in The God of Small Things,
disrupt the homogenising tendencies of nationalist pedagogy and "critique the
naturalisation and essentialisation of nation and woman" (Kaplan et al., 1999, 13).
If, as Radhakrishnan puts it, "nationalist totality [...] is an example of a 'bad totality',
and feminist historiography secedes from that structure, not to set up a different and
oppositional form of totality, but to establish a different relationship to totality" (Castle,
2001, 193-194), we have attempted to demonstrate through our spectrum of
investigation that fiction's multivalent capacity to evoke diverse and conflicting voices,
worlds, dimensions, and trajectories achieves precisely the alternative relationship he
envisions. And through such performances, these novels re-orient our entire view of the
worlds these women inhabit, thus evoking the possibility of "an integrated cultural
politics" (2001, 192), which, in Radhakrishnan's words, "suggests that no one
discourse or historiography has the ethico-political legitimacy to represent the totality,
and that the concept of totality should be understood not as a pre-given horizon, but as
a necessary and inevitable 'effect' or function of the many relational dialogues,
contestations and asymmetries among the many positions [...] that constitute the total
field (193-194).
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Section 4: Refusing the Nation: Other Resolutions.
Introduction: A 'Non-National' Section.
In an essay questioning what it is that is spoken for as the subject of Indian histories,
Dipesh Chakrabarty qualifies Ronald Inden's praise of the Subaltern Studies project
for exhibiting "sustained signs of reappropriating the capacity to represent (Indians)
|within the discipline of history]... perhaps for the first time since colonisation", as
being "gratifying but premature". He offers instead a "more perverse proposition":
That in so far as the academic discourse of history— that is, 'history' as a
discourse produced at the institutional site of the university— is concerned,
'Europe' remains the sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories, including the
ones we call 'Indian', 'Chinese', 'Kenyan', and so on. There is a peculiar way
in which all these other histories tend to become variations on a master narrative
that could be called 'the history of Europe'. In this sense, 'Indian' history itself
is in a position of subalternity; one can only articulate subaltern subject
positions in the name of this history (Mongia, 1996, 222).
This provocative declaration is then substantiated and later summarised:
So long as one operates within the discourse of 'history' produced at the
institutional site of the university, it is not possible simply to walk out of the
deep collusion between 'history' and the modernising narrative(s) of
citizenship, bourgeois public and private, and the nation state. 'History' as a
knowledge system is firmly embedded in institutional practices that invoke the
nation state at every step [...]. One only has to ask for instance: why is history
a compulsory part of the education of the modern person in all countries today
including those that did quite comfortably without it until as late as the
eighteenth century? [...] It does not take much imagination to see that the
reason for this lies in what European imperialism and third-world nationalisms
have achieved together: the universalisation of the nation state as the most
desirable form of political community. Nation states have the capacity to
enforce their truth games, and universities [...] are part of the battery of
institutions complicit in this process. 'Economics' and 'History' are the
knowledge forms that correspond to the two major institutions that the rise (and
later universalisation) of the bourgeois order has given to the world— the
capitalist mode of production and the nation state ('history' speaking to the
figure of the citizen). [...] Since these themes will always take us back to the
universalist propositions of'modern' European political philosophy— [...] a
third-world historian is condemned to knowing 'Europe' as the original home
of the 'modern' [... ]. Thus follows the everyday subalternity of non-Western
histories with which I began this paper (240).
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Chakrabarty thus uncovers to what extent anti-colonial movements have themselves
been willingly and calculatedly complicit in this post-Hegelian privileging of those
historical narratives that portray a nationalist moment as being the only conceivable
consummation of modern political liberty and large-scale fraternity. His potential
project by contrast, from which most of this section will take its cue, is to
'provincialise' such Eurocentric teleologies— first of all by recovering histories that
foreground "other narratives of the self and community that do not look to the
state/citizen bind as the ultimate construction of sociality" (232) and yet have always
existed "in contestation, alliance and miscegenation" as integral dynamics within the
history of modern India— without subsuming such heterogeneous trajectories under a
"transition narrative" that will always ultimately privilege the becoming of the
modernist nation state (240).1 Furthermore, Chakrabarty's re-premised and re-oriented
historiographic work is to be an exploration into whether these "other constructions of
self and community" might themselves now "enjoy the privilege of providing the
metanarratives or teleologies (assuming that there cannot be a narrative without at least
an implicit teleology) of (non-Western) histories" (232). And yet, Chakrabarty is only
too aware of the epistemological impossibility of any distinct separation of one mode of
historicism from another, both because modern post-colonial existence has always
implied continual immersion in various dimensions of becoming simultaneously
(modernist dimensions, as well as those he refers to as "antihistorical" and
"antimodern", both of which characterisations we shall explore in this chapter), and for
the reason that wholly radical interpretative paradigms "are (perhaps) impossible within
the knowledge protocols of academic history, for the globality of academia is not
independent of the globality that the European modern has created" (243). In a
1
Clearly comparable in many respects to the Sangari-Vaid-Radhakrishnan envisioning of 'feminist
historiography' upon which we premised our last section. Recall also Bhabha's articulation via
Kristeva and Benjamin of radically heterogeneous histories and 'times' performed within national
becoming that remain impossible to encompass within any single nationalist pedagogy or discursive
horizon.
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Spivakesque/Foucauldian vein, he recognises that such a history "attempts the
impossible" and must therefore necessarily "embody the politics of despair" (243):
It will have been clear by now that this is not a call for cultural relativism or for
atavistic, nativist histories. Nor is this a program for a simple rejection of
modernity, which would, in many situations, be politically suicidal. [...] I ask
for a history that deliberately makes visible, within the very structure of its
narrative forms, its own repressive strategies and practices [...|. The politics of
despair will require of such history that it lays bare to its readers why such a
predicament is necessarily inescapable. [...] |Yet], to attempt to provincialise
this 'Europe' is to see the modern as inevitably contested, to write over the
given and privileged narratives of citizenship other narratives of human
connections |...j so that the world may once again be imagined as radically
heterogeneous" (243-244).
Why should a study with a thesis to pursue devote an entire section to exploring
counter-possibilities to its guiding propositions? Our work has looked thus far at
narratives of individual and collective involvement of selves inhabiting various social
locations and trajectories within the becomings of post-colonial societies, where
nationhood has been positioned as the primary focus of our investigation; the
fundamental contractual paradigm and existential/interpretative horizon by which the
agents of post-colonial life are understood to orient and direct their beings-in-the-
world. We have already inquired into dimensions such as ethnicity, tradition,
domesticity, and religion, and their implications within a new nation's post-
independence becoming. It is in keeping with the continuity of such multivalent
explorations that we will focus here on attempts at alternative understandings of selves—
- and their locations and histories— that refuse to take their bearings (solely) from a
teleological orientation provided by the history of the nation-state. Most of the novels
and characters in this section demonstrate that the nation is only one frame of reference
among various others within which to locate and interpret African and Indian beings
and their worlds, that there are many more dimensions to their 'worldedness' than
being (just) 'national' or even 'post-colonial'.
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Fredric Jameson, for one, would not grant 'Third World' histories any such scope for
heterogeneous articulation. He has argued, in a much-challenged formulation:
Let me now, by way of a sweeping hypothesis, try to say what all third-world
cultural productions seem to have in common and what distinguishes them
radically from analogous cultural forms in the first world. All third-world texts
are necessarily, I want to argue, allegorical, and in a very specific way: they are
to be read as what I will call national allegories, even when, or perhaps I should
say, particularly when their forms develop out of predominantly western
machineries of representation, such as the novel (2000, 319).
Jameson's argument stands on a distinction he draws between the ways in which the
public-private, personal-political divides are understood and examined in Western
culture as opposed to the 'culture' of the 'third world' where "the story of the private
individual destiny is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the public third-
world culture and society" (320): to him this 'political projection' always assumes the
form of national allegory. It is beyond the scope of this study to fully engage with
refuting various problematic aspects of his argument, but it is as untenable a suggestion
that all novels of the West rehearse and confirm the splits between political and
personal diagnosis that Jameson identifies, as it is to argue that all (and only) 'third-
world' literatures always perform national allegories. As Deleuze and Guattari's
investigations of Kafka and other (Western and non-Western) 'minoritarian' literatures
show (1986), thoroughly 'interactive' and 'worlded' narrative enquiry happens within
novels from everywhere. From Don Quixote to Underworld and including War and
Peace, A Sentimental Education, Balzac's entire Comedie Humaine, The Man without
Qualities, Ulysses, The Adventures ofAugie March and Updike's Rabbit novels, just
to name a few, Western fictions (in Russia, France, Germany, America and England)
have in countless instances organised their investigations of selves and worlds along
national lines, where the narratives of individuals have allowed novelists to
metonymically represent and investigate particular phases of a society's becoming.
Moreover, such trends show no signs of abating even in these "deterritorialised" and
globalised times, particularly not from America, where a surfeit of diverse cultural
products continues to emerge with titles beginning with the defining word 'American'
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(-Beauty, -Pastoral, -Pie, -Werewolf, -Movie). Also, in writers ranging from Tolstoy,
Dostoyevsky, Kafka, Joyce, Celine and Hermann Broch in The Sleepwalkers to DeLillo
and Thomas Pynchon, one would need to overlook a lot of Western literary history to
suggest that personal and political, and psychic and historical investigations, are not
being conducted simultaneously and inter-relatedly. Ultimately, it is as reductive and
misleading to separate cultural production into world zones in any such way as it is
subsume the range and diversity of post-colonial cultural production under a nationalist
teleogogy, which is what we hope to prove in this section. Thus, being comprehensively
'socialised' does not imply only thinking along national lines, and thinking along
national lines is not the exclusive slightly 'lagging-behind-the-West' preoccupation of
the 'third-world' alone. Jameson correctly points out:
None of these cultures can be conceived as anthropologically independent or
autonomous, [...] [because] they are all in various distinct ways locked in a life-
and-death struggle with first-world cultural imperialism— a cultural struggle
that is itself a reflection of the economic situation of such areas in their
penetration by various stages of capital, or as it is sometimes euphemistically
termed, of modernisation (318-19).
Yet we will argue that despite recognising the pervasive social impact of both the
economic forces and nationalist frameworks that Jameson outlines and Chakrabarty
acknowledges, various African and Indian novels, through narrative strategies of an
extraordinary variety, have probed their worlds from a range of angles and directions
that refuse, resist or redefine any potentially deterministic conception of the nation-state
as the dominant, inescapable frame of reference for all post-colonial existence. If such
a pervasive culture of national allegorising indeed prevailed, there would exist not just
the danger of pre-conceived interpretative determinism, but more, we would have to
concede that the post-colonial novel might degenerate from an act of radical re-
inscription (as we have argued it to be), into the kind of coercive consolidation that Said
finds in Culture and Imperialism to be the animating ideology behind much of
nineteenth-century English fiction. The ingenuity of such heterogeneously framed and
directed existential explorations— no less engaged or 'worlded', no less dynamic,
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historicised or 'political' for not being merely 'national'— cautions us against the
folly of reducing our interpretations of social becoming by privileging one of its
horizons over all others. And finally, they count as vital instances in any interrogation
of 'post-coloniality' itself, as a valid term that is meant to cover genuinely specific
ranges of human predicament by establishing credible connections between widely
differing worlds and histories without subsuming them under any homogenising, non¬
viable 'bad totality'.
Leela Gandhi and Anthony Appiah2 both make an important distinction (although
differently) between "the people-who-comprise-the-nation and the State-which-
represents-the-nation" (Gandhi, 1998, 119). Gandhi argues that even if the nation-state
is assumed to be "the proper end of (anti-colonial) nationalism, |... | that point at which
the narrative of nation-making achieves its generic closure and therefore its distinctive
generic identity" (120), there has been released as part of the same movement an
"autonomous political imagination of the people-who-comprise-the-nation [...] spoken
in a distinctly popular, indigenous and pre-colonial idiom" (120), the "recalcitrant
elements, characters and actions" of which "are ultimately in excess of the generic
closure proposed by the postcolonial nation-state" (120). More than anything else, it is
the irreducible aggregate of such heterogeneous agents and dimensions— a spectrum
of which we will now examine over two chapters ranging from high-bourgeois families
to narrative treatments of rural and urban subalternity and encompassing possibilities of
solidarity and community as well as instances of individual survival— that prevents
post-independence national life and discourse in Africa and India from lapsing (or
"
Appiah marks a transition we have discussed already, between 'realist' African fictions that represent
the "stage of nationalist legitimation" to a post-realist disavowal of nationalism, that bases itself not
on any Western conception of 'deterritorialised' post-modernist relativism, but on "an appeal to a
certain simple respect for human suffering, a fundamental revolt against the endless misery of the last
thirty years". See Appiah (1992, 240-250).
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being theorised) into a merely "derivative" copy of its European predecessors, as
Partha Chatterjee has doubted and writers such as V S Naipaul have decreed.
Again, a reminder would be appropriate here that our investigation limits itself to
fictions that engage with post-independence moments and phases on post-colonial
territories— that is, African and Indian societies and environments. This would thereby
exclude novels examining the implications of 'metropolitan' migration, works such as
The Satanic Verses, White Teeth or the England based novels of Buchi Emecheta, to
name a few instances. Even though such migration obviously counts as attempts
towards 'non-nationalist' existential resolution for many (millions of) Africans and
Indians, various aspects of the resulting changes in First-World societies constitute
already well-researched areas of post-colonial studies.
Chapter 8: Family, Place, and Community Instead of the Nation.
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A Suitable Boy: The Nation within the Family.
What novelistic ambition of attaining a Lukacsian 'objective totality' would compel
Seth to include as many dimensions, locations, generations, classes and processes of
Indian life as possible in his novel, and how does it contain them all? Is such a portrait
of India merely a narrative achievement facilitated by the flexibility and scope of the
novel-form, or does Seth detect and perform possibilities of actual connections between
selves and communities across utterly heterogeneous expanses of Indian time and
space?
The extended family is Seth's primary narrative device, enabling him to structure,
diversify and contain his material at the same time. Further, being-in-the-world, in
Seth's world, is being in and of a family: he portrays the family as the fundamental
basis for how Indian selves, individually and collectively (irrespective of class or
religion, or town and country), take their bearings within wider society. Reversing
nationalist priorities that would subsume other trajectories of social history within a
narrative of national becoming, Seth narrates the 'traditional' Indian family as the
primary national-awareness instrument of a newly independent India (rather than the
new modern state), in how it introduces individuals to many unfamiliar areas and
processes of society simply through its wide-ranging webs of connection and
acquaintance. But unlike the novels of Rushdie or Arundhati Roy, the family in Seth is
also a reliably 'timeless' retreat into which characters can withdraw from the dynamism
of the worlds around them into the enduring stability of pre-defined identities: a basis
of Indian 'Being' apparently immune to the transformations wrought by its historical
becomings. Dipesh Chakrabarty and Partha Chatterjee detect similar modes of
orientation and self-definition operating within colonial Indian history, which
Chakrabarty argues "is replete with instances where Indians arrogated subjecthood to
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themselves precisely by mobilising, within the context of 'modern' institutions and
sometimes on behalf of the modernising project of nationalism, devices of collective
memory that were both antihistorical and antimodern:
This is not to deny the capacity of Indians to act as subjects endowed with what
we in the universities would recognise as 'a sense of history' [...], but to insist
at the same time that there were also contrary trends, that in the multifarious
struggles that took place in colonial India, antihistorical constructions of the
past often provided very powerful forms of collective memory (Mongia, 1996,
239).3
Reconciling Individuality and Family.
For both of these theorists, among the primary "antihistorical" 'non-modernist'
modes of community and solidarity— which formed "one of the most important
elements in the cultural politics of Indian nationalism"— is "the metaphor of the
sanctified and patriarchal extended family" (Mongia, 1996, 238). Chakrabarty
delineates further implications of the power and persistence of an existential dimension
with such a distinct ontology, and its own modes of classifying its members and the
roles and spheres of their lives:
According to the fable of their constitution, Indians today are all 'citizens'. The
constitution embraces almost a classically liberal definition of citizenship [in
which] the modern state and the modern individual, the citizen, are but the two
inseparable sides of the same phenomenon [...]. This modern individual,
however, whose political/public life is lived in citizenship, is also supposed to
have an interiorised 'private' self that pours out incessantly in diaries, letters,
autobiographies, novels, and of course in what we say to our analysts. The
bourgeois individual is not born until one discovers the pleasures of privacy.
[...]
Indian public life may mimic on paper the bourgeois legal fiction of
citizenship— [...] but what about the bourgeois private and its history? Anyone
who has tried to write 'French' social history with Indian material would know
how impossibly difficult the task is. It is not that the form of the bourgeois
private did not come with European rule. [...] [Yet] our autobiographies are
remarkably 'public' (with constructions of public life that are not necessarily
modern) when written by men, and they tell the story of the extended family
when written by women. In any case, autobiographies in the confessional mode
3
And according to Chatterjee, as we have seen already:
The [...] state [...] is kept out of the 'inner' domain of national culture; but it is not as though this
so-called spiritual domain is left unchanged. In fact, here nationalism launches its most powerful,
creative, and historically significant project: to fashion a 'modern' national culture that is nevertheless
not Western (1993, 6).
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are notable for their absence [...] How do we read this [...]? Public without
private? Yet another instance of the 'incompleteness' of bourgeois
transformation in India (1996, 230-232)?
In fact, in all the huge cast of Seth's novel, nowhere is the self ever experienced or
defined as isolated except in two cases, both with disastrous consequences. Rasheed
finds himself homeless, cut off from his family and from his inheritance, because of the
landowning legacy that he despises for its ongoing history of injustice and oppression.
Yet Seth narrates his descent into paranoia and suicide as if it were almost inevitable
following this exile: all his individual efforts at reform are proven to be powerless. It is
as though any solitary efforts to participate in history and exert influence over its
transformations are necessarily doomed, especially because Rasheed attempts to act
without (and worse, against) the insulation provided by his sacred ties to clan and
community:
He believed that will and effort could get him anywhere. He attempted bravely,
fervently, perhaps obsessively to reconcile everything— family life, learning,
calligraphy, personal honour, order, ritual, God, agriculture, history, politics; this
world and all the other worlds, in short— into a comprehensible whole. [...]
And it seemed to Maan [...] that [Rasheedj was wearing himself out by feeling
so deeply and taking on so insistently all the burdens and responsibilities of
mankind (1994, 724).
And later, Maan wonders if Rasheed is "not a victim of the tragedy of the countryside,
of the country itself', "forced to choose between loyalty and justice, between trust and
pity" (1289).
Yet his family is anguished by what they can only consider his betrayal. His ideals are
terribly wrong to them: they are righteously blind to the implications of their 'time-
hallowed' ruthlessness towards their landless tenants, but even more, they cannot
comprehend how anything could have more sanctity to an individual than his family's
interests. His father laments:
Rasheed treats us as if we are ignorant to the core. He writes us letters,
threatening us and boasting of his own humanism. Everything has gone—
logic, respect, decency; but his pride and his sense of self, lunatically remain.
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When I read his letters I weep [...]. He had a classmate who became a dacoit.
Even he treats his family with more respect (1288).
Chakrabarty points to "a similar connection between the modern 'free' individual and
selfishness" (Mongia, 1996, 235) within the nineteenth century Bengali literature
extolling the virtues and the pre-eminent claims of the extended family. The other self
set apart is Saeeda Bai, the 'public woman' who is left abandoned at the end, because
being a courtesan keeps her from ever belonging in a world where one's truest self is
no more than the sum of one's (legitimate) familial ties.
Every individual in Seth's world conceals or surrenders something of him- or herself in
compromise, as Chakrabarty above describes, and knows that they are forever to be
subjected in various degrees to "the pressure of the family, the extended family that
enforced a slow and strong acceptance on its members" (Seth, 1994, 986); yet no one
but Rasheed feels paralysed by such a realisation. Such an ahistorical (even
'antihistorical', as Chakrabarty would call it) basis for self-orientation and navigation is
not only taken for granted, but is seen as an essential, conservative yet creative,
perpetuating principle that enables existence itself to continue at all levels, interpersonal
and social. In Seth's novel, there are numerous intelligent, independent-minded people
even of a younger generation, clearly able to identify the contradictions and limits of
their own positions, who nevertheless prefer a conservative torpor to any unchecked
(Rushdian) assertions of individual will and selfhood. Pran and Savita cannot name
their own baby themselves, because "the baby had been born not to a couple, but to a
clan" (953). Near the end the narrator formulates the essence of the family as a
"thread of love" (1458) that each member is under an imperative not to break—
especially not to assert their individuality— because "what breaks won't join; if joined,
it knots the thread" (1458).
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Narrating the Nation through the Family.
Perhaps the fuller implications of what Seth reveals about the dual role of the family—
as the unchanging (yet ever accommodating and continually relevant) basis upon which
the processes of national and individual life occur— become clearer when we set the
methods of his portrayal against Rushdie's entirely subjectivised narratives of self,
family, and world. Unlike Midnight's Children or The Moor's Last Sigh, no individual
is ever at the heart of Seth's novel for any prolonged period. Instead, what centres his
work, through the device and organism of the family, is the potential of the novel form
itself: its Tolstoyan capacities for 'narrative calculus' and its Bakhtinian ability to
contain and perform social heteroglossia, yet both incorporated within a Lukacsian
conception of portraying apparently 'objective totalities'. The invisible omniscient
narrator is the true protagonist of A Suitable Boy, and the formal basis of Seth's novel-
as-national-portrait. As Lukacs would expect of the most exemplary 'critical realists',
every possible aspect and dimension of a society is contextualised and painstakingly
drawn to scale. Seth reveals clues to the architecture of his work: a banyan tree plan and
another based on the structure of an Indian Raag:
It sprouts, and grows, and spreads, and drops down branches that become
trunks or inter-twine with other branches. Sometimes branches die. Sometimes
the main trunk dies, and the structure is held up by the supporting trunks. [...]
It has its own life— but so do the snakes and birds and bees and lizards and
termites that live in it and on it and off it (524).
The absence of a centralised ('confessional') individuality— in the bourgeois-private
sense of Rushdie's narrators that Chakrabarty describes above— and its replacement
by a vision of the stable enduring family as the novel's primary epistemological
procedure is crucial to Seth's investigations of individual and national becomings in
India. Yet, in his work, this conception of a transcendent, 'timeless', immutable network
can paradoxically accommodate an immense, mutually conflicting and dynamic
spectrum of social heteroglossia, encompassing narratives of parliamentary, public and
inter-personal family life, legislative arguments, riots, festivals, disasters, rail journeys,
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villages, elections and cities. Seth portrays through the extended web of four families
and their acquaintances entire spectra of social, political and economic life, assembles
the conflicts of a narrative cast that includes members of three generations and faiths,
and brings together worlds as far apart as upper-bourgeois Indo-European Calcutta
society and villages where the landed gentry continue in age-old fashion to oppress
their tenants and the landless. He captures the rich symbiotic influence of centuries of
Hindu and Muslim co-existence (in the worlds of classical Hindustani music and in
rituals of daily life and friendship), as much as the intransigence of communal hatred
and the remarkable lacunae of genuine mutual incomprehension and ignorance even
after a millennium of cohabitation. The novel uncovers much transition— land and
social reform, elections, debates on every level about versions of the nation recently
born and to be fashioned— and yet carefully contextualises themes that remain
unchanged (life for the landless in Salimpur village, the frozen attitudes of the landed):
"nine months after the murder of Gandhi, the constitutional provision abolishing
untouchability was passed by the Constituent Assembly, and its members broke out
into loud cheers, [...] however little the measure was to mean in practical as opposed to
symbolic terms" (1132). Entire generations are dialogically anatomised as Seth
examines conflicting attitudes and life-trajectories, each of which are shaped by and
reveal further processes and locations that all heterogeneously, incompatibly comprise
India. His work demonstrates the novel's capacities for spatial histories and 'critical
realism' through its exercise of 'narrative calculus'— in its (de)constructing of an
epoch with its diversely layered (and directed) beings, worlds, and becomings. In
another instance, Rasheed's father declares his intransigence regarding any land reform
legislation:
The whole world is being destroyed. These people are selling the country. And
now they are trying to take away the land that our forefathers earned with their
sweat and blood. Well, no one is going to take away a single bigha of my land.
[...J I can tell you that things will get worse and worse. As it is, things have
begun to fall apart (731).
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Thus each transition comes under scrutiny in its multiple aspects not only to reveal how
simultaneous and yet contradictory so many lived, imagined, believed versions of India
can be, but to inquire of a nation reinvented in modernist terms how 'actual' its
modernity is, and how many strands of its various pasts persist and participate in such a
re-invention.
And the family is the structuring mechanism that allows Seth his simultaneous
discussions of so many aspects, strata and locations of Indian life: national narration
through familial networking. Through the clan, multiplied still further in its links to
other vast clans by way of marriage or friendship, he captures not merely India in
microcosm, but (what he portrays as) the society's basis and horizon of Being itself.
Seth performs two simultaneous and related reversals of the usual priorities of the
Western modern novel by altering both its conceptions of 'public' and 'private', and
thereby its very ontological basis for narrating. First, he replaces individual
consciousness (in the Rushdian, or Joycean, modernist sense) with a portrait of the
extended family as the central protagonist of his work. Furthermore, he formats not
merely his 'narrative calculus' but the society's entire history within the demands and
limits of the Indian extended family— thus organising and framing what Tolstoy saw
as the unquantifiably infinite and dynamic extents of any historical epoch within its
secure boundaries, and muffling (if not always resolving) the full volume of Bakhtinian
heteroglossic social cacophony. In fact, his narrative predicates itself on the "two
denials" (1996, 237) that Chakrabarty considers constitutive of the cultural politics of
Indian nationalism: "the denial, or at least, contestation, of the bourgeois private and,
equally important, the denial of historical time by making the family a site where the
sacred and the secular blended in a perpetual re-enactment of a principle that was
heavenly and divine" (237).
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Of course, the upholding of hierarchies on interpersonal, familial, and social levels that
are often confessedly (and proudly) static and patriarchal also involves Seth having to
acknowledge (and sometimes even condone) the implied costs of valorising such
conservatism. Chakrabarty acknowledges the same dilemmas:
The cultural space the antihistorical invoked was by no means harmonious or
non-conflictual, though nationalist thought of necessity tried to portray it to be
so. The antihistorical norms of the patriarchal extended family, for example,
could only have had a contested existence, contested both by women's
struggles and by those of the subaltern classes (Mongia, 1996, 237).
In Seth's world, such prices are paid most obviously by the numerous
unacknowledged, nearly unknown wives of some of the novel's principal patriarchs, the
landless subalterns (and people of lower castes) whose conditions no amount of
parliamentary legislation seems to affect, and characters such as Rasheed who view
historical becoming in more individualist and radically transformatory terms:
As for Rasheed, [...] it was not true that one could change everything through
effort and vehemence and will. The stars maintained their courses despite his
madness, and the village world moved on as before, swerving only very slightly
to avoid him (1994, 1290).
Yet, despite such ironies, and despite "bespeakfing] an antihistorical consciousness"
that "entails subject positions and configurations of memory that challenge and
undermine the subject that speaks in the name of [modernist, nationalist] history"
(Mongia, 1996, 232), Seth does novelistically realise the ambition Chakrabarty has
earlier deemed impossible within the "knowledge procedures" (240) of academic
history:
[of how | these other constructions of self and community, while documentable
in themselves, will never enjoy the privilege of providing the metanarratives and
teleologies (assuming that there cannot be a narrative without at least an implicit
teleology) of our histories (232).
223
Questioning the Endurance of Malgudi: Naipaul on Narayan.
In two travel narratives written fifteen years apart, V S Naipaul reflects on a remark that
R K Narayan made to him at a gathering in London— that "India will go on"
(Naipaul, 1978, 18)— and builds on it to illuminate and simultaneously unravel the
endurance of Narayan's fictional world of Malgudi. Naipaul's charge is that
"Narayan's novels [had] not prepared [him] for the distress of India" (21). In
Malgudi, by writing only of "small men, small schemes, [their] big talk [and ] limited
means", Narayan contemplates a life that is "so circumscribed that it appears whole
and unviolated" (19). Its "smallness was never a subject for wonder" to Narayan,
Naipaul alleges, "though India itself is felt to be vast" (19). Then follows Naipaul's
patronising if empathetic diagnosis:
Well, that was where we all began, all of us who are over forty and were
colonials, subject people who had learned to live with the idea of subjection. We
lived within our lesser world: and we could even pretend it was whole because
we had forgotten that it had been shattered. Disturbance, instability,
development lay elsewhere; we, who had lost our wars and were removed from
great events, were at peace. In life, as in literature, we received tourists (20-21).
The India Naipaul finally arrived in, the "Area of Darkness", the "Wounded
Civilisation", is by contrast, "cruel and overwhelming" (21). And here Naipaul
realises that "to get down to Narayan's world":
To perceive the order and continuity he saw in the dereliction and smallness of
India, to enter into his ironic acceptance and relish his comedy, was to ignore
too much of what could be seen, to shed too much of myself: my sense of
history, and even the simplest ideas of human possibility. [...] His comedy and
irony were (no longer) quite what they had appeared to be, were part of a Hindu
response to the world, a response I could no longer share (21).
Narayan's novels now come to seem "less the purely social comedies [Naipaul] had
once taken them to be than religious books, at times religious fables, and intensely
Hindu" (21). Elsewhere, after analysing another of his books, he describes Narayan as
"instinctive" and unstudied" (41), "negative" and "incapable of self-assessment"
(1970, 216), all of which qualities are then intellectually traced to the fact of Narayan
being Hindu. In fact, fifteen years earlier in his first book on India, Naipaul actually
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makes the same diagnosis his basis for undermining not only Narayan, but almost all
of Indian fiction, and by extension, understanding an entire civilisational malaise:
Indian attempts at the novel further reveal the Indian confusion. The novel is of
the West. It is part of that Western concern with the condition of men, a
response to the here and now. In India thoughtful men have preferred to turn
their backs on the here and now and to satisfy what President Radhakrishnan
calls 'the basic human hunger for the unseen'. It is not a good qualification for
the writing or reading of novels" (1970, 214).
By way of contrast and clarification, it is in a lecture given two decades later that
Naipaul provides one of his clearest portraits of exactly the kind of civilisation that is
required to produce the sort of literature he is seeking, as opposed to environments
such as (for instance) the "instinctive, ritualised life" of his Hindu background, "the
unpromising conditions of colonial Trinidad", or the non-Arab cultures in which he
has travelled, "among a colonised people who had been stripped by their faith of all
that expanding intellectual life, all the varied life of the mind and senses, the expanding
cultural and historical knowledge of the world" (2002, 512). In Naipaul's vision, this
can only be a gradually globalising version of Western civilisation that he deems to be
'universal' in its creative appeal and flexible, inclusive potential, "because of the
extraordinary attempt of this civilisation (since the end of the last war) to accommodate
the rest of the world, and all the currents of that world's thought" (516), even though
he acknowledges:
The universal civilisation has been a long time in the making. It wasn't always
universal; it wasn't always as attractive as it is today. The expansion of Europe
gave it for at least three centuries a racial tint, which still causes pain (516).
To Naipaul, the "attractiveness" that makes the universality of this particular world-
view so desirable is exemplified most evidently in "the beauty of (its] idea of the
pursuit of happiness":
The idea has come to a kind of fruition. It is an elastic idea; it fits all men. It
implies a certain kind of society, a certain kind of awakened spirit. I don't
imagine my father's parents would have been able to understand the idea. So
much is contained in it: the idea of the individual, responsibility, choice, the life
of the intellect, the idea of vocation and perfectibility and achievement. It is an
immense human idea. It cannot be reduced to a fixed system. It cannot generate
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fanaticism. But it is known to exist; and because of that, other more rigid
systems in the end blow away (517).
It is therefore evident to Naipaul as a corollary how he owes his own literary formation
to such a civilisation, and why it is in fact the only world from which can emerge
literature that sceptically, courageously, and dynamically engages with the world in all
its diverse fullness.4
Narayan's Malgudi: Deconstructing the 'Timeless'.
Naipaul dismisses Malgudi as a small town of men leading lives so circumscribed and
static they are never even aware of its limits. It is true in The Maneater ofMalgudi that
Nataraj has not crossed the river in decades to visit the other side of town, as hasn't
Jagan, The Vendor ofSweets, whose daily route between his home and his shop define
the limits of his physical world until the events of the novel. But Jagan's 'smallness' is
no secret to him. He sighs at the thought that "for years his fixed orbit had been
between the statue and the shop, his mental operations confined to Mali, the cousin and
frying" (1980, 112). He recalls the lost friends of his youth, the ecstasy of Gandhi's
visit, the peace of the riverside at dusk that he has not known in decades:
He went on talking and Jagan realised agape as if a new world had flashed into
view. He suddenly realised how narrow his whole existence had been—
between the Lawley Statue and the frying shop (119-120).
Yet among the exploratory priorities of both narratives are the performances of their
central characters becoming aware of not only the new intrusions that directly affect
4
Naipaul makes his own development a point in case:
I didn't possess the rituals and the myths; I saw them at a distance. But I had in exchange
been granted the ideas of inquiry and the tools of scholarship. Identity for me was a more
complicated matter. Many things had gone to make me. But there was no problem for me
there. Whole accumulations of scholarship were mine, in the sense that I had access to them.
I could carry four or five or six different cultural ideas in my head. I knew about my ancestry
and my ancestral culture; I knew about the history of India and its political status; I knew
where I was born, and I knew the history of the place; I had a sense of the New World. I
knew about the literary forms I was interested in; and I knew about the journey I would have
to make to the centre in order to exercise the vocation I had given myself (512).
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their lives, but of their town itself, the human variety contained within and beyond this
apparently well-known and unchanging world, where both Jagan and Nataraj continue
to live in the ancestral homes they were born in. The cast of The Maneater ofMalgudi
includes dancers and women of disrepute, adjournment lawyers, foresters, temple
elephants, taxidermists, ex-wrestlers, teashop owners, bus conductors, master sculptors,
and animal doctors; in the course of the novel, Nataraj, always for the first time, meets
them all. Narayan's novels are comedies that enact how multiple, simultaneous
becomings are forced upon haplessly 'worlded' beings, and are thereby also cross-
sectional studies of a world undergoing various transitions. Caught in the convergence
of the becomings thrust upon him, Nataraj confesses the crime that Naipaul accuses
him of— his smallness. But even now, he confronts it with wonder:
Vasu was like an irrelevant thought. He should have no place in my scheme of
things. People I had never seen in my life acted as a padding to my right and
left and fore and aft. I had lived a circumscribed life and I had never thought
that our town contained such a variety of humanity (1983, 131).
Disparate beings and their multiple collisions— that is, dynamic histories as enacted in
the narrative laboratory of Malgudi— are Narayan's constant concerns, far from the
transcendentalism ritualised, outside-of-history image that Naipaul foists upon him.
Amit Chaudhuri has written:
The seemingly easy-going affable nature of Narayan's fictional universe has
encouraged critics to presume they have it figured out. Critics in the West,
especially in America, have praised it for being a microcosm of the "timeless
India", transcending that Western-manufactured complication, History; critics
in India have condemned it for being a microcosm of the "timeless India",
unpermeated by, and stubbornly oblivious to, the liberal, educated Indian's
burden, History (The Telegraph (Calcutta), 10-06-01).
Yet Narayan's narratives are entirely dynamic. The frequently expressed longings for
stasis are never taken at face value: on the contrary, the characters expressing them are
investigated (and exposed) for their thoroughly kinetic 'worldedness'. Far from writing
in an un-historicised (Hindu) vein, ("incapable of self assessment": a world-view for
which "disturbance, instability (and) development (lie) elsewhere" (Naipaul, 1978,
21)), Narayan dramatises through Jagan and Nataraj the inexperience that is inevitable
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when their lives are disrupted by new awakenings at an advanced age, and explores the
existential equipment necessary (and lacking) for the self to inhabit a world undergoing
multiple transformations. In Nataraj's case these appear embodied in the form of a
stranger: for Jagan the stranger is his own son, and the closest of bonds proves to be
the most unsettling. Thus, in the course of both narratives, Narayan deconstructs
through narrative investigation any essentialist, pre-defined bases of personal identity,
family, and community that may appear to recur in his apparently 'timeless' Malgudi.
Even the most familiar elements and connections only expose his protagonists further
to the implications of their thoroughly dynamic 'worldedness', as well as the
challenging imperative that they have to continually re-evaluate and re-direct their
humanity or be overwhelmed. Chaudhuri's dissent with any 'timeless' views of
Malgudi continues:
The subject of Narayan's fiction is, if anything, the fictionality of "timeless
India"; if there is anything it tells us, it is that "timeless India" is a thoroughly
modern invention, a figment of the contemporary imagination. To this end he
creates a trope for inventedness, Malgudi, a place that, like "timeless India"
exists nowhere; and then both lovingly nourishes and mocks our expectation,
and need for its existence. [...] [But] scratch a relic of "timeless India" in
Malgudi, and you discover a reality that is suburban, modern, dreary, mercantile
and petit-bourgeois: Narayan, in his work, is forever driving a sharp wedge
between the sheen of the eternal and the tawdriness of modern small-town
Indian life (The Telegraph (Calcutta), 10-06-01).
Inextricability is one of Narayan's major themes, from the longings of the self, as well
as from the examinations of becoming that the self is unrelentingly put through even in
the most familiar of worlds. Yet his fictions are always asking what qualities are
needed— not to transcend, elude, deny or ignore change, as Naipaul alleges— but to
adapt and survive it. Further, Narayan's explorations of these themes are never less
than suffused with the ironies of appetite: his characters actually enjoy inhabiting the
world along with all of its changes. They are not to be written off for the petty scale of
their lives, because there is nothing narrow about the irrepressible (Leopold Bloom¬
like) quality of their curiosity even in the midst of the greatest difficulties. Nataraj may
never have met anyone like Vasu before; he may resent his bullying methods, but he is
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also fascinated by his boasts, his strength, and the imprint of the wider world in Vasu's
recounting of his life (the world Naipaul would scorn Nataraj for never having seen).
Similarly, the conflict between Jagan and his America-returned son is nothing as simple
as a conflict between his conservatism and Mali's modernity. Jagan is no simple
conservative: like Nataraj he is simply too curious for that. Even his son's deceitful
escape to America cannot put him off either that country or his enthusiastic questions
about Mali's life there. On the contrary, America and its ways and maxims come to
supplement Gandhi's sayings and the Gita as the primary fascination and guiding
principles of Jagan's life. If he is a "small man", as Naipaul has characterised
Narayan's characters, leading an "instinctive, ritualised" life, he also displays
unconcealed pleasure at any report from newer, greater, more 'dynamic' worlds.
Nataraj's inexperience of worlds outside his own, and his frequent incompetence in the
face of unexpected challenges, is only matched by his curiosity about them. He is
helplessly open in his dealings with strangers even in the midst of fears that they will
beat or murder him. This is not generally a mark of "small men", to be so restlessly
enthusiastic even when confronted by radical otherness. There is nowhere the
complacent blindness, the refusal to acknowledge and engage with the implications of
inhabiting history, that Naipaul associates with Narayan's writing, and (even further)
with India itself:
While his world holds and he is secure, the Indian is a man simply having his
being; and he is surrounded by other people having their being. But when the
props of family, clan and caste go, chaos and blankness come (1978, 103).
More specifically, about Jagan's final decision to retreat from his business and family,
Naipaul has written:
Jagan [...] really has no case. His code does not bear examination. |...] [His] is
the ultimate Hindu retreat, because it is a retreat from a world that is known to
have broken down at last. It is a retreat, literally, to a wilderness where 'the edge
of reality itself was beginning to blur': not a return to a purer Aryan past, as
Jagan might imagine, but a retreat from civilisation and creativity, from rebirth
and growth, to magic and incantation, a retrogression to an almost African night,
the enduring primitivism of a place like the Congo, where, even after the slave
trading Arabs and the Belgians, the past is yearned for as le bon vieux temps de
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nos ancetres. It is the death of a civilisation, the final corruption of Hinduism
(1978,43).
But if Jagan is so contemptible and cowardly, why is it that he insists throughout on
giving Mali all the freedom he wants, even though everything that Mali does with this
freedom always disconcerts him? Despite having a son and never having left the heart
of an absolutely 'known', 'stable', and bounded world, Jagan is finally shown to be
alone with his doubts and longings. Yet he never lets Mali's inaccessibility and hostility
keep him from repeatedly attempting (in vain) to know his son better, even if he has to
embarrass himself and ask outsiders to deliver his questions for him. If caste and clan
are such indispensable props of Indian being, how does that explain Jagan's affection
(despite his initial reservations) for his Korean daughter-in-law? Even amid the
resoluteness of his final withdrawal, and after he has discovered that Grace is not his
legitimate daughter-in-law, his humanity still has the elasticity necessary to insist he
would pay for a ticket for her to return home if she wanted. "It's a duty we owe her.
She was a good girl" (1980, 192). Jagan meets to the end his responsibility to Grace
and Mali. He lets nobody down even when retreating. It is the modernised Mali who
has used up all her money and then abandoned his promise to marry her.
In Narayan's vision, Mali is the limited one, not because he is modern, but because his
modernism is superficial. His superficial understanding of American commerce and
inventiveness is exceeded only by his shallower disregard of his father and the ways
and values of his place of upbringing. Mali is a failure at business as much as at
relationships: just as Jagan's physical and material stability promise him no stillness,
Mali's 'modernity' is no guarantee of growth or creativity. Yet importantly, these
conflicts in Narayan— between Vasu and Nataraj or Mali and his father— are not just
simplistically dichotomised conflicts of modern dynamism against tradition and
continuity, where either is pre-defined as right or wrong: aspects of both positions are
unsparingly ironised and examined in the narratives. All the errors of Jagan and Nataraj
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are exposed and recorded; their frequently expressed longing to extricate themselves
are undermined entirely by their incompetence in their 'worldly' engagements.
"Conquer taste, and you will have conquered the self' (13), begins Jagan in his
sweetshop. But when asked why the self should be conquered, he confesses he does
not know, "but all our sages advise us so" (13). Yet if the novel begins with Jagan
quoting existential strategy he does not understand, by the end he has achieved
reconciliation with both the unattainability of his son's affections as well as his own
isolation. The pre-defined, 'timeless' "props" of family, caste, community and
fatherhood have all fallen away, and yet the narrative has recorded a performance of
understanding and growth. Jagan now recognises the ineluctable limits of his situation
as clearly he formulates the possibility of 'rebirth'. This is scarcely the "Indian"
whom Naipaul describes as possessing a "childlike perception of reality", with the
"underdeveloped ego" (1978, 102) that allows Indians to be "immersed in their
experiences in a way that Western people can seldom be [because] it is less easy for
[them] to withdraw and analyse" (103).
How does Malgudi Endure and Survive History?
Selves are the novel's distinct currency, we have argued, the narrative epistemology
fiction requires to furnish each attempt at exploring further aspects to the limitless
fullness of existence. But we have also established that it is impossible to interpret or
narrate selves without taking account of their worlds: if novelistic narrative is to be a
thorough examination of beings-in-the-world, it is in its very basis implicitly worlded to
the same extent as selves are. Yet Narayan's fiction is at the same time an interrogation
of the possibilities of survival (and even freedom) for selves despite their absolute
immersion within the currents of multiple transformation. This is never to be mistaken
for a concept equivalent to religious transcendentalism— none of Narayan's novels are
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anything like as 'Hindu' as Naipaul argues.5 Novels can never be 'timeless' just as
(and because) they can never be world-less. Narayan leaves few dimensions
unexplored— family, parenthood, modernity, and tradition, always enacted
paradoxically in a town his protagonists have known all their lives. Every possible
essentialist identity is disrupted by change and/or 'otherness'. His characters survive
severe tests to reach different resolutions, but Malgudi, as a place and a community,
also endures another re-telling, another re-examination. Time after time, Narayan re-
performs his comment to Naipaul, by demonstrating in narrative how worlds within
India do "go on".
There is an enduring, elastic quality to such existential resolution that Naipaul, and
others, as Chaudhuri points out, find merely 'affectionate' or incredible. How does
Narayan manage to narrate characters as immersed within their world, and a world as
dynamic and diverse as we have claimed, and yet manage to retrieve the continuities of a
community in books set sixty years apart? If Narayan's work is indeed thoroughly
historicised, why does it never culminate in the spectacular explosions (of selves and
worlds) so characteristic of Rushdie's narratives, or the bitter individual retreats of
Naipaul's own novels?
Of course all narrative is selection, manipulation— Narayan's as much as any other.
But the point we hope to have established (contra readings such as Naipaul's) is that
Narayan takes on the challenge of a fully engaged heteroglossic narration of the life of
the society he continually re-creates. Another such narrative might yield entirely
different results, although equally credible (such as Rushdian anguish and explosion).
Such irregularity is perfectly consistent with the basis and method of the novel. One
5
Although, writing precisely against Naipaul, Kipling and other such Western characterisations of
apparent Hindu 'stasis', Ashis Nandy puts together an ingeniously argued portrait of how elements of
a Hindu identity (might) have been self-consciously marshalled by ordinary people in resisting and
subverting colonial rule. It is not within the scope of our discussion to include it here, but see
Nandy's chapter on 'The Uncolonised Mind...' (1998, 64-114).
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novelist's crisis can co-exist with another's resolution, even when both have been
comprehensively imagined and 'worlded'.
Conclusion: Re-Inscribing histories to Redefine History.
This entire section attempts to establish why particular hermeneutic paradigms of the
world and its becomings (such as the 'grand narratives' of post-colonialism or the
history of the nation-state) are not to be privileged over all others, by demonstrating that
the themes and directions of disparate human lives are never as deterministically
bounded by any such 'dominant' horizons as these all-subsuming conceptions
(Jamesonian 'third-world national allegories'; Naipaul's 'universal civilisation') might
suggest. We forward instead a range of alternative reckonings that selves can make
within diverse trajectories and locations that redefine how inter-actively and variously
we might narrate and interpret history. At the start of his novel Underworld, Don
Delillo posits that "human longing on a large scale is what makes history" (1997, 3).
The novels in this section expand on (and implicitly dissent with) such an assertion to
demonstrate how human becomings on every level enter into and shape (novelistic)
histories. Moreover, they also work towards contesting the "subaltern" terms in which,
according to Chakrabarty, much Indian post-independence historical discourse is cast—
- of "'grievously incomplete' scenarios" that detect only "lack [...], absence, or an
incompleteness", because the criteria of discussion privileged in such modernist
"modes of self-representation" means that "Indian history, even in the most dedicated
socialist or nationalist hands, represents a mimicry of a certain 'modern' subject of
'European' history and is bound to represent a sad figure of lack and failure" (1996,
239). By opening up such heterogeneous spectra of trajectories within a society's
evolution, as inhabited both individually and in diverse manners of community, the
novels of these two chapters articulate a wider and deeper range of "imagined
communities" than any singular mode of "national allegory" can ever include, or any
conceptions of an overarching "universal civilisation" could ever contain or
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homogenise. How irrepressible and irreducibly varied these histories are, is what this
section attempts to evaluate.
Chapter 9: Improvising Resolutions: Beyond Place and Family.
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A Fine Balance: Selves Without the Nation.
In Midnight's Children, Shiva, the midnight's child of the streets (who might be the
narrator's foster brother and a legitimate heir of his upper middle-class life), is
portrayed as being the most cynical disrupter of Saleem's idea of a Midnight's
Children's Conference that should commit itself with parliamentary zeal towards
nation-building purposes:
What purpose, man? What thing in the whole sister-sleeping world got reason,
yara? For what reason you're rich and I'm poor? Where's the reason in
starving, man? God knows how many millions of damn fools living in this
country, man, and you think there's a purpose! Man, I'll tell you—you got to
get what you can, do what you can with it, and then you got to die. That's
reason, rich boy. Everything else is only mother-sleeping wind (Rushdie, 1981,
215-16)!
During their contemporaneous adolescence, Saleem suspects him of parricide and
serial murder, and even when in later life Shiva becomes a war hero and circulates in the
salons of high society (by which time Saleem has been reduced to pavement life), Shiva,
in his conception, never ceases to be "implacable, traitorous, my enemy from our
birth" (409), who finally reveals his true potential and purpose when he is assigned by
the State the task of murdering every last midnight's child. For Saleem, interpreting this
lifelong rivalry is a key to gaining "an understanding of the age" (417) itself, more so
because even though Shiva ensures that the reproductive parts of every midnight's child
are curried and fed to the street dogs of Benares, his own numberless illegitimate
children are simultaneously being born and raised everywhere, "in the boudoirs and
hovels of the nation, a new generation of children, begotten by midnight's darkest
child" (425).
It is the Shivas of India that Rohinton Mistry chooses to focus on in A Fine Balance, as
representatives of the hundreds of millions of Indians for whom any idea of India as a
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nation-state occurs only as harsh irony, and any aspect of national history only
impinges upon their lives as violation. Discarding the possibilities for community,
fraternity and continuity-despite-change that Seth and Narayan establish through the
constructions of family, place, community, and class, Mistry puts together a primary
cast from different classes, locations, faiths, and castes, while the rest include the most
'subaltern' of the social chain— untouchables, slum-dwellers, a beggar-master and his
variously mutilated proteges, and pavement and platform dwellers who do not officially
exist because they live unrecognised existences in illegal slums (even their labour goes
officially unrecorded). Mistry's method of national examination is to narrate an inter¬
connected spectrum of such variedly 'subaltern' "histories from below" including
diverse processes and histories of violation, to see what possibilities of agency,
solidarity and community emerge (endure).6 Where and how do the abandoned gather
together, (and also) where and how do the violated violate each other? How do Indians
outside state and official history "go on"?
Subaltern 'Histories from Below': Mistry's Heteroglossic National Portrait.
In Mistry's novel, even though his characters have no central (Rushdian) interpretative
ambition or paranoia about "swallowing" all of India to be able to inhabit its
multiplicity, they are violated repeatedly in various ways until they cannot be reduced
any further without being killed. In the city, Dina's husband is killed by a reversing
truck; in their village, every member of Ishvar and Om's family is set on fire because,
impatient with the pace of change, they "had dared to break the timeless chain of caste,
[and so] retribution was bound to be swift" (1996, 95). Years later, when they return
for Om's wedding, the same "timeless" nemesis re-violates them in 'modern'
6
These are the lives that Aurora Zogoiby in The Moor's Last Sigh portrays as mere urban "jetsam" in
her later paintings, and Saleem Sinai depicts through Shiva as being no more than a cynical,
mercenary, nation-destroying capacity for chaos and murder. For Aurora, "[these] people's lives, under
the pressure that is only felt at the bottom of a heap, had also become composite, as patched up as
their homes, [...] [until] it was the people themselves who were made of rubbish, [...] collages
composed of what the metropolis did not value" (Rushdie, 1994, 302).
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disguise: the landlord "is a big man now in the Congress Party, they say he will
become a minister in the next elections— if the government ever decides to have
elections" (520). He can now have Om castrated and Ishvar's legs amputated with
official State machinery assisting and protecting him. In Bombay Avinash is found
beaten and murdered for appearing to be of an anti-national temperament in a time of
national Emergency. But as Ania Loomba has cautioned, "the 'powerful' and the
'powerless' are not unitary categories"(1998, 238):
[Therefore] subaltern agency, either at the individual level or at the collective,
cannot be idealised as pure opposition to the order it opposes; it works both
within that order and displays its own contradictions (237). [...] Whoever our
subalterns are, they are positioned simultaneously within several different
discourses of power and of resistance. [...] This also means that any instance
of agency, or act of rebellion can be truthfully assessed in many different ways.
[...] Situating the subaltern within a multiplicity of hierarchies is not enough:
we must also think about the crucial relation between these hierarchies, between
different forces and discourses (239-240).
In Mistry's novel, pavement dwellers bash each other's heads in with bricks because
"one fellow was sleeping in someone else's spot" (1996, 155). At one point, Ibrahim,
the rent collector breaks down under the pressure of being compelled to participate in
the nexus of mutual exploitation:
It's no use, [...]. I cannot do this job, I hate it! Oh, what has my life become!
[...] Forgive me, sister [...]. I did not know, when I brought them, that they
would do such damage. For years I have followed the landlord's orders. Like a
helpless child. He tells me to threaten somebody, I threaten. [...] I am his
creature. Everybody thinks that I am an evil person, but I am not, I want to see
justice done, for myself, for yourself, for everyone. But the world is controlled
by wicked people, we have no chance, we have nothing but trouble and sorrow
(432).
In his extremely polyglossic narrative, Mistry exposes both the limits of middle-class
conceptions of the nation-state as a progressive, modernist project, as well as the actual
implications of inhabiting this society at diverse subaltern (urban and rural) levels. He
presents a range of views expressed by the nationally-'conscious' bourgeoisie who
proclaim nation-building purposes and principles; for Mrs. Gupta, the declaration of
national Emergency comes as "glad tidings":
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Minor irritants in her life were also being eradicated— the Prime Minister's
declaration yesterday of the Internal Emergency had incarcerated most of the
parliamentary opposition, along with thousands of trade-unionists, students, and
social workers. "Isn't that good news? [...] No more strikes and morchas and
silly disturbances (73).
For Nusswan too, "the Emergency is good medicine for the nation" (352), and signals
"a true spirit of renaissance" (371), because "poverty is being tackled head-on" by
the City Beautification Programme that demolishes all its slums. He views the nation¬
wide programme of sterilisations as a timely measure, and all reports of compulsion as
being a CIA rumour. To Nusswan, "at the best of times, democracy is a seesaw
between complete chaos and tolerable confusion. [And | to make a democratic omelette,
you have to break a few democratic eggs" (372). He declares that "at least two
hundred million Indians are surplus to requirements" (372) and could well be
eliminated, because "counting them as unemployment statistics year after year just
makes the numbers look bad" (373) and besides, "people sleeping on pavements gives
industry a bad name" (372). Yet Mistry's heteroglossic method— of juxtaposing such
voices amid portraying the actual implications of the various measures of Emergency
upon the subaltern members of his cast— undertakes a critique of the nation-state (and
implicitly of nationalist discourses and historiography) that reveals the sheer
imaginative distance as well as the violently disruptive relationships between bourgeois
state-based conceptions of the national project and the numerous other histories
comprising an Indian environment. Guha eloquently describes the "failure of the
Indian bourgeoisie to speak for the nation" (Guha and Spivak, 1988, 41). But, he
reminds historians:
There were vast areas in the life and consciousness of the people which were
never integrated into their hegemony. [Yet] the structural dichotomy that arose
from this [...] did not, however, mean that these two domains were hermetically
sealed off from each other and there was no contact between them (41-42).
Mistry's narrative establishes that the Emergency is a constitutional ruse designed to
foil constitutional principles— the bourgeois-state's disagreements with itself that do
not involve or engage these subalterns, yet invariably they pay the heaviest price. Even if
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they are "surplus to requirements", only unofficially existing, they are also the single
national commodity that is freely available. In great detail, he examines the points of
interaction (and inevitable violation and conflict) that arise from inhabiting these distinct
yet simultaneous trajectories— of being subalterns within the modern bourgeois
nation-state. His protagonists are evicted from the slums as part of measures meant to
beautify the city, and are coerced into forced labour on construction sites which the
state and its middle classes consider to be development projects; into forced attendance
at what a cowed media will report as being another well attended Prime-Ministerial
rally; as well as into undergoing the compulsory sterilisations that will improve the
national demographics. Not only does such a narrative span exceed the boundaries of
"elitist" historiograph(ies) that "can do no more than equate politics with the
aggregation of ideas and activities of those who were directly involved in operating
these institutions" (Guha and Spivak, 1988, 40), it exposes diverse instances of what
Chakrabarty has described as the "repression and violence that are as instrumental in
the victory of the modern as is the persuasive power of its rhetorical strategies"
(Mongia, 1996, 242). In a Foucauldian vein, Chakrabarty theorises the "progressivist"
coercion that Mistry narratively demonstrates— through the forced vasectomies, the
abuse of unrecorded, unpaid labour, and the numerous evictions of slum-dwellers in the
name of urban improvement:
The idea is to write into the history of modernity the ambivalences,
contradictions, the use of force, and the tragedies and ironies that attend it. [...]
Nowhere is this irony— the undemocratic foundations of 'democracy'— more
visible than in the history of modern medicine, public health, and personal
hygiene, the discourses of which have been central in locating the body of the
modern at the intersection of the public and the private (as defined by, and
subject to negotiations with, the state). The triumph of this discourse, however,
has always been dependent on the mobilisation, on its behalf, of effective means
of physical coercion. I say 'always' because this coercion is both originary/
foundational (i.e. historic) as well as pandemic and quotidian (Mongia, 1996,
242).
Yet even after discarding every conventional location or possibility of identity and
solidarity (caste, religion, birthplace, family), and exploring the effects of diverse
upheavals upon his characters, Mistry never ceases to inquire into the "contributions
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made by people on their own, that is, independent of the elite" (Guha and Spivak, 1988,
39) towards inhabiting, developing and transforming their environments, which is also
an investigation of the possibility of "acknowledging the subaltern as the maker of his
own destiny" (Guha; quoted in Schwarz and Ray, 2000, 472). If the secret of survival
is "to embrace change, and to adapt" (Mistry, 1996, 230), Ishvar and Om, and indeed
everybody else except Maneck, do so right until the end, even though 'change' only
means successive violations descending upon their lives. Ishvar is ready for further
trials on any terms if they offer the remotest chance of struggle: "giving up already?
That's no way to win in life. Fight and struggle, Om, even if life knocks you around"
(82). With nothing in common between them (not religion, class, gender or
background), they gradually (and unromantically) overcome layers of mutual suspicion,
ignorance and prejudice to perform together the unlikeliest non-familial community for
nearly a year, despite being threatened by different pressures at all times. Mistry
manages to forge a community, brought together by circumstances of accident and
violation, that holds together despite violation, before further violation nearly destroys it.
Though suicide, murder, psychopathic madness, or the weak participating actively in the
exploitation of the weaker are also survival alternatives adopted by other members of
Mistry's cast, he discovers (through enacting the overwhelmingly violent effects of
social and historical circumstances) how such continual disruption itself forces
disparate selves together, and releases unexpectedly plastic (and elastic) capacities for
individual re-definition and collective solidarity where either would seem impossible.
Again, it is only through a comprehensive, fully immersed narrative engagement with
various conflicting processes, sites, dimensions and agents involved in a society's
history that Mistry examines the elasticity of his protagonists, to see what radical
possibilities of community and "oppositional agency" 7 might emerge. Examining his
7
We have already presented how Minu Moallem and Iain Boal theorise "oppositional agency", as a
form of resistance "that is able to recognise the full range of lived experience as the ground of practical
struggle and solidarity" and can "open up spaces in which identities, formed in the welter of political
struggles, remain supple in repertoires, not frozen or cast in official moulds (Kaplan, Alarcon and
Moallem, 1999, 259).
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characters' capacities for reinvention and endurance (endurance through reinvention)
are among Mistry's primary exploratory objectives. Reinvention implies the ability to
assess one's location in an ever-changing environment and continually renegotiate
one's terms accordingly, and to Chakrabarty, such re-inventions are what release
histories:
Contradictory, plural, and heterogeneous struggles whose outcomes are never
predictable, even retrospectively, in accordance with schemas that seek to
naturalise and domesticate this heterogeneity. These struggles include coercion
(both on behalf of and against modernity)— physical, institutional, and
symbolic violence, often dispensed with dreamy-eyed idealism, and it is this
violence that plays a decisive role in the establishment of meaning, in the
creation of truth regimes, in deciding [...] whose and which 'universal' wins
(Mongia, 1996, 241).
And finally, each such distinctly-premised and alternatively-directed trajectory within a
society's history demands of us that we read differently, compelling us to question
(and even revise) our criteria for each separate narrative, rather than subsume them
under pre-defined categories of what constitutes history. Barbara Christian has
articulated in a related context:
It is a learning from the language of creative writers, which is one of surprise, so
that I might discover what language I might use. For my language is very much
based on what I read and how it affects me, that is, on the surprise that comes
from reading something that compels you to read differently. [... | I, therefore,
have no set method, [...] since for me every work suggests a new approach. As
risky as that might seem, it is, I believe, what intelligence means— a tuned
sensitivity to that which is alive and therefore cannot be known until it is known
(Mongia, 1996, 156).
Why Even 'Non-National' Narrative can Never be "Deterritorialised".
Thus we argue, through pursuing such trajectories of alternatively premised,
heterogeneous historicising as Chakrabarty envisions, that what remains for him at the
level of "dreams" for the historian operating "within the knowledge protocols of
academic history", occur as narrative experiments performed repeatedly and diversely
on the discursive terrain of the post-colonial novel (i.e. attempts "to write over the given
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and privileged narratives of citizenship other narratives of human connections" that
have "no (infra)structural sites [...] [to] lodge themselves" (Mongia, 1996, 244)). Yet
this is also the point to highlight how these novels themselves, implicitly, through the
very worldedness of their engagements, caution against any Utopian conceptions of
liberated "deterritorialisation". Arguing against the 'classical realism' that they
theorise as the "root-book" as well as the more modernist book exhibiting the
"radicle-system, or fascicular root",8 Deleuze and Guattari forward instead a
'rhizome' (non-) theory of narrative that appears to express something of the
irrepressible elasticity Mistry's characters display in inhabiting their worlds:
Unlike a structure, which is defined by a set of points and positions, with binary
relations between the points and bi-univocal relationships between the positions,
the rhizome is made only of lines: lines of segmentarity and stratification as its
dimensions, and the line of flight or deterritorialisation as the maximum
dimension after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis, changes in
nature. [...] Unlike the tree, the rhizome is not the object of reproduction [...].
The rhizome is an antigenealogy [...], antimemory [...], a map that must be
produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible,
modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits [...], an acentred, non-
hierarchical, non-signifying system without a General and without an
organising memory or central automaton, defined solely by a circulation of
states (Deleuze and Guattari, 1996, 21).
It is upon such a conception that they base their vision of a potential "nomadology" in
literature:
History is always written from the sedentary point of view and in the name of a
unitary State apparatus, at least a possible one, even when the topic is nomads.
What is lacking is a nomadology, the opposite of a history (23). [...]
The nomads invented a war machine in opposition to the State apparatus.
History has never comprehended nomadism, the book has never comprehended
the outside. The State as the model for the book and for thought has a long
history: logos, the philosopher-king, the transcendence of the Idea, the
interiority of the concept, the republic of minds, the court of reason, the
functionaries of thought, man as legislator and subject. The State's pretension
to be a world order and to root man (24).
Yet, as we have already seen in Mistry and shall continue to establish through the
narrative of Michael K, no novelistic "nomadology", no matter how 'oppositional' or
8
For the full presentation of their formulations of both these 'book-types', see Deleuze and Guattari
(1996,5-6).
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unpredictable its trajectories, can ever exist in unrelated or disengaged opposition to the
various apparatuses of official/State history. Any fictionalised 'nomadology' must
inevitably negotiate the processes and violations of precisely such structures to be able
to emerge as an existentially credible alternative that does not degenerate into fantasy,
private escapism or a contrived theoretical transcendence unattainable to the 'actually
worlded'.
Life and Times of Michael K: Crises of Representing the Subaltern.
In our studies of Shame (and Rushdie's portrayal of Sufiya Zinobia) and Bessie
Head's Maru in the previous section, we have already come across how Gayatri
Spivak redefines the limits of historiographic intervention and representative voicing
'on behalf of the subaltern hitherto effaced from history:
For the (gender-unspecified) 'true' subaltern group, whose identity is its
difference, there is no unrepresentable subaltern subject that can know and
speak itself. [...] The problem is that the subject's itinerary has not been left
traced so as to offer an object of seduction to the representing intellectual. [... |
The question becomes, how can we touch the consciousness of the people, even
as we investigate their politics? With what voice-consciousness can the
subaltern speak (Williams and Chrisman, 1993, 80)?
Her argument takes on Foucault and Deleuze as well as many currents of Western
feminist theory when they appear unproblematically to consider questions of
interpreting and representing 'unmediated, authentic' voices that establish subaltern
historical agency. Yet if, as she concedes— and for the purposes of political activism,
insists— "the intellectual's solution is not to abstain from representation" (80), then
she must work deconstructively and 'archaeologically' with the very incompleteness of
this "trace structure" in a manner of historiographic representation that foregrounds its
own "effacements in disclosure" (acknowledging wherever the irretrievability of voice-
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consciousness compels her to, that "there [remains] no itinerary we can trace here"
(98). Thus:
When we come to the concomitant question of the consciousness of the
subaltern, the notion of what the work cannot say becomes important. [...] This
can be a description of 'investigating, identifying, and measuring [...] the
deviation from an ideal that is irreducibly differential'. [...J The postcolonial
intellectuals learn that their privilege is their loss. [...] Subaltern historiography
must confront the impossibility of such gestures (82).
Coetzee's novel works as another instance of precisely such self-aware problematic
historicising, not only in how it examines questions of the possibility of subaltern
agency in the midst of inhabiting overwhelmingly antagonistic State-directed history,
but because it furthers Mistry's portrayal by confronting within the same narrative the
crises of interpreting and representing such agency in appropriate historiography, both
for a non-subaltern (sympathetic) chronicler as well as for the subaltern subject
himself. The intrigued camp-doctor unleashes image after image upon K in attempting
to understand his enigmatic choices:
He is like a stone, a pebble that, having lain around quietly minding its own
business since the dawn of time, is now suddenly picked up and tossed
randomly from hand to hand. A hard little stone, barely aware of its
surroundings, enveloped in itself and its interior life. He passes through these
institutions and camps and hospitals and God knows what else like a stone.
Through the intestines of the war. An unbearing, unborn creature. I cannot
really think of him as a man (1983, 185).
Elsewhere in a mental letter to K the doctor decides that he now resembles a stick
insect.
You are like a stick insect, Michaels, whose sole defence against the universe of
predators is its bizarre shape. You are like a stick insect that has landed, God
knows how, in the middle of a great wide flat bare concrete plain. You raise
your slow fragile stick-legs one at a time, you inch about looking for something
to merge with, and there is nothing. Why did you ever leave the bushes,
Michaels (204-205)?
The ironies, as well as the 'interpreter's' potential for violence and distortion, as he
vainly attempts to fill his incomprehension, are evident. How can a life appear so free of
its times; how can a being locate himself at such an apparent remove while immersed in
his world's (insistent and violent) demands and enforced becomings? Despite being
easily the most sympathetic and interested government official in the camp, the doctor
can only find terms that are non-human and passive to be able to express his sense of
what K stands for or is 'doing'. He confesses to himself and tries to convince his
colleagues that "K is not wholly of [their] world" (178). Yet, rather than admit his
interpretative incompetence and K's inexpressibility within the terms he wishes to
impose upon him, the doctor in increasing desperation bombards K's silence with
formulations, casting him always in images outside of humanity, historicity, growth and
will. K's intransigent silence annoys him, because it appears to be arrogance that
someone in his position should have no right to: "who is he, after all? [...] A mouse
who quit an overcrowded, foundering ship. Only, being a city mouse, he did not know
how to live off the land and began to grow very hungry indeed. And then was lucky
enough to be sighted and hauled aboard again" (187). The same doctor/historian who
protects K from the impatience and suspicion of the rest of the camp unrelentingly
presses him to speak: "you've got a story to tell and we want to hear it. Start anywhere.
Tell us about your mother. Tell us about your father. Tell us your views on life" (191 -
192). Once K responds to a long harangue by replying that he is not in the war. This
enrages the doctor. "Of course you are in the war, man, whether you like it or not"
(189):
You should have hidden, Michaels. You were too careless of yourself. [...] Did
you think you were a spirit invisible, a visitor on our planet, a creature beyond
the laws of nations? Well, the laws of nations have you in their grip now: they
have pinned you down [...], they will grind you in the dirt if necessary. [... ] The
laws are made of iron, Michaels [...]. No matter how thin you make yourself,
they will not relax. There is no home left for universal souls, except perhaps in
Antarctica or on the high seas (206-207).
Yet ultimately it is the doctor who goes mad (while being stoned by children, he still
pleads with K for a sign, "persecutor, madman, bloodhound, policeman" (229) and
acolyte all at once), from being unable to decide whether after all K is "nothing, no
story of the slightest interest to rational people" (194), or if he is indeed "so obscure
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as to be a prodigy" (195) that only the doctor can save, and ever commemorate (and
even celebrate) in narrative:
Listen to me, Michaels. I am the only one who can save you. I am the only one
who sees you for the original soul you are. [...] I alone see you as ['...] a
human soul above and beneath classification, a soul blessedly untouched by
doctrine, untouched by history [...]. You are precious, [...] you are the last of
your kind [...]. We have all tumbled over the lip into the cauldron of history:
only you [...] have managed to live in the old way, drifting through time,
observing the seasons, no more trying to change the course of history than a
grain of sand does. We ought to value you and celebrate you [...]. But that is
not the way it is going to be. The truth is that you are going to perish in
obscurity [...], and no one is going to remember you but I, unless you yield and
at last open your mouth (207-208).
Resisting Hegemony, and Subaltern Self-Fashioning.
But as this study has argued throughout, not the novel nor the world can ever be a home
for "universal souls", because no being is exempt from thorough existential
immersion. Yet if there is to be an interpretative alternative between the doctor's
impossible idealisations of K having radically (and actively) eluded the demands of
history, and the simultaneous denigrations of him as passive, child-like, even non-
human, Coetzee establishes that such formulation will have to evolve gradually from
within K himself, from out of the inter-related processes of inhabiting and
simultaneously interpreting his own trajectory in the world. Only K, and even then by
degrees, can convert into a distinct historiography his unique approach to inhabiting
history.
Early in the novel, it seems to K that his mother must embody his life's purpose. But
after his mother dies he finds he does not miss her, "except insofar as he had missed
her all his life" (46). The clearest evidence that K is neither 'pre-historically' static nor
passive, and further, not incapable of self-articulation, is that he struggles throughout
the narrative trying to situate himself and direct his own becomings towards those
places and conditions within his world where he thinks he will be happy. What is
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unique about him is that he gradually comes to discover he will settle for nothing else.
His manner of "oppositional agency" will not be a continual Mistrian expanding of
self-elasticity that attempts thereby to contain and endure violation; on the contrary he
will resolutely keep moving and reduce himself until he arrives upon exactly the patch
of earth he is seeking. One of his favourite self- formulations is that he is "a gardener,
because that is [his] nature" (81). Living off an abandoned farm is not thieving,
because "it is God's earth" (53). But this self-image is not invulnerable, nor is his
sense of God's earth otherworldly. For a while he tells himself the reason he gardens is
that "enough men had gone off to war saying the time for gardening was when the war
was over; whereas there must be men to stay behind and keep the gardening alive ]...],
because once that cord was broken, the earth would grow hard and forget her children"
(150). But this purpose, once stated, is found to be too simple, and immediately
unsatisfactory.
Between this reason and the truth that he would never announce himself,
however, lay a gap wider than the distance separating him from the firelight.
Always, when he tried to explain himself to himself, there remained a gap, a
hole, a darkness before which his understanding baulked, into which it was
useless to pour words. [...] His was always a story with a hole in it: a wrong
story, always wrong (150-151).
Coetzee's characters always awarely inhabit opacities, within themselves as much as in
their interpretations of their world. But opacity is never understood to be static or a
vacuum; nor does it arise from the lack of interpretative effort. Michael K. is far from
longing not to be. He has a vision of paradise that is very much of this earth, and is
even momentarily attainable. When he achieves it alone in the veld while waiting for his
seeds to sprout, and "time pour[s] out upon him in an unending stream" (139), K.
learns to "love [this] idleness". Yet this is the closest K. will get to inviolability and
absolute harmony. The narrative cannot stop here, because the world has more
becomings to force upon him yet. The doctor is right to remind him that there is no
room for "universal souls" anywhere. K. is transported back to prison camp as a
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guerilla because there is nothing else he can be doing alone in the mountains, within the
interpretative frame of reference of a state pursuing war against its own citizens.
In Coetzee's narrative, K's growth lies in his coming to articulate his own
uncompromising resistance to the world even as it increasingly imposes itself on him—
this includes redefining the spaces (and times) where he momentarily achieves
happiness and harmony, because none of them are ever outside of history. He realises
that perhaps he is becoming "a different kind of man, [...] if there are two kinds of
man": he is "becoming smaller and harder and drier everyday" (93). Further, K.
comes to see how he resents being thought of as a "body servant", "someone's
creature" (146), so much that he leaves the peace of the farm behind to be alone again.
While there he has not used the farmhouse or any of its machinery usefully, because he
knows it is not the way of life he wants to prolong. He does not build himself anything
permanent to dwell in, nor does he fence off his crops. He is entirely aware of the
reasons he will not work in a camp or accept its food, even if he will not answer any of
the doctor's questions about it (which is what leads to him being labelled a "stick
insect", a "stone", and a "man of earth"). The doctor realises that he "just doesn't
like the food here, profoundly does not like it", that "maybe he only eats the bread of
freedom" (200). From this follows his insistence that K is not of "our world". Yet
this is proven to be entirely inaccurate: K loves the earth, but only on his own terms.
And it is here that Coetzee locates the originality of his opposition— in the terms which
K defines the limits and direction of his own being-in-the-world: which of the world's
violations he has to endure and what he can refuse, and what his irreducible 'standards'
are, irreducible because he has decided so.9 Coetzee establishes again and again his
unvoiced capacity for self-assessment that never leaves history out of account:
9
This is his great difference from Bessie Head's Margaret Cadmore (in Maru) and Rushdie's portrayal
of Sufiya Zinobia, who are shown to become the mere passive 'grounds' (as Lata Mani, Spivak, or
Rajeshwari Sundar-Rajan would put it) cross-traversed by various conflicts and discourses, whereas
any acts of creative or resistive agency are always initiated by others. When Sufiya acts, it is only to
commit mass murder.
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Parasite was the word the police captain had used [...]. Yet to K [..it was no
longer obvious which was host and which parasite, camp or town. [...] What if
there were millions, more millions than anyone knew, living in camps, living off
alms, living off the land, living by guile, creeping away in corners to escape the
times, too canny to put out flags and draw attention to themselves to be
counted? What if the hosts were far outnumbered by the parasites, the parasites
of idleness and the other secret parasites of the police force and the schools and
factories and offices, the parasites of the heart? Could the parasites then still be
called parasites? [...] Perhaps in truth whether the camp was declared a parasite
on the town or the town a parasite on the camp depended on no more than on
who made his voice heard loudest (159-160).
For all K's awareness of the vacuums in self-comprehension that he cannot adequately
fill with language, his resistance to what he will not accept could not be more articulate
(or active):
At least I have not been clever, and come back to Sea Point full of stories of
how they beat me in the camps till I was thin as a rake and simple in the head. I
was mute and stupid in the beginning, I will be mute and stupid at the end.
There is nothing to be ashamed of in being simple. [...] Perhaps the truth is that
it is enough to be out of the camps, out of all the camps at the same time.
Perhaps that is enough of an achievement, for the time being. How many people
are there left who are neither locked up nor standing guard at the gate? I have
escaped the camps; perhaps, if I lie low, I will escape the charity too (248-249).
Only after (and amidst) thoroughly inhabiting some of the worst violations of his
society's history, has he decided which elements within it will not entirely determine his
own choices. He clearly acknowledges the price:
I want to live here forever [...]. It is as simple as that. What a pity that to live in
times like these a man must be ready to live like a beast. [... ] He must live in a
hole and hide by day. A man must live so that he leaves no trace of his living.
That is what it has come to (135).
Thus K refuses both his role as well as the dominant definition of itself that his society
wishes to impose upon him. The doctor thinks of him as an "escape artist" and an
"allegory", of "how scandalously, how outrageously, a meaning can take up residence
in a system without becoming a term in it" (228). But there is nothing transcendental
about K's trajectory or his self-conception: it is the same piece of earth he returns to
where the army captured him before, and then mined so that no 'guerilla' could ever
grow provisions on it again. On his earth, "war [remains | the father of all and king of
all" (1) and K's free hours are numbered.
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As with Mistry's protagonists, Coetzee's narrative enacts through K's development
one of the primary objectives of subaltern historiography— by establishing that K's
agency and activity are neither to be dismissed as pre-politically naive or merely
unconscious and 'backward'. Dipesh Chakrabarty has written of Ranajit Guha's
similar objectives and achievements:
Guha's separation of elite and subaltern domains of the political, had some
radical implications for social theory and historiography. The standard tendency
in global Marxist historiography until the seventies was to look on peasant
revolts organised along the axes of kinship, religion, caste etc. as movements
exhibiting a 'backward' consciousness, the kind that Hobsbawm [...] has
called 'pre-political'. This was seen as a consciousness that had not quite come
to terms with the institutional logic of modernity or capitalism. [...] By
explicitly rejecting the characterisation of peasant consciousness as pre-political
and by avoiding evolutionary models of 'consciousness', Guha was prepared to
suggest that the nature of collective action against exploitation in colonial India
was such that it effectively stretched the imaginary boundaries of the category
'political' far beyond the territories assigned to it in European political thought
(Schwarz and Ray, 2000, 473).10
Further, the novel demonstrates why a narrative "nomadology" can never base itself on
a radically exclusive refusal to engage with the processes and mechanisms of State
history, by performing the ways in which K's 'nomadic' trajectory, no matter how
resolute, is always inextricable from the violations unleashed by the State he inhabits.
Ania Loomba proposes an inclusive narrative approach more akin to the manner of
'worlded' engagements that Mistry and Coetzee demonstrate through their novelistic
performances, than a Deleuzian "post-foundational nomadology" allows for:
Situating the subaltern within a multiplicity of hierarchies is not enough: we
must also think about the crucial relations between these hierarchies, between
different forces and discourses. [...] While many critics believe that post¬
modern ideas of multiplicity and fragmentation make the standpoint of
marginalised historical subjects visible, others argue that post-modernism
carries these ideas to the extreme so that we cannot understand historical
dynamics at all.
10
For instance, another semi-human, 'primitive' and 'pre-historic' image the doctor tries to contain K
within is that of a "genuine little man of earth", made when "someone scuffled together a handful of
dust, spat on it, and patted it together into the shape of a rudimentary man" (220). K is the "kind of
little man one sees in peasant art emerging from the world from between the squat thighs of its
mother-host with fingers ready hooked and back ready bent for a life of burrowing, a creature that
spends its waking life stooped over the soil, [..] while unnoticed as ever somewhere far away the
grinding of the wheels of history continues" (220).
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It is possible to make the case for a more productive synthesis here: we can
abandon the grand narratives which once dominated the writing of history
without also abandoning all analysis of the relationships between different
forces in society [...] [which] should not be thought of as different elements, a
multiplicity of narratives that we can choose between. Their full force is
uncovered only by locating their articulation with each other and with other
social forces. [...] Thus, in order to listen for subaltern voices we need to
uncover the multiplicity of narratives that were hidden by the grand narratives,
but we still need to think about how the former are woven together (1998, 240-
241).
The Beginnings of 'Nation Re-building': Anthills of the Savannah.
We have already come across Kwame Appiah's argument based on which he would
characterise fictions such as Coetzee's (and Mistry's) as novels of the "second stage"
of post-colonial writing, that are to be read as exercises in "delegitimation" "rejecting
the Western imperium, it is true; but also rejecting the nationalist project of the post-
colonial bourgeoisie" (1992, 246):
Africa's postcolonial novelists— novelists anxious to escape neocolonialism—
are no longer committed to the nation; and in this they will seem, as I have
suggested, misleadingly postmodern. But what they have chosen instead of the
nation is not an older traditionalism but Africa— the continent and its people
(246). [...] Postcoloniality [...] is also a post that challenges earlier legitimating
narratives. And it challenges them in the name of the suffering victims of 'more
than thirty republics'. But it challenges them in the name of the ethical
universal; in the name of humanism [...]. And on that ground it is not an ally
for Western postmodernism but an agonist: from which I believe
postmodernism may have something to learn (250).11
In a similar vein, Donald Pease defines a "postnational" narrative practice and
articulates the basis of its difference from the now-discredited narratives of
decolonising nationalism:
11
As with Spivak's frequent discussion of the limits that must necessarily qualify the work of
Foucault, Deleuze, Kristeva and other Western theorists when applied to non-Western histories and
conditions, Appiah points out why post-colonial 'p°st-nabonalism' cannot base itself on Western
postmodernist premises. It is beyond our present scope to enter into the full implications of this
argument, but for his exposition see Appiah (1992), especially pp 240-250.
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Surrogate abjection and unanimous violence have accompanied the wholesale
delinkages of 'national peoples' from the imagined communities in which they
had previously 'experienced' their imagined wholeness. The loss of national
narrativity as an imaginative cushion has released the unmitigated force of the
state's repressive apparatus as a collectively shared experience. [...] The
postnational might be understood as having opened up the gap within national
narratives— in between state power and how to make sense of it— that national
narrativity had covered over. This disruption has violated the belief in their
timelessness that national narratives had previously solicited. It has also
revealed the relation between the nation and its subjects as indistinguishable
from the brute show of state force (O' Donnell, Spring '97, 8).
Pease then adapts a Bhabhan conception of 'performative' national narration to post-
colonial contexts:
[Postnationalism] names the site in-between the nation and the state that is
traversed by these multiple and heterogeneous acts of narration. These narrative
activities inscribe 'national peoples' within a space that is neither organic nor
contractual, neither the origin nor the end of the nation, but in-between the
national and these different acts of narration (3). [...] They have instead
materialised the postnational as the internal boundary insisting at the site where
stateless individuals have not yet consented to state power and the state has not
yet integrated the stateless into its national order (8).
In these two chapters we have attempted to establish how, despite always
acknowledging the immersions of their characters within the overwhelming imperatives
and upheavals of their societies, various novels have nevertheless articulated several
credible trajectories and possibilities of creative coexistence, agency, and solidarity, the
value of which lies in their irreducible heterogeneity. While such re-inscribing of
histories might be considered 'optimistic' in itself, it would be futile to deny, as
narratives such as Mistry's, Seth's and Coetzee's themselves acknowledge, that despite
all such evidence of diverse human irrepressibility on individual and collective levels,
neither the history unleashed by the nation-state nor the implications of its violations
appear to be in any danger of disappearing. For almost all of Africa and India, the
nation-state (however 'failed' it might be in numerous instances) remains the pre¬
dominant political premise and structural paradigm upon which to forge and inhabit any
large-scale collective existence. And therefore it would imply ending the chapter (and
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this study) on a very pessimistic note, if we did not include a single fiction that actually
attempted to reconcile the heterogeneity we have uncovered with the continuing
presence of the nation-state. We would in effect be affirming the impossibility of
negotiating any form of enabling co-existence of such histories within a statist
framework; and that the state and its governing elite must always exist in an
antagonistic, repressive relationship with the irreducible capacities for "oppositional
agency" within its population; and further, that only individual and inter-personal
improvised 'survivals' or small-scale 'non-governmental' premises for collective
existence (e.g. Narayan's Malgudi, Seth's families, shared ethnicity in Achebe's early
fiction) are possible in any creative sense in Africa and India. Yet there do exist
instances of nation-'rebuilding' fictions (or 'post-national' novels in the sense defined
by Appiah and Pease) where these structural divisions are identified, and deeper, more
inclusive experimental performances of a shared national becoming are attempted.
Dismantling Individual Elitism.
In Anthills ofthe Savannah, watching the gathering at a public execution jubilantly jeer
at the condemned men on their way to death, Ikem feels his "tenuous links" with the
crowd "snap totally at that point" (Achebe, 1988, 42): "I knew then that if its own
mother was at that moment held up by her legs and torn down the middle like a piece of
old rag that crowd would have yelled with eye-watering laughter" (42). But instead of
simply remaining another fictionalised instance of an intellectual's slightly overawed
disgust at any rare occasion of proximity with "the people", Ikem in the course of
Achebe's narrative develops from being a self-regarding editor who considers his
newspaper work to be "crusading", to wondering persistently and self-reflexively
"how to connect his essence with earth and earth's people [...] with integrity" (141).
While these terms remain obviously sentimental and patronising, Ikem realises how
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incongruous and limited his youthful idea of entering "public affairs" to be a 'nation-
builder' had been:
But his participation in these affairs had yielded him nothing but
disenchantment and a final realisation of the very term 'public' as applied to
those affairs shrouded as they are in the mist of unreality and floating above
and away from the lives and concerns of ninety-nine percent of the population.
Public affairs! They are nothing but the closed transactions of soldiers-turned-
politicians, with their cohorts in business and the bureaucracy (141).
His "most poignant" journalistic work now seems "to take on the vaporous haze of a
mirage", as does the hypocrisy of the elite, including the conscientious elite, for
"invoking the people's name in whatever [they] do", while at the same time making
sure of their absence, "knowing that if they were to appear in person, their scarecrow
presence confronting our pious invocations would render our words too obscene even
for sensibilities as robust as ours" (141).
After a comprehensive assessment of the state's record of abandonment and
exploitation of its citizens, Ikem diagnoses "the prime failure of this government" as
being "the failure of our rulers to re-establish vital inner links with the poor and
dispossessed of this country" (141), and dismisses his earlier despair as premature,
because only "naive romantics" could have believed that the core of the nation's being
is in "perfect health" (141):
How could it be? Sapped by regimes of parasites, ignorant of so many basic
things though it does know of some others; crippled above all by this perverse
kindliness towards oppression conducted with panache! How could it be in
perfect health? Impossible (141-142).
This disavowal of a facile Armahesque disillusionment at the absence of 'spontaneous'
and sustained social transformation is developed further by a consideration of the limits
of self-reconstructing open to someone of his class and upbringing, even with a newly
expanded consciousness such as his:
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What about renouncing my own experience, needs and knowledge. But could I?
And should I? I could renounce needs perhaps, but experience and knowledge,
how? There seems no way I can become like the poor except by faking. |... | So
for good or ill I shall remain myself, but with this deliberate readiness now to
help and be helped. Like those complex multi-valent atoms |...] I have arms that
reach out in all directions— a helping hand, a hand signalling for help (142).12
Among the re-orientated Ikem's actions, before his murder by the State, are an
unsparing excoriation of the University student body for their self-serving illusions and
duplicities, and a reminder to them that they have no authority, moral, legal or empirical,
to claim to speak for "peasants and workers": "no, you are not a peasant, my good
friend. Sit down. I want a proper peasant [...]. Well, ladies and gentlemen it does
appear we have no proper peasants here tonight. Perhaps they don't even know we are
having this meeting" (156).
He himself apologetically gives up this right of voice as far as the role of subalterns and
women in any transformatory social movement is concerned, and confesses his
presumption and ignorance. Most of all, he recognises, and continually affirms to the
students, how "piecemeal, slow and undramatic" (99), any widespread change would
inevitably have to be:
The sweeping, majestic visions of people rising victorious [...] against their
oppressors and transforming their world with theories and slogans, [...] are at
best grand illusions. The rising, conquering tide, yes; but the millennium
afterwards, no! New oppressors will have been readying themselves secretly in
the undertow long before the tidal wave got really going. [...] Revolution may
be necessary for taking a society out of an intractable quagmire but it does not
confer freedom, and may indeed hinder it (99).
Ikem's friend Chris, who had carved out for himself a niche of supercilious and weary
resignation in the heart of the dictator's Cabinet, is shaken enough by his murder to
12
For comparable critiques, see Neil Lazarus's reflections on the potential (and crucial)
interventionary role of the intellectual in post-colonial national history (Barker, Hulme, and Iversen,
1994, 197-220) as well as his study of Armah (1990), especially Chapters 1 and 2.
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retreat into the provinces, where, apart from his discovery of the countryside for the first
time in his life, he undertakes a short-lived attempt to organise a new centre of
resistance. Yet Achebe makes clear that his own senseless, anonymous killing could
only be interpreted pessimistically within the evaluative standards of what Neil Lazarus
has termed a "literature of disillusionment". Throughout his narrative interrogation of
Kangan society, Achebe never denies its frequently eruptive capacities at various levels
for violence and disorder, but unlike A Man of the People, or Armah's work or
Soyinka's The Interpreters, this is not presented as a final confirmation of the futility
of all transformatory possibilities. Ikem and Chris were only beginning to conceive
gigantic tasks: how can results be expected from work that has not even begun yet?
Ikem challenges the students:
Now tell me, can anything be more elitist, more offensively elitist, than someone
presuming to answer questions that have not even been raised? No I cannot give
you the answer you are clamouring for. Go home and think! I cannot decree
your pet, text-book revolution (158).
Creativity and Agency in Everyday Life.
But it would remain a limited conception of an alternative national society that
examined the possibilities for transformation only among the educated and political
elite. Achebe's social vision traces the beginnings of more creative, participatory
endeavour at numerous other locations— rural and urban, traditional and modern—
outside the governing and interpreting class, to a much greater extent than his earlier
work. At various points his principal characters notice, as if for the first time, the
resourcefulness and "the vitality and thrill" (47) of ongoing life around them:
Now, as the overwhelming force of this simple, always-taken-in-vain reality
impinged on each of Chris' five, or was it six, senses, [...] the ensuing
knowledge seeped through every pore in his skin into the core of his being
continuing the transformation, already in process, of the man he was (204).
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For instance, Chris's growing awareness of his ignorance— of the multiplicity, vitality
and irrepressibly creative agency evident everywhere in the daily life around him—
comes to focus on the construction and vivid decoration of the country's buses that
have been assembled from minimal resources:
That imaginative roadside welder who created the first crude buses might be the
managing director of the transport company that now had a fleet of
Luxuriouses! If there had been no progress in the nation's affairs at the top
there clearly had been some near the bottom, albeit undirected and therefore
only half-realised. [...]
The sign-writers of Kangan did not work in dark and holy seclusions of
monasteries but in free-for-all market-places under the fiery eye of the sun. And
yet in ways not unlike the monks they sought in their work to capture the past
as well as invent a future, f...]
Chris, now fully reconciled to his new condition as a wide-eyed newcomer to
the ways of Kangan made a mental note of these inscriptions (201).
But there is also more organised and self-aware evidence of constructive social
consciousness articulated at different levels and sites of Kangan life. The taxi-driver's
union and the university student party are both multi-ethnic institutions (something
conspicuously absent in Achebe's earlier envisionings of Nigeria) that look upon Ikem
as having inspired and spoken for them, and protest, however futilely, the official
version of his murder. Further, there is the extraordinary instance of the delegation
from Abazon that journeys to the capital to meet the President. Achebe portrays their
confusion within the new political order, where as usual they try to orient themselves by
applying their own proverbs and philosophy to the transformed structures of power
within the nation-state: "it is the place of the poor man to make a visit to the rich man
who holds the yam and the knife" (127). Yet their very decision to make their presence
felt in the capital is an act that moves beyond the status quo of accepting and enduring
their perennial abandonment. In an explicitly different vein from the kin-and-village
oriented (and often unscrupulous-where-necessary) developmental pioneerism
advocated by the Umuofia Progressive Union in No Longer at Ease, the old Abazonian
proclaims pride in their outspoken kinsman Ikem for being their "eye and ear" in the
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capital, not because it brings them material benefits (quite the opposite; it attracts the
rancour of the President), but because Ikem's outspoken editorials are important to the
whole of the country:
But leave this young man alone to do what he is doing for Abazon and for the
whole of Kangan; the cock that crows in the morning belongs to one household
but his voice is the property of the neighbourhood. You should be proud that
this bright cockerel that wakes the whole village comes from your compound
(122).
His declaration ends with a musing on the possibly futile imperative to make their
voices heard: "my people, that is all we are doing now. Struggling. Perhaps to no
purpose except that those who come after us will be able to say: True, our fathers were
defeated but they tried"' (128). Achebe thus performs through the old man and the
delegation the possibilities of re-formulating both Abazon's ethnically-premised
'traditional' identities as well as their pre-colonial values and world-views towards
entering a modern political framework for purposes more constructive than ensuring
their share of the "national cake". Even though the mission fails in its purpose, he
examines the extent to which it is possible to articulate adequate interpretations of the
dynamics of a modernising society based upon a grounding in 'traditional' modes of
thought, and establishes that a community consciousness thus conceived might be re¬
orientated and mobilised constructively into an identity platform to demand progressive
changes on behalf of an entire national society. Going along with Cabral and Fanon
(and Ngugi's similar expedition in Petals ofBlood), Basil Davidson argues that "the
struggle for [... | liberation in these circumstances, closing the gap between the few and
the many, building a new consciousness of united community, becomes a determinant
ofculture as well as a liberating force (1994, 260).
Yet no 'postnational' social re-building is ultimately achieved in the world of Achebe's
novel: i.e. scenarios in which the State has moved from being autocratic "directors" of
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national society to its "facilitators", in Appiah's words, "mobilising and enabling
social allegiances that are largely autonomous" (1992, 274). Indeed, in its narrative
detail, the novel never ceases to stress the numerous, entrenched social, systematic and
attitudinal obstacles on diverse levels that undermine any effort in such directions, thus
continually asking but unable to answer Beatrice's question: "what must a people do to
appease an embittered history" (220). Cut short by their premature murders, the self-
redefining of the novel's intellectuals remains bound within its self-glorifying limits,
and there are as yet no pervasively disseminated mobilising forces or ideologies that
can organise and direct the vitality (and desire for change) evident within the population
towards any lasting structural transformations. The novel exposes the "public affairs"
of Kangan for their extraordinary irrelevance and 'thinness' when the personality
clashes and private histories of three schoolmates takes over the history of the country.
Chris' dying joke (about being the last of the "green bottles" that ruled the country),
remains another symbolic possibility the narrative offers but cannot yet affirm the
realisation of: the conviction that "this world belongs to the people of the world, not to
any little caucus, no matter how talented" (232).
Re-Constructing the Nation: Reconceived Possibilities and their Limits.
Achebe's narrative situates itself within a world still ruled by a repressive, dictatorial
regime, that employs (and maintains in terrified sycophancy) an alienated, cynical
bureaucracy composed of some of the country's brightest young men for the daily
running of state affairs, thus "revealing a more or less total alienation of governors
from governed, intellectually and morally, and in all the customary attachments of
everyday life" (Davidson, 1994, 249).13 Neil Ten Kortenaar argues that "Achebe's
13
Historians such as Basil Davidson and Kwame Appiah have argued that the sources of such
endemic post-colonial autocracy (and all the consequences of structurally entrenched exploitation and
alienation) can be traced to the perpetuated inheritance of "autocratic centralism which had
characterised the colonial state" (Davidson, 1994, 248). For their accounts of such a perspective see
Davidson (1994, 248-250) and Appiah (1992, 264-266)
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(re-)invention of the nation state requires that he close two circles: the circle joining the
national elite and the masses (which he initiates through Chris, Ikem and Beatrice), and
another that joins the traditional participatory community of Abazon with the mass
society of Kangan" (Irele, Fall '93, 65). These then are the simultaneous premises of
the experimental performance the novel attempts. First of all, it examines the extent to
which in Kangan, as Appiah has put it:
[Everyday] life was not a brutish war of all against all. Life went on. Not only
did people not 'get away with murder'. Even though the police would usually
not have been in a position to do anything about it if they did, but people made
deals, bought and sold goods, owned houses, married, raised families (1992,
273).
Secondly, along with thinkers such as Appiah and Davidson (and moving in a different
direction from his own earlier novels that focus on the disruptive, unscrupulous and
'anti-nationalist' mobilisations of ethnic and regional identity within a multi-ethnic
society), Achebe in Anthills... investigates the viability of creatively participating in
contemporary social and political life "through the shared and intelligible norms that
grew out of the responses of pre-colonial cultures to their engagement with European
imperialism" (Appiah, 1992, 273), as an alternative paradigm to repressive, centralised
State government. This later novel is 'post-nationalist' not only in the sense that it
attempts to deconstruct the convictions that underlie both the attitudes and the structures
within which (even) Kangan's (conscientious) elite shuts itself off from any wider
social contact, but also in how it moves beyond the earlier 'nation-building' conviction
(widely held by the first wave of decolonising parties and leaders) that "the ancestral
model could no longer work, while suggesting, at the same time, that the European
model was the substitute which could meet those very problems of the 'modern world'
against which the ancestral charters struggled in vain" (Davidson, 1994, 258). But if, as
Davidson argues, "no one now disputes the centrality of popular participation and the
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human factor as the only viable development paradigm for Africa", Achebe's narrative,
in various rural and urban settings, and 'traditional' as well as modern modes of
gathering, explores the possibility of the restoration of democratic participation at
different levels of social life. Especially in the Abazonian decision to send a delegation
to the capital, Achebe enacts a re-articulation of identity that is shown to evolve
enablingly as part of "a history of changing responses to economic, political and
cultural forces" (Appiah, 1992, 289). This is possibly the novel's most significant
post-Statist experiment— its attempts to examine the possibilities of re-structuring the
autocratic, alienated governing apparatus inherited and perpetuated by the first
generations of African nation-builders through a non-nostalgic re-negotiation with pre-
colonial forms of community, thus performing the rehistoricising endeavour that
Davidson has described as being already underway in various African societies:
Moving beyond this nation-state can only be a gradual process; and this
process will need to draw whatever encouragement it can from Africa's own
experience. [...] Not of course with any idea of returning to the past, but
looking to those principles and attitudes and moralities of power control, and of
power sharing in community, that proved repeatedly valuable wherever they
were applied, or left failure behind them wherever they were not (1994, 289).14
Conclusion: Challenging, or Expanding, National Discussion.
The method of this section has continued to be one of locating narratives on an
exploratory spectrum, to be able to examine and compare a range of sites, trajectories
and novelistic treatments without subsuming them under the same categories. But the
exploratory route that all of these works undertake in common is a comprehensive
engagement with the processes and circumstances of their particular worlds, because no
establishment of heterogeneously premised human trajectories would be credible
without having passed through such thoroughly 'worlded' existential examination.
14
For another narrative that performs how a newly conceived society attempts to find its form on
various levels, from the interpersonal to the parliamentary, and encompasses unresolved conflicts of
race, class, gender etc. simultaneously and interactively, see Gordimer's None to Accompany Me
(1994), set in a post-apartheid South Africa.
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Also, we have seen how none of the novels establish any capacities for resolution as
either universal or final; neither can they claim radical alterity in any Deleuzian
'nomadological' sense that refuses to engage with the implications of inhabiting the
often-imposed hegemony of the nation-state.
Yet we have argued that each of these narratives is premised upon original existential
and hermeneutic strategies; alternatively formulated criteria through which the relations
between selves in particular worlds are appraised, and their circumstances are then
negotiated, endured, and/or resisted with extraordinary ingenuity. Such heterogeneous
histories (and modes of historicising) are impossible to contain within any single
teleology of the nation-state, or indeed other all-encompassing conceptions such as a
Naipaulian 'universal civilisation' or Jameson's 'third-world national allegories'. As
Ranajit Guha affirms, one motive behind exploring such alternatives, for novelists as
much as for historians and theorists, has been precisely the disenchantment with such
ultimately hegemonic historical (and historiographic) models in their applications to the
diverse conditions of post-colonial societies. Though Chakrabarty reminds us that the
"equating of a certain version of Europe with 'modernity' is not the work of
Europeans alone; third world nationalisms, as modernising ideologies par excellence,
have been equal partners in the process" (Mongia, 1996, 242),15 numerous later critics
have noted that in Africa (and India) "the narrative of liberation that saw as its task the
realisation of the truths of the nation in the face of colonialist disfigurement has given
way to a narrative that challenges the nation and the identity wrought by independence"
(Irele, Winter '90, 86). In the same article Edna Aizenberg goes on to ask if "the novel
15
For instance, Kadiatu Kanneh points out a curiosity in the writings of a liberation theorist such as
Fanon, that for someone who deconstructs so thoroughly words such as "revolution", "liberation",
and "the people", there is a certain unquestioning acceptance of the sign of "nation" (1998, 91). Fanon
assumes that the term has some pre-defined stability readily comprehensible and translatable to
Algeria, and moreover that with education and the development of political consciousness, a 'nation'
is 'naturally' what modern independent Algerian society will cohere to be. No other paradigm for a
collectively inhabited modernity is even considered. This is the mode of post-colonial nationalism
(also common to leaders such as Nehru, Nkrumah, Kenyatta and others) that leads to Chakrabarty's
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now combats the very thing it once sought to create".16 The techniques of earlier
"national romances" will no longer suffice, in which "centralisation of authorship
accorded well with the optimal national programme of self-improvement and unity to be
carried out by great individuals": authorship must now capture the "heterogeneity and
rough-hewness of its world" (Irele, Winter '90, 93-94).
Of course any degree of engagement with (most) post-colonial histories would have to
take into narrative account the numerous instances of what Pease has described as the
"surrogate abjection and unanimous violence [that| have accompanied the wholesale
delinkages of national peoples from the imagined communities in which they had
previously 'experienced' their imagined wholeness" (O'Donnell, Spring '97, 8). If
'nationality' then has failed to preserve any distinction between "subjectivity and
subjection" (O'Donnell, Spring '97, 8), then all such heterogeneous historicising
forms part of the search for less coercive possibilities of solidarity that can effectively
endure and resist the transitions and violations of a society's history. If achieving the
nation-state is understood as an attained (Hegelian) acme of European, and decolonised
non-Western, modernity, then articulating diverse versions of such 'post-nationalism'
as we have examined forms part of post-coloniality's indigenously conceived
subsequent project. But this search for 'post-nationalist' re-articulations should not be
thought of as merely reactive, that sets out only to "redress" a felt "lack" or
"incompleteness" of histories that find themselves inadequate in terms of certain
criteria by which Western political paradigms interpret 'becoming-in-history' (i.e.
citizenship and modernity as achieved through the nation-state). Such recasting is active
conclusion about how decolonisation narratives actually become 'subaltern' themselves to the master
narrative ofEuropean modernity.
16
For instance, in Ngugi's fictional techniques of "flashbacks, multiple narrative voices, movement
in time and space and parallel biographies and stories", she reads efforts to "plumb the incoherence" of
the 'Kenyan' nation (Irele, Winter '90, 89-90). As Simon Gikandi notes of similarly utilised
heteroglossia in Anthills of the Savannah (Irele, Fall '93, 49), these novelists uncover a "crisis of
meaning" in which the "power to narrate is dispersed, and discourse is disseminated", which he
interprets as a challenge to the paradigm of centralised State authority.
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in its re-inscriptions, in how it "effectively stretches the imaginary boundaries of the
category 'political' far beyond the territories assigned to it in European political
thought" (Schwarz and Ray, 2000, 473). For instance, as Chakrabarty goes on to point
out about the achievements of 'subaltern studies':
In rejecting the category 'pre-political', [...] Guha insists on the specific
differences in the histories of power in colonial India and in Europe. This
gesture is radical in that it fundamentally pluralises the history of power in
global modernity (Schwarz and Ray, 2000, 475).
This section has introduced an understanding of the ways in which African and Indian
novels have successfully split, challenged, expanded and thereby redefined the
'national' sign. In so doing, the post-colonial novel has been able to extend the range
of existential discussion the form is capable of, always by re-utilising its uniquely
flexible capacities for inscribing diverse histories and evoking their specific fullness. In
such fiction, neither the novel nor the nation is accepted as a pre-defined matrix: the
novel performs inter-related experiments of form, focus, and means in each "attempt to
write over the given and privileged narratives of citizenship other narratives of human
connections [...] so that the world may once again be imagined as radically
heterogeneous" (Mongia, 1996, 244).
Section 5: Conclusion: The Worlds Within Texts.
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Edward Said has devoted a large part of his critical career to articulating a dichotomy
that he finds to be an influential premise (or a tendency, an unchallenged
assumption) in much contemporary theory and criticism. It is the same divide-
between the activities of reading texts and undertaking a comprehensive
interrogation of various aspects of being-in-the-world as being somehow separate-
that we pointed towards at the beginning of this study and promised to address
implicitly through its very performance, by demonstrating that a 'literary' study in no
way excludes an examination of the world the text describes and arises from. On the
contrary, our unifying thematic preoccupation has been to establish, through all the
different directions and sub-explorations we have undertaken, that the discussion of
'worldly' dimensions (as well as questions of interpreting and representing them in
narrative) is fundamental to the writing of novels, and thereby to our analysis of
them, and that this inclusive capacity is an essential part of what makes them
existentially relevant.
Worlds or Textuality: Contrasting Foucault and Derrida.
At the heart of The World, the Text, and the Critic, Said's book-length attempt to
articulate a criticism that can "travel" "between culture and system" and discuss in
free inter-relation issues relating to 'text' and 'world' simultaneously, 1 Said sets up a
comparative study of the premises, methods and hermeneutic horizons of Foucault
and Derrida as a crystallised exploration of his preoccupations. For Said, there
operates "a highly schematic divergence dramatised by the polemical conflict
between Derrida and Foucault" (183), in which for the former, "(if] the text is
1
"For if texts are a form of impressive human activity, they must be correlated with (not reduced to)
other forms of impressive, perhaps even repressive, and displacing forms of human activity" (Said,
1991,225).
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important [...] because its real situation is literally a textual element with no ground
in actuality, [...] then for Foucault, the text is important because it inhabits an
element of power (pouvoir) with a decisive claim on actuality, even though that
power is invisible or implied" (1991, 183).
Yet after an essay in which he presents at length the epistemologies and
interpretative significance of both theoretical positions, Said ultimately
acknowledges dissatisfaction with the restrictive implications of either horizon.2 On
the one hand, he wonders if deconstructionists, for all their (fundamental)
affirmations to the contrary, run the danger of becoming "promulgators of a new
orthodoxy" (200). But even though he decides that "Derrida has gone to
extraordinary lengths to provide his readers (and his students, in France and
elsewhere) with a set of counterconcepts" and has been "most careful to say that
even his affirmative deconstructive technique is not a programme to replace the old-
style philosophic system (209), Said finds that:
It has not, from its unique vantage point, illuminated in sufficient detail, the
thing he refers to in his account of the corps enseignant, that is the contrat
entre ces corps (bodies of knowledge, institutions, power), a contract hidden
because jamais exhibe sur le devant de la scene" (211).
His primary doubt is to do with how "the texts to which this position has been
applied by Derrida have also been denied their historical density, specificity and
weight":
Derrida's Plato, Rousseau, Mallarme, and Saussure: are all these just texts, or
are they a loose order of knowledge from the point of view of a liberal
believer in Western culture? [...] What makes it possible for a certain system
of metaphysical ideas, as well as a whole structure of concepts, praxes, and
ideologies derived from it, to maintain itself from Greek antiquity through the
present? What forces keep all these ideas glued together? What forces get
them into texts? How does one's thinking become infected, then taken over
by those ideas? Are all these things matters of fortuitous coincidence, or is
2 An argument we are not able to fully engage with within our present context, just as we are unable to
undertake an independent appraisal of either Foucault or Derrida. Yet, even though it is therefore
slightly intellectually unjustifiable to say so, we do broadly endorse Said's conclusions on both their
positions, and moreover find the distinction very useful to adapt to our own purposes.
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there in fact some relevant connection to be made, and seen, between the
instances of logocentrism and the agencies perpetuating it in time (211)?
Said's counter is that the 'tradition' thus at work is "an apparatus with power and a
lasting historical, actual imprint on human life. But it needs some greater degree of
specification than Derrida has given it" (211):
And so in reading Derrida's work we marvel at what keeps the ideas of
western metaphysics there in all the texts at night and during the day, for so
long a period of time" (211)?
Clearly, Said is not about to exchange a paradigm of "the great literary text" of "self
delighting humanism" studied as an "isolated paddock in the broad cultural field"
(225), which he refuses entirely, for one which envisions all textuality as being just
more opportunity for equal and endless deconstruction. Yet by the end of the essay,
he has also rejected a purely Foucauldian position to build upon for his own project
of reconsidering the interactive, multivalent relationships between texts and their
worlds. Said finds deeply problematic Foucault's insistence on the all-creating, all-
consuming absoluteness of an abstraction he terms power: a "theoretical
overtotalisation" (242) that is ultimately unhelpful. To assert that "power is
everywhere" as he finds the later Foucault to be doing, is "vastly simplified" (244):
Is it not simply wrong [...] to say that power is not based anywhere and that
struggle and exploitation— both terms left out of Foucault's analyses— do
not occur? The problem is that Foucault's use of the term pouvoir moves
around too much, swallowing up every obstacle in its path (resistances to it,
the class and economic bases that refresh and fuel it, the reserves it builds
up), obliterating change and mystifying its microphysical sovereignty. [...] In
fact Foucault's theory of power is a Spinozist conception (245).
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Resisting Theory: Said on a 'Critical Consciousness'.
Throughout the book, and especially during this comparative essay that brings out
the contrast between two fields of theory when applied to their fullest extent, Said
reflects more generally on the constitutive significance of theor(ies), as well as their
limits within activities of interpretation:
Theory [...] can never be complete, just as one's interest in everyday life, is
never exhausted by simulacra, models, or theoretical abstracts of it. Of course
one derives pleasure from actually making evidence fit or work in a
theoretical scheme, and of course it is ridiculously foolish to argue that 'the
facts' or 'the great texts' do not require any theoretical framework or
methodology to be appreciated or read properly. No reading is neutral or
innocent, and by the same token every text and reader is to some extent the
product of a theoretical standpoint, however implicit or unconscious such a
standpoint may be (241).
But it is essential to his articulation of the requirements of a "critical consciousness"
to define and then distance himself from any form of theoretical absolutism:
I am arguing, however, that we distinguish theory from critical consciousness
by saying that the latter is a sort of spatial sense, a sort of measuring faculty
for locating or situating theory, and this means that theory has to be grasped
in the place and the time out of which it emerges as a part of that time,
working in and for it, responding to it [...]. The critical consciousness is
awareness of the differences between situations, awareness too of the fact that
no system or theory exhausts the situation out of which it emerges or to
which it is transported. [...] Indeed I would go as far as saying that it is the
critic's job to provide resistances to theory, to open it up toward historical
reality, toward society, toward human needs and interests, to point up those
concrete instances drawn from everyday reality that lie outside or just beyond
the interpretive area necessarily designated in advance and thereafter
circumscribed by every theory (241-242).
The Novel as the Terrain of 'Critical Consciousness'.
In the section appraising Derrida, at one point Said notes "one important thing in his
choice of texts. Most are texts in which there is very little [fictional | narrative, or
texts that use narrative to illustrate a point [...] [which then] draw Derrida's
suspicious attention to the author's elisions and complicities, or [...] to what the
author tries to tell and obscure at the same time" (192). Yet, he asks, "what does this
avoidance of narrative mean" (192):
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Now, unlike other texts, the realistic novel is governed by a different [...]
mode of representation. Though it is true of course that many novels use the
same device of a storyteller recounting a story to an audience, this device is
incorporated into the novel, and is therefore an already admitted fiction. ['...]
Moreover [...] many modern novels often are themselves about the
alternation of writing and speaking— an alternation that does not favour
speech over writing— and the alternation of presence and absence. The very
problematic of textuality is neither eluded nor elided, but made into an
explicit intentional and constitutive aspect of the narrative. [...] The point is
that these motifs, which are the very ones in a sense constructed by Derrida's
criticism, already exist in narrative not as a hidden (hence inadvertent)
element but as a principal one. Such texts cannot therefore be deconstructed,
since their deconstruction has already been begun self-consciously by the
novelist and by the novel. Thus this aspect of narrative poses the challenge, as
yet not taken up, of what there is to be done, after deconstruction is well
under way, after the idea of deconstruction no longer represents elaborate
intellectual audacity (193). [...] In all this we have two things with which
deconstruction as a general interpretative strategy, based on allegedly
universal characteristics of western thought, cannot deal: writing as a highly
complex surface activity and formal element in narrative: two, writing that
appears already differentiated from other activities not because of some
preordained decision, but as the consequence of a historical evolution unique,
and yet absolutely crucial, to the narrative form itself (194).
Our argument throughout this study has been that novels are always, already
necessarily 'worlded' from within, and that therefore it is possible to remain inside a
purely 'literary' discussion, and never abandon examining other relevant aspects of
human existence simultaneously. It is what we termed 'novelistic criticism' in our
introductory section (an interpretative perspective akin to a Bakhtinian conception of
"sociological stylistics"), and have attempted to practice subsequently, that we now
present as a response to Said's question, about "what there is to be done after
"deconstruction is well under way, after the idea of deconstruction no longer
represents elaborate intellectual audacity" (193). Said makes clear his own
underpinnings as a critic:
My position is that texts are worldly, to some degree they are events, and,
even when they appear to deny it, they are nevertheless a part of the social
world, human life, and of course the historical moments in which they are
located and interpreted. [...] Each essay in this book [therefore] affirms the
connections between texts and the existential actualities of human life,
politics, societies and events (1991, 4-5).
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There is evidently a crucial difference in our self-positionings. Said defines textual
'worldedness' much more as a matter of the interventionary implications of texts-in-
their-worlds, rather than the worlds-within-fictional-texts. Of course such
explorations can co-exist without contradiction and complement each other fruitfully
and analogously, but the difference in critical location is fundamental. We have
argued that fiction is ontologically 'worlded' in its very modes of discussion, and
that the apparent dichotomy between text and world is dissolved within the novelistic
text itself, as much as by the Saidian project of reintroducing the context of the world
outside in which it is an ongoing event. We have shown by now that the novel, in
Said's words, itself both "commands and indeed permits, invents, all its
misrepresentations and misreadings, which are [here] functions of the text" (199), as
well as simultaneously operates as "the activation of an immensely complex tissue of
social forces" (215). If the former can be seen as fiction's self-deconstructive
dimension, then, as we analysed in the case of The Trial, it is epistemologically
inseparable from the novel's heteroglossic investigations of being-in-the-world,
rather than an alternative theoretical option. Moreover, the multivalent
comprehensiveness of fictional interrogation in which disparate formal, ideological,
theoretical and hermeneutic conflicts are enacted simultaneously— whereby each
position is challenged, filled out, extended, redefined— might offer precisely the
discursive ground upon which to premise the sort of critical 'resistance' to exclusive
theorising that Said enunciates. Because not only do novels accommodate
disagreeing perspectives, but they are embodied within living characters, socialised,
and therefore represented as 'worlded', dynamic, open-ended conflicts. This is why
we propose that the novel, uniquely among discourses, can provide performances of
the "spatial sense" that Said describes, "for locating or situating theories]" whereby
they can be "grasped in the place and the time out of which [they] emerge as a part of
that time, working in and for it, responding to it [...]. [A novelised] consciousness is
awareness of the differences between situations, awareness too of the fact that no
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system or theory exhausts the situation out of which it emerges or to which it is
transported" (241-242).
And this inter-animating merger, of the 'alternatives' of thoroughly situated and
historicised discourse that is also polyglossic, formally and hermeneutically self-
reflexive, and therefore textually self-deconstructive, can have further dichotomy-
dissolving implications. For instance, Lukacs famously accuses Heidegger of an
unacceptably 'ahistorical' formulation of 'Being':
I cannot refrain from drawing the reader's attention to Heidegger's
description of human existence as a "thrownness-into-being". A more graphic
evocation of the ontological solitariness of the individual would be hard to
imagine. [...] This implies not merely that man is constitutionally unable to
establish relationships with things or persons outside himself, but also that it
is impossible to determine theoretically the origin and goal of human
existence.
Man, thus conceived, is an ahistorical being (1995, 190).
Again, it is not within our present scope to debate with Lukacs by considering
Heidegger's philosophy in any detail; we merely point out that such a dichotomous
critique could not be made regarding the world of a novel, which evokes perspectives
upon the fullness of beings immersed in worlds while at the same time always
situating them specifically and revealing their life-trajectories to be social, multi-
layered and dynamic. Even more, as part of its range of efforts to engage with
specific stories and distinct voices, these novels are often re-inscribed formally with
a radical flexibility that does not obey any prescriptive injunctions (such as Lukacs's
beloved 'critical realism'); nor do these works adhere to any formal-thematic
determinism such as Kwame Appiah indicates between 'realist' novels (that
supposedly 'promote' nationalism) followed by 'post-realism' that challenges it. And
finally we have seen— in the works of Tolstoy, Rushdie, Bessie Head, Coetzee, and
Achebe—- that discursive 'praxis' and meta-fictional meditation are often
inextricably correlated within the novel as an integral part of its performance.
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Such are the premises upon which we have interpreted the implications of diverse
novelistic envisionings, and simultaneously practiced ourselves aspects of the
multivalent, 'worlded' criticism Said articulates:
|That would be] always situated, [...] sceptical, secular, reflectively open to
its own failings. This is by no means to say that it is value-free. Quite the
contrary, for the inevitable trajectory of critical consciousness is to arrive at
some acute sense of what political, social and human values are entailed in
the reading, production, and transmission of every text. To stand between
culture and system is therefore to stand close to [...] a concrete reality about
which political, moral, and social judgements have to be made, and, if not
only made, then exposed and demystified (1991, 26).
Only, as with Bakhtin, we found ample opportunity for such criticism within the
worlds opened up by novels.
The Extent of Novelistic Engagement with Post-Colonial National Life.
The novels examined in the course of this study do not dismiss national frameworks
or nationalist discourses a priori as being either anachronistic or atavistic, as has
been fashionable in so many intellectual quarters; nor do they homogenise disparate
versions and phases of post-colonial nationalism and collapse them under the same
critical categories. On the other hand they do not succumb to the temptations of
partisan 'nativism', the dangers of which critics such as Said, Fanon and Bhabha
have outlined. Thus, such narratives fail to provide many instances of the
homogenising 'sociological solidity' that Anderson describes as their crucial function
in fashioning "imagined communities". Nor did we find them to be anywhere near as
ideologically coercive, conformist, or monologically reducible to the interests of a
nationalist elite such as Said suggests, for instance, as being true of all English
novels in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Further, we have argued that post-
colonial fictions perform diversely and repeatedly the potential project of inscribing
voices, social locations and individual or communal trajectories that remain
irreducible to the categories of any nationalist horizon--- historiographic
heterogeneity such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, Spivak, Said, Bhabha, and the subaltern
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historians discretely envision— while at the same time engaging thoroughly with the
implications of inhabiting nationally framed societies and their hegemonic
discourses. Such re-inscription— and the related issues that emerge (such as that of
belonging to the class with the privilege of interpreting and representing)—
inevitably implies a high degree of hermeneutic self-scrutiny. But when such
questions are themselves embodied within novels and performed to the point of
crisis, their resonances are explored simultaneously in their socio-political and
structural origins and inevitably lead on to discussions of the material and
interpretative implications of inhabiting the nation-state at various levels, as well as
possibilities of resistance and redefinition (as opposed to being restricted merely to
discussions of textual surfaces).
A Refusal to 'Conclude'.
Throughout the course of this study, we have made subjective, fluid, and mobile
connections between themes, theories and texts set far apart in time and space,
believing such a practice to be possible and useful, but it is the refusal to add another
horizon (to historiographies, narrative forms, or theoretical interpretations) to the
vast number already available, that keeps us from summarising— and therefore
arresting, essentialising and/or homogenising— our discussions into any overarching
formulations of either 'post-colonial nationhood' or the workings of its narratives. It
is 'novelism' itself that cautions us against any final statements by reminding us of
the fullness of human existence as well as its own expressive limits each time it
initiates another attempt at narrative— again inevitably particular and bounded,
inevitably just another fiction. Besides, not only are we reluctant to perform such
subsuming, but the extent of comparative historical and literary analysis (including
fictions from other places and phases of world history) required to convincingly
establish any such formulations is well beyond the scope of this study. Yet we should
clarify that each separate discursive framework undoubtedly has its hermeneutic and
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political utility, and that we emphatically do not wish to revert to an advocacy of
'free-for-all' interpreting, where no approach has any more validity than another. The
sheer thematic range, depth and detail of engagement that we have demonstrated on
behalf of novelistic discourse should secure us against such accusations of
'cosmopolitan' irresponsibility. But if our objective really is, as Radhakrishnan has
formulated about 'feminist historiography', "not to set up a different and
oppositional form of totality, but to establish a different relationship to totality"
(Castle, 2001, 193-194), we remain content to have illustrated our primary thesis:
that of fiction being a uniquely flexible, 'worlded', and multivalent mode of
discursive interrogation. Even if the novel is inherited from the same phases of
Western history that produced the nation-state, these novelists have done much more
than 'derivatively' reproduce what Chakrabarty worries is the "everyday subalternity
of non-Western histories" (Mongia, 1996, 240). To adapt a term of Chakrabarty's,
they have "provincialised" this medium repeatedly and diversely, and have
cumulatively performed a singularly demanding demonstration (and confirmation) of
the dialogic, re-inscriptive elasticity possible within fictional narrative.
Do Nations Learn from their Novels?
In the first chapter of our second section, we promised to return to Timothy
Brennan's hypothesis as to whether the performative, heteroglossic, experimental
qualities of the novel can themselves operate as a manner of nationalist pedagogy. To
recapitulate, Brennan's synthesis brings Anderson and Bhabha together: to him, the
novel is pedagogic because of being "performative" in its unique Bakhtinian way. By
embodying and performing "a hodgepodge of the ostensibly separate 'levels of style'
corresponding to class; a jumble of poetry, drama, newspaper report, memoir and
speech; a mixture of the jargons of race and ethnicity" (1989, 10), Brennan argues
that fiction demonstrates to the diverse members of the nation that if they can be
shown to co-exist interactively within one textual narrative, perhaps they could
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inhabit history together as well under the framework of a single nation. He thus
redirects the implications of the novel's capacity for heteroglossia from the text back
into the world it arises from, in proposing that such narrative demonstration
"implicitly" answered for Europe how she was to prevent a "continual, chaotic
splintering" of former empires and papal realms, by "objectifying" in its very form
"the nation's composite nature" (10). Further, in the novel's hands 'tradition'
becomes an "useable past", "and the evocation of deep, sacred origins—instead of
furthering unquestioning, ritualistic affirmations of a people (as in epic)—becomes a
contemporary, practical means of creating a people" (9).
So, can the non-monologic, non-pedagogic novel be the blueprint and the
embodiment of a post-colonial "longing for form"? On the one hand, we have Leela
Gandhi's stern reminder that it would be a superficial and impoverishing reversion
into a tradition of textual/aesthetic valorisation encompassing Romantic, New
Critical and even post-structuralist tendencies "that starts to treat the [novelistic] text
as an end in itself, or as an improvement upon the hopeless inadequacies of political
realities" (1998, 157).3 But even more we realise that a study that has insistently
focused on the worlds within texts, cannot suddenly turn in its last paragraph to
Saidian questions of its implications in the outside world, and measure the ways in
which such events have been interventions in national histories. Furthermore, we
have studied only fictional representations, not histories or sociologies, of post-
colonial nations, which allows us therefore to conclude legitimately only about the
workings of novels, rather than the directions of actual histories. That is clearly the
subject for (numerous) other alternatively premised and directed studies.4 We simply
3
See Gandhi (1998, 157-162) for a fuller critique.
4
It must be clarified that we are not for a moment refuting such work or ignoring its possible
importance, only confessing to lack the resources within our research for either conducting any such
historiographies or pronouncing such verdicts. See Barbara Harlow's book on Resistance Literature
(1987) as an instance of such analysis, in how she conflates historical, political, autobiographical and
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do not know enough about the conditions of production and consumption of the
novels we have examined in the actual societies they were written in; whether there
are any ways of calibrating their social influence, and how such radically re-
interpretable texts (all moreover in the English-language) can "teach" (or even reach)
entire societies or nations.
Explicitly coming out against any Lukacsian claims of achieving 'objective
totalities', Rushdie, just to cite one instance among novelists, has also argued the
thoroughly 'worlded', heteroglossic capacities of the novel, while simultaneously
insisting on its complete de-sanctification as an item of knowledge or 'pedagogic'
authority, except for the simple right to exist and participate freely in 'worldly'
conversation:
The novel has always been about the way in which different languages,
values, and narratives quarrel, and about the shifting relations between them
which are relations of power. The novel does not seek to establish a
privileged language, but it insists upon the freedom to portray and analyse the
struggle between the different contestants for such privileges.
Carlos Fuentes has called the novel a 'privileged arena'. By this he does not
mean that it is the kind of holy space which one must put off one's shoes to
enter; it is not an arena to revere; it claims no special rights except the right to
be the stage upon which the great debates ofsociety can be conducted (1992,
420). [...J Literature is an interim report from the consciousness of the artist,
and so it can never be 'finished' or 'perfected' [...J. Nothing so inexact, so
easily and frequently misconceived, deserves the protection of being declared
sacrosanct (427).
Ultimately, it is just the novel's ever-limited, yet ever-renewable capacity to evoke
some of the conflicting voices and multiple dimensions of our 'worldedness' whose
discursive value we are upholding: its unique ability to dissolve dichotomies—
literary examination and reads not just texts, but also their actual revolutionary implications within
their societies; or Said's own criticism that often links the work done by novelists and intellectuals
towards the wider cause of 'social liberation', especially in Culture and Imperialism (1993). Neil
Lazarus is another critic who has written frequently of the 'worlded' role of intellectuals and the
significance of their work within post-colonial societies in helping fashion "a genuinely postcolonial
strategy", a "'new' humanism predicated upon a formal repudiation of the degraded European form,
and borne embryonically in the national liberation movement", that would then attempt "to construct a
standpoint— socialist, nationalitarian, liberationist, internationalist— from which it is possible to
assume the burden of speaking for all humanity" (1999, 143). See also (Barker et al, 1994, 197-220).
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This bibliography is divided into three sections. The second and third sections
comprise the primary and critical/theoretical/historical texts respectively that have
either been cited within the body of my work, or have made a direct thematic impact
upon it. The first section however is based on slightly different principles. Besides
the texts I actually examined, it took me the reading of a significant quantity of
fiction that seemed 'relevant' (i.e. nationally engaged and comprehensively
'worlded') from different periods and places, before 1 could emerge with the
interpretative premises underlying this study. This was part of an effort not only to
understand something of the diversity of perspectives and formal strategies different
novelists over the last three centuries have employed in undertaking such
interrogation, but also to derive my own critical methods from the nature(s) of
fictional discourse itself, from the actual practice of reading it. Also, reading a
number of African, Caribbean (and Latin American) novels was specifically directed
towards assessing if there were any particular and broadly comparable narrative
preoccupations and features that could be characterised as unique to 'post-colonial'
fictionalising.
Perhaps such eclectic reading was inevitable given a study that chose as its
protagonist the capacities and processes of fiction itself, and then ranged in its
explorations over work from two continents. This first section therefore is a selective
list of some of the texts that would (of course) have been impossible to analyse in
detail within the limits of this thesis, but were (invisibly) indispensable nevertheless-
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